The National Republican Institute for International Affairs

The 1990 Elections in Haiti

Report of the International Election Observer Delegation
The 1990 Elections in Haiti

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Acknowledgements

This report is based on the findings of two separate election observation missions sponsored by the National Republican Institute for International Affairs. The first mission observed the December 16, 1990 general election, and the second mission was on hand for the January 20, 1991 run-offs. This report is a collective one, drawn from the experiences of NRIIA delegates stationed throughout the country on both election days, as well as from NRIIA work conducted in Haiti prior to the elections. While the opinions of this report reflect a consensus of all the delegates, the NRIIA assumes full responsibility for factual accuracy.

This report was written by NRIIA Assistant Program Officer Ann Bradley, and edited by Program Officer Ed Stewart and Senior Program Officer Janine Perfit. Appendices were prepared by NRIIA intern Kimberli Brown. The author wishes to thank Mr. Tom Carothers, Esq. for his interpretation of the Haitian Electoral Law, and Dr. Georges Fauriol, who contributed the final edit, and whose political analyses of the Haitian situation were consulted in writing this report.

NRIIA also wishes to thank the United States Agency for International Development for providing the funds for these election observation missions, especially those members of the Port-au-Prince office of USAID with whom we worked the closest: Karen Poe and Anne Nesterczuk. We also wish to acknowledge the efforts of the United States Embassy, especially those of Ambassador and Mrs. Alvin Adams, Political Officer Bob Holly and Military Attaché Lt. Col. Patrick Collins, whose professionalism and dedication to the cause of Haitian democracy were examples for us all.
Foreword

Members of the Caribbean Democrat Union were honoured to take part in the Observer Mission in Haiti with our colleagues in the NRTIA. The elections on December 16, 1990 and the run-off on January 20, 1991, convinced us happily that Haiti was ready to join the community of democratic nations in this region.

Although there were administrative delays in several areas, these failed to dampen the enthusiasm of the people to participate in the political process. They demonstrated an admirable degree of tolerance when there were signs of administrative problems. Some remained in long queues, talking good-naturedly and getting ready to use their votes despite the delays—inordinate in many instances.

This report records a new chapter in Haitian and Caribbean history. For the first step in democracy, free and fair elections, determines to a great extent the next, which is the development of the country for the good of all in the context of the enjoyment of human rights.

The Right Honourable John Compton
Prime Minister of St. Lucia

Executive Summary

When Haitians journeyed to their polling places on December 16, 1990 they elected candidates to five offices: Administrative Councils of the Communal Section (CASEC), Municipal Council, Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, and President of the Republic. There were great hopes that this election might mark a turning point in Haitian history, and bring a democratically elected government to a country which had never had one.

As a show of support for Haiti’s bid for democracy, the National Republican Institute for International Affairs sponsored a thirty-member team of international election observers to monitor the voting and tabulation process, as well as to review the pre-election campaign period. The following is a summary of their conclusions.

1. The will of the people was declared. Haitians went to the polls in record numbers on December 16, determined to exercise the right of franchise which had eluded them for so long. Their presidential candidate of overwhelming choice was Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a liberation theologue known for his social activism. Aristide’s personal popularity carried over to the legislative level, where the party on whose ticket he ran, the National Front for Democratic Convergence, captured more seats in both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies (respectively, 13 and 27) than any other single party or coalition.

2. The government was supportive of the electoral process. When Eartha Pascal-Trouillot was appointed Provisional President of the Republic in March of 1990, she articulated her resolve to lead the country to democratic elections, and no further. She had no aspiration to remain in office; once a president could be popularly elected, her mission would end. This attitude of personal deference to the popular will was a novel one for Haiti, and the President’s and her government’s cooperation with preparations for the elections did much to expedite the procedure.
3. The CEP fulfilled its directive in the face of enormous logistical problems. Haiti is a country bereft of the transportation and communications infrastructure enjoyed by most of neighbors in the Western Hemisphere. Nonetheless, the CEP managed to establish over 14,000 polling places, train the staff who operated them, register over 3 million voters, and print and distribute ballots for five electoral offices. Further compounding the CEP’s difficulties were several constitutional issues, including the exclusion of Duvalierists from office under Article 291. Though far from perfect, the elections did accomplish their fundamental goal of bringing a democratically elected government to power.

4. The military, under the steadying hand of General Herard Abraham, worked to support the democratic process. The Coordinating Committee for the Security of Electoral Activities instigated by the armed forces was seen as a breakthrough in military cooperation with the electoral operation. Still, there was lingering apprehension regarding the attitude of the military, given its role in sabotaging the 1987 elections. Security was a dominant concern of the 1990 pre-election period, heightened by the attack on the Council of State at the Hotel Santos and the December Petionville massacre. Public fears notwithstanding, the military’s comport during the elections was for the most part professional, efficient, and within the confines of its constitutionally delineated role.

5. The contributions and consultations of various foreign and international organizations were integral to the success of the process. The presence of foreign election observers on election day gave assurance to the people of Haiti of international support for the democratic process, as well as allay fears regarding the security situation.

Furthermore, when the final vote count was delayed due to administrative problems within the Provisional Election Council, the parallel vote count undertaken jointly by the United Nations and the Organization of American States helped to mitigate the public impatience over the holdup. The parallel vote count also enhanced the credibility of the CEP when official results were found to closely duplicate those of the UN/OAS sample.

The NRIIA wishes to commend the people of Haiti in their first successful democratic election ever. On December 16, 1990 Haitians overcame an anti-democratic tradition of almost 200 years and elected a President, National Assembly, and local government entirely of their own choosing. We applaud their achievement.

The challenges now facing Aristide and his government are tremendous. Among its manifold problems, Haiti has the lowest standard of living in the Western Hemisphere, a poorly educated citizenry which is 80% illiterate, and a military ambivalent toward the reforms which await it.

During the election campaign, Aristide often invoked a Creole proverb which translates: “with many hands, the work is light”. While the work may prove anything but light, the hands are surely many, both within Haiti and abroad. Haiti’s new government has the support of the freely-elected governments around the world, who have long awaited Haiti’s entry into their ranks. But more importantly, Haiti’s new government— unlike the vast majority of those which preceded it— has the mandate of its own people.
INTRODUCTION

On December 16, 1990 the voters of Haiti went to the polls to elect candidates for five separate offices: the Presidency, the Senate, Chamber of Deputies, Magistrates and Administrative Councils of the Communal Section (CASECS). Though presidential candidate Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide captured an absolute majority in the first round, his party, the National Front for Democratic Convergence, did not. Nor was any one party able to secure a legislative majority in the run-off elections which followed.

Earthia Pascal-Trouillot, a former judge of the Supreme Court, had been appointed Haiti’s interim President in March of 1990, chosen to lead the country toward its first genuinely democratic election. She fulfilled her calling, passing the reigns of power to Aristide in an inaugural ceremony on February 7, 1991, precisely five years after Jean-Claude Duvalier’s flight from office. Aristide’s accession to the presidency marked Haiti’s sixth change of government in five years.

The Provisional Electoral Council, or CEP, had worked feverishly to erect the electoral framework in time to meet the Constitution’s February deadline for the inauguration of a new president. Though the campaign period formally began on November 7, candidates with sufficient resources had begun their campaigns months in advance, and in some cases as many as two years earlier. Ironically, Aristide’s campaign was the shortest of all. The majority of candidates, especially those running below the presidential level, were extremely limited in resources.

As election day approached, it became increasingly doubtful that the elections would occur as scheduled. The CEP—the fourth assembly to hold the title, suffered from a chronic shortage of funding, despite a monthly budget of $200,000 from the national treasury and foreign assistance well into the millions. This fourth CEP had received nothing in the way of an operable organizational structure from its predecessor, and was forced to begin its
labor inheriting nothing more from the third CEP than a sullied reputation.

Compounding the CEP's difficulties was the pressure of time. Staff had to be hired and trained, registration cards printed and distributed, and registration lists computerized. It soon became apparent that the original electoral timetable would have to be extended. On August 17, just two days before registration was set to begin, the CEP announced a six-week postponement of the entire election schedule, including registration. This moved election day from November 4 to December 16, and established November 7 as the beginning of the official campaign period.

Yet for some political figures, such as PAIN leader Louis Dejoie II and liberation theologian Jean-Bertrand Aristide, not even this delay was long enough. Aristide thought no election should be held until those guilty of the 1987 election day massacre could be brought to justice. In fact, Aristide was still denouncing the elections as late as October, urging his followers not to even register. He had presumably amended this view by the month's end, when he announced his own candidacy. Aristide's entry into the race galvanized an unprecedented 3.2 million Haitians into registering to vote, and on December 16, 1990, 2.7 million Haitians turned out at the polls to elect a new president.

**NRIIA ACTIVITIES**

The 1990 International Election Observation Mission sponsored by the National Republican Institute for International Affairs was but one element of a larger and longer NRIIA commitment to democratic development in Haiti.

NRIIA staff first travelled to Haiti in 1986 to assess the needs of the democratic institutions—including political parties, emerging in the wake of President Jean-Claude Duvalier's departure from office. A team of NRIIA observers was also dispatched to witness the Constitutional Referendum in March of 1987. The consequent report, *Toward a Democratic Haiti*, appealed for sustained support of the democratic process, including monitoring of the November 1987 elections.

As the autumn progressed however, the security situation became increasingly precarious. The NRIIA continued its preparations for the observation mission, in the hopes that the situation would improve. It did not, and the NRIIA was forced to cancel its mission on the eve of the election. General Namphy, Haiti's President at the time, cancelled the elections by mid-morning on November 29, when anti-democratic forces opened fire on voters as they made their way to the polls. Thirty-four people were killed in all, and Namphy faulted the CEP for the election's failure.

The NRIIA resumed its efforts in Haiti in the summer of 1990. Working through a grant provided by the United States Agency for International Development, the NRIIA chose two complementary approaches to democratic development: observation of the 1990 elections, and direct aid to the Haitian political parties. Rather than working with only one party or political institution as is its custom, the NRIIA determined that the Haitian need for political assistance was so dire, and so pervasive, that as many parties should benefit as possible. The only requirements were these: the party must be democratic, exhibit long-term viability, and be able to comply with NRIIA management and reporting.
regulations. A total of eight parties qualified, representing a broad range of democratic ideologies.

Beginning in early October, the NRIIA dispatched several cadres of political experts to Haiti to conduct a series of workshops and seminars. These seminars and workshops emphasized such topics as party organization and management, message and theme development, grassroots organization, intraparty communication, membership drives, and volunteer coordination. The seminars targeted all levels of party membership, from rural activists and mid-level managers, to campaign managers and the candidates themselves.

To facilitate implementation of this new political technology, the NRIIA afforded each party a modest amount of funds sufficient to furnish an office for its organization. Field offices located outside Port-au-Prince were especially encouraged, as they increase the parties' visibility and foster participation of the local citizens. Coupled with the training seminars, this assistance enabled the parties to move one step further toward establishing themselves as secure and competitive democratic institutions.

All interaction with the political parties ended prior to November 7, 1990, which marked beginning of the official campaign period.

The NRIIA also sponsored a thirty-member team of international observers to monitor the elections. Led by the Honorable John Compton, Prime Minister of St. Lucia, the NRIIA's team of election observers boasted citizens of eleven countries. See Appendix A for a list of delegates. Delegates arrived on Thursday, December 13. That evening and the following day were devoted to a series of briefings on the Haitian political situation. Speakers included officials from the United States Embassy, the CEP, the Haitian Armed Forces, and leaders and candidates of the dominant political parties. On Friday evening, the delegates attended a final political and security briefing at the residence of United States Ambassador and Mrs. Alvin Adams.

On Saturday, December 15, those twelve NRIIA delegates covering Haiti's northern reaches boarded a plane for Cap Haitian, where they stayed the next two nights. On election day, NRIIA delegates in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitian divided into sixteen teams of two, and deployed to key positions throughout the country. See Appendix B for team deployments. Each team was provided with a car and driver, as well as a translator fluent in English, French, and Creole, the language of most Haitians.

Delegates were in place for the opening of the polls by 6 a.m. on election day, December 16. By 10 p.m. that evening, all delegates had witnessed final balloting and tabulation procedures, and were ready to prepare their preliminary findings. Delegates in Cap Haitian phoned in their findings to the NRIIA headquarters in Port-au-Prince, and a press statement was prepared for delivery the following day. See Appendices C and D for the delegation statements.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION

This chapter provides a cursory history of Haiti in which to view the context of the 16 December, 1990 elections. Much of the historical data is drawn from Lawrence E. Harrison’s Underdevelopment Is A State of Mind.¹

Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with eighty percent of its people surviving on an annual income of less than $100. Its history is one of bloodshed and tyranny, whether imposed from without by foreign ingenuity, or wrought from within by its own leaders. It has never known democracy in any form.

Haiti occupies the western third of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola. Discovered in 1492 by Christopher Columbus, Hispaniola means the “the Spanish Isle”. Its indigenous inhabitants were the Taino Indians, who emigrated from northeastern South America. It is from the Taino language that Haiti derives its name, which means “mountainous land”.

Spain relinquished claim to what is now Haiti to France in 1697, under the Treaty of Ryswick. Through the sweat of slave labor, sugar cane flourished, as did tobacco farming, and Haiti was soon transformed into one of France’s most lucrative colonial possessions.

In 1791, Haiti’s slaves revolted, against both their colonial masters and against France itself. Under the military leadership of Toussaint L’Ouverture, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, and Henri Christophe the Europeans were defeated at last for control of the island. In 1804 Dessalines and Christophe declared the Republic of Haiti, marking the birth of the world’s first black nation, and the second republic in the Western Hemisphere. But the price for freedom was high, for the revolution left a third of the former slave population dead. With the subsequent demise of the plantation system, Haiti’s agricultural production foundered, and the country began its slide into the subsistence farming which has characterized it ever since.

Society remained bifurcated, with the educated mulattos amassing in urban areas, supported by the labors of rural blacks, few of whom were literate. Haiti’s successive presidents of this period are best remembered for their tyranny, avarice and brevity of tenure. Between the overthrow of Jeanne Pierre Boyer in 1843 and the US Occupation in 1915, Haiti saw twenty-two separate heads of state, only one of whom completed a full term. Haiti grew increasingly politically unstable, and became further and further dependent upon foreign loans for survival.

A dozen years into the twentieth century, as World War I loomed near, American financial interests in the region had come to rival those of France and Germany, and the United States became increasingly concerned that Germany might invade Haiti for strategic reasons, in that Haiti controls the Windward Passage and also boasts a large deep water Harbor at Mole St. Nicolas. It was under these circumstances that in 1915, Washington preempted any potential aggression on Germany’s part by intervening in Haiti herself.

The American Occupation lasted for nineteen years, and became a focal point of the inchoate Haitian nationalism. This had two primary manifestations: one was a newfound Africanism among the Haitian populace, and the other an inclination to draw analogies between the political plight of colonial Africa and occupied Haiti. This gave rise to the negritude movement, whose proponents were known as noiristes. Haiti’s most famous noiriste was Francois Duvalier.

The last remaining U.S. Marines returned home in August of 1934. From then until 1956, Haiti had four presidents. The first, Stenio Vincent, was pressured out of office for attempting to seek

an unconstitutional third term; the second and third were
overthrown; and the fourth, Paul Magloire, went into exile in
1956, as did as much as $28 million of the national treasury.

In the ten months following Magloire’s departure, Haiti had
another five governments. Finally, on October 22, 1957, a
president was elected whose staying power would prove much
greater: Francois Duvalier, soon to become known throughout
the world as simply “Papa Doc”.

Duvalier entered office with an impressive background; he was
a noted philosopher of the negritude movement, had served in
government posts of authority, and had briefly studied medicine
at the University of Michigan. There was nothing in his past
which could have predicted the dictatorship which followed. The
debauchery, brutality, murder and personal ambition which
marked Francois Duvalier’s fourteen years in office rival any
which the modern world has known.

Distrustful of the military and its proclivity for overthrowing
presidents, Duvalier created his own private guard, the notorious
Ton-Ton Macoutes. Adopting a uniform of blue denims with a
red kercchief at their neck, the Ton-Ton Macoutes were vigilantes
whose authority over civilians was terrifying and brutal. As long
as they remained loyal to Duvalier, the were free to victimize others
as they pleased. Relying heavily upon voodoo and
thuggery, Papa Doc and his Macoutes managed to bully an entire
nation into submission. As Duvalier grew older, he became
increasingly depraved and bizarre. Tales of torture and murder
at his command were legion. Dressing habitually in black,
Duvalier cultivated the image of Baron Samedi, the macabre
voodoo figure who stalks the graveyards at night, stealing souls
and transforming the dead into zombies.

In addition to his mental depravity, Duvalier suffered from many
physical problems as well, and eventually died of a stroke on
April 21, 1971. As Haiti’s President-for-Life since 1964,
Francois Duvalier ensured that his successor, his nineteen-year-
old son Jean-Claude, was awarded the same tenure. Jean-Claude
proved slightly less malevolent than his father before him, and
was significantly less clever. Immature and sybaritic, Jean-
Claude preferred jet-setting to torture. Business even picked up
under his administration, as Haiti’s reserve of underskilled,
underpaid and perennially exploited laborers lured foreign
factories to its shores.

By marrying a mulatto, Michelle Bennet, Jean-Claude may have
augured his own destruction. A divorcée, both Bennet and her
family were of questionable reputation, and her relatives grew
rich from her new status as first lady.

The beginning of the end for the Duvalier dynasty came in
November of 1985, as tolerance for the very public excesses of
Michelle and Jean-Claude had worn thin. Rioting broke out in
the northwestern coastal city of Gonaives and soon escalated into
anti-government protests across the country. Arrests of opposition
leaders fueled an outraged public, who monitored events on
Radio Soleil before the government shut it down.

Initially, Baby Doc was slow to recognize the severity of public
opinion, for he had just reaffirmed his status as President-for-Life
by a 99.9% margin. But not even the Ton-Ton Macoutes could
contain public protests, and the United States, reversing almost
three decades of support for his family’s rule, now wanted
Duvalier out. On February 7, 1986 Jean-Claude, Michelle Bennet
and their children boarded a United States Air Force C-141 cargo
plane bound for France, where they still reside.

Jean-Claude was succeeded by the Council of National Govern-
ment, or CNG, a six-member junta he had chosen prior to his
departure to govern in his absence. Led by his Army Chief of
Staff, Lt. General Henry Namphy, the CNG included fellow
Duvalierists Williams Regala and Prosper Avril. In June,
Namphy announced an electoral timetable, and in October a
Constituent Assembly was elected to create a new Constitution,
which was ratified by a 98% margin on March 29, 1987.
This new Constitution restored the authority of the legislature and judiciary, and curtailed those of the executive. Its most notable feature was Article 291, which excluded Duvalierists from public office for the next ten years. The Constitution also provided for a civilian election commission to administer elections of a new President and National Assembly, scheduled to take place on November 29, 1987.

But by 9 a.m. on November 29, the election was aborted as 34 voters were slaughtered on their way to the polls by Macoutes and other Duvalierists who sought to thwart any democratic forays perpetrated on Haitian soil. Still the Constitution demanded an election, and a second one was hastily thrown together. As a result, Leslie Manigat was voted into power on January 17, 1988 in an election overseen by a military commission and boycotted by most voters and candidates. Namphy overthrew Manigat five months later, taking the presidency for himself once again.

Namphy in turn was overthrown on September 17-18 by Lt. General Prosper Avril, chief of the Presidential Guard and former adviser to Baby Doc. On March 13, 1989, Avril partially restored the suspended 1987 Constitution, but Haitians demanded much more. In the year which followed, Haiti ran the gamut of third world political experiences: one coup attempt, collective arrests of the political opposition which sparked a nationwide strike; the murder of a prominent Army Colonel, his family and household; the subsequent imposition of a state of siege; its revocation; the eventual release of the political prisoners and a promise from Avril to hold elections.

Avril’s tenuous grasp on the presidency dissolved March 5, 1990 when government troops opened fire upon student protesters, killing an eleven year-old girl in Petit Goave. Citizens stormed the streets, demanding Avril’s ouster. He resigned five days later.

On March 13, 1990 former Supreme Court Justice Eartha Pascal-Trouillot assumed office as President of the Republic, forming a provisional government in conjunction with the nineteen-member Council of State, headed by Louis Rny. Trouillot restored the suspended 1987 Constitution, and promised to lead the country to elections, but no further. By June 29, her promise took form, when the Provisional Electoral Council announced the electoral timetable. On November 4, 1990, Haitians would go to the polls to elect a president.
Heading Toward Election: The Provisional Electoral Council

One of the greatest factors contributing to the success of the elections was the effective management of the electoral process by the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP). Since the fall of the Duvaliers, the CEP had undergone four incarnations. The first CEP oversaw the November, 1987 elections; the second administered the January 1988 elections, which brought Manigat to power; and the third CEP was born in September of 1988, when Avril overthrew Namphy. The CEP had always had a troubled history, dating back to 1987 when in his first tenure as President, Namphy had attempted—albeit unsuccessfully, to place the Electoral Council directly under his control. Though he failed, the ultimate effect of Namphy’s action was to destroy the credibility of the CEP, in perception if not in practice. That the CEP be an separate, independent council, free from political manipulation, was of paramount importance, lest its objectivity be placed in jeopardy.

The fourth CEP was formed in May of 1990 under the leadership of Jean-Robert Sabalat, who like some other Council members had also served in the first CEP of 1987. Yva Youance and Jean Casimir served as Vice President and General Secretary, respectively. With a monthly operating budget of approximately $200,000, the CEP was comprised of nine members (at a monthly salary of $4,000), each of whom represented one of the following sectors of the Haitian professional community: human rights groups, trade unions, cooperative organizations, the national university, the Association of Haitian Journalists, the Supreme Court, the Catholic Conference of Bishops, and the Protestant Churches.

The electoral structure was highly decentralized, aligned in a pyramid configuration. At the top governed the nine members of the CEP. Immediately below them were the nine Departmental Electoral Offices, or BEDs. Each BED in turn administered one of 135 Communal Electoral Offices, or BECs. Each BEC then managed an assembly of BIVs—Office of Registration and Voting, of which there were over 14,000 in all. Used for both registration and voting, BIVs were usually located in schools or churches.

The CEP’s first task was to draft the Election Law, which it made public at a June 29, 1990 press conference. Formal approval came from the Council of State on July 10 when the Election Law was published in that day’s edition of Le Moniteur, the government’s official journal. More similar to the 1987 Electoral Act than the one promulgated by the third CEP, the new Electoral Law contained several innovations, such as requiring candidates to pay a registration fee, and printing separate ballots for each of the five offices up for election. The new Law also required voters to vote at the same BIVs in which they had registered. This innovation had two distinct advantages: it was more convenient for the voter, and it also helped eliminate the possibility of multiple voting. This Electoral Law’s most marked resemblance to the 1987 Electoral Act was the enforcement of Article 291 of the Constitution, which stipulates that:

The following categories of persons shall not carry out any public function during the ten years that follow the publications of the present Constitution and this limitation shall not affect criminal actions or civil reparations against such persons:

a) All persons notoriously known for having by their excess zeal been upholders (or architects) of the dictatorship and its maintenance during its twenty-nine years.

b) All those charged with handling public funds during the period of dictatorship upon whom there rests presumption of illicit enrichment.

c) All persons denounced by the public clamor at the time of arrest or inquiries for having practiced torture on political prisoners or for having committed political assassinations.

This inclusion of Article 291 was by far the Election Law’s most controversial aspect, and prompted several parties to complain that it was too restrictive. Accusations ranged from its supposed
violation of the OAS Charter, to its being openly discriminatory to all office holders under the Duvaliers. These protests notwithstanding, there was no indication that public support for Article 291 had diminished since its overwhelming approval in the 1987 Constitutional referendum.

Many parties also complained about Article 67 of the Election Law, which required all candidates to pay a declaration tax to the General Direction of the Tax Service, ranging from $15 at the CASEC level to $240 for Deputy to the Assembly and $400 for the Senate. Presidential candidates were required to pay a registration deposit of 4,000 gourdes, or $800 at the official exchange rate. Though criticized as a law for the wealthy, Article 67 did have the desired effect of reducing the electoral field to a manageable number of viable candidates. Though important at all levels of elective office this was crucial to the presidential race, where the field would have been flooded otherwise with contenders ill-equipped to assume the presidency, and whose only likely contribution would be to splinter the voting and cause an unnecessary run-off.

Not all criticism was confined to the Electoral Law however, as some was directed at the CEP. Some parties believed that the CEP’s authority was too sweeping. Moreover, the original Electoral Law had no proviso for disciplining its own ranks, despite discursive punishments for other violators of the Electoral Law. Given the excesses historically associated with power in Haiti, any governing body which places itself beyond accountability is bound to arouse suspicion, and the CEP proved no exception. Following repeated criticism from the newspaper the Le Nouvelliste, as well as from such political parties as the Movement for National Development (MDN), the CEP eventually amended the Electoral Law to include disciplining its own members if necessary. On the whole, however, there was broad approbation of the Electoral Law, for even those parties and individuals who complained nonetheless agreed to obey its provisos.

International Participation

President Trouillot first appealed to the international community in June of 1990 for assistance in electoral procurement and security. In response, the CEP received external assistance from a variety of agencies, including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations (UN), and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). A significant contributor to other elections in the region, the Organization of American States had already begun its work in Haiti late in the spring. Implementation was made possible by the OAS’ Permanent Council Resolution 537/90 and General Assembly Resolution 1048. Led by Secretary General Joao Clemente Baena Soares, who spearheaded the OAS Nicaragua effort in 1990, and field officer Jacques Cote, director of Quebec Province’s electoral commission, the OAS contribution was largely advisory in nature. Working with a staff of approximately seven people, Cote and his team provided the CEP with technical advice on all aspects of the electoral process, from promulgation of the Electoral Law and registration, to coordination of the parallel vote count with the United Nations.

Financed through contributions of member countries, the total OAS budget for its Haiti operation was US $1.5 million. In addition, the United States earmarked approximately half a million dollars for the purchase of communication and transportation equipment, given as a permanent gift to the CEP. The OAS sponsored an observer delegation of 202 members for the December 16 primary, with a reduced presence of approximately 45 observers for the January run-off elections.

Acting upon a direct appeal from President Trouillot, the United Nations enacted Resolution 45/2, authorizing UN electoral assistance to Haiti. Like the OAS, the United Nations negotiated its standard Status of Forces Agreement with Haiti’s provisional government. In addition to diplomatic immunity, the Status of Forces Agreement grants observers the right to enter polling
places, observe the proceedings unimpaired, and make whatever investigations necessary.

The United Nations constituted the greatest foreign presence during the course of the elections. Led by a Brazilian, Joao Augusto Medecis, the UN identified three explicit areas of assistance: technical and administrative advice to the CEP, election observation, security, and coordination of the parallel vote count. Each of these areas came under the directorship of a separate deputy: respectively, Peter Hornsby, Horacio Boneo, and Brigadier General Gabriel Zuliani. The United Nations estimated the total electoral budget to be $12,862,656.00 of which it contributed $392,400.00 of its own funds.

Working largely with funds granted from USAID, IFES contributions included a computer system for processing registration forms, voter lists, and vote tabulation; the design and administration of a training program for pollwatchers; four million registration cards printed in Creole; a rented helicopter for ballot distribution, and over 6,000 registration kits.

On October 17, 1990 a general meeting was held with the intent to coordinate international assistance for the elections. Ambassadors to Haiti from the United States, Canada, Italy, Venezuela, and Germany attended, as did a representative of the Republic of China. Having already designated $1,500,000 for the elections, the United States supplemented this by $320,000 on October 23. France announced an eleven million franc contribution on October 26 for civic education and ballot printing. Venezuela’s Electoral Council worked directly with the Provisional Electoral Council. Canada too opted for direct assistance, in the form of voting materials such as ballots, ballot boxes, and ink. German magnanimity totalled one million Deutsche mark, to partially offset some of the printing costs entailed.

Much of the operational costs incurred by the CEP were met by the Haitian Government, as were the salaries of those staffing the BEDS, BECS, and BITs.

Role of the Military

Yet as the CEP and all participants were well aware, the ultimate success of the elections hinged upon the safety factor, to which the cooperation of the military was paramount. When violence broke out during the 1987 elections, the military did little to quell the brutality—in some cases, even contributing to it, and the image bore heavily on the Haitian mind. More recently, on June 21, 1990, four armed gunmen stormed a Council of State meeting at the Hotel Santos. Indiscriminately spraying the hotel lobby with automatic weapon fire, the gunmen murdered Council Member Serge Villard and union leader Jean-Marie Montes. Though two policemen were posted across the street from the hotel at the time, they made no attempt to intervene, nor did they pursue the fleeing gunmen after the shootings. A subsequent investigation was botched, with detectives failing even to gather bullet casings.

The public was outraged, demanding both accountability and competence from a police force which had repeatedly failed to deliver either one. The CEP wanted assurance that steps would be taken to improve the security situation, lest the experience of the disastrous 1987 elections be repeated. General Herard Abraham, Commander in Chief of the Haitian military, responded by creating the Coordinating Committee for the Security of Electoral Activities (CCSAE), an organizational structure in which the military was decentralized to correspond to CEP scales.

Under this configuration, the CCSAE structure duplicated that of the CEP: Departmental Commanders were teamed with their respective BEDs, District and Sub-District Commanders were matched with BECs, etc. Under the aegis of the CCSAE, members of the military were encouraged to meet regularly with their counterparts within the electoral council, to foster open communication and air any misunderstandings.

By way of example, General Abraham and his top military echelons conferred with the CEP in as many as six meetings over the course of the summer, creating an open dialogue between the
two organizations in which problems could find redress. In addition, the military instituted a program of professional military education led by Colonel Bobby Marc-Charles and sponsored by “Le Cercle Militaire”—the Military Club. Through a series of three to five day workshops geared toward the common soldier, the Circle’s main objective was to define and explain the role of the military in modern democracies. Most importantly, the meetings were conducted in a positive and open manner, and the military went to great lengths to keep the public apprised of its progress, which did much to allay public concerns.

Yet the return of Macoute bad-boy and presidential aspirant Roger Lafontant in July triggered a rash of terrorist activity, marked by random acts of violence with no apparent political intent save to terrorize the populace into staying home on election day. The Creole expression for perpetrators of this sort of violence is “zenglendos”.

Vandalism was common, and spray-painted graffiti appeared with mottos such as “Long live Lafontant” and “Down with Article 291”.

Zenglendo activity climaxed on December 5, 1990 in Petionville, an affluent suburb of Port-au-Prince. Following a political rally there in which Aristide had addressed a throng of eager supporters, the electricity was cut, not unusual in a country given to frequent black-outs. What was atypical was the ensuing grenade attack, which left seven people dead and scores more wounded. Aristide had already departed.

As tragic as the December 5 attack was, the handling of the incident—with an immediate investigation and subsequent arrests, was competent and professional, and served as a public expression of the military’s renewed determination to support the electoral process by confronting those criminal elements which sought to undo it.

The military’s newfound professionalism was most apparent in its arrangements for election day. On the weekend of December 16, the border with the Dominican Republic was sealed, and a curfew went into effect on Saturday, December 15 at 10 p.m. until 5 a.m. the next day, at which time voters could make their way to the polls. During this period, no vehicles were allowed on the road unless they bore a green and blue “laïsez-passez” issued by the CEP which authorized them to travel during the curfew. Only 90 laïsez-passez were issued in all, though unmarked vehicles were allowed to travel in cases of extreme emergency. This curfew was strictly enforced; the roads were virtually barren on election day, save for those vehicles driven by the police or credentialed observers—and the latter were often checked for proper authorization. Though this worked very well for December 16, it was not applied with equal force to the run-off elections.

\[\text{2} \] The expression “zenglendo” first appeared in the nineteenth century under the Souloque presidency. Today, zenglendo denotes any terrorist, criminal, or murderer acting for personal gain or political purpose.
CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT

Regulations

Campaign regulations were rather strict, requiring candidates and parties to notify their local electoral boards, communal administrations and the Police at least 48 hours in advance of public gatherings. All campaign materials were required to bear the name and address of the printer, who in turn was obliged to submit two copies to the nearest BEC, who would then forward them to the CEP in Port-au-Prince.

Public officials were forbidden to endorse any candidate. If found guilty of doing so, the penalties were severe, and included loss of office, a fine of 300 to 600 gourdes, and a three to six month jail term.

All campaigning—whether spoken, written, posted, aired, or televised, was to cease 24 hours prior to the opening of the polls, until the time of their closing. The media was forbidden to issue pronouncements on electoral trends until the public posting of the ballot count by the BIVs. Likewise, no public opinion polls or electoral forecasts could be published until the ballot counts were released by the BEDs.

Any candidate, party or coalition found in violation of these rules was subject to disqualification, and forbidden from seeking office again for five years.

Voting Registries

Registration lasted twenty-two consecutive days, from October 5 through October 26. At final count, 3,271,155 citizens had registered to vote, significantly more than originally anticipat-
ed—but, in fact, than were thought to be eligible. Putting aside for the moment the possibility of fraudulent registration, there are a number of potential causes behind the discrepancy. For one, there has been no population census taken in Haiti since 1982, which seriously undermines the reliability of population numbers used to calculate total voter eligibility.

The second reason has to do with the structure of the BIVs themselves, and a certain “incentive” toward registration unknowingly instigated by the CEP. In an effort to economize, the CEP decided to reduce the staff size for each BIV to four people, who would be responsible for a number of registries. Once a registry enrolled 250 voters, it was considered complete, and a new registry was begun. However, poll workers were paid not for time worked, but for registries filled. At a sum of 1,100 gourdes paid per registry completed, the urge to inflate the numbers may have proven irresistible to some workers.

Though double registration may have occurred in isolated cases, there is no evidence that any concerted effort was afoot to defraud the process by means of duplicate registries. Of all the possible ways to defraud an election, this is one of the least effective, in that it also requires a second step—double voting, in order to succeed. There is no evidence that this occurred.

The OAS was the only international organization present for the entire registration process. The OAS found that registration was an overall success, despite occasional irregularities such as lists not being posted, registration cards being signed in advance, or BIVs not keeping correct hours. The OAS attributed such aberrations to three causes: lack of staff experience and training, poor motivation due to low wages, and inferior transportation and communication networks—all of which can be seen as a direct result of the limited funds available for the election.

Voting Abroad

Haiti's Constitution has no proviso for absentee voting, nor does it allow registration from abroad. Given the amount of expense

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3 The official exchange rate for Haitian gourdes to US dollars is five to one; the black market rate is approximately 7.5 to one.
and organization it would have required, as well as the potential for fraud and manipulation, absentee voting was seen as a relatively low priority for the CEP in preparation for the 1990 election. The current situation notwithstanding, the CEP does hope to enfranchise expatriates in time for the next round of legislative elections in 1992.

Handling Complaints

Complaints involving presidential, senatorial or representative races were submitted by the plaintiffs directly to the CEP. Complaints arising at the Municipal Council or CASEC level had to first be heard at the appropriate CEP Departmental Bureau, and then referred to the CEP’s Secretariat. To date approximately six cases, all at the CASEC level, remain unresolved, and await resolution until a permanent Electoral Council is in place to render a final determination.

Voter Education

The CEP instituted voter education through such mediums as television and radio advertisements, posters, newspaper articles, pamphlets and brochures. TV and radio were considered the most effective communication medium, as Haiti’s low literacy rate obviously limits the impact of written matter. Televisions, along with instructive videos detailing the electoral and voting procedure, were provided in most of Haiti’s 153 communes. Voter education had its greatest impact in galvanizing the population into registering to vote.

THE POLITICAL FIELD

The Parties

Though the Ministry of Justice lists as many as fifty-seven political parties and organizations, the following parties were regarded as the main contenders for the 1990 elections:

The National Alliance for Democracy and Progress (ANDP)

The ANDP is a three-party coalition, consisting of MIDH—Movement for the Installation of Haitian Democracy; PANPRA—National Progressive Revolutionary Party; and MNP-28—National Patriotic Movement of 28 November. At first glance, this seems an unlikely grouping: while MIDH and the much smaller MNP-28 are respectively center-right and moderate in orientation, Panpra is social democratic in outlook, and is a member of Socialist International. Its leader, Serges Gilles, is said to be personally close with Francois Mitterand.

What unites these disparate parties is a common belief in private enterprise, fiscal responsibility and economic reform, as well as a detailed plan of how to bring it all about. Without question, MIDH was the dominant political force behind the coalition, with MIDH leader Marc Bazin heading the coalition as its presidential candidate. Bazin is highly regarded throughout the country for his efforts at the World Bank, and as former Finance Minister under Jean-Claude Duvalier. Prior to Aristide’s entry into the presidential race, Bazin was the undisputed front-runner. Had Bazin won the presidency, it was understood that Serges Gilles would have taken the post of Prime Minister, with MNP-28 leader Dejean Belizaire being awarded a cabinet post.

4 See Appendix E for a complete listing of Haitian political parties and organizations.
Of all the Haitian parties, the ANDP—largely through the established political network of the MIDH, had the most extensive campaign organization and ran the most thoroughly modern campaign. They also remained steadfast in their commitment to the 1990 elections, when other parties began calling for postponement. A polished and experienced leader, Bazin was generally perceived to be Washington’s candidate, which may have proved to be a significant liability at the polls.

The coalition dissolved shortly after the election, with each party acting independently of its former partners once the legislature convened.

**National Front for Democratic Convergence (FNDC)**

More of a social movement than a true political party, the National Front for Democratic Convergence was instituted on June 14, 1990 and its political leader is Turneb Delpe, now a Senator from Haiti’s Western Department. The FNCD draws heavily from the clergy on the radical left, the so-called “Ti Legliz” or little church, and advocates an unclear notion of what it terms social justice. Central to this justice is what the FNCD calls “dechoukage”, or uprooting, wherein Haiti would be purged of its Duvalierist and rightist elements. In its place would come “lavalas”, the flood, wherein the oppressed masses would come to the forefront, and a populist government would take its place.

Such rhetoric notwithstanding, initially the FNCD was actually one of the election’s most vociferous detractors, instructing its followers to neither vote nor even register on the grounds that the Duvalierists’ continuing domination of the country would inevitably preclude a legitimate election.

These exhortations ended on October 22 when Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide joined political forces with the FNCD and proclaimed himself a political contender. Initially, Aristide cited Lafontant’s candidacy as the impetus behind his own entry into the presidential race. A liberation theologue, Aristide is a populist priest who was expelled from the Salesian Order for bringing his political activism to the pulpit. Considered by most to be an extreme leftist, Aristide has habitually preached that the roots of Haiti’s problems reach directly to the United States.

An outspoken critic of the Haiti’s successive military governments, Aristide has been the target of several murder attempts yet has always managed to emerge unscathed, which only enhances the mystical quality which Haitians ascribe to him. Aristide’s first constituency base were the slums of Port-au-Prince where he preached, but his influence is nationwide. A gifted orator, Aristide is fluent in several languages and is renowned for his colorful sermons, where he blends voodoo lore with Catholic liturgy.

The fragility of the FNCD-Aristide connection revealed itself in the post-election period, when the respective parties began quibbling over who brought whom to power—did the FNCD legitimize Aristide’s aspirations, or did they simply ride into Parliament on his presidential coat tails?

**Haitian Christian Democratic Party (PDCH)**

Like the FNCD, the PDCH is also led by an activist priest, the dynamic Baptist preacher Sylvio Claude. Though only 10-15% of the Haitian population consider themselves Protestant, Claude has enjoyed a wide popularity for his social activism and anti-Duvalierist preachings.

Despite its name, the PDCH does not formally belong to Christian Democrat International, though they do maintain contact with the Christian Democrats of Venezuela and Germany. The CD International joined forces in 1987-8 with Leslie Manigat and his party, the Progressive Democratic National Party, and the relationship remains.

Left of center but anti-communist, the PDCH suffers from a lack of a defined platform, particularly in fiscal matters. The PDCH
and Sylvio Claude were hurt enormously by Aristide’s entry into the presidential race, for the latter easily captured the constituency that only months before had been solidly Claude’s.

National Agricultural and Industrial Party (PAIN)

Founded by Louis Dejoie, who ran unsuccessfully against Francois Duvalier in 1957, the party is now led by his son, Louis Dejoie II. PAIN is poorly organized and ill-funded, and draws largely upon the reputation of its founder. Its traditional support base comes from Haiti’s southern regions.

National Party for Work (PNT)

Right of center and disorganized, the PNT is led by Thomas Desulme, a well-known Port-au-Prince industrialist. Desulme has been a name in Haitian politics for almost fifty years, having served Francois Duvalier as campaign manager in 1957. Some believe his commitment to the party is waning; in any case, his advanced age is politically limiting and it is doubtful that the party could survive without him.

Unified Party of Haitian Communists (PUCH)

PUCH’s support base is small, and funding is almost exclusively from foreign sources. Its leader, Rene Theodore, is an old player on Haiti’s political stage, and deftly minimized his party affiliation during the presidential campaign. Theodore champions giving power to the people and expunging the remnants of Duvalierism, though he never elaborates on exactly how.

Progressive Democratic National Party (RDNP)

The RDNP’s leader, Leslie Manigat, served as President of Haiti for less than five months in 1988. A respected academic, Manigat has since taught political science in Venezuela and France, and held research fellowships in the United States and Switzerland. Thanks to its leader’s expertise, the RDNP is politically sophisticated in theory, but it lacks the funding and party network required for sustained political success. Manigat’s main liability is the widely held perception that he sold-out to Namphy to in order to be “elected” in 1988 (as one scholar noted, turnout bordered on the nonexistent). Manigat’s candidacy was ruled invalid by the CEP on November 6 in accordance with Article 134.3 of the Constitution, which stipulates that former presidents must wait five years before seeking a new term. Manigat protested, contending that his term was not completed, but to no avail. The RDNP ran its slate of candidates undeterred.

Union for National Reconciliation (URN)

URN is the front party for the notorious Roger Lafontant, a man given to such chilling boasts as “I am a Ton-ton Macoute. I will never deny it.” A pivotal figure of some thirty years of Duvalierist terror, Lafontant had been in exile since 1985, but returned to Haiti illegally last summer. The government’s persistent inability to carry out his arrest warrant gave hope to many Duvalierists that their political fortunes were still high.

Lafontant’s candidacy was a blatant violation of Article 291 of the Constitution, which prohibits Duvalierists from seeking public office for a period of ten years, and there was much speculation over the summer as to whether or not the CEP had the courage to invalidate his candidacy. In a shrewed political move, the CEP disqualified Lafontant on two technicalities—that he had never submitted a birth certificate, a violation of Article 135 of

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5 As Interior Minister under Jean-Claude Duvalier, Lafontant placed the National Security Volunteers—also known as the Ton-Ton Macoutes, under his direct personal control.
the Election Law, and that he had never received his discharge from government service during his tenure as Minister of the Interior. Article 291 was never invoked.

By use of traditional tactics—threats, coercion, and the ever reliable pay-off, Lafontant secured the political and financial support of many hard-line Duvalierists. Lafontant had long boasted of his close ties to the military, but General Abraham’s decisive put-down of Lafontant’s January 1991 coup attempt would belie this. Lafontant and his co-conspirators were promptly arrested and taken to the national penitentiary to await trial on charges of sedition.

Campaign Finances

Foreign governments were strictly prohibited from contributing to any candidate or party. Donations by an individual were limited to 100,000 gourdes ($20,000 at the official exchange rate) per individual or legal entity per fiscal year.

For most parties, campaign resources were extremely limited. All they had was what they could generate themselves; no monies were given to them by the CEP or National Treasury.

Other parties were able to draw upon the resources of expatriated Haitians for their campaign treasuries. A few candidates, such as Bazin, Gilles, Dejoie and Aristide made trips abroad, partly with the intent to solicit funds.

Role of the Media

The Electoral Law said little regarding the media, simply that candidates were free to utilize it to make their platforms known.

The electoral campaign formally began on November 7, the day after final eligibility rulings were passed down from the CEP. Yet candidates and parties had been campaigning for months, in some cases years; the only aspect which changed on November 7 was that the national television and radio stations began broadcasting electoral publicity for a set number of hours each day. Beyond that, electoral publicity or campaign material depended entirely upon the resources of candidates and parties themselves.

In that most Haitians do not read, and few own televisions, radio was the preferred means of advertising. Over forty radio stations operate in Haiti, averaging between fifteen and twenty hours of air time daily, though a few do have twenty-four hour capabilities. Two of the more prominent radio stations are Radio Soleil, owned and operated by the Catholic Church, and Radio Lumiere, managed by a consortium of Baptist evangelical missions.

Other major stations broadcasting from Port-au-Prince include Haiti-Inter, Radio Metropole, Radio Cacique and Radio Antilles International. Radio Nationale is the government’s official station, and reaches most of the country. At least ten stations possess FM capabilities as well as AM. Though most carried political advertising, none made endorsements.

The official TV station, Haitian National Television (TNH) gave dutiful and unbiased coverage to the election process, devoting a portion of each evening’s news to the candidates running for office. Impact of TV coverage is limited however, confined largely to the Port-au-Prince area.

Haiti’s main newspapers are Le Nouvelliste, Haiti Progres, and Haiti Observateur. Though the Haitian press is technically a free one, editorial opinions are not always immune from mob retaliation. In one instance Haiti Observateur, which had endorsed ANDP candidate Marc Bazin for the presidency, was sacked and looted following Aristide’s victory. Likewise, the openly Duvalierist newspaper Le Petit Samedi Soir was attacked following Lafontant’s thwarted coup attempt, and has since stopped publishing. Given that the idea of a free press is a relatively new one to Haiti, realized only after the demise of the Duvaliers, the
generally responsible and objective behavior of the news media over the course of the electoral campaign was commendable.

REGISTRATION

The registration period ran from October 5 through October 26. A series of Registration and Voting Offices (BIVs) were established in every Haitian community, each of which was empowered to register up to 250 voters. Once this threshold was achieved, the BIV was allowed to close, to reopen again on election day. Over 14,000 BIVs were created in all. They consisted of a president, secretary, two clerks, and a doorperson. Upon registration, the voter received a card detailing the following information:

* his or her full name; sex; age or date of birth;
* address; order number; voting district; registration date;
* the signature of the BIV's president and secretary;
* the card number; and a blank space to be marked at the time of actual voting.

Registration Lists

In accordance with Article 35 of the Election Law, registration lists were posted every Monday at the entrance of the BIV until the end of the registration period.

Suffrage was universal for all Haitians at least 18 years of age on the day of elections. Mental illness constituted grounds for voting disqualification, as did any of the following: loss of citizenship, simple or fraudulent bankruptcy, judicial suspension, suspension of political rights as a result of refusal to be sworn, criminal conviction resulting in the partial or total suspension of political and or civil rights, and conviction of electoral fraud.

Citizens seeking to register were required to present one valid piece of identification to the appropriate BIV official. As many Haitians do not hold formal identification of any kind, a verification by two registered voters was taken as due proof of identity. Mention of such was recorded both on the voting card and in the register.
At the close of the Official Election Registration period on October 26, more than 3.2 million Haitians had registered to vote.

**Declarations of Candidacy**

From October 6 - 21, 1990 the citizens of Haiti were eligible to file for the following offices:

- Administrative Council of the Communal Section (CASEC)
- Municipal Council (Magistrates)
- Deputy to the Legislative Chamber
- Senator
- President of the Republic

Haiti has a bicameral parliament, comprised of the Senate and the House of Deputies. There are 83 Deputies in all, one from each of Haiti’s electoral districts, and they serve four-year terms. The Senate has 27 members, three from each of Haiti’s nine departments. They serve six-year terms, with one third of the seats up for election every two years. At the local level, each CASEC consists of three people who run for office as a team. Municipal Councils contain two deputies and a mayor, who also run as a team. Both CASECs and Municipal Councils serve four-year terms.

To win office, a candidate must capture an absolute majority: fifty percent of the votes plus one. Failing that, a run-off is held between the two candidates with the highest number of votes. If the initial vote is especially close however, more than two candidates may be included in the run-offs.

Requirements for candidacy vary according to office. Age requirements are 25 years for CASEC and Municipal Council, 30 for Deputy, and 35 for the Senate and Presidency. For the offices of Deputy, Senator, and President of the Republic, residency requirements are two, four and five years respectively. Property ownership is also a precondition for holding office at the Deputy level and above.

By the close of registration and determinations of eligibility, the following number of candidates had qualified for office:

- 1,539 for 565 CASEC positions;
- 534 for 135 Municipal Councils;
- 382 for 83 seats in the Chamber of Deputies;
- 131 for 27 Senate seats; and
- 11 for President of the Republic

The eleven candidates who qualified for the President of the Republic are as follows, listed in the same order in which they appeared on the ballot:

1. Thomas DESULME, PNT
2. Fritz SIMON, Independent
3. Marc BAZIN, MIDH
4. Rene THEODORE, MRN
5. Jean Bertrand ARISTIDE, FNCD
6. Richard Vladimir JEANTY, Paradise
7. Francois LATORTUE, Modeleh-PRDH
8. Sylvio CLAUDE, PDCH
9. Hubert DE RONCERAY, MDM
10. Volvic Remy JOSEPH, MKN
11. Louis DEJOIE, PAIN

The most common grounds for disqualification were “party not recognized”, “no deposit” and “lack of bank accreditation”. The high rate of disqualification—57.7% for the Presidency, 15.5% for the Senate and 19.3% for the Chamber of Deputies is attributable largely to the proliferation of forty parties which

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6 See Appendix F for a chart of candidates by party and by post.
sprang up literally overnight upon Baby Doc’s departure in 1986. Many of these parties and their candidates have little or no credibility, resources, or base of support.

Prior to the CEP’s eligibility determinations on November 6, there was a great deal of public speculation concerning the candidacy of former Interior Minister Roger Lafontant. As former de facto head of the dreaded Ton-Ton Macoutes, Lafontant was and is one of Haiti’s most notorious figures. Not only was his candidacy an overt violation of Article 291, Lafontant had publicly sworn there would be violence should his candidacy be refused, and the members of the CEP were said to fear for their personal safety as they deliberated. In the end, the CEP was spared a difficult choice, for Lafontant’s candidacy was annulled on grounds which had nothing to do with Article 291—for neglecting to receive a discharge from government service during his tenure as Interior Minister, and for failing to present a birth certificate at time of filing.

Leslie Manigat, President of the Republic from February to June, 1988 was also ruled ineligible. Article 134.3 of the Constitution stipulates that a President must wait a period of five years before seeking office, and Manigat had served briefly as President of the Republic in 1988. Manigat contested; he been ousted in a coup led by General Namphy after only five months in office, and Haiti had undergone three separate governments since his departure.

As rulings by the CEP may not be appealed, the only recourse left to rejected candidates is to publicly question the integrity of the CEP, and/or dispute the legitimacy of the Electoral Law. Most rebuffed candidates dutifully did both. Lafontant took this to the extreme, when on January 6, 1991—between the time of the general election and the run-offs, he and a score of armed men stormed the Presidential Palace and proclaimed the elections invalid. The coup was intercepted at General Abraham’s order, and Lafontant was arrested. On July 30, Lafontant was sentenced to life in prison, along with twenty-one of his co-conspirators. Thousands of Haitians stayed home that day, glued to the radio’s coverage of the trail. When the verdict was revealed, Aristide proclaimed a national holiday.
ELECTION DAY

Voting Procedures

Haitians voted in the same BIVs on December 16, 1990 in which they had registered in October. Computerized registries were posted outside each BIV, detailing who had registered to vote there. After verifying their names on the posted lists, voters then proceeded one by one to the BIV secretary, who checked each voter’s card against the registry. In isolated cases, registries were written by hand.

In addition to the voter and the five designated BIV officials, pre-designated party representatives and official observers bearing credentials were also allowed into the BIV to witness the voting. Political groups were permitted as well, as were members of the press. The media was tightly restrained from making any pronouncements however until the official results were posted.

Once their registration was verified, voters were given both ballots and voting instructions from the BIV president. The voter then took the ballots behind the isoloi (voting booth), and chose accordingly. Both the candidate’s name and party appeared on the ballots; voters placed an X or other clearly identifiable mark next to the candidates of their choice.

Each voter received a total of five ballots, corresponding to the five elective offices being decided: CASEC, Municipal Council, Deputy, Senator, and President of the Republic. Each ballot bore two colored bands on its opposite side, which corresponded to one of five ballot boxes, into which the voter deposited the appropriate ballot.

After making his or her five selections, the voter folded each ballot separately, and placed it in the corresponding ballot box. The voter’s thumb was then dipped in indelible ink, and his or her voter registration card marked as having voted.

The use of ink to identify those who had voted, the so-called Nicaraguan method,7 provoked much concern throughout the electorate, though not perhaps for the reasons one might expect. Rather than feeling indignant toward the prospect of being physically marked, most Haitians were instead concerned that the method was vulnerable to deceit. Rumors spread that the ink could be washed away easily, leaving open the possibility of multiple voting.

The Nicaraguan method had also been planned for the abortive 1987 Haitian elections. This only added to the public anxiety, for it was thought that this ink had dried up, and that the CEP would not act in time to buy additional ink for the 1990 elections. The truth was that the ink from 1987 was perfectly intact. The facts yielded to perception however, and the Canadian government donated thousands of bottles of fuscia ink to the CEP to allay public concerns.

According to the Election Law, polls were to open at precisely 6:00 a.m. This was not uniformly accomplished however, in that many BIVs did not receive their election kits in time for the 6:00 a.m. opening.8 This was especially true within the environs of Port-au-Prince, with some polling places in Carre Four and Cite Soleil unable to secure their kits until almost midday.

Understandably, this led to a great deal of frustration among the would-be voters, who had been standing in line since before dawn. As a result, the BIVs in these areas extended voting hours

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7 The Nicaraguan method actually predates the 1990 Nicaraguan election for which it is named, and is used throughout the Caribbean and Central America to discourage multiple voting.

8 Some BIVs failed to receive their ballots for Magistrates and CASECs altogether. In those instances, make-up elections were scheduled for early January, prior to the official run-off election of January 20.
beyond the official 6:00 p.m. closing time in order to accommodate those still waiting to vote.

This was less of a problem in the countryside and in cities outside of Port-au-Prince which had received their materials the preceding day, in many cases by helicopter. In several rural areas BIV officials made their final preparations by candlelight, as voters gathered outside in the pre-dawn darkness.

**Issues of Concern**

Distribution of voting materials was a chronic problem throughout the electoral period, causing frequent shortages and delays. There were incidents throughout the country of missing electoral lists, shortages of ballots and other materials, and of BIVs opening significantly later than 6 a.m. Some instances were isolated; others, as in Port au Prince’s Cite Soleil, were more expansive. Haiti has neither the roads nor the vehicles capable of carrying out a logistical endeavor of the magnitude which the election entailed. Three helicopters—one rented, one government-owned, and one provided by IFES—were procured at the last minute to facilitate the delivery of materials. In the final days preceding December 16, officials literally worked around the clock in an effort to guarantee delivery of the ballots and other voting materials. Because Haiti’s transportation system is so dilapidated, distribution may prove to be one of the most difficult electoral problems to overcome.

**Voting Assistance**

Assisting voters who request it is a delicate issue in any country. In a nation such as Haiti, where there is no established tradition of regular voting and where illiteracy is estimated to run as high as 80%, voters asking for assistance can become routine. Article 104.2 of the Election Law provides that:

“Any voter suffering from any infirmity that prevents him from registering or voting according to the present law, may be assisted by a voter of his choice. This should be reported on the electoral card and in the oral report.”

Voters seeking assistance was common, and in reality voters were helped more often by members of the BIV—usually the president—than they were by voters of their own choosing. The president would normally go behind the isoloir with the voter and identify all of the candidates on the ballot, or in some cases, simply ask the voter which candidate he or she preferred, and indicate where that candidate appeared on the ballot. As the Election Law stipulates, anytime a voter requested assistance it should have been noted on the official register. This was not done consistently.

In certain BIVs in L’Artibonite, as well as in Fort Liberte, near the Dominican border, voters seeking assistance were publicly asked by a visiting BEC official for whom they wished to vote, and were shown accordingly. The voter then marked his or her ballot in front of the entire council, dispensing with the formality of the isoloir, since the voting was no longer secret at this point. This was a more egregious breach of secrecy than was usually found.

In many of the smaller BIVs, or in BIVs which lacked sufficient furniture, the aspect of secrecy was hard to maintain. In BIVs that had no tables, isoloirs were placed on the ground, with voters squatting behind them to mark their ballots. This made it relatively easy to see for whom they were voting if one tried. The degree to which the secret ballot was guaranteed varied from BIV to BIV. Some officials went to great lengths to insure privacy, while others held a more casual view on the issue.

**Influencing the Vote**

There were various charges throughout the day that voters were being pressured to vote for a particular party, usually the FNCD. Upon closer investigation by NRIIA election observers however, while there were many charges, no one would substantiate this by giving either his or her name, that of the alleged perpetrator, or
by providing documental evidence. More often than not, people claimed to have heard of someone else being intimidated, or of a specific BIV in offense, rather than having experienced coercion or intimidation themselves.

There were instances reported throughout the country of voters crowing like a rooster (the FNCD’s symbol), and of carrying roosters in close proximity to the polling stations. Whereas the intent behind this behavior was clear, what could be done to stop it was not, in that most farm animals roam freely in Haiti and their sudden appearance is not atypical. Though some party activists complained, BIV officials considered the matter outside of their purview.

**Plastic over Aristide’s Slot**

By mid-morning on December 16, rumors spread throughout the country that bits of laminated plastic were placed over Aristide’s #5 spot on the ballot, so that when a voter marked the ballot, nothing legible would appear. Though the rumour proved to be groundless, it was telling of the widely held fear among the populace that attempts to defraud the election were afoot, with Aristide the express target.

**Proper Identification**

There were surprisingly few instances of people trying to vote without their voter registration card. One reported instance occurred during the run-offs, near Gonaïves. When the NRIIA went to investigate, the BIV president admitted that this was true. He added however that since the man in question was known to all of the BIV officials, and because his name did appear on the registry, he was still allowed to vote despite having lost his registration card. While this was technically a violation of the Election Law, the president’s decision given the circumstances was perhaps understandable, and in any case, his candor was appreciated.

**Military Voting**

The military voted alongside the civilian population, in most cases while still in uniform. They were forbidden however to carry their guns or other weapons into the voting office, which was a significant concession given the military’s notorious past. While soldiers were posted throughout the country to ensure a peaceful and uneventful election, they for the most part kept a low profile, and took exhaustive precautions not to disrupt the voting process by their presence.

**Election Observers**

In addition to the observer delegation hosted by NRIIA, several other delegations were present for the election. NRIIA’s counterpart, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, co-sponsored a delegation in conjunction with the Carter Center of Emory University. Led by former President Jimmy Carter, the delegation had thirty-three members, including Prime Minister George Price of Belize, and former Mayor of Atlanta Andrew Young. The United Nations fielded approximately one hundred observers. The Organization of American States boasted the largest showing of observers with approximately two hundred, representing a total of twenty-six countries. The field staff of the International Foundation of Electoral Systems were also credentialed as election observers, as were members of the American Embassy and the United States Agency for International Development.

In addition to foreign observers, the political parties were allowed to provide pollwatchers of their own. Usually no more than two per BIV, the party representatives were permitted to stand by and watch the day’s voting, provided that they were credentialed with papers from their respective parties authorizing them to do so. Only the major parties managed a consistent presence however, with the FNCD the most widely represented.
Recourse

Parties and candidates with grievances about the conduct of any political party or candidate directed their complaints, along with "justifiable and testimonial documents", to the appropriate BED. If the complaints proved legitimate, the CEP could nullify the candidacy of the guilty party (parties), and prohibit him/them from running for office again within the next five years. One recurring problem for Haitian political parties was their failure to fully document the alleged infractions.

The most remarkable aspect to election day was not what occurred but rather what did not: there was no concerted effort made to disrupt the process, to intimidate voters, or to subvert the secrecy of the ballot. On the contrary, some voters were so excited by the opportunity to vote that they proudly revealed their marked ballots to anyone who would look.

Vote Tabulation

BIVs were supposed to close at 6:00 p.m., although those which were late in receiving their election kits stayed open until all voters were accommodated. When the BIV president declared the voting officially closed, all electoral officials, party representatives, candidates and observers verified closing operations in the registry. Once the poll was declared closed, no one was allowed to leave or enter without the express permission of the CEP.

With doors closed, the clerk began counting the number of unused ballots remaining for each office. Beginning with the ballot box for the President of the Republic, the BIV president counted the votes placed in each box, and verified that the total number of votes corresponded with the number of voters.

The BIV president then unfolded each ballot, beginning again with the President of the Republic, announced its content, and revealed the ballot to all present. Ballots were placed in piles according to candidate; any ballots in which the voter's intent was unclear were declared nullified by the BIV president, contingent upon the agreement of the other officials present. Though the president and other electoral officials made every attempt to ascertain the voter's meaning, a significant number of votes were invalidated due to the ballots being marked incorrectly, which rendered the voters' intent undiscernible.

At this point one of the two BIV clerks compiled the valid votes for each candidate and counted them. After the clerk's count, the secretary then cataloged the following information into the register:

* the number of ballots received by the BIV
* the total number of votes cast
* the number of valid votes
* the number of nullified votes
* the number of unused ballots
* the number of votes by party, political group, or candidate
* complaints or contestations by any party representative, political group, or candidate concerning the judgments of the BIV
* any other noteworthy incident

Tabulations were made in six originals, one of which the president posted outside of the BIV. One original then went to the BEC and two to the BED, one of which was forwarded to the CEP. The two remaining originals were then given to the party representatives of the two leading candidates in the presidential race.

Upon the completion of the count, the BIV president, accompanied by the two party representatives, presented the results to the appropriate BED, who then relayed them to the CEP. The BIV president and party representatives then appeared before the competent BEC to receive transportation to the BED. They carried with them the following documents:

* the report of the ballot count
* the valid ballots
the nullified ballots
the unused ballots
the registers

Both communication and transportation were achieved through any means possible. Results were reported by phone, shortwave, cable, or messenger. Ballots were transported a variety of ways, including government transport, private vehicles, bicycles, donkeys, and by foot. Military escort was provided whenever possible.

After verifying the votes of each BIV, the BED then began tabulating results of all the electoral districts, in the presence of observers and representatives. The BED assembled all electoral data in one report, including any disputes held by the party representatives. Five originals were made, with the BED keeping one for its records and posting another at its main entrance. The two party representatives were each given an original, with the fifth original dispatched directly to the CEP.

Concurrent with the official tabulation, the United Nations and the Organization of American States conducted a parallel vote count of their own. Drawn from a random sampling of less than one percent of all BIVs, the parallel vote count sought to determine whether or not any one candidate had captured a clear fifty percent of the vote. Failing that, the parallel vote count tried to verify the top two finishers in the race. Relying upon a state-of-the-art communications and transportation network which far eclipsed the technology available to the CEP, the UN/OAS effort determined by midnight that Aristide would be the uncontested winner. Officials from both the UN and OAS tendered the data to the CEP, which was reportedly relieved that the independent findings so closely mirrored its own.

The CEP made a preliminary announcement the following afternoon in which it proclaimed Aristide the winner of the presidential race by a majority of 69%. It was the first such public disclosure, as both the Election Law and a previous agreement with the CEP had prevented the UN and OAS from making a public announcement the night before. Results were made official on Christmas Eve, when all BEDs had reported. See Appendices G and I for the distribution of seats within the National Assembly, and the results of the presidential balloting.

January 20, 1991 Run-Offs

The December 16 primary threw scores of races into run-offs, including 22 Senate seats, 42 seats in the House of Deputies, 33 Municipal Councils and over a hundred CASECS. Whereas the primary had been an undisputed success, the run-offs proved disappointing.

For one, voter participation was negligible. Following the palpable excitement and anticipation engendered by the December 16 election, January 20 was anticlimactic by comparison. Few people could muster the interest or motivation required to actually go to the polls. The general perception was that only the election of a president really mattered, and that the lesser offices held no significant sway on the process. Many voters had discarded their voter registration cards in December, thinking they were no longer needed.

The NRJIA fielded another team of election observers for the January run-offs, though a smaller one than it had the month before. John Lattuzio, head of the Republican party of New Mexico, led the delegation. Other delegates included Dr. Georges Fauriol, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; John Grotta, of the National Republican Senatorial Committee; Hector Wynter, Executive Secretary of the Caribbean Democrat Union; and NRJIA Program Officers Edward Stewart and Ann Bradley.

The NRJIA team found the elections paralyzed by apathy, with BIV officials looking lonely and bored as they waited for voters who would never show. Some administrators became lax in their duties, and at times the vigilance which had characterized the preceding election gave way to carelessness. This could be seen
in such occurrences as unsealed ballot boxes, failure to use the isoloirs, and voting in public rather than in secret.

The curfew and other security measures were not applied to the run-offs to the same degree they had been on December 16. This concerned many citizens, who took the abundance of traffic on election day to mean that security measures were not in place as they had been on December 16. As a result, some voters stayed home who might have voted otherwise. Turnout was about 15%, significantly lower even than the cautious UN/OAS prediction of under 50%. Final results were released by the CEP on January 24, 1991.

ASSESSMENT

The NRIIA bore witness to the Haitian elections at all stages of development, including the initial announcements and subsequent postponements, the declarations and disqualifications of candidacy, the December 16, 1990 elections and January 20, 1991 run-offs, as well as the counting processes for both.

In the wake of each postponement, the date of February 7—the day designated by the Constitution for the new president to take office, loomed heavy in the mind of the electorate. Yet the deadline was met, to the credit of the dedication and tenacity of the all parties involved, especially the CEP, President Trouillot, General Abraham and the Haitian people themselves.

In most countries with totalitarian pasts, fear and intimidation serve as trenchant reminders of the anti-democratic forces which linger. As always in Haiti, rumors abounded of Duvalierist plots to undo the electoral process, and the December 5 bombing of an FNCD rally in Petionville which killed seven people and injured scores more was a gruesome illustration of enduring Duvalierist opposition to free and fair elections.

Yet if anything in this election, the specter of violence and intimidation only served to galvanize voter determination. This was not Communist Europe, where the government had doled out patronage jobs in exchange for political loyalty. In Haiti, there were no jobs, except for a rarefied and privileged few. After thirty years of Duvalierist torture and plunder, there was so little to lose by voting, and so much to gain, that the voters advanced to the polls undaunted.

As the day wore on December 16, it became clear that Aristide had captured the presidency outright, and that no recount would be necessary. That evening and into the following day, people poured onto the streets, dancing and chanting their pleasure over Aristide’s victory, waving tree branches in triumph. Though many parties held complaints against individuals and certain BIVs, no candidate or individual contended that the presidential
outcome would have been any different had the voting been flawless.

Aristide, who two months before the election was not only not a candidate, but was urging his followers not to register, walked away with 67.48% of the presidential vote on election day. On paper, Aristide had all the disadvantages: he had no government experience, no established party organization behind him—the FNCD had only been formed that summer, and had less than two months in which to campaign. A further liability in western eyes was that he was seen as being too far left to curry continued US support, unlike Bazin, who was highly regarded in Washington and other world capitals. Although conventional political wisdom would have never anticipated this outcome, traditional predictors of success have little relevancy in a country with a political record as sordid and tumultuous as Haiti’s.

As in any election, the ultimate verdict on its fairness falls to the people themselves. For most Haitians, the answer to the question of fairness would have to be a resounding “yes”. If there is one palpable change which came about on December 16, it was the sense that for the first time in their lives—perhaps for the first time in the history of their country, that the common people had a voice in their own destiny. That the people were finally allowed to wield their political voice was a direct function of the military’s responsible behavior over most stages of the electoral process.

The problem remains however that the Haitian public still views politics in terms of the single candidate and his or her charisma, rather than in terms of permanent political parties and institutions with structured ideologies and constructive approaches to government. Aristide is a paradigm of the charismatic figure turned politician. The FNCD, either due to its late entry into the race or a failure to comprehend the importance of doing so, neglected to field a full slate of candidates for all offices. Out of a possible 27 Senate seats, the FNCD ran 15 candidates, 13 of whom won. For the Chamber of Deputies, which has 83 seats, the FNCD fielded 36 candidates and captured 27 seats. Had the FNCD managed a complete list of candidates for all positions, its numbers would surely have been higher, and would have almost certainly given them the majorities in both houses which they currently lack.

In the wake of Aristide’s and the FNCD’s overwhelming victory, the attitude of most Haitian political parties is that of “wait and see”. As one party leader put it, “we are democrats, this is a democracy, and we accept that he has won. We will give him a chance.” She added that time will inevitably “demystify and demythify” Aristide’s aura of invincibility.

One campaign promise which Aristide has delivered is purging the military of its Duvalierist elements. At his inauguration, he “suggested” the retirement of six generals—Lacret, Saint Eloi, Saint Louis, Laurenceau, Romulus, Chavannes, and called for Colonel Raoul Cedras’ promotion. On July 3, Cedras replaced Abraham as Commander of the Haitian Armed Forces. Responding to allegations of fiscal impropriety within the Trouillot administration, Aristide forbade more than 160 senior level civil servants and administrators from leaving the country pending an investigation. The list included former President Trouillot.

Unfortunately, Aristide’s reformist fervor can go too far. He has been castigated by moderates for not condemning the rioting and political reprisals triggered by Lafontant’s January coup attempt, and his subsequent arrest of Trouillot on the grounds that she had conspired with Lafontant against her own government was considered both spurious and politically motivated.

With the FNCD lacking a majority in either chamber, Aristide faces an opposition legislature, and the degree to which they will cooperate remains unclear. Already there is much squabbling between the new government and the FNCD, which each thinking the other is ungrateful for having brought the other to power. The ANDP alliance has dissolved, and PANPRA has emerged as a dominant legislative force in Parliament, as has PAN, which like the PDCH holds eight seats. The Constitution stipulates that the majority parties in both Houses may elect the Prime Minister;
if no party holds a majority, the task falls to the president. Aristide’s first and second choices for Prime Minister, Charles Roumain and Rene Preval, were both initially rejected by the leaders of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, Ernst Pedro Casseus and Eudrice Raymond. Casseus and Raymond eventually consented however, and Preval’s nomination was approved by both chambers on February 13. Preval announced his cabinet on February 19. His selections included three women and was comprised largely of people known for their leftist leanings and personal closeness to Aristide. A baker by vocation, Preval himself assumes the key portfolio of Interior Minister as well as that of Defense.

Aristide has toned down his anti-American rhetoric, and cultivated a positive working relationship with United States Ambassador Alvin Adams. For its part, the United States has approved $82 million in aid for Haiti. In a departure from its earlier stance, the Haitian government has also opened negotiations with the International Monetary Fund for renewed loans. The business community remains skeptical of Aristide’s economic policy however, especially his decision to raise the daily minimum wage from $2.00 to $3.50.

December 16, 1990 marked a momentous step in Haiti’s on-going struggle for participatory government. But democracies are made of greater things than one legitimate election, and this was but the first step of which many are needed. Throughout Haiti’s history, politics have tended to be personalistic rather than issue or platform-oriented. Though Aristide’s dynamic character and oratory swept him effortlessly into office, only successful leadership and internal reform will keep him there. Yet for the moment, President Aristide enjoys a reserve of good-will.

There is a creole proverb which goes “after the dance, the drums are heavy”. Now that the euphoria has subsided a bit, Aristide and his government are discovering just how heavy those drums truly are.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As successful as the elections were, as in all human endeavors there was some room for improvement. In the hopes of furthering the democratic momentum of December 16, 1990 the NRIIA respectfully recommends the following measures for future elections.

Registration

As very few Haitians possess any form of positive identification, voters lacking paper credentials were allowed to register upon the sworn testimony and positive identification of two registered voters. Many people feared multiple voting would result, as theoretically people may have been able to register at more than one BIV. A simple solution would be to introduce a national identification card with a picture ID for citizens 18 years or older prior to the next round of elections in 1992. This could be used for a number of verification purposes, in addition to being required by the BIV at the time of registration and voting.

Voter Assistance

The Election Law stipulates that those voters requiring assistance may bring someone along to the polls to aid them in casting their ballots. In actuality however, voters were more often assisted by BIV officials or party poll watchers, which leaves open the issue of possible impropriety or undue influence. In the future, greater care should be taken to insure that those giving assistance are truly neutral, and not connected to the voting process in some way.

Ballot Simplification

Haitians were presented with a total of five ballots on election day, which would be confusing to anyone, especially to people not accustomed to voting regularly. Not only is the printing and distribution of so many ballots unnecessarily expensive, but it adds to the time needed for voters to cast their ballots, as well as
the time consumed in counting each one. The NRIIA recommends that the number of ballots be reduced to two, one for the President, Senators and Deputies, and one for the CASECS and Magistrates.

Work Shifts

Polls were open for a total of 12 hours, which does not take into account the amount of setup and ballot time in the morning, nor closing and tallying time in the evening. BIV officials were understandably very tired by closing time. For future elections, the CEP should consider either rotating poll workers, or allowing them to work shifts with one or two breaks in between to provide them a respite from the day’s demands. Another option would be to simply shorten voting hours.

Ballot Distribution

Due to the late distribution of ballots, not all polls opened at 6:00 a.m. In some cases openings were delayed until the early afternoon; in others, the BIVs never opened due to lack of ballots. Greater efforts should be made by the CEP to insure that ballot distribution is both prompt and uniform.

Ballot Storage

In the excitement following the election, instances were reported of ballots being lost or destroyed before being brought to the CEP for final verification. As this final count is integral to the integrity of the election, all efforts should be made to ensure that all votes are safely conveyed to the CEP for conclusive verification.
Mr. Alfredo Fournier  
Ambassador at Large  
for Caribbean Affairs  
COSTA RICA

Mr. Russel Hammond  
Jamaica Labour Party  
JAMAICA

Ms. Margret Harne  
Office of Congressman  
Lawrence Coughlin  
UNITED STATES

Mr. Huell Howser  
K CET-TV  
UNITED STATES

Mr. Eugene Johnson  
Business Mail Express  
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Mr. Martin Krause  
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Appendix B

DEPLOYMENT LIST

Teams Deploying from Cap Haitian:

Team One: Bradley, Johnson
Translator: Stanley Chapouet
Destination: Trou du Nord, Caracol, Fort Liberte

Team Two: Scott-MacDonald, Williams
Translator: Patrick Samy
Destination: Dondon, St. Raphael, Paignon, Hinche

Team Three: Larue, Orville Brown
Translator: Raoul Auguste
Destination: Port Margot, Le Borgne

Alpha Four: Asencio, Harned
Translator: Dorzema Widner
Destination: Cap-Haitian Metro Area

Team Five: Barber, Watkins
Translator: Barbara Dominique
Destination: Cap-Haitian Metro Area

Team Six: Nanton, Todd
Translator: Deborah Polynice
Destination: Southwest to Gonaives with points in between

Teams Deploying from Port-au-Prince:

Team Seven: Compton, Thompson
Translator: Julie Gardere
Destination: Port-au-Prince

Team Eight: Castor, Hammond
Translator: Alex Duchemin
Destination: Port-au-Prince

Team Nine: Stewart, Howser
Translator: Sabine Vital Herne
Destination: Port-au-Prince

Team Ten: Wynter, Esquivel
Translator: Jacqueline O’Garro
Destination: Port-au-Prince

Team Eleven: Hoggarth, Fournier
Translator: Henry Hoggarth
Destination: Port-au-Prince

Team Twelve: Sticht, Mitchell
Translator: Dimitri Fourcand
Destination: Leogane, Petit Goave,
             Maragoane, Aquin, Les Cayes

Team Thirteen: Cox, Russell
Translator: Guylicane Polynice
Destination: Leogane, Petit Goave,
             Maragoane, Aquin, Les Cayes

Team Fourteen: Canfield, Fauriol
Translator: James Timmer
Destination: Jacmel, Marigot

Team Fifteen: Al Brown, Walcott
Translator: Marie Belizaire
Destination: Saut d’Eau ou Ville

Team Sixteen: Krause, Salazar
Translator: Carlos Serf
Destination: St. Marc, Dessalines
Appendix C

Opening Delegation Statement

by

The Right Honorable John Compton,
Prime Minister of St. Lucia,
Delegation Leader

14 December, 1990

We are an international delegation of thirty observers from eleven countries who are present in Haiti this week to assess the presidential, legislative and local elections. The delegation includes former heads of state, parliamentarians, political party leaders, election administrators, and democratic activists. Many of them have participated in other election missions, and a number have visited Haiti in the recent past.

We are here to examine the development of the electoral process, including the voting and counting on election day. It is important to emphasize that we are just observers and not participants. We are not here to arbitrate, and we take no position on the outcome of the election. Nor are we here to interfere in the internal affairs of Haiti. We simply want to see for ourselves that the people of this country are able to cast a secret ballot in a fair and meaningful election.

This perspective is consistent with the practice of international missions to elections in other countries, and is widely accepted as the standard for observer conduct. It has also been accepted by the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), the governing body for Haiti’s elections, the government and the major political forces. Our mission has several purposes. We wish our presence to be symbolic of international support for a free and fair election and for a genuine and complete democratic transition. We also hope our presence will provide Haitians with confidence in the election process, because many of them are fearful and distrustful of previous governments. We are also here to learn about the electoral process from firsthand contacts with Haitians, including voters and administrators, so that we may provide a complete assessment to the international community afterward.

We have met today and will continue to meet with a broad spectrum of Haitians to solicit their views on the electoral process and the campaign that has taken place. On election day our delegation will divide into sixteen teams which will travel to towns in every part of the country.

The delegation will seek to evaluate three distinct elements of the election process. With respect to the election campaign, delegates will ascertain whether candidates and other participants in the process were able to communicate their views to the public. Regarding procedures on election day, we will analyze whether voters were able to cast their ballots in secret, and without fear of intimidation. Finally, in analyzing the counting process, we will attempt to determine whether the ballots have been accurately tallied, relying on a review of official results, as well as the results of the parallel tabulations of the vote being conducted by private, non-partisan groups. Throughout the weekend, our teams around the country will remain in communication with our office in Port-au-Prince and the delegation leader.

This delegation represents the Western Hemisphere’s interest and deep concern in the Haitian political process. A large component of this delegation is derived from the political parties of the Caribbean Democrat Union (CDU), the regional body of democratic and market-oriented political parties. The CDU and the Caribbean people have looked forward to these elections with great interest. A democratic election and a stable, popularly-elected government in Haiti will make tremendous strides in moving the Caribbean toward a progressive twenty-first century.

This delegation has been organized by the National Republican Institute for International Affairs, which is affiliated with the Republican Party in the United States. The Institute conducts programs in support of democratic development around the world.
and has been active in Haiti since June. The Institute has sponsored a number of observer missions similar to this one, in the Philippines, Haiti, Panama, Honduras, Chile, Nicaragua, South Korea, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

The Institute has had staff in Haiti since June, and we in the delegation have benefited from a full review of the campaign during these previous months. Pre-election surveys of the election administration and the campaign environment have been conducted, and have highlighted a number of issues of interest. These reports will enable this delegation to provide a comprehensive assessment of the whole process.

On Monday, December 17, the delegation will regroup in Port-au-Prince for a full debriefing and comparison of observers. On Monday at 12:00 noon, we will offer a preliminary statement to the press at a press conference here at the Hotel Villa Creole.

Appendix D

Preliminary Conclusions of International Observers

by

The Right Honorable John Compton, Prime Minister of St. Lucia
Delegation Leader

17 December, 1990

We are an international delegation of thirty observers from eleven countries who have been here in Haiti this week to assess the presidential, legislative, and local elections. This delegation includes former heads of state, parliamentarians, political party leaders, election administrators, and democratic activists.

This delegation has been organized by the National Republican Institute for International Affairs, which is affiliated with the Republican party in the United States. The Institute conducts programs in support of democratic development around the world and has been active in Haiti since June. The Institute has sponsored observer missions similar to this one in the Philippines, Panama, Honduras, Chile, Nicaragua, South Korea, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and to the 1987 Haitian Constitutional Referendum.

This delegation represents the Western Hemisphere’s interest and concern for the Haitian political process. A large component of this delegation is derived from the political parties of the Caribbean Democrat Union (CDU), the regional body of democratic and market-oriented parties. The CDU and the Caribbean people have looked toward these elections with great anticipation since Haiti’s stability affects the entire region’s well-being.
We have examined the development of the electoral process, including the voting and counting that took place yesterday. It is important to emphasize that we are just observers and not participants. We were not here to arbitrate, and we take no position on the outcome of the election. Nor were we here to interfere in the internal affairs of Haiti. We came to see for ourselves that the people of this country were able to cast a secret ballot in a fair and meaningful election.

First, we would like to commend the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) for its work in organizing these elections. We realize that the members and staff of the CEP faced an enormous task to arrange all of the voting stations, the material and equipment, and the support personnel.

Our teams covered approximately 800 polling places throughout the country and witnessed the voting from the opening through the closing of the BIVs. We feel that the political will of the people was expressed. There were however, some serious problems in the administration of the materials. We witnessed polling stations without ballots, boxes, ink, or voter registration lists. We have further concerns that the voter registration process could be improved to more accurately reflect the number of eligible voters. The delayed opening of many polling sites in areas such as Cite Soleil and Carrefour could have caused a serious problem both in terms of security and the overall fairness of the election. However, the parties’ and the CEP’s quick reaction and announcement that they were working together to solve the problem contributed to diffusing the tension.

In addition to the distribution problems, our delegation is concerned about what appeared to be the influencing of the voters by BIV officials in some areas.

None of the irregularities we witnessed seemed to be so serious as to have changed the overall vote of the people. The international community will be extremely watchful that the many problems experienced during this election will be addressed during future elections.

In conclusion, our delegation wants to commend the Haitian people for their enthusiasm and determination to participate in the democratic process. We were all impressed by the willingness of voters to stand quietly in line for many hours in certain places in order to cast their vote. We congratulate the military for its part in providing the security necessary for the political parties to conduct a full and meaningful campaign and for safe-guarding the voting process.

This was a good beginning for democracy in Haiti. We are encouraged by this first step, and although the official results are not in and will take a while longer to be announced, our preliminary finding is that the determination of the Haitian people to vote, the responsible behavior of the military, and the work of the CEP have resulted in an election which reflects the will of the Haitian people. We offer our congratulations and goodwill for the future.
### POLITICAL PARTIES AND GROUPS IN HAITI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation or acronym</th>
<th>Name of political party or group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARH</td>
<td>Alliance pour la renaissance d’Haïti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANPRA) PNDH) MNP-28</td>
<td>Bloc unitaire patriotique (dissolved on 11 December 1988)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHADEL</td>
<td>Centre haïtien des libertés publiques Comité de coordination des forces démocratiques Comité de liaison des forces démocratiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KID</td>
<td>Confédération unitaire démocratique - Komité inité démokratik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP-7</td>
<td>Club politique du 7 février Forces révolutionnaires haïtiennes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNL</td>
<td>Front uniifié de libération nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KONAKOM</td>
<td>Komité nasyonal kongrè mouvman démokratik yo KONAKOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDN</td>
<td>Koumbite démocratique national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDN</td>
<td>Mobilisation pour le développement national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mouvement d’action démocratique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODELH-PRDH</td>
<td>Mouvement démocratique de libération</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDU</td>
<td>Mouvement démocratique de l’unité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDNH</td>
<td>Mouvement des démocrates nationaux haïtiens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKN</td>
<td>Mouvement koumbite national</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIDH</td>
<td>Mouvement pour l’instauration de la démocratie en Haïti</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNP-28</td>
<td>Mouvement national patriotique du 28 novembre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNPH</td>
<td>Mouvement nationaliste progressiste haïtien</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>Mouvement d’organisation du pays - Mouvement ouvrier paysan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MODHA</td>
<td>Mouvement ouvrier démocratique haïtien</td>
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<tr>
<td>MURH</td>
<td>Mouvement d’union révolutionnaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOVELH</td>
<td>Mouvement de volontariat pour des élections libres et honnêtes</td>
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<td>PAIN</td>
<td>Parti agricole industriel national</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCSD</td>
<td>Parti des chrétiens sociaux démocrates</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDCH</td>
<td>Parti démode chrétien haïtien</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDPP</td>
<td>Parti démocrate parlementaire progressiste</td>
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<td>PDPC</td>
<td>Parti démocrate progressiste de carrefour</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Parti démocrate libéral Jean-Jacques Dessalines</td>
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<td>Parti haïtien de Dieu</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLPH</td>
<td>Parti libéral patriotique haïtien</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Parti de la libération haïtienne</td>
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<td>Parti national de défense des travailleurs</td>
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<td>FNDRPH</td>
<td>Parti national démocratique pour la reconstruction et le progrès d’Haïti</td>
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<td>Parti national haïtien</td>
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<td>PNP</td>
<td>Parti national progressiste révolutionnaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNT</td>
<td>Parti national du travail</td>
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<td>PPH</td>
<td>Parti des patriotes haïti</td>
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<td>PPNH</td>
<td>Parti populaire national haïtien</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPSH</td>
<td>Parti populaire social chrétien</td>
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<td>PADRANA</td>
<td>Parti de ralliement national</td>
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<td>PARAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRH</td>
<td>Parti réformiste haïtien</td>
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<td>PSCH</td>
<td>Parti social chrétien d’Haïti</td>
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<td>Parti unifié des communistes Haïtiest</td>
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<td>PUNH</td>
<td>Parti union nationale d’Haïti</td>
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<td>RANFOP</td>
<td>Rassembleman Nasyonal For Peysan Yo</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDNP</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDC</td>
<td>Rassemblement des démocrates chrétiens</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDR</td>
<td>Rassemblement des démocrates pour la République</td>
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<tr>
<td>REN</td>
<td>Rassemblement national (Organisation populaire, partis politiques et centrales)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDC</td>
<td>Rassemblement des démocrates chrétiens</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDR</td>
<td>Rassemblement des démocrates pour la République</td>
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### Appendix F

#### CANDIDATES BY PARTY AND BY POST

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<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>President</th>
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<th>Deputy</th>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th>CASEC</th>
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<td>113</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>90</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>94</td>
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**Posts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Senator</th>
<th>Deputy</th>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th>CASEC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>560</td>
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### Appendix G

#### DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS WITHIN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Seats Obtained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FNCD National Front for Change and Democracy</td>
<td>40 (13 senators, 27 deputies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDP National Alliance for Democracy and Progress</td>
<td>23 (6 senators, 17 deputies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAIN National Industrial Agricultural Party</td>
<td>8 (2 senators, 6 deputies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDCH Haitian Christian Democrat Party</td>
<td>8 (1 senator, 7 deputies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDNP Assembly of National Progressive Democrats</td>
<td>7 (1 senator, 6 deputies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDN Mobilization for National Development</td>
<td>5 (5 deputies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNT National Party of Work</td>
<td>4 (1 senator, 3 deputies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRN Movement of National Reconstruction</td>
<td>3 (2 senators, 1 deputy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODELH-PRDH Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Haiti</td>
<td>2 (2 deputies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKN National Cooperative Movement</td>
<td>2 (2 deputies)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent Candidates</td>
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* Two seats for the Assembly of Deputies have yet to be determined
Appendix I

FINAL RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CANDIDATE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF VOTES</th>
<th>PERCENT OF VOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Bertrand Aristide</td>
<td>1,107,125</td>
<td>67.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(FNCD)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marc Bazin</td>
<td>233,277</td>
<td>14.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ANDP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Dejoie</td>
<td>80,057</td>
<td>4.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PAIN)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubert de Roncerary</td>
<td>54,871</td>
<td>3.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MDN)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvio Claude</td>
<td>49,149</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PDCH)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rene Theodore</td>
<td>30,064</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MRN)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Desulme</td>
<td>27,362</td>
<td>1.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>(PNT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Volvick Remy Joseph</td>
<td>21,351</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MKN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Francois Latortue</td>
<td>15,060</td>
<td>.92</td>
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<tr>
<td>(MODELH-PRDH)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vladimir Jeanty</td>
<td>12,296</td>
<td>.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>(PARADIS)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fritz Simon</td>
<td>10,117</td>
<td>.62</td>
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<tr>
<td>(independent)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,640,729</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
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