Challenges and Obstacles to Village Elections in China, By Paul Grove

February 29, 1999

Let me begin by thanking the Council on Foreign Relations and Ambassador Lilley for hosting this discussion on village committee elections in China. IRI has been involved in these elections since 1994, providing technical advice and training to Chinese election officials on direct election practices and procedures and election monitoring techniques. IRI staff and trainers have observed dozens and dozens of elections throughout China, and I am pleased that Susan Tillou of the Council was able to travel to Sichuan province with IRI last November to observe elections there.

Villages in China hold elections to select membership to committees that are comprised of 3 to 7 individuals; usually a chairman, up to two vice-chairman and as many as six members. These committees generally handle all administrative matters of a village including tax collection, budget management, dispute resolution, and local business management. An indirectly elected or appointed village representative assembly oversees the committee and has veto power over its decisions. While there is no fixed schedule for the holding of village elections, terms of office are for three years. Most villages have held at least one round of election, and some are on their fourth or fifth round. The quality of elections that occur in China’s one million villages varies considerably, and it is estimated that only as many as one quarter of all villages have held elections with recognizable democratic practices.

Village committees were initiated by peasants following the collapse of collectivized agriculture and the dissolution of the commune system. In 1982 they were officially recognized by the Chinese Constitution as a legitimate form of grassroots political organization. Debate in Beijing centered on how committees should be formed with some, including Long March veteran and National People’s Congress (NPC) Chairman Peng Zhen, advocating direct elections over Communist Party appointment. In November 1987, an experimental law was passed by the NPC that required committees to be formed by direct election. Last year, the village committee law was further amended to codify the use of some internationally accepted election practices and procedures.

Why does the Chinese government permit these elections? Primarily because senior officials believe that direct elections provide a check on corruption, may contribute to stability in the countryside, and may mend the strained relationship between cadres and villagers. In 1994, nearly three-quarters of the Party’s rural branches were in "a state of collapse." As recent protests throughout China illustrate, villagers are increasingly demanding greater accountability from officials, particularly in the collection and expenditure of taxes.

The elections may also be a source of rural economic development. Young, competent entrepreneurs are often elected on promises to develop ailing village cooperatives and enterprises. Candidates running in these elections need not be Communist Party members and in some provinces as many as 45 percent of winning candidates are not. Admittedly, the Party does target for recruitment some newly elected village committee members.

The Ministry of Civil Affairs is charged with implementing and overseeing village elections, and has done so in three stages. From 1987 to 1992, efforts were focused on creating an environment that would be receptive to direct elections. Model counties were created, and officials were encouraged to experiment with election procedures. From 1992 to 1995, greater experimentation with election practices occurred and foreign organizations, such as IRI, were invited to observe elections and to provide training to Chinese election officials. From 1995 to 1998, the Ministry encouraged the use of standardized election practices, including the use of secret ballot booths, initiated an independent monitoring program to help check the integrity of elections, and began to focus on local governance and transparency issues.

Despite the best efforts of Ministry reformers, numerous challenges and obstacles to village elections exist.

The first challenge for all provinces is to devise sound implementing regulations. Each province must develop its own rules and regulations for village committee elections, and this is one area where China’s inexperience with direct elections is most glaring. For example, Chapter III, Article 16 of Sichuan’s regulations states that "the election is generally to be secret." Fortunately, the approval of an updated, national village election law requires each province to review and amend its regulations and to include, among other specific provisions, the posting of voter lists 20 days before the election and the mandatory use of secret ballots and secret voting booths. Nomination procedures should be standardized in all provinces to include not only villager nomination of candidates but also an open primary election in which all voters, not just members of representative assemblies, can participate.

A related challenge is to adequately train election officials. One million people will have to be trained for each village to have at least one person qualified to run elections. This training need is massive and includes officials at the provincial, county, and township levels. In 1995, the Ministry of Civil Affairs estimated it could train only 12,000 officials by 2000. While experience is gained through trial and error, Ministry officials believe that it takes at least three rounds of elections -- or nine years -- before local election officials fully comprehend the basics of the election process. As each province is responsible for sponsoring its own local elections, training programs can be non-existent or haphazard depending upon available funding. This is one area where in the past foreign organization have played an important role.

Election officials must also educate voters. Villagers familiar with voting practices and voter rights are central to the entrenchment of this particular reform, and with over 800 million peasants this challenge is daunting. In most every election IRI has observed, election officials and voters appeared unfamiliar or uncertain about some polling procedures. Informed voters are the best bulwark against manipulation of elections by township and party officials, and it is interesting to note that protests in Shaanxi and Jiangsu provinces earlier this year centered on election fraud and irregularities.

A final challenge is encouraging direct elections for village representative assemblies, and township and county governments. President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji have both expressed support for village committee elections, and the new Chairman of the NPC Li Peng observed village elections in Jilin province last summer. The recent amendment of the national election law may be an indication that the leadership has fully embraced direct elections at the local level (the law is no longer experimental), but it remains to be seen how committed they are to promoting this reform and if they will permit direct elections at higher levels. Most telling will be Beijing’s response to the recent secretive election in Sichuan province where direct elections were used for the first time to form a township government. Access to reliable information on village elections in Beijing is critical to plotting the direction this reform may take.

The greatest obstacle to village committee elections is ineffective national and local leadership. From 1990 to 1997, overall leadership on the elections within the Ministry of Civil Affairs was unquestionably strong due to Wang Zhenyao, a dynamic Chinese reformer. He and his small staff promoted direct election practices and procedures at all levels throughout China. They developed training handbooks and civic education posters and, with the assistance of international organizations, educated thousands of officials through "train-the-trainer" programs. He inspired provincial election officials to take an interest in and support village elections.

A shuffle in the Ministry in 1997 saw Wang replaced by an individual with no experience in elections and who has demonstrated very little initiative in promoting or improving the elections process. Last year, a Ministry-wide downsizing removed some of Wang’s proteges and the impact of pending provincial government downsizings on the elections is not known. IRI is concerned that momentum may be adversely impacted by the removal or replacement of effective leadership to government downsizing or hardliner attempts to assume control of the process.

Related to this obstacle are corrupt township and Party officials. Given their preference, many of these officials would rather appoint village committee members than accept those elected by peasants. Some officials have reportedly subverted elections by nullifying the results if their preferred candidates did not win. In Shanxi province earlier this year, an incumbent village committee chairman was prosecuted for failing to hold elections despite his term expiring two years earlier. It is uncertain if township officials responsible for overseeing that election will be similarly prosecuted. In an attempt to control committees, corrupt township officials are also reportedly requiring their approval before spending more than $15.

A final obstacle impacting current and future direct elections is China’s decentralized election framework. Currently, the Ministry of Civil Affairs is responsible for village elections while the National People’s Congress has jurisdiction over township elections. Chinese advocates of direct elections believe all elections should be centralized under a single election commission, with branches extending from the center that is wholly independent from any ministry.

Village committee elections are not proof of democracy in China. Basic democratic institutions, such as legal opposition parties, simply do not exists. Peasants aren’t voting to change national policies or grain quotas, nor are village committee candidates campaigning on policy platforms. Bread-and-butter issues dominate nearly all the elections IRI has observed in China.

Why should we be interested in village elections? Let me offer three reasons. First, they are the only legitimate "training ground" for democracy within China and the only direct elections currently in practice throughout the country. Dissidents are routinely jailed for their courageous activities, but the elections have been ongoing in an official capacity for over ten years. The experience villagers and officials gain through credible village committee elections could prove invaluable should direct elections move to township and county levels. At this point, however, election procedures are preceding democratic substance.

Second, international organizations can have an impact on the quality of elections. IRI learned this in Fujian province where we first observed elections in 1994, made specific recommendations to election officials and provided them with training, and then returned in 1997 to find that over 70 percent of our suggestions had been fully or partially implemented. Although no foreign observers witnessed the recent secret township election in Buyun, the Washington Post described a direct election process that included candidate debates, campaigning and secret balloting -- everything, it seems, except candidate-appointed monitors at polling stations.

Finally, IRI believes that direct elections will re-define -- not mend -- the relationship between cadres and villagers. Already, in some villages elected officials are perceived by peasants as having more authority than appointed Party officials, and in Hebei province IRI heard of a newly elected chairman who announced that he was now in-charge because he was the only official in the village elected by all the people. To illustrate just how negative the perception of cadre can be, in an election in Shandong province a village idiot reportedly received 54 votes because, as one villager put it, "idiots are better than village cadre for they are not greedy."

Evidence that this relationship is already being re-defined can be found in the use of the "two-ballot" system in Hequ County, Shanxi province. Villagers use one ballot to elect their village committee and cast a second to evaluate the performance of party cadre. A person can only serve on the party committee if he receives a majority of villagers’ votes. The Party retains the right to select its members, but they must come from the pool of candidates who have received a plurality of favorable votes.

In conclusion, it is extremely difficult to assess the longer term impact village committee elections will have in the democratization China. Will direct elections move up to higher levels or will they become a hollow sideshow under the leadership and guidance of oppressors, not reformers like Wang Zhenyao? What does the Buyun experiment hold for the future of township elections, and will rampant corruption and unrest in the countryside undermine any efforts at political reform? America should make use of every available opportunity to affect change in China; at IRI, we are aggressively promoting direct election practices and procedures at the local level.

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