I. Mission overview 

This preliminary statement is offered by the international election observation mission of the International Republican Institute (IRI) to Moldova’s October 20, 2024, presidential election and constitutional referendum. At the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Moldova and the Central Election Commission (CEC), IRI deployed a 34-person international delegation representing seven countries to observe the electoral process. The mission was co-led by Mr. Peter Roskam, former United States Congressman, Ms. Danuta Hübner, former EU Commissioner and UN Deputy Secretary-General, and Mr. Steven Nix, IRI Senior Director for Eurasia.

Through this mission, IRI: echoes the international community’s interest in, and enthusiasm for, inclusive and transparent elections in Moldova; offers an impartial and objective assessment of the electoral process; provides actionable short- and long-term recommendations to enhance the administrative, legal and regulatory environment ahead of the 2025 parliamentary elections; and documents the malign activities of foreign entities who may seek to interfere in or discredit the election process. Importantly, the mission recognizes that the 2024 elections are critical for the long-term future of Moldova and the democratic aspirations of its citizens.

Methodology

The mission conducted its activities in accordance with the laws of Moldova and the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, adhered to principles of non-interference, and coordinated closely with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and other regional observer missions that endorse the Declaration. Thematic analysis of the pre-electoral environment began in September and was augmented by 34 short-term observers (STOs) who arrived in Chisinau on October 14. The mission deployed observer teams to all 32 raions (districts), two municipalities (Chisinau and Balti), and the autonomous administrative unit of Gagauzia. Observers also witnessed voting at polling stations dedicated for Moldovan voters who reside in Transnistria. This preliminary statement summarizes the observations and analysis of three long-term thematic analysts (LTAs) who focused on Moldova’s legal framework and election administration, voter inclusion issues and the campaign environment including finance and foreign influence. The IRI mission met with representatives from government, civil society, political parties, media as well as other stakeholders.

As the nation awaits the official results announcement of the presidential and referendum elections, IRI will continue to observe the electoral process including the adjudication of disputes. At the conclusion of the process, IRI will issue a comprehensive final report. The mission is made possible with the support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

II. Executive Summary

On October 20, 2024, Moldova held a presidential election and a constitutional referendum to select its next president and to decide whether provisions in support of Moldova’s accession to the European Union (EU) should be added to the Constitution. The presidential elections were the fifth since Moldova’s independence and took place at a decisive moment for Moldova and its citizens. Eleven candidates ran for president including candidates nominated by Moldova’s two largest parliamentary parties, Maia Sandu representing the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), and Alexandr Stoianoglo representing the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM).

Moldova has made impressive strides to align its legal frameworks to international conventions for democratic elections, to bolster the participation of women and other marginalized groups in political life, and to proactively work toward more responsive and accountable governance. Moldova’s democracy is a positive reflection of the potential that exists when citizens have sovereign agency over their own destiny. Yet despite this progress, Moldova’s institutions are under constant assault from malign actors whose primary aim is to destabilize the country and usurp the will of the Moldovan people. Undeniably, the greatest threat to Moldova’s electoral integrity is malign foreign influence from the Russian Federation.

The 2024 electoral period saw unprecedented levels of brazen interference throughout the election cycle. Principally, the tentacles of foreign influence include: a vote-buying network that allegedly paid up to 130,000 Moldovans to act in line with the crime network’s orders; training of provocateurs on methods of destabilization; information manipulation and spreading of false propaganda; direct illegal financing to political candidates; alleged cyberattacks on the Central Election Commission and other illegal activity[1]. On election day, this interference manifested in carousel voting schemes[2] and influence agents in proximity of polling stations overtly bribing voters in Ialoveni raion (district).

Collectively, these pernicious tactics undermine the fairness of the election and erode confidence in the process. Though preliminary election results have been declared, efforts to undermine Moldova’s institutions will continue in the expected second round. Consequently, Moldovans and the democratic community must remain vigilant. Afterall, elections are fundamental for democracy, but democracy cannot survive on elections alone.

Positively, Moldova enjoys a system of competent election commissions with highly trained election officials, a vibrant civil society with robust citizen monitoring and oversight, a skilled and effective security sector and police force, political parties that have demonstrated improved financial transparency and reporting capacity, and a motivated electorate, including those in the diaspora, who came out in large numbers to participate on election day. 

Reforming the Election Code to more closely align with the Venice Commission was a positive development that effectively improved the conditions for more inclusive elections to occur. In the pre-election period, Moldova’s Central Election Commission (CEC) performed admirably, including increasing the number of polling stations for voters living abroad, implementing of new procedures for postal voting, maintaining polling stations for Moldovan citizens that reside in the Transnistria region despite security threats, and special mobile voting booths for homebound voters. However, the State Registry of Voters (SRV)—derived from the State civil registry—needs significant improvements.

Public campaigning was less visible than in previous elections, with many political candidates opting to leverage online media for voter outreach. Presidential candidates campaigned both within Moldova and in the diaspora. However, the citizen observer group Promo-LEX reported cases of misuse of state resources by governing officials, and local media reported concerning cases where the Ilan Shor criminal network paid people to attend rallies of at least two candidates: Victoria Furtuna (independent) and Vasilie Tarlev (Party for the Future of Moldova).

There were missed opportunities for public debate. Public broadcaster Moldova 1 held its first presidential candidate debate on October 8, however only one candidate remained present. Notwithstanding, many campaigns leveraged social media, placed ads on online platforms, and used free-of-charge broadcast advertising time for public outreach. Campaigns targeted a diversity of voters with messages that focused on issues of foreign policy, economic development, rule of law and corruption.

For the “No” campaign, some groups violated the law by failing to register with the CEC and failing to disclose their funding source. Notwithstanding these violations they distributed “No” campaign materials, in contravention of Moldovan law.

Before election day, the Moldovan Law enforcement authorities and Audiovisual Council laudably thwarted efforts to counter illicit finance and malign information operations, uncovering allegations of a massive vote-buying network linked to the Russian Federation and banning approximately 100 Telegram channels and accounts belonging to fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor and his affiliates[3].  

On election day, over 1.5 million voters turned out to vote, roughly ten percent more compared to the 2020 presidential elections. Polls were well-staffed and properly equipped, opening on time according to procedures. This was complemented by strong civic engagement, as both citizen and international observers were present at many polling stations, ensuring transparency and accountability. IRI observed a commendable level of gender inclusion, with a significant representation of women among polling staff, including leadership. There were concerns on election day of irregularities like loose ballots and bussing, however those allegations were not found to be consequential. However, observers did witness carousel voting and vote buying. Overall, the voting environment remained peaceful and efficient, with minimal wait times. Closing procedures were similarly orderly with high presence of observers, reinforcing the integrity of the proceedings.

IRI continues to monitor the electoral process including the announcement of provisional and official results and the adjudication of disputes. At the conclusion of the process, IRI will issue a comprehensive final report.

III. Key Recommendations

In the spirit of international cooperation, the mission offers the following six key recommendations that can be implemented to enhance transparent, credible, and inclusive electoral processes in Moldova:

1. The Central Election Commission (CEC) in collaboration with the State Register of Population should continue to update and maintain the integrity of the State Registry of Voters (SRV) including establishing a commission of experts to resolve the complex issues of reconciling the voter list, especially concerning Moldovans in diaspora and providing the updated voter list in an analyzable format to ensure independent analysis of its quality.
2. The international community should continue to support initiatives at the national and local level to counter foreign malign influence so that non-governmental and state institutions are better equipped to confront the multifaceted threats that foreign authoritarians pose to democracy.
3. Parliament and the CEC should expand postal voting to more countries so Moldovans abroad can more fulsomely participate in the electoral process.
4. The Moldovan government should continue to take steps ensure integrity at all levels of the judicial system to hold criminals accountable to the rule of law and to empower authorities to investigate and prosecute individuals from foreign countries who have the intent to disrupt electoral processes.
5. Oversight agencies should strengthen efforts to combat illicit finance from external sources and to increase the capacity of institutions to address these threats.
6. The Moldovan government should expand the jurisdiction of the Audiovisual Council to a wider range of platforms to safeguard Moldova’s information ecosystem from malign influence.

IV. Political Context 

Since gaining its independence in 1991 after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Moldova continues to recover from its post-soviet history, enduring significant economic, social, and political challenges to its relatively nascent democracy. Russia’s persistent interference in Moldovan politics compounds these challenges, destabilizing institutions, and undermining credible elections that are fundamental for democratic growth. Principally, the tentacles of Kremlin influence include financing of pro-Russia electoral candidates, paying Moldovans to vote against pro-West policies, hiking gas prices, and aiding the Transnistrian region’s unrecognized separatism as a lever against the Moldovan national government[4]. Though public opinion of Russia has tarnished in recent years, according to an IRI public opinion poll, many Moldovans still rank Russia among the country’s most important political and economic partners, although trade with Russia only accounted for 3.7 percent of all trade in 2023[5]. 

Maia Sandu, the first female president of Moldova who was elected in 2020, is currently seeking re-election. Sandu’s first term saw Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the combined impact of the war with post-COVID inflation. Since her election, the country has undergone a remarkable realignment towards the West, institutionalizing democratic governance and deepening European economic and political integration. In 2022, Moldova achieved EU candidate status and began formal accession negotiations. This process, however, was not codified and remains reversable.

In the lead up to the October 2024 polls, eleven candidates were nominated to run for president including Maia Sandu nominated by the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), Alexandr Stoianoglo backed by the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM) and Renato Usatii, nominee of Our Party, among many other candidates whose polling numbers have been consistently under five percent or lower in IRI public opinion polls[6]. Stoianoglo is a former Prosecutor General and former MP from Moldova’s Gagauz ethnic community and enjoys popular support in Gagauzia, in Moldova’s south. Usatii, a former mayor of Balti—the 2^nd largest city in Moldova—is a businessman with interests in Russia.

After changes to the electoral code in 2024, Moldovans are permitted to vote on a constitutional referendum simultaneously with the presidential election. Public sentiment toward the EU referendum election centered on Moldova’s foreign policy orientation, with pro-Russia parties opposing EU ascension and other parties supporting the referendum.

Though most of Moldova’s political parties stepped up efforts to comply with transparent campaign finance reporting, the CEC found some deviations: namely, illegal political organizations affiliated with Ilan Shor[7]. Illicit operations include funneling illegal campaign funds through the Russian bank Promsvyazbank (PBS) to the Shor network. This infusion of Russian funds coupled with inflammatory rhetoric from pro-Kremlin politicians, as well as anti-EU propaganda further fueled political tensions, particularly among ethnic and Russian-speaking minorities.

Though the CEC of Moldova is widely perceived to be independent and competent, the use of Kremlin propaganda and divisive rhetoric to cast doubt on electoral outcomes was designed to reduce public confidence in the legitimacy of Moldova’s polls. With that goal in mind, fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor threatened not to acknowledge the results of the election should Sandu win, raising the probability of an unstable post-election period.  It is against this backdrop that the 2024 October elections took place.

V. Pre-Election Period

Legal Framework and Electoral System

Elections in Moldova are principally regulated by the Constitution of Moldova; the 2022 Electoral Code; the law on Political Parties; the Code of Audiovisual Media Service; the Criminal Code and secondary legislation decisions, regulations and guidelines of the CEC, including those pertaining to the financing of electoral campaigns and related matters[8]. The president of Moldova is elected through a simple majority model, which requires a candidate to receive at least half of the total votes cast in an election. If no candidate receives the votes necessary to cross this threshold, a second round will be held between the two candidates who receive the most votes in the first round. The candidate who receives the most votes in the second round will then be declared president of Moldova. A constitutional referendum can be initiated by at least 100,000 Moldovan citizens who are eligible to vote, one-third of the Members of Parliament, the president, or the government. The provision of the Constitution that is subject to such a referendum must be adopted if it receives at least half of all votes from those who participated in the referendum[9]. There is a thirty-four percent participation threshold for a referendum to be valid.

Since 2022, parliament has adopted noteworthy amendments to the Election Code, including but not limited to: eliminating a ban on referenda within 60 days of an election and opening the door to simultaneous elections; introducing stricter campaign finance rules; simplifying procedures for Moldovans to vote abroad including enabling partial postal voting, establishing mechanisms to combat electoral fraud; implementing measures to dissolve illegal parties; lifting candidate eligibility and media coverage limits; permitting the Ministry of Justice to restrict political parties; enhancing procedures for filing election-related complaints; and instituting penalties for a range of malfeasance. The amendments were responsive to civil society recommendations, however interlocutors expressed concerns over their timing.

Election Administration

The CEC is the authority responsible for administering elections at the national level and comprises nine persons with eight members nominated by parties in parliament on a proportional basis and one member nominated by the president. One of the most important activities of the CEC is to monitor the financial reporting of political parties and electoral competitors. CEC’s new electronic system for financial reporting is agile and transparent, enabling rapid review of financial reports.

Due to the banning of the Shor Party, the CEC currently has five members appointed by PAS and three by the Bloc of Communists and Socialists (BCS) – which comprises the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) and the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM). At the subnational level, there are 37 District Electoral Councils (DECs) and 2,143 Precinct Election Bureaus (PEBs) that include among their members individuals appointed by each political party represented in parliament.

Voters’ Registry and Alternative Voting Methods

According to the CEC there are approximately 3.3 million voters in the State Registry of Voters (SRV) including 2.74 million that reportedly live in-country of which there are 274,718 registered voters in Transnistria and 285,900 registrants without addresses. The list is based on automatic updates provided by the State Register of Population (civil registry) that is maintained by the Public Service Agency. Concerns were raised about the accuracy of the SRV related to the potential inclusion of deceased individuals as well as those individuals on the voters’ list without addresses, as these inaccuracies could create susceptibilities to illegal voting and could lead to higher numbers of voters required to reach turnout thresholds. The inflated SRV also has implications for estimating and planning for diaspora voting—where registration is not compulsory—potentially creating vulnerabilities for fraud. The voter list is not available in an analyzable format that would enable independent assessment of its quality. The mission also heard reports of people who were registered to vote at polling sites in Russia though they reside in Moldova.

Given Moldova’s large diaspora, in 2024 the CEC announced a significant increase in the number of polling stations for voting abroad from 139 to 278. In September, a total of 111,389 voters had voluntarily indicated that they plan to vote abroad, including 13,377 new registrants.

Due to low turnout in the three previous national elections and the inability to ensure the safety of voters due to the presence of Russia-backed military contingents, the CEC reduced the number of polling stations in the left side of the Dniester River Transnistria region from 42 in 2020 to 30 in 2024.  As a result of public criticism in previous elections over maintaining secrecy of the ballot for immobile voters, special mobile polling booths for voting at home were prepared for 2024. A Supplementary Voters’ List which provides conditions for eligible individuals with special circumstances such as voters who do not have a domicile or temporary residence registration is also provided for in the Electoral Code.

Voters in Canada, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the United States had, for the first time, the option to vote by postal mail. As of September 25, 1,986 voters had applied for postal voting. However, stakeholders raised concerns about CEC’s lack of public consultation on the details of implementing postal voting, including deadlines for requesting ballots and other processes.

Campaign Environment

Presidential

The campaign period officially began on September 20, one month before the elections. Public attention primarily focused on the presidential election. Notwithstanding, some political parties with whom the mission met viewed the presidential election as a precursor to the Spring 2025 parliamentary elections.

Presidential candidates campaigned both within Moldova and in the diaspora, communicating primarily through local party structures. Compared to the 2020 presidential election, public campaign rallies were less visible. Most candidates did not publish their schedule of events on their public pages on Facebook or Instagram, two of the most popular social media platforms in Moldova. Local media documented cases where the Ilan Shor criminal network paid people to attend rallies of at least two candidates: Victoria Furtuna (independent)[10] and Vasilie Tarlev (Party for the Future of Moldova)[11].

There were few opportunities for public debate among the eleven presidential candidates. Public broadcaster Moldova 1 held its first presidential candidate debate on October 8, inviting candidates Alexandr Stoianoglo (PSRM), Maia Sandu (PAS), and Renato Usatii (Our Party). However, Sandu did not attend the debate and Stoianoglo left without debating, leaving Usatii as the only candidate present.  

Broadcast media was cost-prohibitive for many campaigns, with many opting instead to leverage social media and placing ads on online platforms for public outreach. Most campaigns used the free-of-charge broadcast advertising time that they are entitled to. Usatii’s campaign submitted to Moldova 1 an ad for broadcast that Moldova 1 rejected because Moldova 1 considered its message about LGBTQI+ “propaganda” in schools to be hate speech. The Usatii campaign contested the rejection in court, but courts affirmed Moldova 1’s rejection of the ad.

Campaigns targeted students and young people, pensioners and senior citizens, and select groups such as teachers with messages that focused on issues of foreign policy, economic development, rule of law and corruption. Some campaigns focused on cultural issues. The major campaigns produced materials, held events, and gave speeches in Romanian and Russian though materials in Moldova’s four minority languages, Bulgarian, Gagauz, Romani, and Ukrainian were not produced.

In its fourth report, citizen observer group Promo-LEX reported cases of misuse of state resources by the governing party. In response, PAS asserted that it took measures to address these practices. One campaign reported to the mission that it held its own events in municipal buildings, suggesting that this practice occurred among other parties. 

Referendum

Fifteen political parties registered with the CEC to participate in the referendum campaign. Thirteen parties registered as supporters of the option “Yes” while two parties registered to support the “No” option. Of the thirteen parties that registered for “Yes,” the mission was only aware of two parties that printed campaign material or conducted physical campaign activities in support of the referendum: PAS and MAN. Those parties opposed to the adoption of the referendum utilized two strategies: some advocated a boycott of the referendum while others simply endorsed a “No” vote.

The mission did not observe any printed campaign materials or physical campaign activities by the parties that registered to oppose the referendum (PCRM and Renastere). However, campaign material opposing the referendum was distributed by groups that were not registered as participants in the “No” campaign, and campaign material opposing the referendum did not have its funding source disclosed, in contravention of Moldovan law. This illegal material included online static image ads as well as sponsored video content on YouTube.

Illicit Finance and Vote Buying

On October 3, Moldova’s police and national anti-corruption center revealed allegations of a massive vote-buying network linked to Ilan Shor. The police alleged that over 130,000 people in Moldova were paid to attend campaign events, distribute illegal campaign materials, vote in line with the Shor criminal network’s orders, and recruit others into the network.[12] Local reporting before and after the police allegations corroborate details of reports and the mission also heard from individuals that they were personally offered bribes in a manner consistent with the reported scheme[13] [14].

Police allege that the network updated its tactics since the 2023 local elections, which saw hundreds of Shor-backed candidates for local office removed from the ballot due to their affiliation with the network. During this campaign, police allege that the network ordered people to vote “No” on the referendum but declined to name its preferred candidate until the last minute, in an effort to keep that candidate from being removed from the ballot. The mission received evidence that on the last day of campaigning Shor representatives endorsed socialist party candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo, sharing this endorsement through social media platforms including Telegram and WhatsApp.

Police took various actions to combat the network and its vote-buying scheme. Anti-money-laundering efforts were sufficiently effective that they forced the network to find new ways to move money, such as via cryptocurrency and courier. Police repeatedly arrested couriers and seized cash and illegal campaign materials. Government coordination with the messaging app Telegram also degraded the network’s ability to communicate. On October 10, Telegram banned approximately 100 channels and accounts belonging to the Shor network and its affiliates on the grounds of “violating local law;” and when the Shor network set up new accounts, Telegram banned these accounts as well. These police actions likely degraded the network’s ability to coordinate its vote-buying network in the short term, but large parts of the network still operate. The network exploits vulnerable pensioners whose average pension in Moldova is as low as $155 per month. In contravention of the law, there were also reports of priests who, upon returning from pilgrimage in Moscow, allegedly sold coal for a discounted price to elderly citizens in exchange for photographing their passports, allegedly for the purposes of vote buying.

Information Operations

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of neighboring Ukraine in 2022, Moldova’s government has banned most Kremlin-backed TV stations, including stations that are part of the Shor network. However, these and new stations are still available in Moldova via web streaming. Just before the campaign period officially started on September 20, local media reported the launch of a new Shor-backed web TV channel.[15] All of the pro-Kremlin narratives that the mission observed during the campaign period supported the Kremlin’s previous messaging in Moldova, and largely followed the same trends.[16]

Inclusion and Participation

Women’s participation in political life has improved in Moldova due to the enactment of a gender quota in 2016 and incentives that tie public funding of political parties to the inclusion of women and youth on the electoral lists[17].  Positively, four out of the eleven presidential candidates running for the presidential election were women including incumbent Maia Sandu, Irina Vlah, Natalia Morari and Victoria Furtuna. Women hold a substantial number of positions in national and subnational government—occupying 39.6 percent of seats in parliament, 24 percent of mayoral seats, and 47.2 percent of the local councilors and 45.3 percent of district/municipal councils[18]. Women maintain a significant presence in election management and administration. At the national level, half of the eight executive members of the Central Election Commission including the president are women and women comprise 66 percent of district level commissions.

Minorities, particularly the Roma population, are frequent targets of discrimination and tend to turn out to vote in lower numbers than any other part of the population. For the first time, the CEC printed ballots in local minority languages printing 631,979 ballots in Russian, 115 in Ukrainian, 3,400 in Gagauzian, 870 in Romani e, and 991 in Bulgarian.

The CEC took significant measures to accommodate voters with visual impairment including providing each polling station with magnifying glasses and ballots in brail as well as provided a map to enable people with mobility issues the option of finding an accessible polling station where they can go to vote. Few candidates made efforts to communicate campaign messages in sign language or provide subtitles on digital media for people with hearing impairment. Though the CEC prepared the presidential and referendum ballots in Romanian, Russian, Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Gagauz and Romani some interlocutors reported that they were not informed that the ballots were available in their mother tongue. 

Homophobia remains a long-standing concern and LGBTQI+ persons experience significant discrimination in Moldova. During the campaign period interlocutors reported an increase in homophobic narratives to foment public opposition to the EU referendum. At the same time presidential candidates made no efforts to approach or include the interests of LGBTQI+ voters in their campaign messages, with one candidate openly calling for the prohibition of LGBTQI+ propaganda in schools in one of his campaign ads[19].  

VI. Election Day 

Polls opened on time and according to procedures. Most polling stations had adequate staff, although observers noted the absence of police officers in a few instances. All polling stations were well-prepared with the necessary voting materials, and the ballot boxes were locked, sealed, and visible. One observer noted that some required materials, such as the SIAS Alegeri software, were only available in Romanian, which led to confusion by Russian-speaking poll workers. Polling stations were generally calm with no crowding upon opening. Positively, there was a strong presence of women among the electoral officials, including in positions of leadership, reflecting significant gender inclusion in the process.

Fifteen teams observed 132 polling stations across the country. Generally, voters had independent access to these stations. However, in 52 percent of polling locations, accessibility for voters with reduced mobility was insufficient. Citizen observers were actively present in 95 percent of polling stations, and international election observers were present in 18 percent, which signaled strong local and international engagement in the process. Political party representatives from presidential campaigns were present at nearly all polling stations, including Maia Sandu (57%), Alexandr Stoianoglo (81%), Renato Usatai (50%), and Irina Vlah (35%). Additionally, representatives from Renastere Party, part of the Shor criminal network and Victoria/Pobeda bloc, were present at 29 percent of polling stations. Voting processes were calm and well-administered, although fourteen polling stations were not clearly marked. Proper procedures for voter identification were followed, and the layout of the polling stations effectively maintained the secrecy of the vote.

Closing and counting processes were orderly and enabled a variety of stakeholders to observe and verify ballot tabulation, including citizen and international observers which helped to maintain oversight and reinforce the integrity of the proceedings.

Observers noted six critical incidents across the country.  In raions such as Soroca and Besarabeasca, observers reported incidents of ballot boxes not being properly sealed and four critical incidents in Ialoveni raion, which validated pre-election concerns of vote-buying. Two observers also observed vote carouseling, whereby a young woman was witnessed leaving the polling station with a ballot and passing to someone outside. Incidents of vote tampering and/or buying also occured in Horesti, Tipala, Puhoi, and Zimbreni.

VII. Acknowledgements

IRI has led or supported 249 international and citizen election observation missions worldwide and is recognized for its impartiality and professionalism.  The organization has been actively working in Moldova for more than 20 years, contributing to the strengthening of democratic institutions and civil society. The mission is grateful for the cooperation it received from Moldovan citizens, the government officials, candidates, party members, representatives from civil society and the journalists with whom it interacted.

IRI adheres to the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and the Code of Conduct, as adopted by the United Nations in 2005. IRI closely coordinated with the National Democratic Institute (NDI)’s international election observation mission, ensuring extensive, nation-wide coverage and a holistic account of the elections by the respective missions.

This mission is made possible with the support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS).

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Endnotes

[1] Luxmore, Matthew. “In Moldova, a Pro-Russian Oligarch with a Criminal Past Tries to Derail Path to Europe.” The Wall Street Journal, www.wsj.com/world/europe/in-moldova-a-pro-russian-oligarch-with-a-criminal-past-tries-to-derail-path-to-europe-a000bf12?mod=europe_news_article_pos2.  

[2] “Carousel voting” is an illegal practice whereby one voter smuggles an empty ballot out of the polling station and passes it to a conspirator. The conspirator fills out the ballot and gives the completed ballot to the next voter. The next voter then casts the completed ballot and smuggles out a new empty ballot, continuing the cycle. This practice ensures that voters cast votes the way the conspirator intends. In other contexts, this practice is called the “Bulgarian Train.” For more information see “Bulgarian Train.” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgarian_train.

[3] Ilan Shor was convicted in absentia in 2024 by Moldovan authorities for stealing approximately USD $1 billion from Moldovan banks. He currently resides in Moscow.

[4] The territory of Transnistria occupies a thin, 100-kilometer-long strip of land that runs along the left bank of the Dniester River, separating it from the rest of Moldova.

[5] “National Poll of Moldova | May-June 2024.” International Republican Institute, 12 July 2024, www.iri.org/resources/national-poll-of-moldova-may-june-2024/; “EU Trade Relations with Moldova.” European Commission, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/moldova_en.

[6] “National Poll of Moldova | May-June 2024.”

[7] Blocul Victorie, Pobeda, and Sansa are political entities created by Ilan Shor in the aftermath of his party being banned that operate out of the legal system.

[8] Regulation referring to the financing of the Initiative Groups and Electoral Campaigns (No.1185 from 18 August 2023); Regulation referring to the Financing of the Political Parties (No.1101 from 21 June 2023); Regulation referring to the procedure of Examination of Contestations within the Electoral Period (No.1128 from 18 July 2023)

[9] Article 75 of the Constitution governs the referendums, and the Electoral Code Chapter XIV (art.181- 214) governs the organization of referendums.

[10] Nistor, Mariuța. “În Slujba Moscovei. Trei Luni Printre „Robii” Lui Șor. Investigație ZdG Sub Acoperire.” Ziarul de Gardă, 11 Oct. 2024, www.zdg.md/investigatii/ancheta/video-in-slujba-moscovei-trei-luni-printre-robii-lui-sor-investigatie-zdg-sub-acoperire/.

[11] Cojocari, Malvina. “Vasile Tarlev – Susținut de Ilan Șor Din Culisele Kremlinului.” Cu Sens, 17 Oct. 2024, http://cusens.md/ro/investigatii/vasile-tarlev-sustinut-de-ilan-sor-din-culisele-kremlinului/.

[12] Percic, Elena. “Peste 130.000 de Persoane Racolate Pentru Influențarea Alegerilor Din R. Moldova, Cu Bani Din Federația Rusă.” ZUGO, 3 Oct. 2024, https://zugo.md/actualitate/video-peste-130-000-de-persoane-racolate-pentru-influentarea-alegerilor-din-r-moldova-cu-bani-din-federatia-rusa/237988/actualitate.

[13] Paholinițchii, Nicolai. “„Stop UE” Pentru 500 de Lei. Cum Folosește Șor Boții de Pe Telegram Pentru a Angaja Activiști Și de Ce Acest Lucru Este Ilegal.” NewsMaker, 1 Oct. 2024, https://newsmaker.md/ro/stop-ue-pentru-500-de-lei-cum-foloseste-sor-botii-de-pe-telegram-pentru-a-angaja-activisti-si-de-ce-acest-lucru-este-ilegal/.

[14] “În Slujba Moscovei. Trei Luni Printre „Robii” Lui Șor. Investigație ZdG Sub Acoperire.”

[15] Paholinițchii, Nicolai. “Șor a Început Să Emită de La Moscova. A Lansat Un Post TV Online de Știri, Care Emite 24 Din 24 de Ore Din Rusia Cu Prezentatori Din Moldova.” NewsMaker, 17 Sept. 2024, https://newsmaker.md/ro/sor-a-inceput-sa-emita-de-la-moscova-a-lansat-un-post-tv-online-de-stiri-care-emite-24-din-24-de-ore-din-rusia-cu-prezentatori-din-moldova/.  

[16] For a taxonomy of major anti-EU and pro-Kremlin narratives, see Muravschi, Eugen, and Valeriu Pașa. Report: Mapping Anti-EU Narratives in Moldova. WatchDog.MD, 2023, https://www.watchdog.md/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Report_Mapping-anti-EU-narratives-in-Moldova_by-WDMD_November-2023.pdf.

[17] A minimum representation quota of 40% for both sexes is required for every ten places for the lists of candidates for the parliamentary and local elections.

[18] Ermolenco, Alexandra, et al. Indexul Egalității de Gen 2023: Tendințe Privind Nivelul Egalității Între Femeile Și Bărbații Din Moldova. Centrul Parteneriat pentru Dezvoltare, Mar. 2023, https://progen.md/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/CPD_IEG-2023.pdf.  

[19] Radio Moldova. “DOC // O Instanță de Judecată a Respins Cererea Lui Renato Usatîi Împotriva „Teleradio-Moldova”.” Radiomoldova.md, 28 Sept. 2024, https://radiomoldova.md/p/40769/doc–o-instanta-de-judecata-a-respins-cererea-lui-renato-usatii-impotriva-teleradio-moldova-.  

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