Lorne W. Craner, IRI President, Testifies on Democracy in China

April 30, 1998

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to speak to you today on the timely topic of U.S.-China policy options. Given the International Republican Institute’s (IRI) experience in the People’s Republic of China, I would like to focus my remarks on the unique role that non-governmental organizations can play in furthering American -- and Chinese -- interests in that country.

For more than two decades, the United States has maintained a policy of engagement with China. During the Cold War, the framework for such a policy was very clear. In the wake of the Cold War, however, engagement has come under fire as doubts and concerns have grown about the nature and objectives of U.S.-China relations. IRI’s programs, which I will describe in detail below, have demonstrated that, properly utilized, engagement can assist those inside China who are actively working to reform the country’s political, economic and social systems. IRI believes in the value of engagement, but more than that, IRI believes in engagement with a purpose. Let me put this another way: it is important to engage today’s China on a wide range of issues, but it is especially important to enhance and catalyze changes underway in the PRC that will result in a more positive future relationship in line with our interests.

IRI’s programs exemplify the engagement with a purpose approach. IRI became involved in the PRC in 1993, when the Board of Directors, under the leadership of Senator John McCain, decided that China’s strategic significance merited the exploration of programming possibilities. At that time, IRI met with a broad spectrum of China experts, including diplomats, policy analysts, and dissidents. While they disagreed on a number of issues, consensus was strong among them that change in China would be gradual and homegrown. With the bitter tragedy of Tiananmen fresh in everyone’s memory, I was expecting to hear many advocate for IRI to work with dissident groups. To my surprise, they explained to me that nascent democratic reforms were taking root in several areas and that it would prove more beneficial to the cause of furthering democratic reform in China to work on these then virtually unknown developments.

In 1993, the developments identified were village committee elections and reform of China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC).

Electoral Reform

In 1994, IRI became the first international organization to observe village committee elections when a small team of election observers traveled to Fujian province in southern China. That delegation, which consisted of both IRI and independent American election experts, evaluated village level elections using the same criteria that IRI uses to observe elections around the world. While errors and abuse of power were observed, on the whole, IRI concluded that the elections were of a minimally sound technical quality and that, if improved, they represented an unprecedented opportunity for Chinese citizens to select their local leaders in a direct, competitive process. Even more important than the quality of elections at that time was the willingness and desire that local and national officials expressed in working with IRI to make their elections more democratic.

Between 1994 and today, IRI has observed almost 50 elections in 10 of China’s provinces. From the beginning, IRI assisted local officials to identify ways to improve the quality of village elections. IRI has been instrumental in advocating the use of secret ballot booths and election monitors, augmenting civic education efforts, and conducting training programs to stress the importance of open primaries and transparent vote tabulation.

In 1997, IRI returned to the counties in Fujian province where we had observed 1994 balloting to observe the next round of village elections. We were surprised to find that in three short years the use of secret ballot voting booths had become mandatory and candidate appointed monitors were present to check voting fraud and irregularity. In fact, of 40 recommendations made by the IRI delegation in 1994, 29 have been fully or partially implemented.

While there have been remarkable improvements in election administration, IRI maintains a healthy awareness of the reality of village elections. First, while over 800 million people are affected by village committee elections, only about a quarter have yet had elections with recognizable democratic practices. Second, no major changes to China’s overall political structure have resulted. There are, for example, no truly independent political parties; China remains a one party state characterized by top-down management. This extends to village committees, which are not free to ignore unpopular central edicts, and must vie for power with local Communist Party branches.

But vie they do. As one non-Party member elected village committee chairman announced over loudspeakers throughout the village:

I was elected by the whole village; the Party secretary was elected solely by Party members. From now on, I am the number one leader in the village. You should come to see me when you have problems.

Approximately two-fifths of those elected to village committees are non-communists. Village committees are beginning to wrest real power away from local Communist Party branches, which are viewed by many villagers as populated by out-of-touch cadres who care little about village concerns. This is beginning to result in a slow reform of the governance process, albeit at a local level, in a way that is unprecedented in modern China. Village committees are recognizing that democracy confers legitimacy, and realizing that reelection is based on performance and they are responding to villagers’ needs and concerns. Over the past few years, for example, IRI’s staff has increasingly noticed that in villages where elections have occurred, transparency of village affairs has become a priority: village committees have started to post tax income and expenditures, while others are putting major policy decisions before their constituents for a vote.

Momentum is building behind efforts to apply the village election experience to the township and county level. President Jiang Zemin endorsed village committee election during last September’s Party plenum, and suggested: "the grassroots organs of power... in both urban and rural areas should establish a sound system of democratic elections." Similarly, Prime Minister Zhu Rongji expressed support for local elections, though he deferred predictions on whether the president and prime minister of China may one day be democratically elected. In recent months, Chinese scholars and officials have renewed their calls for increased political reform, including extending open elections to higher office. By introducing hundreds of millions of Chinese villagers to an electoral process and by now extending that process vertically to higher levels of government, one can see a pathway on which democratic elections could travel.

The implementation of elections at the village level does not alone satisfy the demands for greater political reform in China. However, it has introduced important democratic concepts and generated momentum for increased reform. Next month, a bill is expected to be discussed by the NPC that will amend the village election law to include articles that outline more transparent voting procedures, including transparent voter registration, open candidate selection, secret ballot, and immediate announcement of election results. The codification of these practices will have an impact at all levels in China as officials come to understand what democratic elections are and how they are implemented.

Legislative Reform

Just as signs of political reform have emerged at the grassroots level, national level bodies have started to emerge as institutions capable of promoting pluralism in the political process. The NPC, for decades rightfully derided as a rubber stamp, has assumed a measure of control over the legislative process and started to debate and even disagree with central policies. Many in the press have reported the high percentages of negative votes cast during the legislature’s annual meeting, registered as criticism of growing corruption and ineffectiveness. This year, a new anonymous voting system was installed in the legislative body, a step that may help to diminish Communist party control over delegates.

IRI’s own work with the NPC has focused on providing core assistance during the legislative drafting process. Almost a decade ago, a central document was issued that decreased the party’s role in micro-managing the legislative process, opening the door for NPC Standing Committee delegates and their staff to take greater control over the drafting and amending of legislation. IRI began a program with an NPC severely hampered by a lack of resources, to provide technical and legal assistance on specific draft legislation. To date, IRI has worked with the committee on more than ten laws, including banking, bankruptcy, contract, futures, securities, partnership, sole proprietorship, real estate, anti-monopoly, trust, tax, and foreign currency management. As NPC delegates and staff increase their understanding of the substance of these subjects, they are able to participate more fully and effectively in the legislative process and to debate significant issues from a position of authority.

There is much evidence that China is becoming an increasingly pluralistic society. Economic development has lead to the stratification of Chinese society and the emergence of new and differing interest groups. Differences between rich and poor, coastal and interior, agrarian and industrial will only grow wider and the Chinese government will have to learn to address the needs of new constituencies. In an increasingly complicated society, the NPC may be the only existing institution suited to represent growing interests and resolve tensions.

Legal Reform

Legal reform in China began in the 1980s, when China’s leaders, wary of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and anxious to promote investment and economic growth, reestablished administrative and organizational norms and passed commercial laws that could support the new market economy. For more than a decade now, legal reform efforts have centered on bolstering developments in these two areas. In recent years, greater attention has been paid to other areas of legal reform that have far-reaching implications for the majority of China’s citizens.

The promulgation of new laws is only one component of the development of the rule of law in China. Implementation of these laws and the administration of justice are arguably the most critical aspects of a sound legal system -- aspects which are deficient in China. In 1995, judges who attended a bankruptcy conference hosted by IRI and the NPC approached my staff to see if IRI would train judges on the enforcement of new laws. We immediately agreed, understanding that providing training to Chinese judges is an effective means of enabling them to preside over cases in accordance with the requisites of a rule of law system.

Since then, IRI has conducted judicial training seminars on futures law, securities law, guaranty law, and contract law. In addition to reviewing the details of each of these laws -- and studying and analyzing case studies -- IRI’s pro bono, international legal experts have familiarized Chinese judges with Western judicial practices. In all of IRI’s training seminars, Chinese judges have raised insightful questions about the adversarial process, the presumption of innocence, standards of proof, and the right to an appeal. IRI’s judges training program, like all of the Institute’s programs in China, deals with broader subjects of the rule of law and political reform by focusing on the technical aspects that make these concepts realities.

In 1996, China passed an amended criminal code, which among other things, gave defense counsel greater access to their clients, reduced the amount of time a suspect can be detained, and decreased the role courts play in investigating the facts of the trial. While recognizing that there is often disparity between the law as it is written and the law as it is implemented, IRI sees the creation and establishment of legal aid centers throughout China as perhaps an indication that the criminal code may be taken seriously.

Growing income disparity, coupled with greater awareness of the legal system, has fueled the need for legal aid in China. In the first half of 1997 six provinces alone provided legal aid services, usually to the poor and indigent, in approximately 11,000 cases, mostly involving employment and family disputes and breach of contract issues. Those responsible for setting up the legal aid system are anxious to raise public awareness of the availability of legal aid, but they worry that lines will form around the block overnight.

In 1997, IRI became the first foreign organization to provide training for China’s legal aid officials, including providers from the national legal aid center and from 17 provincial centers. Utilizing pro bono international experts, IRI examined issues critical to the development of a sound legal aid system, including civil versus criminal legal aid, class action litigation, public outreach, and representation in death penalty cases.

While China is not yet a rule of law society, it is no longer a society where issues can be resolved definitively by work units and neighborhood committees. The law and the pursuit of legal action is becoming increasingly relevant, even for the poorest members of society who through legal aid are able to access the justice system in ways unprecedented in Chinese history.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, this Subcommittee knows well that China is a complex country. In the same period of time in which the reforms that I have described above took place, so, too, has the Tiananmen massacre and the continued imprisonment of outspoken dissidents. It goes without saying that ongoing electoral, legislative, and legal reforms do not counteract violations of human rights that have been committed in the PRC. The reforms should not, however, be discounted. They represent some of the best possibilities for change that Chinese intellectuals and activists would like to see. Simply put, they may be the beginnings of representative government and the rule of law in China, and as a possible path to those goals, they are worthy of continued support. IRI’s programs to date have been made possible by grants from the National Endowment for Democracy, and the generous support of Ameritech, Chubb, Federal Express, Ford Motor Company, Honeywell, Pfizer, and the William and Karen Tell Foundation.

I began my testimony talking about our government’s policy to engage China. In recent years, little effort has been made to define the goals, meaning or methods of engagement. Five years ago, IRI ventured out to give some definition to the term. Engagement, in our view, must include identifying developments underway in China that are congruent with American goals and principles, and that are viable within the Chinese context. Further, it should include supporting reformers within China who are working to change the old system. In short, engagement must have a purpose that both advances our interests and recognizes Chinese realities. At IRI, we see that democratic reform may be a long way off for China, and that it may come only through incremental change. At the same time, when we observe villagers voting for their local leaders, or talk to judges about creating a truly independent judiciary, we see that democratic reform may be just around the corner.

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