HAITI

IRI Assessment of the
June 25, August 13, and
September 17, 1995 Legislative
and Municipal Elections in Haiti

October 11, 1995

(Note: All translations by IRI staff)

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I. Executive Summary
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide by US troops on October 15, 1994, was to provide Haiti with the opportunity to build a democratic future. The elections of June 25, 1995, provided the chance for Haiti to strengthen its democratic practice and pave the road towards reconciliation. The Haitian people should be commended for their endurance and enthusiasm during the laborious registration process and through the vote itself. Unfortunately, an arbitrary election process and breakdown of the electoral system deprived the people of Haiti of this opportunity. The aftermath of the election process has only made more pronounced the government of Haiti’s intransigence in addressing opposition parties’ concerns and has fractured the democratic forces in that society.

The problems that IRI identified in its pre-election updates released weeks before the balloting went unaddressed and led directly to the chaos of June 25th. The lack of transparency at every step of the process from the naming of the members of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) to the review of candidate registration dossiers undermined the political parties’ confidence in the system and its ability to produce a fair election. The CEP itself also cast doubts on parts of the electoral process by questioning the permanency of the ink and announcing that one million voter cards were missing and later explaining this was due to hoarding of cards by its own electoral officials.

Despite the amount of assistance provided by UN and US forces, the logistical difficulties, endemic to past elections, delayed or canceled voting in many areas throughout Haiti. Although many election officials worked exceptionally hard on election day to compensate for these difficulties, the CEP’s incompetence posed too many challenges that hard work could not overcome. The CEP’s failure to train election workers resulted in a severely diminished administrative ability, and little ballot secrecy as voting screens were not properly positioned and pollwatchers and election officials could observe the voting. Ballot security was further compromised by the failure of BIV workers to apply the seals to the ballot boxes.

The opportunity of obtaining a reliable result from this technically flawed election was lost at the point when the ballot boxes arrived at the BECs. There was a flagrant lack of control of the material; there was no system in place to handle the arrival of the large amounts of material or to secure any of the material. IRI observers saw marked and unmarked ballots and tally sheets strewn around the floor, open ballot boxes piled to the ceiling with materials spilling out, and tampering with ballots and tally sheets. The integrity of the results could not be assured because of this widespread mismanagement and the opportunity for fraudulent activities.

After a thorough examination of Haiti’s pre-electoral environment, the June 25 elections the August 13 complementary elections, the September 17 elections, IRI has identified 13 areas for improvement and 36 recommendations to address them.
The areas are:

- the electoral law
- election administration capability
- candidate qualification and registration
- voter registration
- access to media for campaigning
- campaign financing
- location of voting places
- safeguarding of election materials
- pollwatchers
- transparency of the counting process
- the absence of an appeal process
- security
- civic education.

The 36 recommendations can be found in Section IV.

The people of Haiti have endured decades of dictatorship and oppression and most recently three years under a military regime; this election was a critical juncture to help erase the memories of Haiti’s authoritarian past. The people of Haiti deserve better.
II. Introduction
INTRODUCTION

US troops returned Aristide to power on October 15, 1995 after a coup on September 29, 1991 forced Aristide to flee the country. The election in 1990 which brought Aristide to power ended a series of interim governments which followed the exile of President Jean-Claude Duvalier in April 1986. These elections were carried out with the assistance of the United Nations and a large contingent of international observers, including an IRI delegation. However, during the period of the military regime from September 1991 to mid-October 1995 any progress Haiti had made on the road to democracy was summarily erased. Therefore, the parliamentary and municipal elections of June 25, 1995 rivaled in importance those of 1990 for their significance in signalling Haiti’s desire to rejoin the democratic family of nations. This report will build on IRI’s pre-election Haiti updates which were collected in IRI’s June 24th report. These updates detailed flaws in the pre-election process, the consequences of which became evident before, during and after the June 25th balloting.

Methodology

IRI opened an office in Port-au-Prince on May 1, 1995. IRI staff established contacts with the Haitian Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), its representatives in the departments and communes, all recognized political parties, labor unions, business associations, popular organizations, representatives of the Catholic and Protestant churches, representatives of the judicial system, representatives of the Organizations of American States, the United Nations and others. IRI conducted interviews, site visits and observed many meetings. To supplement the work of the IRI staff based in Haiti, IRI sent four assessment missions prior to the election to different provinces to meet with local election officials, candidates, political party representatives and other organizations. The pre-election teams assessed the status of ongoing efforts of the CEP, the ability for all political parties to fairly compete in the process, and the technical capacity of the election officials. Through the efforts of these teams and the IRI staff, IRI travelled to every department in Haiti prior to election day.

During the June 25, election IRI hosted a 25-person election observation mission, led by U.S. Representative Porter Goss, which covered all nine departments in Haiti. The delegation arrived three days prior to the election and remained throughout Haiti for three days following the election. Each team of two observers sent in regular reports throughout the election, and the contents of this report are derived from their reporting as well as IRI staff work subsequent to the elections. During election day, IRI observers reported in from all departments and visited approximately 500 voting sites (each voting site has 400 voters). IRI’s observers were able to monitor 50 percent of the ballot collection centers and local counting centers. IRI also had a team that observed the operations of the national CEP around the clock. A list of observers can be found at the conclusion of this section.

After Haiti’s June 25 elections, IRI maintained a presence and travelled throughout many of the departments following up on previous observations. For the rerun elections held on
August 13, which were boycotted by a majority of the political parties, IRI had teams in the three departments where a majority of the voting took place: North, Artibonite and the West. During the rerun elections of September 17, IRI had teams in the departments of the West, Artibonite and Grand-Anse.

The quality of this report is directly attributable to the willingness of the Haitian participants to share their experiences and records. IRI believes that the facts speak louder than any analysis, so in many instances, documents are included in this report that stand alone. These were elections for all Haitians, and it is critical to take into account how they see the elections in their own words.

Factors Contributing to a Transparent Election Process

There are certain internationally accepted standards for free and fair electoral processes. It is against these norms that organizations like IRI weigh and evaluate such processes.

1) There must be a legal framework that clearly establishes the role of the electoral administration institution and the procedures for an election;

2) The administration of the election must be conducted in a nonpartisan manner;

3) The electoral process must be open to any groups or individuals who meet reasonable standards to participate;

4) The general population must be able to participate, both directly and indirectly, in the process if they so choose;

5) Political parties or groups and candidates must be able to campaign freely and openly;

6) Access to media and other forms of public expression must be equitable;

7) Access to state resources, other than that which is specifically authorized in the electoral law or other pertinent legislation, must be prohibited;

8) Secrecy of the ballot must be assured;

9) Clear voting and counting procedures must be established;

10) Results of the voting at all levels must be made public.

As the following chart and sections show, Haiti failed to meet these recognized standards.

Clearly, there are conditions unique to each country and every election that provide a backdrop for each process. Specific conditions of the campaign period that may affect voting
on election day often have more impact on the quality of the process than any one of the points listed above.

The outcome of an election can also be affected by the political "playing field" on which competing parties attempt to deliver a message to voters. Uninhibited access to scarce campaign resources, equitable media exposure, security, and equal protection under the law are all factors affecting a party’s true competitiveness. This is a special concern in electoral environments that are in the early stages of democratic transition.

Because of the importance of these factors, IRI sought to fully evaluate the pre-electoral process and issued an extensive report prior to the election. A summary of these findings can be found in Section III.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STANDARDS FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS</th>
<th>PRESENT IN HAITI</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal framework that establishes role of the electoral administration institution and the procedures for an election.</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration of election must be conducted in a non-partisan manner.</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral process must be open to any groups or individuals who meet reasonable standards to participate.</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General population must be able to participate.</td>
<td>PARTIAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties, groups or candidates must be able to campaign freely and openly.</td>
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<td>Secrecy of the ballot must be ensured.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear voting and counting procedures must be established.</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results of the voting at all levels must be made public.</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-election Problem Identified by IRI</td>
<td>Remedial Action Taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP members named contrary to agreement with the political parties.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BED, BEC and BIV members named without consultation with the political parties.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A different electoral law than the one passed by the Parliament is promulgated by decree by President Aristide.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient Material for Voter Registration</td>
<td>Voter Registration is extended but new materials are not supplied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP President statement that one million voter cards are missing.</td>
<td>CEP President promises to release serial numbers so that the cards can not be used illegally. Then he claims 60,000 have been recovered and the rest were never really lost, the electoral officials were hoarding them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP repeatedly fails to pay election workers.</td>
<td>UN attempts to assist in the process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP misses deadline to post final candidate list - no final list was ever published.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP announces rejected candidates but fails to give reasons.</td>
<td>CEP later gives reasons for some of the rejected candidates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP fails to issue election day instructions to election workers.</td>
<td>IFES produces general guidebook for elections and provides general training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP fails to issue counting procedures.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP does not provide official voter registration lists to the BIVs.</td>
<td>Some BIVs use handwritten lists they kept during registration; others let those with voting cards vote; others just keep a list of those that vote; other make ad hoc decisions on whom to let vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No system in place at the BECs to receive ballots.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. List of IRI Observers
IRI OBSERVER DELEGATION

U. S. Representative Porter J. Goss: Congressman Goss (R-FL) is serving his fourth term in the House. He has a particular interest in Latin American policies and served as an election observer to the 1990 electoral process in Nicaragua. Congressman Goss is a member of the Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Ethics Committee, and the House Rules Committee.

Cleveland Benedict: Mr. Benedict represented the Second District of West Virginia in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1980-1982, and he has served as the state Commissioner of Agriculture, as well as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. He is the President of Ben Buck Farms in Lewisburg, West Virginia.

Jeff Brown: Mr. Brown is Director of Grassroots Development with the Republican Party of Virginia. Prior to joining the state Party, he served in Governor George Allen’s Administration as Director of the Commission on Citizen Empowerment and was with Empower America.

Malik M. Chaka: Mr. Chaka is the Director of Information for Free Angola Information Service in Washington, D.C., and editor of Angola Update, an internationally distributed monthly newsletter. As a Tanzanian-based free lance journalists in the 1970’s, Mr. Chaka has observed the advance of democratic processes in southern Africa.

George Dalley: Mr. Dalley is a partner with the Washington, D.C., law firm of Holland and Knight. He is a former Counsel and Staff Director to Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY) and was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Carter Administration.

Mary Dunea: Ms. Dunea is Assistant to Governor Jim Edgar of Illinois. She directs cultural and international initiatives for Governor Edgar and serves as his liaison with groups involved in developing international trade.

George A. Fauriol, Ph.D.: Dr. Fauriol is Director and Senior Fellow, American Programs with the Center for Strategic & International Studies in Washington, D.C. At CSIS, he directs the program in engaging policy makers in Canada, the United States, Mexico, Latin American and the Caribbean in pivotal issues of common concern, such as trade, democratization, and security matters.

Ronald Fuller: The owner of an advertising and public relations firm in Little Rock, Arkansas, Mr. Fuller serves as a consultant on governmental and media relations to businesses, trade associations, and political candidates. He served as a communications and political party trainer on an IRI mission to Latvia and Lithuania.

Rich Garon: Mr. Garon is Chief of Staff of the U. S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations. He is a long-time assistant to Committee Chairman Ben Gilman (R-NY) and has extensive experience in developing foreign policy legislation.
Kevin T. Lamb: Mr. Lamb is a partner and chair of the creditors’ rights, business restructuring, and bankruptcy practice group at Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault in Boston, Massachusetts. Mr. Lamb represents major lending institutions and venture capital funds in corporate reorganization and work-out arrangements.

Kirsten Madison: Ms. Madison is Senior Legislative Assistant to U.S. Representative Porter Goss (R-FL). She manages the Congressman’s initiatives regarding U.S. policy toward Haiti, as well as has oversight responsibilities involving other foreign policy legislation.

Earl McClure: Mr. McClure is with the International Projects Group in Washington, D.C. He previously was the Chief of Staff to Senator Paul Coverdell and also served as General Counsel of the U.S. Peace Corps during Senator Coverdell’s tenure as Director.

Roger Noriega: Mr. Noriega is a professional staff member on the U.S. House of Representatives International Relations Committee, responsible for issues involving U.S. interests in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Canada. He has actively monitored the situation in Haiti since the 1991 coup and has visited Haiti twice in the last six months and met with President Aristide. Before joining the House committee, he served at the State Department, the Agency for International Development, and the Organization of American States.

Martin Poblete: Professor Poblete is the permanent adviser on Latin American Affairs at the Northeast Hispanic Catholic Center in New York. He is also Chairman of Columbia University Seminar on Latin America and a Professor of History at Rutgers University.

Steve Rademaker: Mr. Rademaker is Chief Counsel of the Committee on International Relations of the U.S. House of Representatives. Prior to joining the committee staff in 1993, he had served as General Counsel for the Peace Corps and Associate Counsel to the President and Deputy Legal Adviser to the National Security Council during the Bush Administration.

Therese M. Shaheen: Ms. Shaheen, who has wide-ranging experience working in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, is President, Chief Operating Officer and Co-founder of U.S. Asia Commercial Development Corporation in Washington, D.C. U.S. Asia develops and manages commercial projects for American firms in Asia.

Tim Stadthaus: Mr. Stadthaus is Legislative Assistant and Assistant Press Secretary to U.S. Representative William F. Goodling (R-PA). He monitors foreign relations matters and oversees related legislation initiated by Congressman Goodling, who is a member of the House International Relations Committee.

John Tierney Ph.D.: Dr. Tierney is a member of the faculty at Catholic University in Washington, D.C. and also teaches at the University of Virginia and Johns Hopkins. He has served as Director of the U.S House of Representatives Caucus on National Defense, as a consult to the Heritage Foundation, and as a Special Assistant with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Reagan Administration.
Jacqueline Tillman: Ms. Tillman is Senior Staffer for National Security Affairs and Director of Issue Advocacy for Empower America in Washington, D.C. Before joining Empower America, she was Executive Vice President of the Cuban American National Foundation, Director of Latin America policy with the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration and an assistant to U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick.

IRI STAFF/OBSERVERS:

Margaret Bartel, Chief Financial Officer
Dan Brady, Intern
Kellyn Guevara, Program Assistant
Karen Harbert, Regional Director, Latin America and Caribbean Programs
Bernard LaChance, Haiti Representative
Kevin Lineberger, Haiti Representative
Stanley Lucas, Political Analyst
Bruce McColm, President
Katja Siegert, Program Assistant
Beverly Ward, Press Officer
IV. Summary of Pre-Electoral Conditions
SUMMARY OF PRE-ELECTORAL CONDITIONS

The June 25, 1995 elections in Haiti were to elect 18 Senators, 83 Deputies, 135 mayors and 565 community councils. These elections were originally scheduled to be held in December but were postponed several times for a variety of reasons.

The election occurred at a pivotal time for Haiti as it struggles to reestablish its nascent democracy and offer renewed hope of stability for its people. The election was also critical for the international community as it sought a benchmark to demonstrate the transition from an internationally dominated country to a Haiti governed by Haitians. For many in the international community, these issues made the holding of an election far more important than the quality of the election. IRI sought to evaluate the pre-electoral process and environment for their comparison to minimal standards of acceptability.

IRI issued an in-depth analysis on the pre-electoral environment on June 24. The following is a summary of the issues identified in that report.

Electoral Process

- The legal foundation for these elections was a Presidential decree that subverted the legislative process.

- The formulation of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) itself breached an agreement between the President of the Republic and the political parties to allow the parties to nominate all candidates from which CEP members would be chosen by the three branches of government. Only two of the nine CEP members were chosen from the parties' list.

- The voter registration process, to have been administered by the CEP, was complicated by miscalculations of population size, lack of sufficient materials and registration sites, and one million missing voter registration cards.

- The CEP review of the over 11,000 candidate dossiers for eligibility was a protracted process that occurred under a cloak of secrecy. When the CEP made its decisions known, by radio, no reasons were given for the thousands of candidates rejected. After vehement protests by the parties, some reasons were supplied and supplemental lists were announced through June 14, 31 days after the date the final candidate list was to have been announced. Many candidates were not certain of their approval until seeing the ballots on election day.
The sliding scale of registration fees imposed by the CEP -- whereby political parties with fewer CEP-approved candidates pay larger fees -- made it difficult for many parties to compete. Protests against this requirement went unanswered.

The ability of the CEP and those under its direction to administer an election was questionable. As of June 20, five days prior to the election, formal instructions for the procedures of election day and the count had not been issued; this prevented the 45,000 persons needed to administer election day from receiving specific training.

As of June 20, those persons designated by the political parties as pollwatchers had not received any training from the CEP which could lead to serious confusion on election day.

These actions led to deep misgivings across the Haitian political spectrum about the ability of the CEP to fulfill the mandate and functions normally executed by election commissions. Political parties had no idea to whom to turn with complaints in the process - the CEP, the President of the Republic, the United Nations Electoral Assistance Unit or the United States Government. Three political parties withdrew from the process as a form of protest.

Electoral Environment

A concern for security is an issue that permeated every step of the process. The assassination of Mireille Durocher Bertin, a well-known lawyer and leading political opponent of Aristide, only confirmed the fears of the parties and candidates. During the crisis, many elected representatives feared returning to their districts, contributing to the decay of political infrastructure. Candidates curtailed their campaign activities and have gave personal security a higher priority.

The campaign itself began late and was barely visible until some activities in the last week prior to elections. Given the process and environment surrounding these elections, it is doubtful many of Haiti’s recognized political parties could have competed effectively.

The electorate itself was basically uninformed about this election - what it stood for and who was running. There was no civic education campaign, with the exception of some limited U.S. and U.N. military efforts, to illuminate the purpose of this election.

Similarly, there was no educational campaign on how to vote, which for a largely illiterate population in Haiti posed serious difficulties on election day.

Compared to other "transition elections" observed by IRI, such as in Russia in 1993, El Salvador in 1994, South Africa in 1994 and even China’s Jilan Province village elections in 1994, the pre-electoral process and environment in Haiti seriously challenged the most minimally accepted standards for the holding of a credible election.
V. Recommendations
RECOMMENDATIONS

IRI has conducted 47 election observation missions in over 30 countries including the Philippines, Panama, Honduras, Nicaragua, Eastern and Central Europe, Haiti, Kenya, Russia, South Africa, Ukraine, Mexico, and El Salvador. These missions have created an internationally recognized reputation for impartiality and professionalism in the analysis of this fundamental democratic practice. The purpose of these missions and the Haiti mission has been to evaluate the electoral process, identify the strengths and weaknesses of the system, and make recommendations to improve the conduct of future elections.

The electoral process in Haiti requires significant changes. After undertaking an extensive evaluation of the pre-electoral environment and the electoral process, IRI makes the following recommendations to improve the administration, transparency and confidence in future elections in Haiti.

ISSUE 1: ELECTORAL LAW

Background:

The entire electoral system has been operating in an ad hoc manner without the foundation of a permanent electoral law. The 1987, 1990 and 1995 election processes were each presided over by a different provisional electoral law and council. Each electoral law has significant differences. In order to instill some framework for future elections, a permanent electoral law needs to be promulgated. It should be noted that the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate passed an electoral law for the June 1995 elections but President Aristide did not sign it into law, and instead issued a different electoral law by decree.

Given the extraordinary need for reconciliation in Haiti and the predominance of the Lavalas movement in the new Parliament, extra effort should be undertaken to bring in the other major opposition parties in the drafting of the law.

Recommendation:

1) A permanent electoral law needs to be drafted and passed by the Parliament. The drafting committee should review other examples of electoral laws and be open to input from the major political parties.

ISSUE 2: ELECTION ADMINISTRATION CAPABILITY

Background:
1) The CEP, created as a provisional institution, has no permanent infrastructure, no permanent staff, nor the benefit of any records or institutional history on which to build. The large sums of money, mainly from the United States government, and technical assistance from the United Nations, made this election possible. It is doubtful that any institutionalization of the process will be realized as a result of these outlays. It is necessary to put into place the permanent electoral council as stipulated in the 1987 Constitution. Once the 1995 presidential elections are concluded under the auspices of a provisional CEP, planning and execution of the steps necessary to establish a permanent CEP need to commence. The process to name a permanent CEP is lengthy and requires local elections all of which need to be completed well in advance of the 1996 legislative elections.

2) Because the last three election cycles have been presided over by different election councils, no permanent cadre of professional staff has been cultivated. Every election council begins the process over again without any institutional memory or support.

3) As noted in IRI's pre-election Haiti updates, the manner in which the CEP members were appointed highlighted a total disregard for political party interests, tainting the election process from the beginning. The CEP and its departmental representatives lost their credibility with the political parties during this election cycle as a result of inaccessibility, a lack of transparency and no accountability for their decisions. The political parties had no representation on the council and felt that their concerns were not considered during any decision-making. After witnessing the process used to appoint the CEP, 11 political parties proposed a resolution to the CEP on how the remaining appointments of electoral officials should proceed. On February 9, 1995, these 11 parties signed a resolution that proposed that 2/3 of the members of the Departmental Electoral Offices (BEDs), Communal Electoral Offices (BECs), and Voting Stations (BIVs) be chosen at a public meeting by the CEP from a list presented by the political parties. The remaining 1/3 could be independently chosen by the CEP. The parties never received an answer to their proposal from the CEP.

On March 2, 1995, the CEP announced its decisions regarding the composition of the BED officials. The preponderance of officials named, associated with the Lavalas movement (OPL), sparked many parties to protest these appointments. After visits to the BEDs and BECs in the North, Northeast, Central Plateau, Artibonite, West and Southeast, IRI assessment missions found that a majority of the local election officials had served as election officials in either the 1987 or 1990 elections. This is a major issue for most of the parties. For the Presidential election at the end of this year, it is imperative that new officials be appointed and that the political parties be involved in the selection. The politicization of the election officials, while a challenge in any transitional democracy, could be lessened if the election officials at the local level are changed with input from opposition parties. While this will involve additional costs for training of new officials, this step would show a good faith effort on behalf of the CEP.
4) Prior to the June 25 elections, many of the BIV and BEC members had received little or no training, which further compounded election day confusion. To their credit, a majority of the BIV workers did their best but would have benefitted from training. Training provided by IFES and the CEP for officials for the August 13 rerun and September 17 runoff elections showed improvement in administration capability at the BIV level.

5) In addition, the CEP changed the salaries of the BIV workers and then experienced serious delays in delivering the salaries. Some BIV workers refused to work on election day because they had not been paid in so long.

6) The lack of infrastructure and materiel for this process was chronic. Communication from the BEDs to the CEP was irregular during the pre-election process and severely constrained on election day; between the BEDs and the BECs, it was somewhat better as there are shortwave radios; no structure existed between the BIVS and the BECs, which compounded the mass confusion on election day. The CEP owns 44 vehicles; however, most of the transportation requirements for delivering voter registration material and ballots, and forwarding such material were met by the United Nations Military in Haiti (UNMIH). Without the logistical support of the UNMIH, many pre-electoral needs and election day itself would have been nearly impossible. Voter registration material distribution, ballot distribution, ballot collection and many other transport needs were met by the UNMIH.

Recommendations:

1) Create a representative permanent electoral council appointed in accordance with the process outlined in the 1987 Haitian Constitution.

2) Recruit capable full-time staff for electoral council with a view towards creating a cadre of professional staff with acquired expertise.

3) Replace all BED, BEC and BIV officials according to the procedures outlined in the 1987 Haitian Constitution.

4) Formulate training programs for all CEP, BED, BEC and BIV officials that is extensive and covers all aspects of the election law, voting procedures, counting procedures and dispute resolution. Training for officials should occur well in advance of election day. Temporary workers hired for election day should be paid for attending training sessions. Training materials should be standardized, easily comprehensible and readily available.

5) Salaries for these officials should be determined and delivered in a timely manner.

6) Materiel that is bought for the election cycle needs to be safeguarded for use in future elections. Plans need to be undertaken on how to acquire the supplies necessary to begin the fill the vacuum the UN will leave.
ISSUE 3: CANDIDATE QUALIFICATION AND REGISTRATION

Background:

The candidate review process was by far the most protracted and opaque part of the electoral process. According to the electoral calendar set by the CEP, the candidate dossier review process was to be completed with the publication of the final approved candidate list on May 13. The first announcement by the CEP of any approved candidates came over the radio on May 18, when the CEP gave its list of approved candidates to several radio stations but not to the political parties. This required the political parties literally to listen to the radio around the clock to hear who of their candidates had been approved. The CEP did not release reasons for rejecting candidates. According to the electoral law, a political party has the right to appeal the decision of the CEP within 72 hours. Because the political parties were not given the reasons for the rejected candidates, they were unable to exercise their right to provide evidence contrary to the CEP judgements. On May 18 and 19, all political parties registered complaints regarding the lack of explanations for these rejections in writing to the CEP. To IRI's knowledge, none of the political parties have ever received a written response to their letters from the CEP. On May 21, 22, and 23 additional lists of approved candidates were released and also three separate partial lists of rejected candidates with explanations. Again, the parties did not receive these lists until many days after their release. As with the approved candidates, these lists were read over the radio. The CEP did supply reasons for the final rejected candidate list. The candidates and political parties protested and provided evidence contrary to the reasons supplied by the CEP, but many were never reinstated. Angry supporters for candidates who were inexplicably rejected from the process and those that were inadvertently left off the ballot mounted protests on election day.

The candidate registration fees for national office of Senate and Deputy are based the number of municipal candidates on their same party slate running for office in their districts. The more candidates on local slates a party has, the less it pays. However, because the political parties in Haiti have minimal resources, candidates themselves must bear the cost of their registration. This sliding scale does prohibit the proliferation of minuscule parties, candidates from recognized parties in areas where it has little support pay a large penalty.

The CEP announced on May 31, at 11 p.m. on the radio its decision to require all candidates to pay any fees owed within 72 hours -- or by June 3. Because of the number of candidates that had been rejected by the CEP, many parties were expected to pay large sums of money (some up to US$75,000). As the political parties had never received a list of approved local candidates, it was virtually impossible for them to calculate the correct amount of additional fees owed. Following protests by all political parties, the CEP extended this deadline to June 8. However, many parties maintained that it would be impossible to pay additional fees. Indeed, political party representatives told the CEP President on June 3 that as many as 75 percent of the parties would be forced to withdraw if this provision is enforced. The CEP promised to seek a meeting with the Prime Minister to determine if the Government could assist in the payment or offer a legal way around this requirement.
Recommendations:

1) Candidate qualification criteria should be simplified and registration procedures should be streamlined. Qualification criteria should be limited to party certification and by petition for independent candidates.

2) Lists of approved candidates should be posted on the day set by the CEP. Reasons for rejections should be released simultaneously to allow equal access to the appeal process.

3) Registration fees should be reduced and the sliding scale fee schedule should be reviewed.

ISSUE 4: VOTER REGISTRATION

Background:

According to the CEP estimate, there are 3,759,913 eligible voters in Haiti. There is no way to know how realistic this estimate is because the last census in Haiti was in 1982. In 1987, the Haitian Bureau of Statistics and Information estimated that there were 2,974,293 persons 18 years or older. The figure for the 1995 elections was based on estimated population growth and some figures preserved from the 1987 and 1990 elections.

The voter registration list that was compiled for the 1990 election disappeared without explanation. Therefore, voter registration in this election had to begin from scratch. All Haitians had to re-register to be eligible to vote for this election and also for the Presidential election scheduled for 1995. The voter registration for these elections was not computerized; instead, it is a manually recorded registration list. The recorded numbers of registered voters at the BED level do not match the numbers published by the CEP.

IRI observers witnessed the destruction of voter registration lists and voter cards on election day in the West, Artibonite, North, Northeast, and Northwest departments. How this will impact voting for the presidential elections and how the situation will be remedied is unclear. At the very least, these lists will have to be reconstructed.

The lack of a master voter list and the existing significant numerical inconsistencies are significant weaknesses in this election process that need to be addressed prior to the Presidential election later this year.

Recommendations:

1) Voter registration should be carried out year round.

2) Voter registration card should be valid for all subsequent elections.
3) A permanent voter registry should be created with thorough audits conducted prior to elections.

4) The system should be converted to a computerized system from a manual system when the infrastructure in Haiti can support its maintenance.

5) The government of Haiti should conduct a new census.

**ISSUE 5: ACCESS TO MEDIA FOR CAMPAIGN**

**Background:**

A majority of the political parties in Haiti, because of a lack of financial resources, were unable to afford media time. Given the high rate of poverty and illiteracy, television and newspapers do not have a wide audience. Radio is the best medium for political campaigning. Late in the campaign period, the CEP announced that all political parties would have equal access to state media. In reality, however, many of the political parties were still unable to broadcast their announcements due to fiscal constraints and uncooperative media.

**Recommendations:**

1) All political parties should have equal access to state media.

2) The independent media should make affordable airtime available to all parties. If the media are unable to afford this effort, consideration should be given by the government of Haiti to provide limited financial support for this purpose in an equal manner to such media.

**ISSUE 6: CAMPAIGN FINANCING**

**Background:**

Again, financial resources available to a majority of the political parties are scarce. A great discrepancy in the funds available to the Lavalas party was evident in its ability to mount a much larger public campaign. Whether warranted or not, this led to a great deal of public speculation as to the source of these funds.

**Recommendations:**

1) Create a reporting mechanism for all funds received and spent by political parties and individual candidates. This information should be made available to the public. Criminal penalties should be imposed for failure to comply.
2) Strict penalties should be created and enforced against the misuse of state resources for a political campaign.

ISSUE 7: LOCATION OF VOTING PLACES

Background:

One of the problems that was evident in this process was the changing of BIV locations. Many people went to vote on election day at the site where they had registered only to find the location of their BIV was different or had been changed. Not only did this add to the confusion but some voters (no one will ever know how many) were unable to find their new voting sites.

Recommendations:

1) Voting places should, whenever possible, be the same as registration locations.

2) Lists of all voting sites should be posted at the BECs 2-3 weeks prior to the election.

3) Lists of voters assigned to each voting site should be posted at the voting site the required three days in advance of the election.

ISSUE 8: SAFEGUARDING ELECTION MATERIALS

Background:

The most dramatic breakdown in the electoral machine occurred after the election when the ballots and tally sheets arrived at the BECs. In every department in Haiti, IRI observers reported that bags and boxes of marked and unmarked ballots were unsealed, abandoned, not logged in and separated from the tally sheets. There was absolutely no way to rematch tally sheets with the ballot boxes thereby eliminating the option of a recount. In the legal community, this is known as breaking the chain of evidence. This made every subsequent step of the process unverifiable. This part of the process only marginally improved during the rerun and runoff elections. IRI is still waiting for the CEP to produce copies of the tally sheets used to compile the results to check against the numbers reported on the individual BIV tally sheets.

Recommendations:

1) A more systematic way by which elections results and materials are transported, supervised and logged in at the BEC and BED levels needs to be devised. These steps should be included in all training programs for election officials and party pollwatchers.
2) Ensure that ballot boxes, ballots and tally sheets can be easily matched. This can be done through the use of pre-printed numbers for all materials.

3) Ballots should be securely maintained, in an orderly fashion, at the BEC offices for at least 30 days after the election to permit challenges and recounts if necessary.

ISSUE 9: POLLWATCHERS

Background:

According to the electoral law, political parties and/or candidates have the right to have a representative at each BIV. The role of pollwatchers is critical in any election, particularly a transition election. The CEP stalled the process for registering the pollwatchers and further complicated the process by requiring photos for each identification card. With over 10,000 BIVs to monitor, no party had the infrastructure or funds to mobilize that number of pollwatchers. The Center for Free Enterprise and Democracy (CLED), a private-sector organization, filled a critical void by providing funding to the five largest parties to enable them to send out pollwatchers.

Except for a national pollwatcher training of trainers program by the National Democratic Institute, training for pollwatchers was basically non-existent. This curtailed the opportunity for Haitians to play a constructive monitoring role and also added a lot of confusion to the process. The pollwatchers did not know the electoral process (neither did the electoral workers because many did not receive the last minute CEP training) nor what their role throughout the day should be. Many pollwatchers actively watched the voters voting, compromising the secrecy of the vote. Other pollwatchers sought out illiterate voters to "help" them vote. The electoral workers themselves did not know the role of the pollwatchers either, which angered some pollwatchers who were denied access to parts of the process.

The formation of the Unit for Surveillance and Control of the Elections (USCE), a political party monitoring unit at the BEC and BED level, was agreed to by the parties and the CEP. On June 15 the parties met and conducted a lottery to designate the USCE members for each BEC and BED. The unit did not become operational for the June 25 elections because the CEP never provided training, and funds never became available to deploy the members. However the unit was reactivated for the rerun and runoff elections, with members only from those parties that were participating in the elections.

The unit could have instilled greater confidence in the electoral process as another external validation measure. The CEP again showed its disregard for the parties' interests by letting this initiative go by the wayside days before the election.
Recommendations:

1) Political party and independent candidate pollwatchers should receive training in the electoral process and their specific roles at the BIV and during the counting process at all levels. Specific attention should be paid as to specifically defining the role of the pollwatchers in assisting illiterate voters.

2) In the electoral workers training seminars, the role, responsibilities, and rights of pollwatchers need to be defined.

3) The political party surveillance unit should be adequately financed and be representatively staffed. The unit should be operational well in advance of election day.

ISSUE 10: TRANSPARENCY OF THE COUNTING PROCESS

Background:

Because many steps of this elections process were shrouded by a cloak of secrecy, additional steps to build confidence in the process are necessary.

Due to the extended candidate review process the ballot production timetable was severely delayed. Samples of the ballots were never shared with the public, elections workers or the parties in advance of the election. In fact some candidates only found out on election day that they were not on the ballot. Because of the complexity of the ballot, it would be extremely useful for the electoral workers and the voting public to view and understand the ballot in advance of election day. This also would exhibit a sense of transparency to the parties who could confirm their candidates and logos were listed correctly on the ballot.

The system of making results available needs to be standardized and provided equally to the public and political parties. Because of the laborious process of making numerous handwritten copies of the tally sheets at the BIVs (sometimes without light), sometimes an insufficient number of copies were produced. Also many times no copy was posted at the BIV for public viewing.

In the calculation of the results of this election, there was a wide misunderstanding of the CEP's methodology for computing the winners of Senate seats. Because each voter had the opportunity to vote for two Senators (although not all did), the CEP had to average the number of voters and divide by two to arrive at the number of votes for each candidate. This was never explained by the CEP and was disputed by candidates and parties alike.
Recommendations:

1) Sample ballots need to be available in advance of the election for parties, candidates and the electorate to ensure correctness and enhance understanding.

2) Results of each BIV need to be available to the public, the political parties and the candidates.

3) The methodology used by the CEP to calculate the winners of Senate races needs to be clarified.

ISSUE 11: APPEAL PROCESS

Background:

As repeatedly highlighted by IRI before the election, the lack of an appeal mechanism destroyed the confidence of the political parties in the system. The total lack of transparency and unresponsiveness to party inquiries and protests by the CEP, the total disinterest in addressing the chaotic mismanagement of the elections by the CEP and the unwillingness of the CEP to examine and respond to evidence regarding the problems on election day ultimately caused the political parties to boycott the re-run and runoff elections.

In drafting a new electoral law, specific consideration needs to be given how these mechanisms should be constructed. Different processes may be appropriate for candidates versus disenfranchised voters.

Recommendation:

1) A clearly defined process needs to be establish whereby candidates, parties or individual voters register their complaints and receive explanation or redress. This structure needs to be outlined in the electoral law. The appropriate organ must respond to complaints within a set reasonable timeframe and in writing.

ISSUE 12: SECURITY

Background:

Security was a major concern by all involved in the election process. The UNMIH and International Civilian Police (CIV/POL) forces provided significant security --largely accounting for the relative lack of violence during the last year-- which will not be present for elections beyond this year. The new Haitian police force will have to fill this vacuum for future elections.
To their credit a great deal of enthusiasm was exhibited by the Haitian people on election day. In very few places, however, was there an individual whose responsibility was to monitor the flow of people into the BIV. Not only does this create confusion inside the BIV but also sacrifices the secrecy of the vote. Many people stood in long lines only to find out that they had waited at the wrong BIV. Officials were unable to tell them their correct location to vote, which caused a great deal of frustration. IRI observers in all nine departments reported instances where BIV officials closed down (some temporarily, some not) due to unruly crowds.

Recommendations:

1) A designated official must be present at all BIVs on election day to regulate voter traffic and check voter cards.

2) The new Haitian police force needs to receive specific training on their role on election day. Consideration should be given in the course design on how the police force may play a facilitative role (i.e. directing citizens to vote locations) as well as offer appropriate security.

ISSUE 13: CIVIC EDUCATION

Background:

Civic education plays an integral role in any election. Civic education was nearly non-existent in these elections. The UN/US military, to their credit, did initiate some civic education activities to fill a large information vacuum. The CEP created a division to direct civic education efforts and appointed as its director a leader within the Lavalas (OPL) movement who was a candidate for the Senate in the Southeast department. This unit did not initiate any activities for the June 25 elections. Ultimately, the CEP mounted some effort for the runoffs on September 17, which a majority of the parties boycotted.

The balloting for this election was particularly complicated because it entailed four separate ballots. The actual voting was slowed down severely by persons who did not know how to mark their ballots nor what constituted a valid vote. Many Haitians did not know what offices this election was for or whom they were electing. It is the CEP’s responsibility to make clear to the population their right to vote and the specifics of the election. This normally has a direct impact on increasing the level of participation. Given the turnout in light of the high voter registration, the impact of the lack of civic education can almost be quantified. Despite a confused and cynical electorate for the complementary and runoff elections, the CEP still did not mount a civic education campaign and the turnout further decreased.

In addition, political debate in Haiti could be very instrumental in the reconciliation process. While political parties may not be able to fund issue debates, community or non-governmental organizations would be well-suited to organize such forums.
Recommendations:

1) A serious civic education campaign needs to be undertaken by the CEP that explains the purpose of the election, what offices are being elected, how and when to register and how to vote. Included in this campaign should be voters' rights and what constitutes valid and invalid votes.

2) Non-governmental efforts should be encouraged that support open political debates and forums.
VI. Electoral Process Chronology
HAITI ELECTION CHRONOLOGY

December 16, 1990  Jean Bertrand Aristide is elected President of Haiti.

January 7, 1991  Coup is attempted by Roger Lafontant to prevent Aristide from coming to power.

January 20  Run-off elections are held for Parliament seats.

February 7  Aristide is inaugurated President.

September 29  Presidential Palace is attacked and Aristide is placed under arrest.

September 30  Aristide leaves for Venezuela after intervention by the U.S. and French Ambassadors.

October 2  Aristide comes to the US.

Sept 17, 1994  Delegation of former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin Powell arrive in Haiti for last minute negotiations.

September 19  US forces enter Haiti.

September 29  Haitian Parliament convenes with a quorum for first time in over a year and a half.

October 15  President Aristide is returned to Haiti.

October 27  President Aristide holds a meeting with 12 political parties to decide modalities for holding legislative and municipal elections. Agreement is reached that the parties will nominate a list of 27 candidates from which the 9 CEP members will be chosen.

November 8  The Cabinet ministers of the newly returned Aristide government assume office.

December 8  President Aristide replaces the Supreme Court (contrary to Articles 175 and 177 of the 1987 Constitution).

December 9  Political parties submit their consensus list of candidates to the Supreme Court, the Parliament and the Executive branch.
December 14  Renaud Bernardin, then Executive Secretary to President Aristide, transmits a new candidate list for the CEP members to the Parliament and Supreme Court, replacing the political parties’ lists without their knowledge or consent.

December 16  Bernardin transmits two new candidate lists for the CEP members to the Parliament and Supreme Court, replacing the list of December 14. Again without consulting with the political parties.

December 16  President Aristide announces the new CEP. Only two of the members of the CEP can be found on the political party list. Five of the members (two of the five overlap with the political party list) can be found on the list sent out by the President’s Executive Secretary. Four of the members of the CEP cannot be found on either list.

January 1995  According to the Haitian constitution, elections should be held during this month but are postponed to March.

January 17  Aristide calls a special session of the Parliament to consider the provisional electoral law.

January 30  Chamber of Deputies passes the electoral law and the following day transmits it to the Senate for consideration.

January 30  UN Security Council adopts a resolution declaring that the US-led intervention force in Haiti has achieved a "secure and stable environment" in Haiti and establishes the turnover date to UN forces for March 31.

January 31  The first four-month training course begins for the Haitian civilian police force.

February 1  Haitian Prime Minister Smarck Michel announces that parliamentary elections could occur on April 28.

February 3  Senate transmits electoral law to the President as passed by both houses of the Parliament.

February 7  Parliament’s term expires.

February 9  Eleven political parties submit a proposition to the CEP that 2/3 of the BED, BEC and BIV officials be chosen in public from a list proposed by the parties and the remaining 1/3 be chosen at the discretion of the CEP.
U.S. Congressional delegation led by Dan Burton (R-IN), chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, and accompanied by three other Republicans and one independent arrive in Haiti to meet with government leaders.

Aristide issues by decree a different electoral law than was passed by the Parliament. Some differences are: ● The Parliament’s law has a minimum education requirement for candidates. The president’s decree does not. ● The Parliament’s sliding scale for registration fees for candidates is much less than that required by the President’s decree. In addition, the Parliament’s law provides a reimbursement clause, which the President’s decree does not. ● There are different mechanisms for counting and reporting results.

Aristide forces the retirement of several top military officials. Leading up to this decision is a series of moves by Aristide to realign the country’s security apparatus. Among these are the establishment of a permanent police force and stripping the armed forces of its headquarters.

Former President Jimmy Carter, Sam Nunn (D-GA), and retired Gen. Colin Powell visit to promote fair elections and ensure that all political parties have the opportunity to participate in the process.

Haiti’s "Carnival of Hope" begins. Reports include that several political organizations will be excluded from the June and December elections, in line with Haiti’s 1987 Constitution that prohibits "putchists" from participating.

Election delayed from January which are scheduled to occur this month are delayed again until June 4.

CEP announces composition of BED officials.

Mireille Durocher de Bertin, a lawyer and leading opponent of Aristide, is assassinated.

The US turns over the peacekeeping operation to the command of the UN. The mission includes 2,500 U.S. troops.

The Electoral Council delays the national elections by three weeks, June 4 to June 25, and extends deadlines for candidates and voter registration until the end of April.

Secretary General of the CEP Marie Jocelyn Lassegue goes to Brussels after she disagrees with the internal workings of the CEP (she does not return until August 3).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 24</td>
<td>More than 3.7 million eligible voters are registered, CEP officials report.</td>
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<td>April 30</td>
<td>Voter Registration is extended until May 30.</td>
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<td>May 1</td>
<td>IRI establishes its office in Haiti.</td>
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<td>May 13</td>
<td>Deadline for candidate list to be released is missed.</td>
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<td>May 17</td>
<td>First candidate list is announced on radio, an unofficial signal that campaign period has begun. Two political parties are excluded from participating in the election.</td>
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<td>May 19</td>
<td>In response to growing refugee groups’ criticism, Clinton Administration announces that all orphaned Haitian children in Guantanamo Bay US Naval Post will be brought to the US by June 30 rather than returned to Haiti.</td>
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<td>May 21</td>
<td>CEP announces supplementary list of approved candidates.</td>
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<td>May 22</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 24</td>
<td>IRI releases pre-election update regarding problems with voter registration, candidate dossier review process and non-payment of local election officials’ salaries. This and all subsequent IRI pre-election updates are sent to the government of Haiti, the US Embassy, USAID, the State Department, the OAS, the UN, and US and Haitian press.</td>
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<td>May 26</td>
<td>Mayoral candidate Mr. Cadet Madsen is shot twice during a political meeting in his hometown of Baraderes in the Grand Anse region.</td>
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<td>May 30</td>
<td>Senate candidate Renaud Bernardin escapes an attack by a group of unidentified assailants in the North Department.</td>
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<td>May 30</td>
<td>CEP President Anselme Remy confirms that one million voter registration cards are missing.</td>
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<td>May 30</td>
<td>CEP issues a press release informing the political parties that the parties must submit a registration card complete with photo and voter registration number for every pollwatcher by June 17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 31</td>
<td>CEP announces that candidate list is final.</td>
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</table>
May 31  CEP announces at 11 p.m. on the radio its decision to require all candidates to pay any fees owed within 72 hours -- or by June 3. Because the political parties never received a list of approved local candidates, it is virtually impossible for them to calculate the additional fees owed.

May 31  Presidential Commission to Haiti, led by AID Administrator Brian Atwood visits Haiti and is briefed on pre-election problems by IRI, NDI, IFES and other groups.

May 31  IRI releases pre-election alert regarding: the announcement by Anselme Remy that one million voter cards are missing, the slippage of the electoral calendar, the status of candidate list, the shooting of a candidate and the extension of voter registration.

May 31  In Jacmel, 15 persons are arrested for actions considered against the electoral process. Most were released for lack of evidence.

June 3  CEP states that final candidate list lacks some names.

June 4  OAS General Assembly opens at Club Med in Haiti.

June 5  First class of police officers graduate from new police academy. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher attends ceremony with President Aristide.

June 5  IRI releases pre-election alert regarding: the errors on the final candidate list, the additional fees levied on candidates, the accord signed by the parties creating the surveillance unit, the recent arrests of 15 persons in Jacmel for impeding the election process, and the fact that procedures for election day and counting are still not set.

June 7  Final rejected candidate list is released.

June 12  The CEP and a majority of the political parties agree to a structure for the Surveillance Unit.

June 14  Final list of candidates includes four more senatorial candidates and eight more deputies.

June 14  IRI releases pre-election update regarding the formation of the surveillance unit, the CEP's questioning of the permanency of the ink, the still missing voting cards and a list of the candidates that were rejected and received explanations.
June 19  
RDNP Candidate for Senate for the Southeast Department (Jacmel) Milot Gousse is wounded and his driver is fatally shot. Mr. Gousse has been a vocal critic of the current government.

June 20  
Legal and only time set once every four years by the Constitution of Haiti for Constitutional amendments occurs. The next is scheduled for June 1999.

June 23  
Campaign period officially closes.

June 23  
Two hundred people storm voting office in Le Borgne and steal voting materials.

June 23  
Firebomb attack on voting office in Limbe destroys voting materials.

June 23  
IRI issues pre-election update regarding the attack on Milot Gousse, the state media alteration of NDI's candidate debate, the still missing voter cards, and unpaid election workers.

June 24  
PANPRA Deputy candidate Duly Brutus’ house is attacked and he is forced to seek refuge in a police station.

June 24  
IRI releases summary of all problems outlined in its previously released pre-election updates.

June 25  
Legislative and Municipal elections are held.

June 25  
The elections are immediately condemned by the political parties.

June 25  
The Front for the Democratic Convergence (FNCD) party issues a statement on the basis of information of tally sheet and ballot trafficking, accuses the electoral officials of electoral manipulation in favor of the Lavalas party, and calls for national dialogue to resolve the matter.

June 25  
The KONAKOM party states that in light of the breakdown of the electoral system and clear evidence of manipulation by electoral officials in favor of the Lavalas party, they have serious reservations concerning the credibility of the elections.

June 25  
The PANPRA party issues a statement regarding the incapacity of the electoral council, and the ability of the different electoral officials to manipulate the electoral system in favor of the Lavalas party, and offers a proposal for redoing the elections.
June 26 Statement of the International Republican Institute (IRI) observation mission led by Congressmen Porter Goss Chairman denounces the breakdown of the electoral system.

June 26 Twenty-two political parties other than FNCD, KONAKOM and PANPRA condemn the elections. Among them are ALAH, PAIN, PNT, PNR, FULNH, MNP-28, RDP, PDCH, PAKAPALA, PSR, UPAN, PDN, MOP, MKN, MDN, PDRH, and PAPP.

June 26 The PDCH party of murdered pastor Sylvio Claude, an anti-Duvalier activist, condemns the elections and characterizes them as dishonest.

June 26 The "Mouvement Kombite National" (MKN) party condemns the elections.

June 26/27 FNCD Deputy candidate in the town Anse d'Hainault, Mr. Henock Jean-Charles, is assassinated.

June 27 IRI report on election sparks discussion on the US Senate floor.

June 27 The Minister of Culture Mr. Jean Claude Bajeux calls the elections "a national shame."

June 27 Mr. Jacillon Barthelmy, President of the West department electoral office is fired by Anselme Remy, President of the electoral council. Mr. Jacillon Barthelemy was replaced by Mr. Boussuet Aubourg, another employee of the BED.

June 28 Letter of D. Jeffrey Hirschberg, member of the Presidential delegation to observe the elections, to Sandy Berger Deputy National Security Advisor says that allegations of a breakdown in the electoral system are "substantially accurate not only as to scope but also severity." He adds, "there is credible evidence to suggest the election outcomes were managed and that President Aristide did not remain neutral throughout the process."

June 28 The PNDPH party led by Turneb Delpe, a Senator elected in 1990 for six years, who was beaten by the military during the coup period, denounces the fraudulent elections as "an electoral coup d'etat."

June 28 The Haitian Nationalist party (PNH) party calls for the annulment of the elections, resignation of the CEP, and the formation of a commission to put together a new CEP.

June 28 The political party Popular Political Associations (PAPP) calls for the annulment of the elections.
June 29 Resolution of 22 political parties calling for the annulment of the elections and the nomination of a new electoral council.

June 29 The Party for a Development Alternative (PADH) condemns the elections.

June 30 The FULNH party condemns the elections.

June 30 President Aristide, ruling by decree, closes down six privately owned television stations, claiming their operating licenses obtained during the military regime's rule are not recognized.

June 30 Meeting between President Aristide and the political parties at which they ask him to annul the elections and dissolve the CEP.

July 1 The party for Mobilization and National Development (MDN) calls the elections of June 25 "an electoral crime" characterized by manipulation of ballots and tally sheets, and asks for the annulment of the elections.

July 2 The CEP issues a statement that it has dispatched teams to each of the nine department to evaluate the situation and determine where complementary elections will be held. The CEP determines the areas for new elections by the following three criteria: "areas where elections did not take place; situations in which official reports of each voting station and ballots were destroyed; areas where at least 50% of the electoral offices failed to function."

July 3 The Center for Free Enterprise and Democracy (CLED) calls for the political parties to document the irregularities, asks the electoral council to clean up the electoral machinery and to take legal steps to correct the prejudices against the candidates and the political parties during the electoral process.

July 3 The Front of the Democratic Convergence (FNCD) calls for the annulment of the June 25 elections, a new electoral council, and denounces the assassination of their Deputy candidate in Anse d'Hainault, Mr. Henock Jean Charles.

July 5 IRI releases election update regarding the political parties call for new elections, President Aristide's decree revoking the licenses of private television stations, the murder of FNCD candidate, the CEP statement that it has dispatched teams throughout the country to evaluate where new elections must be held, and the removal of the BED of the West department President.
July 9  The PANPRA Deputy candidate, Duly Brutus, former President of the Chamber of Deputies, writes a letter to the President of the CEP, Mr. Anselme Remy, and the Chief of the UN mission, Mr. Laikhdar Brahimi, denouncing a murder attempt against him and asking for an investigation and security.

July 9  CEP press release announces that it will give the results on July 11 after 5:00 p.m. and that the "partial" elections, those that fit the criteria set on July 2 (see above), will be held on July 22, 1995.

July 11  Results of June 25 elections are released.

July 12  Twenty-four political parties sign a communiqué in reaction to the July 9 press release of the CEP maintaining their position against the June 25 fraudulent elections. Among them are PAPP, MRN, FULNH, MNP-28, Coalition of Independent Candidates, PANPRA, PNRH, ALAH, PAIN, PSR, PDN, UPAN, and PNT.

July 12  The CEP releases a list of 25 candidates allowed to run in the June 25 balloting who will be barred from participating in the re-run and run-off elections. The candidates have been accused of instigating election day violence.

July 12  US Senate Foreign Relations Committee holds a hearing on Haiti with IRI President Bruce McCollm as a witness.

July 15  A candidate for Deputy of the PANPRA party, Duly Brutus, from the area of Limbe is illegally arrested and imprisoned. He is accused of burning down the BEC in Limbe.

July 17  Report of the Carter Center condemns the elections of June 25. The report states, "the best that could be said of the irregularities is that they did not appear to be a part of a centralized of coordinated effort. Indeed, it is probably more accurate to state that Haiti’s problem was that no one seemed to be in control....Some in the international community would close their eyes to this travesty, but that would be unfair to the Haitian people, who together with the political parties, are the ultimate judges of the election....The international community should insist that the political parties’ concerns be effectively addressed."

July 17  Duly Brutus is released from jail

July 23  Original date for the runoffs passes.
July 24
The MDN party issues a press release outlining their objections to the elections.

July 26
Anselme Remy, President of the CEP, announces his resignation and Jean Francois Merisier, another member of the CEP, is removed.

July 27
IRI releases election update regarding the replacement of two members of the CEP, the new electoral calendar for the partial elections (which sets the date for the elections for August 6) and the illegal arrest and imprisonment of PANPRA candidate Duly Brutus and the justice of the peace of Limbe.

July 28
Presidential decree appoints Pierre Michel Sajous, a member of the staff of President Aristide’s Presidential Commission in Haiti during the military regime’s rule, and Johnson Bazelaïs as new members of the CEP.

July 28
Pierre Michel Sajous is sworn in and unanimously elected President of the CEP. Mr. Johnson Bazelaïs is sworn in as a member of the CEP.

July 28
Thirty political parties sign a communiqué demanding the annulment of the elections, and the formation of a new CEP. They form a coordination committee of representatives of five parties to pursue their joint interests. The parties are ALAH, PANPRA, MDN, MKN, MNP-28, MODELH, MRN, PADN, PAIN, PAPP, PDCR, PDN, PNH, PNC, PNR, PNT, PSR, RDNP, UPD, UPAN, PDRH, Generation 2004, MOP, PAKAPALA, PAN, PSR, MODEJA, and MRN.

July 28
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and AID Administrator Brian Atwood visit Haiti. Talbott delivers a proposal of seven steps for the CEP and the Haitian government to follow to correct the electoral problems. Among the seven points are the reorganization of the CEP, reconsideration of new sites for the partial elections, and the creation of the political parties surveillance unit.

July 31
United Nations Security Council votes to extend the mandate of UN/US troops in Haiti until the end of February 1996.

August 3
After months overseas abandoning her post, Marie Jocelyn Lassegue returns to her post as the Secretary General of the CEP.

August 3
PANPRA, FNCD, and KONAKOM make public a proposal to end the crisis.

August 4
Port-au-Prince Mayor Emmanuel Charlemagne is inaugurated.
August 7  Sitting Senator Eudrice Raymond declares he will not be sitting with de-facto senators coming from the fraudulent elections of June 25th. Sitting Senator Robert Martinez (KONAKOM) condemns the elections as a "Lavalas selection not election."

August 8  The Haitian Center for Free Enterprise and Democracy (CLED) calls on the CEP to halt the electoral process and initiate a dialogue with the political parties to find an honest solution to the June 25 elections.

August 8  The Chief of staff of the Minister of Culture Dunois Cantave resigns in protest of the fraudulent elections of June 25.

August 8  CEP opens electoral campaign for August 13 re-run elections.

August 9  Meeting with CEP of UPD, GMRN, PADH, PROP, LAVALAS, UPDC, PNR, FULNH, and UPAN establishes the USCE for the August 13 election.

August 11  In protest to the June 25 fraudulent elections, two cabinet members resign from the government: the Minister of Public Administration, Mr. Anthony Barbier (PANPRA), and the Minister of Social Affairs, Mr. Enold Joseph (FNCD).

August 13  Partial elections are held in 21 areas in 1993 polling places. Election is boycotted by the majority of the political parties except Aristide-backed Lavalas platform.

August 14  White House says it is "disappointed" at the low turn out in Haiti’s local and parliamentary elections but claims that it was still a step forward.

August 15  Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott visits Port-au-Prince with an eight point plan to resolve the crisis.

August 17  The Electoral Council rejects the Talbott plan to resolve the crisis.

August 18  Arrest without warrant of Carl Denis, Secretary General of the Organization for Democracy in Haiti. Denis is a well known opponent of President Aristide and close associate of assassinated lawyer Mireille Durocher Bertin. On August 17, Mr. Denis organized a peaceful demonstration against the June 25 fraudulent elections and the boycott of the second round.

August 19  US Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt visits Haiti.
August 19  President Aristide, in the presence of US Secretary of Interior, declares that "he’s against the annulment of the elections."

August 20  CEP announces results from August 13 partial elections.

August 22  CEP rejects Talbott plan.

August 23  CEP announces September 17 as the date for the runoff elections.

August 25  The MDN party comments on the results and declares that the dishonest CEP gave birth to a monster.

August 25  FRAPH leader Emmanuel Constant faces deportation from the U.S. in a Baltimore court for human rights violations during the coup period.

August 28  The Vice President of the CEP announces that state TV and radio will allow candidates to present their promotional ads and the CEP will extend civic education.

August 28  The PDCH party reconfirms that it will not participate in the second round.

August 29  The Ministry of Information says that it will allow 10 minutes for each candidate on state-owned media during the campaign period.

August 29  U.S Ambassador William Lacey Swing declares that elections should be organized in more places where irregularities did happen and that the eight points of the Talbott plan, if applied, would guarantee the participation of the political parties.

September 1  The CEP asks the participating political parties for a list of names no later than September 5 to form the political party Surveillance Unit for the September 17 elections.

September 5  Prime Minister Smarck Michel visits the United States to discuss privatization and the elections.

September 7  The FNCD party and its candidates (16 for Deputy and 9 for Senate) declare in a press conference that they will not participate in the second round of elections.

September 9  Fighting erupts in the town of Belle-Anse concerning the elections.
September 10  Electoral posters distributed by United Nations soldiers to invite the population to vote. This is denounced by the political parties who accuse the UN of intervening against the democratic boycott of the runoff elections and supporting government propaganda.

September 11  In a meeting with members of the diplomatic corps in Haiti, the FNCD party and its candidates confirm their boycott of the process and the reasons.

September 11  Secretary General of the CEP, Marie Jocelyn Lassegue, announces that there will be 126 candidates in the September 17 election (110 for Deputy, 16 for the Senate).

September 12  Colin Granderson, head of the UN/OAS civilian mission, holds a press conference and states that there have been 20 commando-style killings in Haiti since the beginning of the year.

September 14  While travelling in the Plateau Central, Aristide conducts violent verbal political attack against the 26 political parties who boycott the elections.

September 17  Runoff elections are held.

September 18  Twenty-two political parties reaffirm their position that the elections should be rerun.

September 28  Results from runoff elections are released.

October 5  CEP announces that three races for Deputy will have to be rerun again in December.

October 8  Last round of runoff elections are held.
VII. June 25 Elections
JUNE 25 ELECTION PROCESS

This chapter is drawn from the observations of IRI’s 25-person June 25 monitoring team; their detailed observations are contained in the following chapter.

I. Material Delivery

The CEP experienced chronic problems in material delivery. In every department, there were BECs which did not receive material until late the day before the election or even the morning of election day. There was no system in place to transfer the materials to the BIVs after arriving at the BECs which delayed the opening of numerous BIVs and prohibited the opening of many others. BIV workers were unclear whether material would be delivered or if they were personally responsible for retrieving the materials. Clearly, the lack of transportation was a factor but a clearly defined delivery system, even if by foot, would have simplified the last minute confusion.

II. Opening, Voting and Closing Procedures

Many of the electoral workers had not received training from the CEP on the actual voting day procedures. Some BIVs did not even have the procedures manual and were forced to borrow from other BIVs. This further slowed opening procedures, once materials arrived.

Without any clear instruction on how to set up the polling site, some BIV workers set the voting partitions in such a way that the voter was in clear view of onlookers; others did not identify the four ballot boxes by office; almost no one used the ballot box seals correctly.

Due to the delay in opening a majority of the BIVs, the CEP issued a statement late in the day that all voting sites must stay open the required twelve hours. Given the communication problems in Haiti, many did not receive that message. Those that did and stayed open experienced problems with light as the material package contained limited candles, and most places did not have electricity.

The closing process was equally as slow in most BIVs due to unfamiliarity with the process and because the voting officials had to make numerous handwritten copies of the tally sheets. In every department there were instances where BIV workers left their polling sites for the BEC where they could count in the light. This proved chaotic as people were spreading out in front of the BEC filling out tally sheets with no security.

III. Voter Registration Lists
The voter registration process is manual in Haiti and no master list has been compiled. This means that it is impossible to ensure against double registration. Presumably the use of the indelible ink, if used and used correctly, would prevent double voting. No IRI observer reported that the voter list was posted on the BIV prior to election day as required by the law. IRI observers reported that in every department there were a large quantity of BIVs that were not supplied the voter registration lists. Those that had lists did not post them on the BIV doors because they only had one copy; therefore voters could not check if they were at the correct polling site. Many voters who were unable to register during the registration period due to a shortage of materials showed up to vote; where there were no lists, it was difficult to identify these voters where persons were not asked to show their voting cards.

Where registration lists had been provided, many voters who had registered and had registration cards did not appear on the list. This was reported by every IRI observer team as a widespread problem and was a major cause of the frustration on election day. Voters who had endured the registration process and long lines on election day were outraged when their names did not appear on the registration list. Officials were unable to explain or fix the problem. Some officials allowed them to vote; others turned them away. It is impossible to know how many people were not allowed to vote who were duly registered; however, every IRI observer team reported this as a major problem.

The sites that did not have registration lists were forced to make written lists of who had voted there, without any assurance that these were the correct voters for that site. Most of these handwritten lists were transmitted with the results to the BECs but are not usable to check against the real voter list due to illegibility and the inordinate amount of time it would take to complete this task.

IV. Ballot Box Security

The seals for the ballot boxes provided in the election materials package were generally not used or used improperly. Eight seals were supplied for each box - one for each of the corners of the box. Election officials did not seem to know their purpose. All IRI teams reported widespread problems on this issue. This problem magnified itself during ballot drop-off at the BECs. Ballot boxes and bags of ballots were piled sometimes to the ceiling without any proper seal, allowing completed ballots to spill out into other boxes and onto the floor. There was no way to reconstruct where many of the marked ballots had come from.

V. Secrecy of the Ballot

There was little if any secrecy of the ballot. The election workers were not trained on how to arrange a voting site and use the designated screens for voting. Most screens, if used, were placed on the ground requiring that a voter hunch behind it to vote. Pollwatchers proximity to the voter was not controlled in a systematic way and often voters were observed while voting by both the pollwatchers and the electoral officials.
VI. Location of BIVs

As noted earlier, the location of many BIVs on election day was different than during registration. In addition, there was a shortage of BIVs during the registration period so additional sites were added for election day. Voters were not given information on the site changes or additions. Most of the BECs visited by IRI observers did not post the location of voting stations prior to the election.

VII. Voter Behavior and Turnout

Voter behavior and turnout on election day were affected by two factors: a problematic voter registration process and a complete lack of voter and civic education. Just as election officials were unfamiliar with the process so were the voters. Many voters had to ask for assistance and were provided such from either the election officials, the pollwatchers (when present), or both. Because there is no master voter registration list, the exact number of registered voters is unknown. The range of best guesstimates of voter turnout range from 30-40 percent.

VIII. Ballot Collection and Counting

At the BECs that received the ballots the night of June 25 and for the next two to three days in some areas, there was complete chaos. There was no system to receive the ballots and log them in; no system to identify ballot materials with the correct tally sheets once they were separated for vote compilation; absolutely no security of materials; and overt efforts to change ballots and tally sheets. There were numerous open packages of unused ballots unaccounted for.

IRI observers witnessed these events. In the BED in Port-au-Prince, the situation became so out of control that IRI observers were prevented from touring portions of the building on June 26. Only after assistance from UN forces were observers allowed access to the entire building. These persons witnessed enormous piles of materials (marked ballots, tally sheets, voter registration lists, blank and valid voting cards) being destroyed. IRI observers saw altered tally sheets and ballot box stuffing. This was the worst site of the entire observation. Any possibility of verifying any part of the process was destroyed. The integrity of the results were then completely open to question.

The CEP made a quick decision to change locales for vote compilation (proces-verbaux) and set up ad hoc counting centers around the country. The CEP had to hire new personnel to consolidate the tally sheets from the BIVs. These workers had no access to the ballot boxes to do a recount or check on the tallies. Observers likewise were unable to match the materials. The political parties were not told of this new system and when their pollwatchers finally arrived at the counting centers, they were denied entry. Likewise, IRI observers were denied entry to several and only allowed entry after heavy insistence.
Electoral official falsifying tally sheets
Ballot boxes after arrival at BEC
Electoral official counting without BIV members or party representatives
Electoral official counting ballots in front of BEC
UNUSED ELECTORAL CARD FOUND ON FLOOR OF BEC
ONE MILLION CARDS DISAPPEARED DURING REGISTRATION
CONSEIL ELECTORAL PROVISOIRE
ELECTIONS DE JUIN 1995

PROCES-VERBAL DE DEPOUILLEMENT DU SCRUTIN

Jour  Mois  Année  Election
25  06  95  SENGE

Bureau de vote  Sect. Communale  Commune de  Département de
GRAND LUCOMANS<br>ANTILLES L'OUEST

Bulletin recus  Bulletin utilisés  Bulletin inutilisés
1 126  254

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NOMBRE DE VOTES OBTENUS par CHAQUE CANDIDAT

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<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>JULIEN CHRISTIAN PAIN</td>
<td>ENCJ  DIX HUIT</td>
<td>2</td>
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Le (la) Président (e) vérifie et regroupe les feuilles de comptage remplies par les clercs avec l'assistance des membres du bureau. Le (la) Président (e) prononce à haute voix les résultats du scrutin.

FALSIFIED TALLY SHEET
Le présent procès-verbal, dressé et clos à... heures... du... est, après lecture, présenté à tous les membres du bureau de vote, des mandatés et aux observateurs, pour signature.

Un original de ce procès-verbal sera immédiatement à l'entrée principale du BIV par le (la) Président (e), un original sera déposé au BED et deux originaux seront délivrés au BED qui en fera parvenir au CEP.

Le (la) représentant (e), mandaté (e), du (de la) candidat (e) à la Députation et au Sénat de la République recevra une copie pour le candidat qui aura obtenu le plus grand nombre de voix (art. 111). En cas d'absence de ce (cette) représentant (e), les deux originaux seront remis au (à la) Président (e) du BED.

**COMPOSITION DU BUREAU DE VOTE**

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<td>Portier</td>
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**MANDATAIRES ET OBSERVATEURS**

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VIII. Regional Problems
REGIONAL PROBLEMS BY DEPARTMENT

SOUTH EAST

• The BED did not receive all the ballots they were supposed to, leaving some BIVs without materials.

• The ballots for CASEC were never printed for some regions outside Ville-Jacmel and Marigot, closing 30 BIVs.

• The CEP failed to provide official voter registration lists to the BIVs in Jacmel, Cayes-Jacmel and Marigot.

• In Jacmel, Cayes-Jacmel and Marigot BIVs allowed voting with pencils, and later had to invalidate these votes.

• All BECs observed failed to ensure security of ballots.

• At all BECs in the Department BIV workers were counting ballots and filling out tally sheets inside the BEC, on the street, and even on top of cars.

• Unpaid pollworkers failed to present their voting materials, and others simply left their materials on the doorstep of all of the BECs in this department without checking in.

• In BIVs 006-16 to 22, a Lavalas member was directing voters for whom to vote. The ballot box was not sealed.

• In Jacmel, 17 BIVs never opened.

• In Cayes Jacmel, 48 BIVs had not opened as of 1:30 pm.

NORTH-WEST

• In Jean-Rabel, Deputy candidate Henri Desanour was left off the ballot and his followers prevented the distribution of election materials to 124 voting stations, affecting 42,000 people. Voting was effectively shut down.

• In Bassin Bleu, four BIVs were destroyed, and the BEC president had to flee to his home, which was later ransacked.
• In Port-de-Paix, the CEP failed to deliver sufficient ballots to the BIVs and left two candidates for Deputy off the ballot. The followers of one Mr. de la France, who was left off the ballot, ransacked three voting stations, affecting 1,200 people.

• In Nicola, a crowd forced the BEC president to hand over the keys to the building, whereupon a mob destroyed the tally sheets.

• In Chansolime, the CASEC ballots were missing; 23 boxes were needed and later 15 arrived.

• In Lycee Tertulien Guilbaud, five BIVs did not open.

**CENTER**

• Of 678 BIVs in this department, 12 percent did not open because the CEP either never sent election materials or they arrived too late. This affected some 30,000 people in the region.

• In Thommonde, material was supplied only for 44 of 58 BIVs; five candidates were left off the ballot.

• In the departmental capital of Hinche, 20 percent of the BIVs did not open on election day.

• In Maissade, four BIVs did not open, and the BEC was partially burned down the day after the election. Opposition parties protested the changing of the BIV locations and the exclusion of their party pollwatchers from observing the count at the BEC.

• In Mirebelais, opposition candidates claimed that OPL candidates arrived at the BIVs in government cars and campaigned. Also, more people voted in Mirebelais than were registered.

• In Thomassique, the CEP had failed to send enough materials to the BIVs but the elections were ordered to go ahead. Demonstrations broke out and the UNMIH forces had to intervene. BEC officials were afraid to go to work the next day so ballots had to be transported to Hinche to be counted.

**NORTHEAST**

• According to the BED out of 358 BIVs in this department, there was trouble with 32 and 25 did not open at all.

• In Fort Liberte, seven BIVs never opened and three were burned down.

• In Fort Liberte, IRI observers saw an OPL militant with wads of registration cards. Election officials, who had received no training, told voters they did not need to register to vote.

• In Malfety, only five of 121 BIVs were open. The local citizens arrested the head of the BEC and turned him over to the police for failure to do his job.
• In Quanaminthe, five BIVs did not open.

• In Perches, five BIVs did not open, and all ballots were later burned from the remaining six BIVs that did open.

• In Ferrier, IRI observers found a pile of ballots being burned. Local police arrested the arsonist. Two other BIVs did not open.

• In Caracol, two BIVs did not open.

• In Terrier, three BIVs did not open.

• In Vallieres, three BIVs did not open.

• In Fort Liberte, there were reports of young men outside BIVs telling old people how to vote Lavalas.

• None of the ballot boxes observed by IRI were sealed.

GRAND-ANSE

• In Roseaux, the BEC was burned, resulting in the destruction of 40 BIVs ballot boxes and tally sheets.

• In Jeremie, a party activist was arrested for pulling a gun on election officials.

• In Les Cayes, a PAIN party stronghold, a number of PAIN candidates were left off the ballot and other candidates’ names and photos were mixed up on the ballots.

• In Marfranc, some BIVs did not have ballots.

• IRI observers reported that no seals were on the ballot boxes.

• Inside two BIVs in Jeremie, IRI observers saw posters of the Lavalas movement and of President Aristide.

ARTIBONITE

• BED officials reported that 25 percent of the 85 BIVs in the Artibonite did not open.

• In Grosse Morne, no materials were distributed, disenfranchising 44,000 people.

• In Ennery, the voting was interrupted by agitated people who did not appear on registration lists; some ballots were burned.
• In the towns of Goya and Mapou, election officials did not let non-OPL persons vote. OPL supporters were wearing OPL badges, and only they were allowed into the BIVs.

• In L’Estere, the BEC reported that only seven out of 22 BIVs received materials.

• In Gonaïves, six BIVs not open.

• In Gonaïves, a disturbing pattern of intervention in the act of voting on the part of BIV officials, raising tentative questions about the issues of a truly secret vote and coercion of voters.

• In Gonaïves, five members of the Lavalas movement were wearing international observers cards issued by the CEP.

• The President of the BIV of Opoto was beaten up by angry registered voters whose names did not appear on registration lists and who were unable to vote.

NORTH

• In Limbe, the BEC was burned down because of an apparent local war between faction of the OPL. Mr. Duly Brutus, a PANPRA candidate for Deputy, was threatened; his house and car were attacked by OPL militants.

• In DonDon, no election was held because of political demonstrations by supporters of a candidate who had been left off the ballot. This affected 18,000 voters.

• In Borgne, no election was held.

WEST

• In the Cite Soleil section of Port-au-Prince, of 11 BIVs at St. Ann’s school, only four were functioning. Only one of the four BIVs had a pollworker who had received training.

• In Cabaret (formerly known as Duvalierville), voting was peaceful.

• In St. Marc, five local candidates were left off the ballot, so much of the population abstained in protest.

• In Kenscoff, a BEC was burned to the ground. An IRI team recovered burned ballots, voter registration lists, and cards a week later.

• During ballot collection at the BEC in downtown Port-au-Prince, IRI teams witnessed flagrant changing and forging of ballots, wanton destruction and disposal of voting materials, unauthorized people counting votes, copious numbers of blank ballots lying around.
• At the BEC at Delmas, ballots were destroyed and removed from the premises. Filled out tally sheets were strewn around the site.

• In the area of Carrefour, 500,000 photocopies of ballots had been made for the process because the CEP did not deliver enough.

• There were numerous demonstrations in Port-au-Prince because a candidate for mayor had his logo mixed up with another candidate on the ballot. This temporarily shut down voting in numerous sites as the demonstrators traversed the city.

• In Carrefour, a Lavalas poll watcher was seen with an international observer identification card issued by the CEP.
Le présent procès-verbal, dressé et clos le ...Jim...six...juin...19... à...3...heures...11...du...matin en six originaux a été, après lecture, présenté à tous les membres du bureau de vote, aux délégués mandatés et aux observateurs, pour signature.

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## KASEK BEL-AIR

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<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.D.N.P.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Centre de comptage de Jacmel
Elu: Liste KONAKOM

### Tableau #2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LISTE</th>
<th>BV1</th>
<th>BV2</th>
<th>BV3</th>
<th>BV4</th>
<th>BV5</th>
<th>BV6</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>P.N.C.D.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KONAKOM</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>250</td>
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<tr>
<td>O.P.L.</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.K.N.</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.D.C.H.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.D.N.P.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Originaux des Procès-verbaux de dépouillement dans les BIV délivrés aux listes arrivées en tête.
Elu: Liste M.K.N.
Port-au-Prince, le 4 juillet 1995

Aux Membres du BED du Sud-Est
Jacmel, HAITI

Messieurs les Membres,

Des délégués mandatés se sont rendus le 3 juillet 1995 au BED du Sud-Est pour contester les données utilisées par le centre de comptage pour départager les candidats aux élections locales (CASEC) de Bel-Air, 5ème section communale de Bellanse. La procédure prévue à cet effet n’a pu être respectée parce que comme l’ont souligné M. Délouis Domond, Conseiller et M. François Dessieu, vice-président du BED, les formulaires de contestation ne sont pas disponibles.

Suivant les chiffres du centre de dépouillement (cf. Tableau #1), la liste du KONAKOM est donnée gagnante. Nous détenons des originaux de procès-verbaux délivrés aux mandataires des candidats arrivés en tête à l’issue du dépouillement dans les BIV. Selon les données en notre possession (cf. Tableau #2), la liste du M.K.N. totalise quatre cents (400) voix dans la cinquième section communale de Bellanse (Bel-Air). Elle est donc élue avec cent trente sept (137) voix d’avance sur son suivant immédiat qui est la liste de l’O.P.L. La liste du KONAKOM n’arrive qu’en troisième position avec deux cent cinquante (250) voix.

On constate aisément que les falsifications ont eu lieu dans trois bureaux de vote, à savoir:

Bureau #2 - Robinette, présidé par M. Cassagnol Jn Pierre;
Bureau #5 - Caduc, présidé par M. Alexis Jiné;
Bureau #6 - Bois-Comte, présidé par M. Roosevelt Pierre.

.../
BEL-AIR CASEC

TABLE 1

[voting results table]

Source: Jacmel Tallying Center

Elected: KONAKOM List

Table #2

[voting results table]

Source: Originals of the tally sheets in the BIVs [polling stations] delivered to the party lists that were in the lead.
To the members of the BED of the Southeast
Jacmel, HAITI

Dear Sirs,

Mandated delegates went on July 3, 1995 to the BED (Department [regional division] Electoral Office) of the Southeast to dispute the data used by the tallying center to decide between the candidates for the local elections (CASEC) of Bel-Air, 5th ward of Bellanse. The procedure laid down for this purpose could not be adhered to because, as was emphasized by Mr. Délouis Domond, Council Member, and Mr. Francois Dessieu, Vice-Chairman of the BED, the dispute forms are not available.

According to the figures of the tallying center (cf. Table #1), KONAKOM’s list comes out the winner. We have originals of tally sheets delivered to the representatives of the candidates who were leading at the outcome of the tally in the BIVs [polling stations]. According to the data we have (cf. Table #2), the M.K.N.’s list counts a total of four hundred (400) votes in the fifth ward of Bellanse (Bel-Air). It is thus elected with a one hundred thirty-seven (137) vote lead over the runner-up, which is the O.P.L.’s list. KONAKOM’s list only came in third, with two hundred fifty (250) votes.

It is easy to note that falsifications took place in three polling stations, to wit:

Station #2 - Robinette, presided over by Mr. Cassagnol Jean-Pierre;
Station #5 - Caduc, presided over by Mr. Alexis Jiné;
Station #6 - Bois-Comte, presided over by Mr. Roosevelt Pierre.
Maiissade, le 26 Juin 1995

MONSIEUR CESNER BRUN
PRESIDENT DU BIV HINCHIE

EN SES BUREAUX,

Monsieur le President,

La Coordination du Panpra a Maiissade s'empresse de porter a votre compétence pour les suites necessaires les fraudes, irregularités constatées au cours des operations de vote dans les BIVs de la deuxième circonscription de Maiissade. Elle tient a signaler quelques uns d'entre elles pour votre souveraine :

1- BIV San Ramier : les delegues mandates du Panpra ont été force de laisser le bureau de vote vers midi par les actions des lavalassians et des membres du BIV par des menaces d'armes tranchantes. De plus, les partisans de l'OPL ont placé une affiche " VOTE TAB LA " en face des electeurs. On a force les electeurs a voter " TAB LA ". La situation est telle que les membres du BIV ont empêché le delegue du Panpra de voter.

2- BIV Cinquieme 2 : Ce bureau a ouvert ses portes vers les heurs heures A.M, ceci s'explique par le fait que les electeurs en ligne avant l'ouverture du BIV n'étaient pas des lavalassians.

3- BIV Cinquieme I : Contrairement aux instructions du BCO, ce sont le president et le portier du BIV qui indiquent aux electeurs ce qu'ils doivent voter et autorisent le delegue de l'OPL a accompagner les votants a l'iseoir.

4- BIV Cajou brique 2 : Sur 143 inscrits seulement 3 votants ont pu retrouver leur nom sur le registre selon un leader qui personnellement les avaient fait inscrits. Tout ceci explique qu'il y a eu un truccage de registres.

5- "agone I : Tout le long du processus de vote les delegues de l'OPL disent aux electeurs de voter " TAB LA " a haute voix et aucune observation n'a été faite par le president du BIV alors que le delegue du Panpra ne pouvait le faire quand un electeur demande a voter nos candidats.
Maissade, June 26, 1995
MR. GESNER BRUN
CHAIRMAN OF THE BED / HINCHE
[Department (regional div.) Electoral Office]

IN HIS OFFICES

Mr. Chairman,

The PANPRA Coordination at Maissade is eager to bring to your attention, for the necessary follow-up, the instances of fraud and the irregularities noted during the voting operations in the BIVs [polling stations] of the second district of Maissade. It must point out certain instances for your information:

1 - BIV Nan Remier: Panpra’s mandated delegates were forced to leave the polling station towards noon by the assaults of the Lavalas people and the members of the polling station under threat of sharp weapons. In addition, the OPL partisans placed a sign "VOTE FOR TAB LA" facing the voters. The voters were forced to vote "TAB LA". The situation is such that the members of the BIV prevented Panpra’s delegate from voting.

2 - BIV Cinquieme 2: This station opened its doors around nine o’clock A.M., this is due to the fact that the voters waiting in line before the opening were not Lavalas people.

3 - BIV Cinquieme 1: Contrary to the instructions of the BEC [Municipal Electoral Office], the director and the doorman are the ones who indicate to the voters how they must vote and authorize the OPL delegate to accompany the voters to the booths.

4 - BIV Cajou brile 2: Of 143 voters registered, only 3 voters were able to locate their names on the register, according to a leader who had personally had them registered. All of this shows that registers were rigged.

5 - Lagoune 1 - Throughout the voting process, the OPL delegates were loudly telling the voters to vote for "TAB LA" and the director of the polling station made no comment, whereas the PANPRA delegate could not do this when a voter asked to vote for our candidates.
Suite

relatés, quelqu'un au milieu des milliers de cas sont une entorse à l'article 106.- de la loi électorale. Dans presque tous les bureaux de Vote, les membres des BIV dictaient aux électeurs les candidats qu'ils doivent voter.

Si selon plus d'un, ces membres des BIV et président sont liés à un candidat du nom de Paul Aymond Pierre candidat prioritaire du BEC de Bainet Lavalas (B6 TAB LA) le nommé Roland Pierre cousin de Paul Aymond Pierre trouvé en flagrant délit de fraude dans le bureau de BEC. Ils étaient plusieurs dans cette situation.

Considérant que les articles 137, 138, 139 des doléances des candidats de la loi électorale en vigueur dictent les suites légales à prendre contre les coupables.


Recevez, monsieur le Président, nos salutations patriotiques.

Suivent les signatures:

Batichon Jn Prophète (RDC)  
Pierre Jean Benoit (RDNP)  
Jean Nebe Jn Louis (PAIN)  
Doulou Bé N'est (KONAKOM)  
Felix Jncé Jacques (FNCD)  
Joseph Jncé Jean Zacary (UPD)  

Alain Jean Rubin (FNCD)  
Jean Jn Jn Bainet (PAIN)  
Geoffard Jn Michel (FAMFRA)  
Emile Jn Emile (MODEL/RDH)  
Alexandre Jn Emile (FULNH)
The signatures follow:

Batichon Jean-Prophète, (RDC)  Alistant Rubin (FNCD)
[signature] [signature]
Pierre Jean Benoit (RDNP)  Jean Louis Brunet (PAIN)
[signature] [signature]
Jean Neland Jean Louis (PAIN)  Geffrand Jn. Michel (PAMPRA)
[signature] [signature]
Duval [illegible] (KONAKOM)  Emile Pierre-Louis (MODEL PRDH)
[signature] [signature]
Felix Pierre Jacques ((FNCD)  Alexandre Jean Emile (FULNH)
[signature]
Josselin Jean Zacary (UPA) [signature]

Larriance Barreau (FULNH)  Pierre Kesner Rémilas (RDNP)
[signature] [signature]
E devan  [signature]
Barreau Jean Gilneau (FULNH)  Paulcillon Santerre (RDNH)
[signature] [signature]
PaulLeon Jean-Pierre (UPD)  [signature]
A la Mairie:

Hocclair Germain
OPL

Pour
Perilus Alexis
PAIN

Hendre Bernard
RDNP

Wilton Andre
PANPRA

Perre Augustin

ALAH
Press communiqué

We, the undersigned, Candidates for the Chamber of Deputies and for Town Hall for the District of Cerca-la-Source/Thomassique, are taking this opportunity to draw the attention of the national and international community to the irregularities recorded during the course of the June 25 vote.

1) There are over ten BIV [polling stations] in the municipality of Thomassique that are not operating.
2) The materials did not arrive on time in the BIVs; some started operating at eleven o’clock and others at 4 pm, yet all the stations closed at six o’clock.
3) The tight grip of the members of the BIVs [polling stations] on the electoral process
4) The operation of certain BIVs in certain candidates’ neighborhoods.
5) Less than 15% of the voters participated in the voting operations.

Faced with this deplorable, catastrophic situation considered to be an electoral assassination, we request that the Provisional Electoral Council annul these elections considered, in the eyes of some, to be a complete farce.

[signature] Amos R. Metellus  RDNP
[signature] Mardoche Francois  PANPRA
[signature] Dr. Edouard Celestin  PAIN
[signature] Henriлот Thermidor  MODEL-PRDH
[signature] Raoul Kessa  KONAKOM

[A.L.A.H. stamp]

At the district hall:

__________________________  ____________________________
[signature] Moclar Germain  O P L
[signature] Perilus Alexis  PANPRA
[signature] Honore Bernard  RDNP
[signature] Wilton Andre  PANPRA
[signature] Perd? Augustin  PANPRA
Monsieur Smarck MICHEL
Premier Ministre
En ses Bureaux

Port-au-Prince le 10 Août 1995

Monsieur le Premier Ministre,

Dans le cadre du retour du Président Jean Bertrand ARISTIDE et de l’ordre constitutionnel j’ai accepté, à la demande de mon Parti, le PANPRA, de participer à votre gouvernement à titre de Ministre de l’Administration et de la Fonction Publique. Conscient, Monsieur le Premier Ministre, que cette participation ne signifiait nullement que mon Parti était “au pouvoir”, mais qu’il apportait plus simplement sa contribution au processus de consolidation démocratique et à la reconstruction économique de notre pays dans le cadre du retour du 15 octobre, j’ai toujours adopté un comportement qui privilégiait la cohésion gouvernementale plutôt que les intérêts particuliers de mon Parti. Je sais aussi l’occasion pour rendre un hommage public au respect que vous avez toujours témoigné envers moi et à l’égard de mon Parti.


Tant que votre gouvernement adoptait une attitude impartiale recherchant le déblocage de la situation en encourageant le dialogue entre le CEP et les partis politiques qui contestent le processus électoral, mon devoir était de vous aider dans cette voie. C’est dans ce sens que j’ai encouragé les dirigeants de mon parti à adhérer au même titre que ceux du KONAKOM et du FNCD aux propositions visant à sortir le processus électoral de l’impasse actuelle.

Mais aujourd’hui Monsieur le Premier Ministre, j’estime que c’est plus tard. Votre
CLED
CENTER FOR FREE ENTERPRISE AND DEMOCRACY
PRESS RELEASE

On June 23, the Center for Free Enterprise and Democracy, CLED, took the initiative to collect funds from the Private Sector. The goal of this action was to allow the groups and political parties to delegate representatives in the polling stations on June 25, the day of the municipal and local legislative elections: this was in order to improve the transparency of the voting and tallying operations.

Alarmed by the wave of protests of all kinds that seem to want to cast doubt on the credibility of the June 25 vote, the CLED recommends:

-- To the Parties, Groups, Political Men and Women having expressed reservations and denunciations to document them with serious, well-prepared dossiers;

-- To the CEP [Provisional Electoral Council], to finally assume its responsibilities and:

* To receive and consider the reservations and denunciations formulated within the framework of the law;

* To purge the Electoral Apparatus of all persons having shown themselves to be incompetent or dishonest;

* To make those decisions, in accordance with the law, that can rectify the mistakes and remedy the harm caused for the candidates during the day of June 25 and during the electoral process in general.

The Center for Free Enterprise and Democracy renews its faith in free, honest elections, a necessary passage to the establishment of a Legitimate State in our country.

Port-au-Prince, July 3, 1995

[stamp:] CLED

[letterhead information]
Mr. Smarck MICHEL  
Prime Minister  
In his offices

Port-au-Prince, August 10, 1995

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Within the framework of President Jean Bertrand ARISTIDE’s return and of constitutional order, I accepted, at the request of my Party, the PANPRA, to participate in your government as Minister of Administration and Civil Service. Aware, Mr. Prime Minister, that this participation by no means signified that my Party was "in power", but rather that it was providing, more simply, its contribution to the process of democratic consolidation and economic reconstruction of our country within the scope of the October 15 return, I always assumed a behavior favoring government cohesion over my Party’s individual interests. I am also taking the opportunity to pay tribute publicly to the respect you have always shown toward me and toward my Party.

However, Mr. Prime Minister, the numerous irregularities and frauds that soiled the credibility of the June 25 elections led my Party to dispute the results thereof. With the PANPRA, I condemn the irresponsibility and the arrogance of the present CEP [Provisional Electoral Council] which is jeopardizing democracy and the political stability of our country.

As long as your government assumed an impartial attitude, seeking to unblock the situation by encouraging dialogue between the CEP and the political parties that are disputing the electoral process, my duty was to help you on this path. It is in that sense that I encouraged the directors of my party to comply, for the same reasons as those of the KONAKOM and the FNCD, with the proposals aiming to bring the electoral process out of its present impasse.
TRAUDUCTION DE LA DECLARATION DE PRESSE DU MRN DU 26 JUIN 1995

June 26, 1995

-Declaration-

As we predicted, the elections held on Sunday, June 25, 1995, were an absolute fiasco. At first, it seems that this fiasco is primarily due to the incompetence and sheer mediocrity of the this Electoral Counsel. Furthermore, the number of people who were able to vote was around twenty per cent, according to our own estimates, for the whole country.

Concerning the irregularities, even since the constitution of this Counsel, the formation of the Departmental Electoral Bureaus (Bureaux Electoraux Departementaux, B.E.D.), the formation of the Communal Electoral Bureaus (Bureaux Electoral Communal, BEC), and of the Electoral and Inscription Bureaus (Bureaux d’Inscription et de Vote, BIV), no laws, no rules have ever been respected. Since the beginning, the Electoral Counsel had planned that each inscription bureau would be transformed into 3 electoral bureaus. We had then predicted that this affair would turn into a mess. The Electoral Counsel in a show of incompetence and cynicism has transformed these elections into shambles. The inscriptions of the electors were badly organized and the distribution of the Voting Bureaus was accomplished in a disorderly fashion. In this mess, one million electoral cards were lost. All this shows, at the very least, that the Electoral Counsel that was in charge of the technical organization of these elections was incompetent.

The day of the elections, around sunset, we finally understood that half a million ballot-papers had been lost. Mrs. Gessy Chancy Manigat, the acting general secretary of the Electoral Counsel declared in a press conference broadcasted at 7 p.m. that the lost ballot-papers had been replaced by photocopies of the authentic ballot-papers, in order to enable the elections to be held as planned. We consider this to be extremely grave and immoral. How many photocopies were in fact produced? How must we interpret the number of boxes filled with ballot-papers already marked before the beginning of the elections (authentic or fakes)? And what are we to do with the already marked ballot-papers that were deposited in the Electoral Bureaus? In addition to the fact that these elections were conducted in a disorderly manner, it also appears that they were rigged.
Le 25 juin 1995 le peuple haïtien a été victime d'un crime électoral planifié, prémédité et exécuté de sang froid par un Conseil Electoral Provisoire "Transitoire d'Exception" composé à 80% d'individus au service du parti au pouvoir. La consigne était claire : garantir une victoire totale au clan gouvernemental ou bien saboter à 100% les élections. Cette mission s'est heurtée aux pressions croisées des institutions nationales et internationales. Elle a donné lieu à une telle somme d'incohérences que les analystes ont finalement conclu à l'incompétence, l'inexpérience, la mauvaise foi, à l'absence totale de crédibilité du C.E.P. et du processus électoral. Toutes les astuces ont été inventées pour marginaliser les partis politiques non gouvernementaux, les terroriser et les obliger à fuir le terrain. Certains observateurs internationaux espéraient voir les partis politiques constituer une Unité de Surveillance et de Contrôle Electoral (U.S.C.E.) pour valider les résultats du vote. Mais le C.E.P. a tué dans l'œuf une telle initiative.

Les opérations électorales du 25 juin 1995 sont un crime parfait contre la démocratie parce que :

a) le peuple haïtien n'a pas eu droit à un C.E.P. crédible, à des employés entraînés et compétents dans les Bureaux Electoraux Départementaux, Communaux, dans les Bureaux d'Inscription et de Vote;

b) le peuple n'a pas eu droit à un minimum d'ordre, de discipline, d'organisation, d'honnêteté, de scrupule et de décence dans le fonctionnement des "magouilles" électorales;

c) les bureaux de vote n'ont pas eu droit à la sécurité tant clairement par les forces d'occupation et les agents nationaux;

d) les mandataires des partis politiques n'ont pas réussi à contrôler le matériel de vote ni les urnes remplies d'avance au bénéfice des candidats gouvernementaux;

e) les électeurs n'ont eu droit à aucune explication sur la disparition de 1 million de cartes électorales et la distribution en plein "black out" de 1 million de bulletins de votes supplémentaires dans la soirée du 25 juin 1995;

f) les électeurs n'ont pas eu droit au secret du vote, à la vérité, à la transparence, à la protection contre les "élections zобop", les "élections sanpouel", réalisées avec près de 1 million de photocopies de bulletins;
Mobilization for National Development "MDN"

"THE ELECTORAL CRIME OF JUNE 25, 1995 MUST BE PUNISHED"
decrees the General-Secretary of the M.D.N.

On June 25, 1995, the Haitian people were the victims of a planned, premeditated electoral crime carried out cold-bloodedly by a "Transitional, Exceptional" Provisional Electoral Council, 80% comprised of individuals in the service of the party in power. The order was clear: guarantee total victory for the government clan or completely sabotage the elections. This mission ran up against the overlapping pressures of national and international institutions. It gave rise to so many inconsistencies that the analysts finally concluded that it was incompetence, inexperience, insincerity and a total absence of credibility of the CEP [the Provisional Electoral Council] and the election process. Every imaginable trick was thought up to marginalize the non-government political parties, terrorize them and force them to flee. Some international observers were hoping to see the political parties form an Election Supervision and Monitoring Unit (U.S.C.E.) to validate the voting results. But the C.E.P. nipped any such initiative in the bud.

The electoral operations of June 25, 1995 were the perfect crime against democracy because:

a) the Haitian people were not afforded a credible Provisional Electoral Council or competent employees in the Departmental [regional division] or Municipal Election Offices or in the Registration Offices and Polling Stations;

b) the people were not afforded a minimum level of order, discipline, organization, honesty, scruples and decency in the working of the electoral wheeling and dealing;

c) the polling stations were not afforded the security proclaimed so far and wide by the occupation forces and the national officials;

d) the representatives of the political parties did not manage to control the voting materials nor the ballot boxes, stuffed in advance in favor of the government's candidates;

e) the voters were not afforded any explanation regarding the disappearance of 1 million voter cards and the distribution, in the middle of a black-out, of 1 million additional ballots in the evening of June 25, 1995;

f) the voters were not afforded voting privacy, truth, transparency or protection from the [creole expressions denoting fraudulent] elections carried out with nearly 1 million photocopies of ballots.
PROTEST LETTER

The National Labor Party (PNT) believes it has a duty to draw the attention of the Chairman and the Members of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) to the situation resulting from the hindrances and irregularities observed at the level of the electoral operations during the June 25, 1995 vote. The PNT's representatives were prevented from assisting and observing the voting process through the polling stations of the capital and the provincial towns.

Such a measure, applied systematically against the PNT's representatives without any grievances held against them, can only be described as an arbitrary act, contrary to the prior ententes established between the CEP [Provisional Electoral Council] and the political parties.

The National Labor Party energetically protests the conditions under which the June 25 elections took place, elections which were tainted by frauds and may well have severe consequences for the future of democracy in Haiti.

Consequently, the PNT proposes to simply annul these municipal and local legislative elections and to postpone them until the next presidential elections.

Finally, the National Labor Party is convinced that only elections conducted under conditions of honesty and transparency can have any chance of bringing a legitimate state to prevail in Haiti.

[signature]
General-Secretary

copies:
IRI
NDI
PROSSE
UN
OBA
FULNH
HAITI NATIONAL LIBERATION UNIFIED FRONT

Pétionville, June 30, 1995

Press Release

The Haiti National Liberation Unified Front (F.U.L.N.H.) is hastening to inform National and International public opinion that according to the information that reached it from its candidates, members and sympathizers in the country's nine geographical departments, the June 25, 1995 elections were organized for the exclusive benefit of a clearly defined sector.

The F.U.L.N.H. is asking its candidates, members and sympathizers and all of the country's democratic patriots to keep calm, while denouncing these elections as dishonest and humiliating.

[signature]

[letterhead information]
Comme déjà souligné dans le "Rapport" du 6 février 1996, le RNPF rappelle le caractère inconstitutionnel de l'Article 128 qui réduit les délais de résidence à trois mois pour les prochaines élections, et la non-applicabilité, sans les dispositions préalables requises, des Articles 146-2 et 146-3 sur la participation des Haïtiens de l'extérieur aux élections présidentielles, participation par ailleurs éminemment souhaitable et possible à l'avenir.

L'Article 25-2 introduit de nouveaux agents en la personne de délégués des Sections Communes choisis par les BIO. Quels sont les critères de sélection ? Quel est leur statut ? Quelle est leur fonction ? Il est prévu de les désigner entre le 1 et le 14 Mars, un même temps que les membres des SEC pourront appeler à leur choix. Cette cent-ic n'indique-t-elle pas que déjà les jeux sont faits et que vont s'ajouter aux fonctionnaires du CEH quelques 365 "petites copains" (?) qui confieront les effectifs partiens ?

5- L'Article 120 étend l'immunité dont jouissent les membres du CEH jusqu'à "un an après l'expiration de leur mandat". Mais à l'Article 148 il est précisé qu'une plainte déposée contre les membres du CEH ou leurs délégués ne pourra être retenue en vue de poursuites pénales qu'à la fin de leur mission. Précisons, le texte n'indique pas la durée de ce mandat en termes de cette mission.

6- Les amendes éventuelles prononcées par les Tribunaux ne pourraient être versées sur les comptes du CEH (Article 148-3) mais au Trésor Public (Direction Générale des Impôts), comme n'importe quelle ame.

7- Le mode de depressed du cautionnement (Articles 146-2 et 3)

Le RNPF rappelle sa résolution antérieure concernant le principe même du cautionnement (en particulier, anti-dérogatoire, anti-constitutionnel, parfois discriminatoire, source de corruption et qui pénalise outrancièrement les candidats indépendants et les partis démunis dans un pays pauvre comme le nôtre.

Mais le mode de calcul lui-même doit être précisé à partir de la notion de base de "circumscription concernée".

Par ailleurs, il insiste de nouveau sur le caractère inacceptable et fort peu pratique de l'exigence qui est faite à "tout candidat et tout cartel" de déposer une "attribution bancaire prouvant l'existence d'un compte courant électoral" (Article 69). Le CEH sait-il quels sont les conditions requises par les Banques pour ouvrir un compte ? Peut-il raisonnablement exiger de candidats qui n'en ont jamais eu et qui ne disposent pas d'établissements bancaires dans la ville la plus proche de leur circonscription, voire dans la circonscription elle-même, de prouver l'existence d'un compte courant électoral ? Cette disposition disproportionnée automatiquement l'immense majorité des candidats potentiels. Ne s'agit-il pas plutôt d'une attestation bancaire du Parti qui ratraverse un candidat ou un cartel ? Dans ce cas, il conviendrait de le préciser.

8- Enfin, à signaler une lacune évidente part.

Les dispositions relatives à la propagande (Section 8 : Articles 104-1 à 105-2) : l'utilisation impartiale et équitable des médias d'État n'ont pas été mis au service harming d'une ou de groupes privés du pouvoir. Il conviendrait d'alléger un terme de parole aux parties et aux candidats pour leur publicité, et de contrôler le temps d'antenne qui leur
les rendre exécutoires, et les **Articles 130 à 130-3** sur les élections particulières.

2- Le texte comporte une disposition anachronique et dangereuse.

En effet, parmi les Visas, il fait mention de l'**Article 192 du Code Pénal** qui stipule :

"Si les blessures sont du nombre de celles qui portent le caractère de meurtre, le coupable sera puni de mort".

Or, l'**Article 20** de la Constitution est formel :

"La peine de mort est abolie en toute circonstance".

Il est inclus parmi les Visas et ce rappel, à lui seul, aurait dû rendre caduque l'invocation de l'**Article 192 du Code Pénal**, notamment à l'**Article 120** du Document du 14 Février 1995 et qui s'applique exclusivement pour garantir l'intégrité physique des membres du CEP.

3- Le texte est vicié en plusieurs occasions :

a) par déplacement de dispositions :

A l'**Article 25-2**, les 8 alinéas s'intègrent plutôt à l'**Article 110** qu'ils complètent, mais ce dernier qui s'achève par les deux points (...) énumératifs les omet.

b) par répétition de dispositions :

L'**Article 115** reproduit intégralement le 114 et devient, de ce fait, inutile;

L'**Article 148-1** fait de même avec le deuxième paragraphe de l'**Article 146** et devient, de ce fait, lui aussi, inutile.

c) par omission de dispositions :

À l'**Article 1-1**, le Conseil Electoral n'est pas qualifié.

L'**Article 53-1** du Projet soumis au Parlement ne se retrouve pas dans le Texte du 14 Février et cela rend incompréhensible l'**Article 154** qui organise l'élection de deux Sénateurs par Département et fixe même la durée de leur mandat. Et la confusion augmente par la lecture de l'**Article 86-2** qui parle d'élection de trois Sénateurs.

d) par des "légersetôs" inadmissibles dans un texte de loi :

**Article 148-2** : au deuxième paragraphe, il est été plus pertinent d'écrire "des cartels ou des candidats".

**Article 67** : Il est fait référence à l'**Article 64** et non à l'**Article 66** qui est la disposition réellement concernée.

**Article 84** : La circonscription unique de La Gonave (No 32) comprend les Communes d'Anse-à-Galets et de Pointe-à-Raquette et non... Fort-à-Piment.

La Deuxième circonscription de Lascahobas (no 59) est Belladère et non Balladère (mentionné deux fois).
Il est normal pour un parti politique, dont c'est expressément le rôle, de participer aux élections, car la compétition électorale dans un cadre pluraliste est le seul moyen pacifique d'arriver au pouvoir. C'est là un principe essentiel de la vie politique partisan, une fonction-clé de son existence.

Mais il est évident qu'une élection doit offrir des garanties objectives de régularité, d'impartialité et d'honnêteté à tous les partis et à tous les citoyens, dans une compétition libre et ouverte pour le suffrage des citoyens. D'où la souci du HDNP d'examiner attentivement la "loi électorale" publiée dans Le Moniteur du mardi 14 Février 1995 (150ème année, No 13), devant régir les élections de Juin 1995, dans le contexte d'un dispositif partisan mis en place, susceptible de permettre, de favoriser le non-respect de la libre expression de la volonté populaire, et que nous avons déjà dénoncé.

C'est donc en toute lucidité, mais en se rassérant le droit, à tout moment d'intervenir pour dénoncer les manquements, les favorisismes et les irrégularités, et réévaluer la situation à la lumière de ceux-ci et de celles-là, que le HDNP a décidé de participer quand même à ces prochaines élections, en présentant des candidats à tous les niveaux, sur toute l'étendue du territoire national.

Par souci de sérieux, dans l'espoir que c'est par le dialogue qu'il faut et qu'on peut sauver ce qui doit être sauvé, malgré les conditions adverses toujours susceptibles d'être corrigées de bonne foi si bonne foi il y a,

En tout cas pour l'Histoire et,
Pour mettre en garde les démocrates du pays en attirant leur attention sur les risques de manipulation, de fraude, de favoritisme et même de confiscation du vote populaire dont chacun doit être conscient car personne ne doit être dupe,
Et afin d'éviter, à l'avenir, la répétition des mêmes erreurs démocratiques,
Le HDNP a décidé de rendre publiques des observations professionnelles (juridiques et politiques) à propos du texte du 14 Février 1995. Celles-ci comportent les différentes prises de position antérieures contenues, notamment, dans trois documents récents auxquels il réfère expressément :

"Les premières réflexions sur la question des élections" (soumis aux participants à la réunion du 27 Octobre 1994, au Palais National, sur invitation du Président de la République)

"Les Eléments essentiels du Document présentés sous la forme d'une liste de 11 Propositions"

Le "Mémorandum à la réunion organisée entre le CRF et les partis politiques par le National Democratic Institute, le 6 Février 1995".
As was already emphasized in the "Report" of February 6, 1995, the RDNP reiterates the unconstitutional nature of Article 156 which reduces the periods of residence to three months for the next election, and the non-applicability, without the required prior provisions of Articles 146-2 and 146-3 on the participation of Haitians abroad in the presidential elections, a participation eminently desirable and possible in the future.

Article 25-2 introduces new officials in the person of Delegates of the Wards chosen by the BECs. What are the selection criteria? What is their status? What is their function? It is planned to designate them between March 5 and 14, at the same time as the members of the BECs, who are called on to choose them, however. Doesn’t this coincidence indicate that the die is cast and some 565 "buddies" are going to be added to the officials of the CEP (?), who will inflate the partisan ranks?

5- Article 120 extends the immunity enjoyed by CEP members until "one year after expiry of their mandate". But in Article 148, it is specified that a complaint lodged against CEP members or their delegates can only be considered for criminal prosecution after the end of their mission. Precisely, the text does not indicate the duration of this mandate and the term of this mission.

6- The possible fines proposed by the Courts would not be paid to the accounts of the CEP (Article 181.3? [illegible]) but rather to the Treasury (General Management of Taxes), like any fine.

7- The aggressive method of calculating the security (Articles [illegible]).

The RDNP reiterates its previous comments against the very principle of the refundable security, which is anti-democratic and anti-constitutional because it is discriminatory, a source of corruption, and it excessively penalizes the independent candidates and the destitute parties in a country as poor as ours.

But the calculating method itself must be specified, starting with the basic notion of "district concerned".

Moreover, it once again insists on the unacceptable and highly impractical nature of the demand that is made on "every candidate and every coalition" to submit a "bank attestation" proving the existence of an electoral current account" (Article 69.1). Does the CEP know what conditions are required by the Banks to open an account? Can it reasonably require candidates who have never had an account and who have no banks in the town nearest to the district, let alone in their district itself, to prove the existence of an electoral current account? This provision automatically disqualifies the overwhelming majority of potential candidates. Is it rather a matter of a bank attestation of the Party sponsoring a candidate or a coalition? In this case, this should be specified.
promulgation and publication in order to make them enforceable, and Articles 130 to 130-3 on the partial elections.

2- The text comprises an anachronistic, dangerous provision. Indeed, among the Quotes, one must mention Article 192 of the Penal Code which stipulates:

"If the injuries are in a number that gives them the nature of murder, the guilty party will be punished by death".

Now then, Article 20 of the Constitution is formal:

"The punishment of death is abolished under any circumstances".

It is included among the Quotes, and this reminder alone should have rendered null and void the citing of Article 192 of the Penal Code, in particular Article 120 of the Document of February 14, 1995 and which applies solely to guaranteeing the physical soundness of the CEP's members.

3- The text is marred on several occasions:

a) by the shifting of provisions:
In Article 25-4, the 8 paragraphs fit instead into Article 110 which they complete, but Article 110, which ends with the enumerative colons (:), omits them.

b) by repetition of provisions:
Article 115 reproduces 114 in its entirety and, because of this, becomes useless;

Article 148-1 does likewise with the second paragraph of Article 148 and, because of this, also becomes useless.

c) by omission of provisions:
In Article 1-1, the Provisional Electoral Council is not described.
Article 53-1 of the Bill submitted to Parliament is not reproduced in the Text of February 14 and this makes incomprehensible Article 154 (or 164?, not clearly legible) which organizes the election of two Senators per Department [regional division] and even sets the duration of their mandate. And the confusion increases when reading Article 86-b, which alludes to the election of three Senators.

d) by instances of "casualness" inadmissible in a written law:
Article 14-2: in the second paragraph, it would have been more pertinent to write "of the coalitions or of the candidates"

Article 67: Article 64 is referred to and not Article 66 which is the provision actually concerned,

Article 84: The sole district of La Gonave No. 32) comprises the Municipalities of Anse-à-Galets and Point-à-Raquette and not Port-à-Piment.
The second district of Lascayobas (No. 59) is Belladère and not Balladère (mentioned twice).
NATIONAL PARTY OF THE PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATS


It is normal for a political party, the role of which is expressly this, to participate in the elections, since the electoral contest within a pluralistic framework is the sole peaceful means to come to power. That is a basic principle of partisan political life, a key function of its existence.

But it is obvious that an election must provide objective guarantees of regularity, impartiality and honesty to all parties and all citizens, in a free, open contest for the citizens’ vote. Hence the RDNP’s concern to attentively examine the "Electoral Law" published in Le Moniteur of Tuesday, February 14, 1995 (150th year, No. 13), intended to govern the elections of June 1995 in the context of a partisan mechanism put in place that is liable to make possible and promote the non-observance of free expression of the people’s will, and which we have already denounced.

So it is in complete lucidity, though reserving the right at any time to intervene to denounce breaches, instances of favoritism and irregularities, and to reevaluate the situation in light of these, that the RDNP has decided to participate nevertheless in the next elections, by presenting candidates at all levels throughout the national territory.

Out of concern for seriousness, and in the hope that by dialogue, one must and can save what must be saved, despite the adverse conditions that are always able to be corrected in good faith, if there is good faith,

In any case for History and,

To warn the country’s democrats by drawing their attention to the dangers of manipulation, fraud, favoritism and even confiscation of the people’s vote, of which everyone must be aware because no one should be duped,

And in order to avoid in the future the recurrence of the same mistakes that destroy democracy,

The RDNP has decided to publicize professional (juridical and political) observations regarding the text of February 14, 1995. These complete the different previous positions taken, contained namely in three recent documents to which it expressly refers:

"The initial reflections on the issue of the elections" (submitted to the participants in the meeting of October 27, 1994, at the Palais National, at the invitation of the President of the Republic)

"The Essential Elements of Documents presented, in the form of a list of 11 Propositions"

The "Report submitted at the meeting organized between the CEP and the political parties by the National Democratic Institute on February 6, 1995".
MNP 28
Mouvement National Patriotique du 28 Novembre
B. P. 988 Port-au-Prince, Haïti
Tel. 465317 222251

Déclaration

La journée du 25 juin 1995 marque une étape importante du Processus électoral devant conduire au renouvellement du personnage politique haïtien. Toutes les étapes précédentes préfiguraient déjà ce que devaient être les élections de ce jour. Celles-ci, réalisées, ont contribué à mettre à nu toutes les faiblesses congénitales et toutes les failles du processus telles qu'elles se sont manifestées.

- Relations tendues entre le CEP et les membres des BIV au sujet du salaire de cent cinquante gourdes environ dix dollars américains et au sujet du transport du matériel de vote. Dire que jamais dans l'histoire d'Haïti aucune élection n'a bénéficié de support financier et logistique aussi important.

- Irregularités de toutes sortes incluant notamment l'absence d'emblèmes des candidats sur certains bulletins de vote, carence de bulletins de vote, inexistence de noms d'électeurs inscrits sur les listes affichées dans les BIV, impossibilité de repérer les bureaux de vote, confusion sur les circonscriptions briguées par certains candidats dans la distribution des bulletins à travers le pays, arrivée tardive du matériel de vote dans certains BIV.

- Violation par le CEP de l'accord qu'il a signé avec les partis pour la mise sur pied d'un organisme de contrôle.

- Violation par le CEP de la presque totalité des
DECLARATION

The day of June 25, 1995 marks an important phase in the electoral process intended to lead to the renewal of Haiti's political personnel. All the preceding phases already foreshadowed what this day's elections would be. Carried out, these elections helped to reveal all the congenital weaknesses and all the flaws of the process as they appeared.

- Strained relations between the CEP [Provisional Electoral Council] and the members of the polling stations regarding the wage of one hundred fifty gourdes, approx. ten US dollars, and regarding the transporting of the voting material. To think that never in the history of Haiti has an election enjoyed such significant financial and logistical support.

- Irregularities of all kinds including, in particular, the absence of the candidates' emblems on some ballots, shortage of ballots, absence of registered voters' names on the lists posted up in the polling stations, inability to locate the polling stations, confusion regarding the districts sought by certain candidates in the distribution of the ballots throughout the country, late arrival of the voting material in some polling stations.

- Violation by the CEP of the agreement it signed with the parties for setting up a control body.

- Violation by the CEP of almost all the articles (of) the section of the electoral decree relative to the voting operations.

- High voter abstention rate.

The MNP-28 denounces these elections as a veritable farce, "a huge mess" says the Chairman of the RDNP.

The MNP-28 deplores that the opposition parties failed to develop a certain solidarity around the February 9, 1995, Resolution adopted by fifteen political parties. This could have warned them of such a catastrophe.

The MNP-28 deplores that the International Community underestimates the level of democratic awareness of the Haitian people ....... [sic] .... was able to declare these elections illegal and not in conformity with the rules of the democratic game
Article 101.- A six (6) heures précises du matin, le président du Bureau d'Inscription et de Vote, après avoir constaté la présence de tous les membres du Bureau, compté et revisé en leur présence les bulletins et le matériel électoral disponibles, déclare ouvertes les opérations de vote. Le secrétaire dresse le procès-verbal d'ouverture des opérations électorales. (2ème paragraphe, relatif à l'ouverture du scrutin).

Article 101-1.- (2ème paragraphe, relatif au secret de Vote) Les électeurs se retirent dans l'isolement pour exprimer leur suffrage. Beaucoup de BIV ont fonctionné sous des arbres ; dans ces conditions, il n'y a pas eu d'isolement. Donc, le vote n'a pas été secret.

Article 104.- (Relatif à la clôture du scrutin) "A six (6) heures du soir, le président du BIV déclare le scrutin clos. Après cette déclaration, aucun vote ne sera reçu". Le 25 juin, en certains endroits, le scrutin a duré jusqu'au lendemain.

Article 108.- (Relatif au dépouillement) "Après la clôture du scrutin, il est procédé sans désemparer au dépouillement en présence de partis ou groupements accrédités reconnus, cartels et candidats, et des observateurs d'entretient accrédités qui se trouvent présent". Personne ne peut sortir du BIV ou y pénétrer avant le dépouillement à moins d'être muni d'une autorisation spéciale délivrée par le C.E.P.

Cet article a été violé en deux (2) points : D'une part, obstruction et étant faite à des mandataires de partis, en particulier ceux du KONAKOM, qui n'ont pas pu pénétrer dans les bureaux de Vote. D'autre part, dans beaucoup de bureaux, le dépouillement ne s'est pas fait dans les BIV.

Article 111.- (Relatif au procès-verbal du Vote) Le Procès-Verbal de dépouillement de scrutin est préparé en six (6) originaux. Un original sera affiché à l'entrée principale du BIV par le Président, un original sera transmis au SEC et deux originaux seront délivrés au BED qui fera parvenir un au C.E.P.

Les enquêteurs du KONAKOM ont visité le local de plusieurs BIV et n'ont pas vu de procès-verbal exposé. Ainsi, quand le C.E.P promet des résultats, on se demande à partir de quels Procès-Verbaux.

III- REVENDICATIONS DU KONAKOM

LE KONAKOM REITERE SES REVENDICATIONS :


2- Recomposition de la machine électorale pour rendre transparent le prochain scrutin.
2- Reconstitution of the electoral machinery to make the next vote transparent.
3- Forming of the Election Supervising and Monitoring Unit, with the members of the political parties.

In addition, the KONAKOM points out that the inquiry the CEP is preparing to carry out to determine the irregularities and the frauds comprises a gap right from the start:

The CEP didn’t bother to record the specific grievances of each party. As a result, we are asking the CEP to rethink its method of approach, by having a meeting with the parties to record their grievances before starting the inquiry.

Port-au-Prince, July 4, 1995

[signature]
Victor Benoit
KONAKOM General Secretary
KONAKOM

PARTY OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENTS
Legally recognized - Member of the Socialist International - Member of the COPPPAL

THE KONAKOM’S POSITION CONCERNING THE ELECTION DAY OF JUNE 25, 1995

Ten days after the June 25 electoral scandal, the KONAKOM insists on drawing the public’s attention to several essential points:

I - DENUNCIATIONS

1) A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS AT KENSCOFF: Since June 26, several citizens from Kenscoff who are partisans of candidates of the KONAKOM and other parties and were falsely accused of having set fire to a BEC [municipal electoral office] that was, however, not set on fire at all, have been arbitrarily thrown in prison. Despite the efforts of the attorneys hired by the Party, these citizens have not been brought before their competent judge, whereas the Constitution provides for a deadline of 48 hours in these matters.

Also, the candidate for the Chamber of Deputies, Jean Buteaux Coriolan, is the victim of harassment and search. During the night of June 30, 1995, at 11 pm, a search was carried out in his residence. This is a violation of the Constitution in its Article 24-4.- "Except in the case of flagrante delicto, no arrest on a warrant and no search can take place between six (6:00) o’clock pm and six (6:00) o’clock am". Consequently, the search conducted in the night is an arbitrary, dangerous, suspicious action and is reminiscent of the dictatorial methods of former times.

The KONAKOM requests the structures of the concerned judicial apparatus, Justice of the Peace and Government Commissioner, to apply the law and the Constitution, i.e., to bring these citizens before their competent judges so that they can find the justice due them. Contrary to the opinion of the CEP [Provisional Electoral Council], they are not arsonists.

2) A CONSPIRACY MOUNTED AGAINST THE KONAKOM IN THE CRIME PERPETRATED AT ANSE D’HAINAULT AGAINST JEAN-CHARLES ENOCK.

While Mr. Eric Falt, spokesperson of the MINHUA, formally denied the information, Mr. Anselme Remy persists in his accusation against the KONAKOM. The public must understand that Remy’s position is in conformity with that of the political sector "BO- TAB- LA" which wishes at all costs to eliminate the KONAKOM from the political scene. Given this conspiracy, the KONAKOM demands from the CEP the results of its inquiry into the crime of Anse d’Hainault and demands that the whole truth be told in order for the criminal or criminals to be known.
Le Front National pour le Changement et la Démocratie (F.N.C.D.) adresse ses patriotiques salutations à toute la population et la remercie du support et de la confiance qu'elle lui a témoignées au cours des élections législatives et municipales du 25 juin 1995.

Suivant les informations recueillies par nos mandataires et délégués, les électeurs, une fois de plus, ont voté le "FNCD KOK KALITE LAVALAS".

Ainsi, d'ores et déjà nous affirmons que nous avons gagné les élections à l'échelle nationale, particulièrement dans la zone métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince où nous nous attendons à remporter presque tous les sièges, en dépit des conditions économiques difficiles dans lesquelles le FNCD a conduit la campagne électorale marquée par des embûches de toutes sortes montées par le CEP.

Le scandale a atteint son comble le 25 juin 1995 quand les irrégularités suivantes ont été observées:

- Les mandataires du FNCD ont été pochés des bureaux de vote;
- Les électeurs du FNCD ont été intimidés et n'ont pas pu librement exprimer leur choix;
- Les Bureaux de vote ont été livrés à des partisans d'une seule tendance politique qui ont ouvertement manifesté leur appartenance et ont ordonné à certains policiers complices de molester, de frapper et d'arrêter...
NATIONAL FRONT FOR CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY
F.N.C.D.

Port-au-Prince, July 3, 1995

POSITION OF THE FNCD
CONCERNING THE DISPUTED ELECTIONS OF JUNE 25, 1995

THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY (FNCD) once again
denounces the numerous, blatant irregularities, frauds and acts of
violence that tainted the electoral process of June 25, 1995, at
national level with the objective of facilitating the systematic,
total takeover of the government apparatus by a small, incoherent,
shallow group.

The FNCD, following its June 30 meeting with its valiant candidates
for the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, the municipalities, and
the wards, and taking into account the reports of the regional
coordinating committees of Haiti's nine geographic departments,
insists on confirming that it will not accept the results, whether
favorable or not, of the widely disputed elections of June 25,
1995, tending to flout the people's will. This is why it requests:

1.- The annulment of the disputed June 25 elections characterized
by irregularities, abuses of power, violence, undue pressures and
constraints, administrative breaches and frauds of all kinds noted
throughout the country's nine geographic departments.

2.- The reshaping of all the authorities of the electoral
apparatus.

3.- The organizing of a national dialogue, genuine and open, in
order to reach the consensus indispensable to implement a realistic
political agenda liable to bring the country out of the
institutional, socioeconomic and political crisis with which it is
struggling, and to arrive at the holding of free, honest,
democratic elections.

While it mourns the odious assassination of Mr. Jean-Charles Hénoc,
its winning candidate for the Chamber of Deputies for the district
of Anse d'Hainault, the FNCD asks its numerous friends, partisans
and sympathizers at home and abroad to stay mobilized to defend the
democratic acquisitions and to continue to fight for Change and
Democracy.

[signature]
Evan PAUL
Spokesperson

[signature]
Turneb DELPE
Spokesperson
NATIONAL FRONT FOR CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY
F.N.C.D.

PRESS RELEASE

The National Front for Change and Democracy (F.N.C.D.) sends its patriotic greetings to the entire population and thanks it for the support and trust it has shown it during the course of the June 25, 1995, legislative and municipal elections.

According to the information gathered by our representatives and delegates, the voters have once again voted for the "FNCD KOK KALITE LAVALAS".

Thus, we henceforth affirm that we have won the elections at national level, especially in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area where we expect to carry almost all the seats, despite the difficult economic conditions in which the FNCD conducted the electoral campaign marked by pitfalls of all kinds put in place by the CEP.

The scandal reached its height on June 25, 1995, when the following irregularities were observed:

- The FNCD representatives were chased away from the polling stations;
- The FNCD voters were intimidated and could not freely express their choice;
- The Polling Stations were handed over to partisans of a single political persuasion who openly displayed their affiliation and ordered certain accomplice police officers to molest, hit and arrest the representatives of the other political parties, namely those of the FNCD.

Nothing was left out to make the task difficult for the other parties not favored by the government. Even the "passes" were handed out parsimoniously.

Since the population did not follow the calls for voting despite the intrusion of the authorities in position and a flashy, costly advertizing campaign, the CEP was moved aside to allow a prolongation of the voting hours. This confused situation, according to the observations made by the FNCD, was supposed to make it possible for those in charge of the polling stations to fraudulently stuff the ballot boxes in disregard for the clear will of the Haitian people. So it was the population itself that alerted both the national and international press and observers to the ballot box stuffing that took place at Rue Pavée.

The FNCD remains convinced that only free, honest elections, the
For Immediate Release
Monday, June 26, 1995

IRREGULARITIES MAR ELECTORAL PROCESS
STATEMENT BY REP. PORTER GOSS (R-FL), DELEGATION CHAIRMAN

Good morning. This is our second press conference. On Saturday, the International Republican Institute (IRI) released its pre-electoral assessment in which we expressed our concern over a number issues. They include the implications of the failure of the electoral authorities to create an open, transparent and verifiable process; the disqualification of parties and candidates; the lack of adequate training for electoral workers; and the failure to conduct any civic education to encourage voter participation. Today, all of us here have seen the consequences of these failings.

I want to underscore the fact that our delegates are still in the field throughout the nine departments sending in reports. Election day has only recently come to an end and the counting continues. Our serious concern about the total lack of ballot security is being borne out as I speak. We received reports from our delegates early this morning who observed disturbing irregularities at BEC level (regional collection and counting station). I have asked our delegation to determine the extent of these abuses for our evaluation of the count. The problems in this electoral process can only complicate the strengthening of democracy in Haiti.

Frankly, the Haitian people deserve better. We saw their remarkable dignity and endurance yesterday while trying earnestly to participate in an arbitrary process. We share a common objective with others in the international community -- we all want a better Haiti and a stronger democracy here. IRI is not here to certify this election. Only the Haitian people themselves have the right to determine the legitimacy of this process. Already several major parties have issued statements challenging the integrity of the process. We must take their judgements seriously.

Let me share with you our observations about yesterday’s events. We received radio and telephone reports from IRI delegates in the field from Les Cayes to Fort Liberte. Together, the IRI delegates have visited during the course of election day about 500 BIVs (local polling

(more)
POLITICAL PARTY SURVEILLANCE UNIT AND POLITICAL PARTY POLLWATCHERS

The political party surveillance unit (USCE) and party pollwatchers are two mechanisms that could have been excellent instruments to shore up confidence in the electoral process. Unfortunately, the USCE failed to materialize. Due to funding constraints many parties were not able to field as many pollwatchers as hoped.

Political Party Surveillance Unit

On June 3, 1995, the political parties met with the CEP to discuss a number of concerns and to form an Election Monitoring and Surveillance Unit (USCE). The document regarding the USCE was signed by all parties except the FNCD, MDN and MODEJHA.

The unit was intended to provide for members of political parties to be present at the CEP, the BEDs, and the BECs; BIVs would be covered by party pollwatchers. The parties gathered on June 15 to have a lottery to select which parties would represent each BED and BEC. Each party in turn then appointed a member to the BEDs and BECs for which it has been assigned.

The CEP committed to training these persons, and the European Union was to provide funding.

The Unit never became operational, and no political party representative was accredited as a member of the USCE for the June 25 elections. The reasons for this are twofold: funding became available late, and the CEP did not undertake the work necessary to make this unit operational.

Political Party Pollwatchers

According to the electoral law, political parties and/or candidates have the right to have a representative at each BIV. This was virtually impossible for most parties as this would require each party to mobilize 10,000 persons. A proposal was made that the parties would come together and pool representatives and a lottery mechanism would be used to choose representatives. The effort failed because some parties felt that it was their unalienable right to have representatives wherever they so chose.

The CEP also made a decision that posed another obstacle for the parties to have pollwatchers at the BIVs. On May 30, the CEP issued a press release informing the political parties that the parties must submit a registration card complete with a photo and voter card registration number for every pollwatcher by June 17. This was nearly impossible for many
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION CAPABILITY

The CEP was created as a provisional institution with no permanent infrastructure, no permanent staff, nor the benefit of any records or institutional history on which to build. Large sums of money, mainly from the United States government, and technical assistance from the United Nations, made this election possible. Without the logistical support of the UNMIH, many pre-electoral needs and election day itself would have been nearly impossible. It is doubtful that any institutionalization of the process was realized as a result of these outlays. This was a significant missed opportunity for Haiti and the United States to lay the foundation for Haiti’s electoral system. The next election will occur at the end of 1995 presumably under a provisional council as well. However, there is sufficient time to establish a permanent electoral council for the legislative elections slated for late 1996. This council will most likely have to begin the institutionalization process from scratch again. The impact of the large sums of US taxpayers money would have been far greater had there been a larger vision of institution building, rather than simply hoping to conduct one election.

The council had limited breadth and depth in decision-making capability. The heavy hand of the international community in this process steered the CEP at times but could not act in place of it. While there are nine members on the CEP, most decisions were made by the President of the CEP. This not only bogged down the process but led to a greater number of "ad hoc" decisions that were unevenly publicized. The political parties have maintained, as one of the prerequisites to their rejoining the electoral process, the replacement of the current members of the CEP. Acknowledging the severe management problems of the CEP, the President of the CEP and another member were replaced by President Aristide at the end of July. Political parties are still demanding that more members be replaced.

The CEP organizational structure and delineation of responsibilities were never clear. The roles assigned to different divisions and activities undertaken by those divisions were never made known nor understood by the election participants. Again, it will be critical in the aftermath of this election that all activities of the CEP are publicly known.

As documented in IRI’s pre-election updates, political parties and individual candidates addressed themselves in writing to CEP countless times on numerous issues. The CEP was completely unresponsive to these complaints. Frustration in the process was magnified by this lack of responsiveness. In future election processes, the lines of communication between the CEP and the parties need to be defined, open and transparent. Future CEPs will have to justify decisions and invite dialogue. Lacking completely from this election was the appeal process. This will have to be addressed in the drafting of a new electoral law. Participants in the process must be guaranteed fair explanation or redress of their concerns.

The inability of the CEP to adhere to its own election calendar was disconcerting. Not only were the elections postponed several times but other benchmarks along the way were not met. While many different factors played into these delays, it was another detracting element from the credibility of the CEP (see table overleaf).
Le présent procès-verbal, dressé et clos le 26 juin 1995 à 12 heures, du matin, six originaux a été, après lecture, présenté à tous les membres du bureau de vote, aux délégués mandatés et aux observateurs, pour signature.

Un original de ce procès-verbal sera affiché immédiatement à l'entrée principale du BIV par le (la) Président (e), un original sera transmis au BEC et deux originaux seront délivrés au BED qui en fera parvenir au CEP.

Le (la) représentant (e), mandaté (e), du (de la) candidat (e) à la Députation et au Sénat de la République recevra une copie pour le candidat qui aura obtenu le plus grand nombre de voix (art. 111). En cas d'absence de ce (cette) représentant (e), les deux originaux seront remis au (à la) Président (e) du BED.

**COMPOSITION DU BUREAU DE VOTE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fonction</th>
<th>Nom et Prénom</th>
<th>Carte Electorale</th>
<th>Signature</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Président (e)</td>
<td>Alexis Liné</td>
<td>231 008</td>
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<td>Frédéric Dessy</td>
<td>221 001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clerc</td>
<td>Frédéric Fétet</td>
<td>231 001</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Clerc</td>
<td>M. Jacque Cossou</td>
<td>231 004</td>
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<td>Portier</td>
<td>Guillaume Baudieu</td>
<td>231 002</td>
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**MANDATAIRES ET OBSERVATEURS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation/Groupement</th>
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<tr>
<td>M.R.N.</td>
<td>Phavor-denette</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kongom</td>
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<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>Mito Paul</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP de C.I.O.</td>
<td>Andrienne Fizou</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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CONSEIL ELECTORAL PROVISOIRE
ELECTIONS DE JUIN 1995

PROCES-VERBAL DE DEPOUILLEMENT DU SCRUTIN

Jour : Samedi  
Mois : Juin  
Année : 1995  
Election : 

Bureau de vote : Potinette  
Sect. Communale :  
Commune de : Jérémie  
Département de : Sud Est  

Bulletins reçus : 1698  
Bulletins utilisés :  
Bulletins inutilisés :  

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<tr>
<th>Electeurs inscrits</th>
<th># votants</th>
<th>Votes valides</th>
<th>Votes nuls</th>
<th>Votes exprimés</th>
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<tr>
<td>386</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>135</td>
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NOMBRE DE VOTES OBTENUS par CHAQUE CANDIDAT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nom des candidats ou cartels</th>
<th>#du candidat ou du cartel</th>
<th>Nombre de votes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Philomène Louis</td>
<td>L.P.-G.</td>
<td>quatre</td>
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<td>André francois Remy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Trente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Nicolau</td>
<td>L.D.</td>
<td>vingt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoine Bruno</td>
<td>M.D.</td>
<td>quatre-vingt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eugène Charles</td>
<td>G.P.-G.H.</td>
<td>Dix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>André Goloni</td>
<td>R.D.P.F.</td>
<td>Trois</td>
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</table>

Le (la) Président (e) vérifie et regroupe les feuilles de comptage remplies par les clercs avec l’assistance des membres du bureau. Le (la) Président (e) prononce à haute voix les résultats du scrutin.
Le présent procès-verbal, dressé et clos le .........................................................., à ................ heures ................., du .................. en six originaux a été, après lecture, présenté à tous les membres du bureau de vote, aux délégués mandatés et aux observateurs, pour signature.

Un original de ce procès-verbal sera affiché immédiatement à l'entrée principale du BIV par le (la) Président (e), un original sera transmis au BEC et deux originaux seront délivrés au BED qui en fera parvenir au CEP.

Le (la) représentant (e), mandaté (e), du (de la) candidat (e) à la Députation et au Sénat de la République recevra une copie pour le candidat qui aura obtenu le plus grand nombre de voix (art. 111). En cas d'absence de ce (cette) représentant (e), les deux originaux seront remis au (à la) Président (e) du BED.

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<th>Nom et Prénom</th>
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<td>Marc Carbonneau</td>
<td>542-45-12</td>
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<td>Jean Chehabé</td>
<td>547-35-76</td>
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<td>547-35-70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portier</td>
<td>Claudes Boisseau</td>
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### MANDATAIRES ET OBSERVATEURS

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Léopold</td>
<td>Pierre Roger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. L. &amp; Co.</td>
<td>Claire Barthaud</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. L. &amp; Co.</td>
<td>Agella Reynolds</td>
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### PROCES-VERBAL DE DEPOUILLEMENT DU SCRUTIN

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Jour</th>
<th>Mois</th>
<th>Année</th>
<th>Election</th>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Juin</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>C.A.S.E.C.</td>
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Bureau de vote: 231-001  
Sect. Communale: Belle-Hir  
Commune de: Belle-Hir  
Département de: Sud Est

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<th>Bulletins reçus</th>
<th>Bulletins utilisés</th>
<th>Bulletins inutilisés</th>
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<tr>
<td>423</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>144</td>
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### ELECTEURS INSCRITS ET VOTES

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<th>Electeurs inscrits</th>
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<th>Votes valides</th>
<th>Votes nuls</th>
<th>Votes exprimés</th>
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<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>228</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philogène Louis</td>
<td>C.A.S.E.C.</td>
<td>Six Voix 6</td>
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<td>Bonheure Ricex</td>
<td>Congo M</td>
<td>Vente-Cinq 35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joseph Volant</td>
<td>LaValas</td>
<td>Quarante Quatre 44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bruno Antoine</td>
<td>M.A.N.</td>
<td>Quarante-voix 101</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georges Charle</td>
<td>F.D.C.H.</td>
<td>Trente 11 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>André Poline</td>
<td>F.D.N.P.</td>
<td>Dix-sept-voix 17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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XV. Post-Election Issues
POST ELECTION ISSUES

I. Political Parties Demand Annulment of Elections and a New CEP

Immediately following the conclusion of voting on June 25, many of the political parties began issuing statements in protest of the elections. On June 29, 22 political parties signed a resolution demanding that the elections be rerun in a majority of areas and the formation of a new CEP. The parties subsequently strengthened their demand to annul the elections once the CEP announced their criteria to determine where new elections would be held (the criteria would only require about 20 percent of the election to be held again, whereas, the parties believed the number should be much higher). Following the CEP’s press release on July 9 announcing that the results would be released on July 11, 24 political parties signed a communiqué maintaining their position against the elections. On July 28, 26 political parties, representatives of independent candidates, and parties that were excluded from the process signed a communiqué that again demanded the holding of new elections and a new CEP.

In light of the government’s decision to go ahead with the August 13 elections, the political parties’ announced their decision to boycott the elections and called on all of their members to support their decision.

Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott came to Haiti twice with two separate proposals to resolve the crisis, in late July and in mid-August. The first such proposal was reviewed by the three largest political opposition parties (PANPRA, KONAKOM and FNCD) and slightly modified and submitted to the government and CEP (attachment 1). Neither accepted the proposal. The second proposal Talbott submitted directly to the government and it was summarily rejected by the CEP and the government of Haiti, and they went ahead with the September 17 rerun elections (attachment 2).

II. Replacement of Two CEP Members

CEP President Anselme Remy resigned from his position on July 26 in a late night television address. Remy attributed his resignation to the ongoing pressure for negotiations regarding the outcome of the elections. Haitian radio and TV also announced that another member of the CEP, Jean-Francois Merisier, had been removed. The two vacancies were filled by appointments made by President Aristide on July 28: Pierre-Michel Sajous for Anselme Remy, and Johnson Bazelais for Jean-Francois Merisier. The naming of these two members occurred without any consultation with the political parties.

Mr. Sajous served on the staff of President Aristide’s Presidential Commission in Haiti during the military regime’s rule. This reshuffling of the CEP occurred on the eve of the arrival of a US delegation to Haiti, including the head of the U.S. Agency for International Development, Brian Atwood, and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.
These replacements brought heated protests from the political parties as they had wanted a completely new and representative CEP. In the proposal put forward by PANPRA, FNCD, and KONAKOM to resolve the crisis, five of the nine members would be replaced from a list of candidates put forward by the parties.

On July 29, the CEP elected Mr. Sajous as the new President of the CEP.

III. Deputy Candidate and Local Judge Imprisoned

The communal headquarters of the elections council in Limbe was burned down two nights before election day. A candidate for Deputy of the PANPRA party, Duly Brutus, and two rivalling factions of the Lavalas party have accused each other of starting this fire that prevented balloting on June 25. Brutus’ house and car were attacked the next night, and he was forced to seek refuge at the Limbe police station.

Duly Brutus was arrested in Port-au-Prince and imprisoned on July 15. The July 5 warrant to request Mr. Brutus’ appearance at Civil Court accuses him of subversive actions and criminal arson. It is against the Haitian legal code to arrest someone with this type of warrant, because the legally mandated investigation to collect evidence to gain authority to arrest someone in Haiti had not been initiated. After protests by the OAS and IRI, Duly Brutus was released on July 17.

The Justice of the Peace in Limbe, Jacques LaGuerre, was also imprisoned on July 6 in connection with the same incident. Mr. Brutus wrote an open letter to the Special United Nations Representative in Haiti on July 9 protesting this arbitrary arrest without evidence. Mr. LaGuerre is still in prison and has not been given a hearing on his case or the evidence against him.

IV. President Aristide Shuts Down Private Television Stations by Decree

President Aristide promulgated a decree on June 30 that banned the operation of any television station that received its license during the period of the military regime. This affected six prominent private television stations. These stations went off the air, leaving only the state-owned television station and cable stations operating.

V. FNCD Deputy Candidate Murdered

FNCD Deputy candidate, Henock Jean-Charles, was assassinated two days after the election in the Department of the Grand Anse. Two individuals, both members of COREGA, a non-governmental organization associated with the Lavalas Movement, were detained by the UN military in connection with the crime. The FNCD requested the arrest of the leader of COREGA, Father Samedi, as the intellectual author of the crime; but no action was taken.
VI. **BED President Replaced in the Department of the West**

The President of the regional headquarters of the CEP (BED) in the Department of the West, which includes Port-au-Prince, was replaced on June 27 without warning. Mr. Jacqillon Barthelemy was replaced by Mr. Boussuet Aubourg, another employee of the BED.

Numerous on-site inspections of the BED by IRI staff and observers during the June 25 election revealed a grave lack of control of ballots and other materials by election workers, destruction of materials, and a high level of chaos in the days following the election.
Provisional Electoral Council

Port-au-Prince, July 28, 1995

COMMUNIQUE

With reference to the promulgation of the Presidential Decree of July 26, 1995 in the official bulletin Le Moniteur, the two new members of the Provisional Electoral Council, Mr. Pierre Michel SAJOUS and Johnson BAZELAIS were sworn in this Friday, July 28, before the court of appeal.

During the course of a work session held on the premises of the CEP [Provisional Electoral Council] in Pacot, Mr. Pierre Michel SAJOUS was unanimously elected the new Chairman of the Provisional Electoral Council.

The bulletins printed by SEQUOIA in California, USA will arrive in Port-au-Prince on Tuesday, August 1, and will be in the BECs [municipal electoral offices] as of August [illegible], 1995 July [sic].

Press Office of the CEP
Conseil Electoral Provisoire

Port au-Prince, le 28 juillet 1995

COMMUNIQUE


Au cours d'une séance de travail tenue au local du CEP à Pacot, M. Pierre Michel SAJOUIS, a été élu, à l'unanimité, nouveau President du Conseil Electoral Provisoire.

Les bulletins imprimés par la SEQUOIA, en Californie aux Etats-Unis, arriveront à Port-au-Prince le mardi 1er aout et seront dans les BFC à partir du 3 aout 1995 jullet.

Bureau de Presse du CEP
Port-au-Prince, July 28, 1995

Mr. Reynold Georges
ALAH General-Secretary

The Provisional Electoral Council has the pleasure of informing you that its new members Johnson BAZELAIS and Pierre-Michel SAJOUS were sworn in this Friday, July 28, 1995 before the Court of Appeal.

The new Councilor Pierre-Michel SAJOUS was unanimously elected Chairman of the Provisional Electoral Council. In so doing, the Provisional Electoral Council would like to meet you within the scope of the electoral operations underway with a view to exploring the parameters of this desirable cooperation. Toward promoting the swiftness of the exchanges, we also offer you the opportunity to make an appointment with us by phone.

Hoping that you won't fail to respond to this call, we remain,

Sincerely,

[seal: CEP] [signature]
Leon MANUS
Vice-Chairman
Port-au-Prince, le 28 juillet 1995

Monsieur Reynold Georges
Secrétaire Général ALAI!


Le nouveau Conseiller Pierre-Michel SAJOUS a été élu, à l'unanimité, Président du Conseil Electoral Provisoire. Ce faisant, le Conseil Electoral Provisoire souhaiterait vous rencontrer dans le cadre des opérations électorales en cours en vue d'explorer les paramètres de cette souhaitable coopération. En vue de favoriser la célérité des échanges, nous vous laissons aussi le loisir de prendre rendez-vous avec nous par téléphone.

En espérant que vous ne manquerez pas de répondre à cet appel, nous vous renouvelons, Monsieur, notre disponibilité et vous prions de croire en notre considération distinguée.

[Signatures]

Pierre-Michel SAJOUS
Président 1994-1995

Léon MANUS
Vice-Président
The District Attorney's Office of the Civil Court of Port-au-Prince
Port-au-Prince, July 5, 1995

CALLS FOR the Chief of the Interim Police to give the orders for Duly BRUTUS, residing in Tomassin, to be searched for and brought in to the District Attorney's Office of the Civil Court of this jurisdiction, for subversive activities and arson, disrupting in this way the established social order.

At the District Attorney's Office, on the day, month and year below.

[handwritten:]
Read and approved by the police
7/6/95

[seal]
Jean AUGUSTE BRUTUS, av
Government Commissioner
[signature]
Le Parquet du Tribunal Civil de Port-au-Prince

Port-au-Prince, le 5 Juillet 1995

REQUIERT le Chef de la Police Interimaire de passer les instructions nécessaires pour que la femme DILLY BERNIS, demeurant à Port-au-Prince, soit recherchée et amenée au Parquet du Tribunal Civil de ce dessort ce jour, pour menées subversives, et incendies criminelles troublant ainsi l'ordre social établi.

Fait au Parquet les jour, mois et an que dessus.

Komise gouven men mande pou passe lad pou la missie DILY BERNIS, ki rete nan tonasin, pou cheche 1 min nin l ban moun an de fòr tribina l civi l pot o prince lan se pou sisan la twoubly ak di fe o Frizye.

fe lan noi jou, ak dat ki la.

Vu et approuvé
par la police 6/7/95

Jan Ogiste BERNIS, av
Komise gouven men.

Jea. AUGUSTE BERNIS, av
COMMISSAIRE DU GOUVERNEMENT.
XVI.  Political Party Joint Resolutions and Proposals to End Crisis
The solidarity group of the 22 parties confirms and updates its rejection of the so-called legislative, municipal and ward elections of June-September 1995.

The 22 political parties that had approved and signed the joint resolution of June 29, 1995, by which they declared that they do not acknowledge the validity of the June 25 elections due to serious irregularities, flagrant illegalities and blatant frauds, insist on making known that they could not, in any case, acknowledge the results of the partial elections and those of the second round supposedly organized by the government on August 13 and September 17. As the first round was tainted to the core and its results distorted by a scandalous 100% of representatives elected solely in favor of the Lavalas party, no second round could be assented to while the fait accompli of the fraudulent results of June 25 has been maintained. This is why these parties in their entirety had publicly decided not to participate and in fact did not participate in the last elections, and consequently asked the people to refrain from voting. Consequently, the parties signing the resolution of June 29 solemnly and jointly declare that they do not acknowledge the parliament resulting from these so-called elections and confirm their demand to form a new CEP with participation and representation of the parties in its composition, to entirely repeat the electoral process with a view to new general elections this time guaranteed free and honest. They insist on reminding, in clear, unequivocal terms, that the two conditions sine qua non for their return to participation in the electoral process are and remain the reconsideration of the June 25 elections and those that followed, and the reconstitution of an entirely new, representative CEP with the participation of the parties to guarantee the normal rules of the competitive, democratic game.

The undersigned 22 political parties emphasize that the head of state and his party in power, Lavalas, have twice been the only ones to ask the people to go and vote, the first time on the occasion of the repetition of the partial elections on August 13, and the second time on the occasion of the second round on September 17, while all the other independent and opposition parties called for a boycott to bring about justice; well, both times, the Lavalas people counted themselves and achieved less than 20% of participants on August 13 and less than 15% on September 17. So it was demonstrated, for those who still doubted: the Haitian people, in their overwhelming majority, are not Lavalassian.

The undersigned 22 democratic political parties thus thank this Haitian people, who were thought to have been infantilized, for the calm maturity they just demonstrated by unequivocally rejecting the march toward a monochrome parliament and a faceless, single-party autocracy, since the deceitful face shown continues to simulate democracy for the needs of foreign consumption.

Port-au-Prince, September 19, 1995

[signatures]
Le groupe solidaire des 22 partis confirme et actualise son rejet des prétendues élections législatives, municipales et de casecs de juin-septembre 1995

Les 22 partis politiques qui avaient approuvé et signé la résolution conjointe du 29 juin 1995 par laquelle ils déclaraient ne pas reconnaître la validité des élections du 25 juin pour cause d’irrégularités graves, d’illegaletés flagrantes et de fraudes caractérisées, tiennent à faire savoir qu’ils ne sauraient en aucun cas reconnaître les résultats des élections partielles et de celles du second tour prétendument organisées par le pouvoir les 13 août et 17 septembre derniers. Le premier tour ayant été vicié à la base et ses résultats faussés par un scandaleux 100% d’élu en faveur du seul parti lavalais, aucun second tour ne saurait être entériné alors qu’a été maintenu le fait accompli des résultats frauduleux du 25 juin. C’est la raison pour laquelle ces partis dans leur totalité avaient publiquement décidé de ne pas participer et de fait n’ont pas participé aux dernières consultations électorales et demandé au peuple, conséquemment, de s’abstenir d’y aller voter. En conséquence, les partis signataires de la résolution du 29 juin déclarent solennellement et solidairement ne pas reconnaître le parlement issu de ces soi-disant élections et confirment leur réclamation de la constitution d’un nouveau CEP avec la participation et la représentation des partis dans la composition de celui-ci, pour reprendre entièrement le processus électoral en vue de nouvelles élections générales cette fois garanties libres et honnêtes. Ils tiennent à rappeler en termes nets et clairs que les deux conditions sine qua non à leur retour de participation au processus électoral sont et demeurent la reconsidération des élections du 25 juin et de celles qui les ont suivi et la recomposition d’un CEP entièrement nouveau et représentatif avec la participation des partis pour garantir les règles normales du jeu compétitif démocratique.

Les 22 partis politiques soussignés tiennent à souligner qu’à deux reprises le chef de l’état et son parti au pouvoir Lavalas ont été les seuls à demander au peuple d’aller voter, la première fois à l’occasion de la reprise des partielles le 13 août, et la seconde fois à l’occasion du deuxième tour le 17 septembre, alors que l’ensemble des autres partis indépendants et d’opposition appelait au boycott justicier, eh bien, les deux fois, les lavalassins se sont donc comptés pour réaliser le 13 août moins de 20% et le 17 septembre moins de 15% de participants. La démonstration est donc faite pour ceux qui en doutaient encore : le peuple haïtien, dans son immense majorité, n’est pas lavalassien.

Les 22 partis politiques démocratiques soussignés remercient donc ce peuple haïtien qu’on croyait avoir infantilisé, de la maturité tranquille dont il vient de faire preuve en opposant un refus sans équivoque à la marche vers un parlement monochromé et à une autocratie monopartisane sans visage, puisque la face trompeuse offerte continue de simuler la démocratie, pour les besoins de la consommation étrangère.

Port-au-Prince, le 19 septembre 1995

[Signatures]
RÉSOLUTION DU 12 JUILLET 1995

Considérant la Résolution du 29 juin 1995 concernant la prise de position de plus d'une vingtaine de partis politiques sur les élections contestées du 25 juin 1995,

Considérant la proclamation de ces pseudo-résultats relatifs à ces élections faites par le CEP le 11 juillet 1995,

Considérant que compte n'a pas été tenu, dans ce document, des multiples irrégularités et violations des dispositions légales à la charge des BIV, BEC, BDE, avec la tolérance ou l'appréciation coupables du CEP,

Considérant que par un tel comportement, cet organe s'est rendu indigne de la confiance que lui ont faite les partis politiques;

NOUS, représentants dûment mandatés des partis politiques, soussignés, réunis en Assemblée extraordinaire à l'hôtel HOLLY DAY INN, ce mercredi 12 juillet 1995 pour délibérer sur les résultats du scrutin entachés d'ilégalités, d'irrégularités et de fraudes, DECIDONS:

1.- de rejeter catégoriquement les soi-disants résultats partiels émanant d'un prétendu conseil électoral contesté et répris par l'ensemble des partis signataires de la présente résolution et tous autres acceptant, par la suite, d'y apporter leur soutien.

2.- de demander la dissolution immédiate de ce prétendu conseil électoral provisoire, partiel, partisan et incompétent.

3.- en attendant d'entreprendre toutes les actions légales qui conviennent pour exiger les réparations des dommages à nous causés par de tels agissements malhonnêtes, de refuser systématiquement de participer au soi-disant second tour et à toutes autres opérations électorales sous l'égide de ce CEP immoral.

4.- de demander la tenue de nouvelles élections générale, après consultations entre toutes les forces politiques, à une date ultérieure.

Fait à Port-au-Prince, le 12 juillet 1995.

SUIVENT LES SIGNATURES:

[Signatures manuscrites]
RESOLUTION OF JULY 12, 1995

Considering the Resolution of June 29, 1995, on the position of over twenty political parties concerning the disputed elections of June 25, 1995.
Considering the announcement, made by the CEP [Provisional Electoral Council] on July 11, 1995, of these pseudo-results relative to these elections.
Whereas that document did not take into account the multiple irregularities and violations of the legal provisions, for which the BIVs [polling stations], BECs [municipal electoral offices], BEDs [departmental electoral offices] were responsible, with the CEP’s guilty tolerance or approval.
Whereas by such behavior, this body has made itself unworthy of the trust that the political parties gave it;
WE, the undersigned, duly mandated representatives of the political parties, gathered in a Special Meeting at the HOLIDAY INN Hotel this Wednesday, July 12, 1995, to deliberate on the results of the vote soiled by illegalities, irregularities and frauds, hereby DECIDE:

1. to categorically reject the so-called partial results stemming from a self-styled electoral council disputed and reproved by all the parties signing the present resolution and all others accepting, afterwards, to provide their support.

2. to request the immediate dissolution of this biased, partisan, incompetent, so-called provisional electoral council.

3. while awaiting to undertake all legal actions suitable to demand reparation of the damage caused for us by such dishonest actions, to systematically refuse to participate in the so-called second round and in all other electoral operations under the aegis of this immoral CEP.

4. to request the holding of new general elections, after consulting with all the political forces, at a later date.

Port-au-Prince, July 12, 1995.

THE SIGNATURES FOLLOW:

[signatures]
RESOLUTION DU 28 JUILLET 1995 DES PARTIS POLITIQUES

Considérant que la Communauté Nationale, les Partis Politiques ainsi que les instances internationales se sont rendu compte de la faillite systématique du CONSEIL ELECTORAL PROVISOIRE;

Considérant que le CONSEIL ELECTORAL PROVISOIRE s'est montré indigne et non crédible pour organiser des élections honnêtes et transparentes;

Considérant que devant le danger d'aboutir à une chambre législative composée d'une majorité frauduleusement extorquée;

Considérant qu'il est indispensable de trouver une formule d'entente qui tienne compte des aspirations des partis politiques;

Considérant que l'arrêté présidentiel en date du 26 juillet 1995, révoquant deux membres du CEP et nommant à leur place deux autres membres, outre qu'il implique une reconnaissance des actes frauduleux du CEP, constitue une insulte aux justes revendications des partis politiques;

Considérant que cette résolution du 29 juin dernier a été officiellement remise tant au Président de la République, qu'au CEP;

Considérant que les fraudes, irrégularités et illégalités reprochées ne seraient être imputées uniquement aux deux membres limogés du CEP, par l'Exécutif, mais plutôt à l'ensemble de ses membres et qu'il y a lieu en conséquence de le dissoudre intégralement;

NOUS, représentants dument mandatés des partis politiques, soussignés, réunis en Assemblée extraordinaire à l'Hôtel Holiday Inn ce vendredi 28 juillet 1995:

1.- Dénonçons le fait par le pouvoir exécutif de n'avoir pas tenu compte de la résolution du 29 juin 1995 des partis politiques réclamant la dissolution du CEP et l'annulation des élections frauduleuses du 25 juin 1995;

2.- Exigeons à ce titre, l'annulation des élections et la démission des membres du CEP et la formation d'un nouveau CEP de concert avec les partis politiques;

3.- Réclamons la tenue de nouvelles élections générales à une date ultérieure;

Par conséquent, décidons la formation d'un comité de coordination composé de cinq représentants de partis politiques dont le rôle sera d'assurer l'application de nos diverses prises de position et actions à entreprendre.

Comité de Rédaction: Reynold Georges, Gilles Hendrick, Martial Célestin, Joseph Bataille, Frantz Edouard, Wesner Morency

Comité de Modération: Gérard Dalvius, Reynold Georges, Mme Alté Saint Louis.

N/B.- Une copie conforme de la présente résolution des partis politiques sera
remise au chef de l'Exécutif, au chef du Gouvernement, au Parlement, aux instances nationales et internationales, aux partis politiques, à la presse.

SUIVENT LES SIGNATURES

1. ALAH
2. PANPRA
3. MDN
4. MKN
5. MNP-28
6. MODRIN

7. MRRN
8. PAAN
9. PAIN
10. PAPP
11. PDCH
12. PDN
13. PNH
14. PNC

15. PNR

16. PNT
17. PSR
18. KDNP
19. UPD

20. UPA

21. PDHR

22. GENERATION 2004
23. MOP
24. PAKAPALA
25. PAN
26. PSN
27. MOSES HABRI

POUR AUTHENTICATION: Sen. Me. Reynold George
JULY 28, 1995, RESOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES

Whereas the National Community, the Political Parties as well as the international authorities have become aware of the systematic failure of the PROVISIONAL ELECTORAL COUNCIL;

Whereas the PROVISIONAL ELECTORAL COUNCIL has shown itself to be unworthy and not credible to organize honest, transparent elections;

Whereas, faced with the danger of ending up with a legislative house composed of a fraudulently extorted majority;

Whereas it is absolutely necessary to find a formula of entente that takes into account the aspirations of the political parties;

Whereas the presidential decree dated July 26, 1995, dismissing two members of the CEP and appointing two other members to replace them, apart from implying an acknowledgement of the CEP’s fraudulent acts, constitutes an insult to the legitimate demands of the political parties;

Whereas this resolution of last June 29 was officially remitted to both the President of the Republic and the CEP;

Whereas the frauds, irregularities and illegalities being criticized could not be attributed solely to the two CEP members dismissed by the Executive, but rather to all of its members, and whereas it is consequently necessary to completely dissolve it;

WE, the undersigned, duly mandated representatives of the political parties, gathered in a Special Meeting at the HOLIDAY INN Hotel this Friday, July 28, 1995:

1. Denounce the act, by the executive power, not to have taken into account the June 25, 1995 resolution of the political parties demanding the dissolution of the CEP and the annulment of the fraudulent elections of June 25, 1995;

2. Demand, for this reason, the annulment of the elections, the resignation of the members of the CEP, and the forming of a new CEP in concert with the political parties;

3. Demand the holding of new general elections at a later date;

Consequently, we decide for the forming of a coordination committee, made up of five representatives of political parties, the role of which will be to assure the application of our various positions taken and actions to be undertaken.

Editorial Committee: Reynold Georges, Gilles Hendrick, Martial Celestin, Joseph Bataille, Frantz Edouard, Wesner Morency
Moderation Committee: Gerard Dalvius, Reynold Georges, Mrs. Alte Saint Louis.

N.B. A true copy of the present resolution of the political parties will be remitted to the head of the Executive, the head of the Government, to the Parliament, the national and international authorities, the political parties and the press.

THE SIGNATURES FOLLOW:

1. ALAH [signature]
2. PANPRA [signature]
3. MDN [signature]
4. MKN [signature]
5. MNP-28 [signature]
6. MODELH [signature]
7. MRN [signature]
8. PADN [signature]
9. PAIN [signature]
10. PAPP [signature]
11. PDCR [signature]
12. PDN [signature]
13. PNH [signature]
14. PNCH [signature]
15. PNR [signature]
16. PNT [signature]
17. PSR [signature]
18. RDNP [signature]
19. UPD [signature]
20. UPAN [signature]
21. PDRH [signature]
22. GENERATION 2004 [signature]
23. MOP [signature]
24. PAKAPALA [signature]
25. PAN [signature]
26. PSR [signature]
27. MODESHA [signature]
28. 29. & 30. [illegible]
PROPOSALS TO END THE CURRENT IMPASSE IN THE HAITIAN ELECTORAL PROCESS

August 1, 1995

Addressed by KONAKOM, FNCD, and PANPRA to President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and to the International Community.

A.- Goals:

- To ensure a good electoral process in an atmosphere of social peace and political stability.
- Agreement among the Government, the Political Parties and the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) with the assistance and good offices of the International Community.

B.- Prerequisites:

1) The acceptance of the principle of the reorganizing the CEP with the support and the participation of the political parties.

2) An objective evaluation of the June 25 elections by a Tripartite Committee (formed by a new CEP, representatives of the political parties, and International observers). This committee will determine, among others the matters, the number of electoral districts where the elections must be rerun because of errors in materials, irregularities, illegal actions, violence and the abuse of authority, pressures and undue constraints, and those characterized as fraudulent.

C.- Conditions and guarantees for reviving the electoral process with the participation of the political parties:

1) Reorganization of the CEP in order to secure political balance in this Institution:

Modalities:

- Resignation of five (5) of the nine (9) members of the current CEP.
- Selection of four (4) members of the new CEP proposed by the political parties involved in the electoral process.
- Selection of the ninth member by the eight (8) other members.
- Election of a new cabinet for the CEP.
- Reorganization of the electoral structure (including the staff of the Departmental Electoral Offices (BEDs), Communal Electoral Offices (BECs), and Local Voting Offices (BIVs) with the collaboration and the participation of the political parties who shall be represented by their delegated representatives as members.
- Quick and effective training of the electoral staff.

2) Evaluation of the June 25th election

Modalities

- The creation of the Tripartite Committee (a new CEP, representatives of the political parties, international observers).

3) The creation of the Electoral Supervisory and Control Unit (USCE) through the means already established.

4) Establishment of a new electoral calendar beginning on August 14 through presidential elections to be held no later than December 17.
5) Access to government-controlled media by political parties during all campaign periods.

6) Financial support for the political parties in accordance with the number of candidates that they have registered.

7) Strict application of the Electoral Degree under the oversight of the USCE, by all sectors (the Government, CEP, political parties, candidates, citizens).

D.- Proposed New Electoral Calendar up to Presidential Elections

This calendar will cover nineteen (19) weeks from August 14 through the presidential elections:

- First week: August 14
  - Reorganization of the CEP and revision of the Electoral Decree.
- Second week: August 21
  - a) Formation of the USCE
  - b) Evaluation of the June 25 elections
- Third week: August 28
  - a) Reorganization of the electoral structure (BEDs, BECs, BIVs)
  - b) Reopening of registrations and reexamination of candidate files
  - c) Civic Education Campaign
- Fourth week: September 4
  - a) List of districts where partial elections will be held
  - b) Reopening of electoral campaign
  - c) Preparation of ballots and electoral materials
- Fifth week: September 11
  - a) Presentation of the ballots to the political parties
  - b) Hold partial elections
- Sixth week: September 18
  - Results from the partial elections announced
- Seventh-Eighth week Sept. 25-October 2
  - Campaign and run-off election
- Ninth week: October 9
  - Results from run-off elections announced
- Tenth week: October 16
  - Registration of candidates for presidential elections
- Eleventh week: October 23
  - Examination of presidential candidates' files
  - a) list of accepted candidates to the presidency
  - b) Opening of presidential campaign
- Twelfth week: October 30
- Thirteenth week: November 6
  - Preparation of the ballots
- Fourteenth week: November 13
  - End of the Civic Education Campaign
- Fifteenth week: November 20
  - First presidential balloting
- Sixteenth week: November 27
  - Results announced
- Seventeenth week: December 4
  - Campaign for the second round
- Eighteenth week: December 11
  - Campaign for the second round
- Nineteenth week: December 17
  - Second round of Presidential balloting.
An advisory commission, made up of the CEP, political party representatives, and members of the international community shall be formed to advise and support the CEP in carrying out its mandate. The commission shall meet at least twice weekly, under the chairmanship of the President of the CEP, at a locale to be determined mutually or, in the absence of agreement, at a locale to be provided by the international community. The international community will make available premises if the commission so desires and requests. The first meeting should take place on Friday, August 18, at the National Palace, in the presence of the President of the Republic.

Members of the advisory commission shall present to the CEP their views as to possible further localities for rerun elections, and other steps designed to remedy problems resulting from the June 25 ballot by Monday, August 21. The CEP shall announce its decision regarding additional reruns by Wednesday, August 23. Runoff, and any further rerun elections, will be held by Sunday, September 10.

The Electoral Survey and Control Unit (USCE) shall be expanded and employed.

All candidate registration fees shall be fully reimbursed no later than August 23, and the Government of Haiti will match the parties' campaign spending, providing each party a sum equal to its own spending on the campaign.

All parties shall be given free access to government radio and TV, beginning no later than August 23, and ending no earlier than two days before the rerun/runoff elections. At least two ours of broadcast time in each medium shall be set aside each day for this purpose throughout this period.

The CEP, with the advice of the advisory commission, will define no later than August 23, a plan for voter education, which will be implemented immediately, with assistance by the international community.

All those involved in the electoral process shall strictly respect the provisions of Haiti's electoral law.

A new electoral council shall be named after the second round of elections, and no later than mid-October, consistent with the Haitian constitution, to conduct the Presidential election in December. In order to ensure that the council is seen as credible, it should be appointed following consultation with the government, the parliament and the political parties.
XVII. August 13 Complementary Elections
AUGUST 13 COMPLEMENTARY ELECTIONS

On August 1, the CEP announced the names of 377 candidates that would appear on the ballots from 21 communes, 15 electoral districts and eight departments. There were 131 candidates for Senate, 118 for deputy and 128 mayoral candidates. The elections on August 13 were carried out in 1993 BIVs. The criteria used by the CEP to determine where to hold these elections were:

1) areas where no election had taken place;
2) areas where the tallysheets and the ballots were destroyed; and
3) in areas where 50 percent or more of the BIVs did not operate.

These criteria were hotly contested by a majority of the parties who wanted a much broader rerunning of the elections. As the CEP did not cede to the opposition demand to hold more elections again, 26 parties boycotted these elections.

IRI teams covered the North, West and Artibonite departments of Haiti and witnessed voting at 100 BIVs.

I. Campaign

The CEP granted a total of four days for campaigning to begin on August 7 and end on August 11. In general, there was little political activity.

II. Opening of Polls

In all of the areas where IRI had observers, the polls still opened late due to late delivery of materials and slow opening procedures, and many of the problems witnessed on June 25 were repeated. In a number of polling places, the opening procedures were delayed because one or more of the electoral workers was absent. In the Artibonite department, changes to the roster of electoral workers brought the opening process to a halt as the previously designated officials protested their right to work.

The location of some of the BIVs had been changed from June 25 location. Some of the explanations given were that the owner of the house did not want the voting to occur there, more spacious sites had been found, etc. The sites had been changed after the lists of electoral polling sites had been provided by the CEP to observers. These lists were not provided to the public. This slowed down the opening in some cases as even election officials looked for their designated location.
III. Voter Registration Lists

IRI observers reported that a majority of the BIVs in the three departments did not have voter registration lists. No place IRI observers visited had the lists posted three days prior to the vote as directed in the electoral law. Because of new BIV locations and new BIV workers in some areas, this caused some delays and frustration. In BIVs where there was no voter list, the BIV president had to decide whom to let vote. Many let a legitimate registration card for that BIV suffice; others let people vote and kept a written list; while some seemed to make ad hoc decisions.

Some BIVs did have a voter list that they posted on the door. If they had only one copy, then the voter was checked off the list at the door and then allowed to vote.

IV. Election Administration Capability

There was some improvement in the ability of the election workers to administer this process compared to the June 25 elections. It was evident the election officials were more familiar with the process and the handling of materials. The CEP assigned members who had performed well in the last election from other BECs to assist in this election. However, it is impossible to determine the level of improvement given the low level of voter turnout; some BIVs had no more than 10 voters.

Most of the election officials attempted to use the required seals on the boxes this time. It was reported to IRI observers that this exercise had been included in the CEP training for election workers for this elections and had not for the June 25 elections. However, the seals were still not used correctly and still constitute a material weakness for this process. This must be addressed in future training to ensure ballot secrecy.

The closing procedures in most areas were rapid, mainly due to the low turnout, and were completed without any major problems.

V. Presence of Party Pollwatchers and USCE Members

The parties and independent candidates that were participating in this election were the only ones allowed to have pollwatchers. IRI observers did report a larger number than one would expect given the small number of parties participating. Often in BIVs there would be more than one (and at times up to five) pollwatchers from the same party. Given the low turnout, there often were more pollwatchers than voters. Pollwatchers were overly participative in the voting process by accompanying people to vote and instructing people how and for whom to vote.

The USCE was operational for this election, albeit only two days prior to August 13. IRI observers had a list of the USCE members assigned to each BEC and BED but only encountered one USCE member the entire day.
VI. Ballot Collection

This was still the most problematic portion of the process. There was still no standardized process for delivering and logging in the ballots and tally sheets. In all places where IRI had observers, the scene looked very much like that of June 25, albeit with less volume. Security of the ballot was very lax and the operation was very chaotic. This must be addressed for future elections if any part of the process is to be considered verifiable.

At BECs in the North and West departments, IRI observers saw completed ballots and tally sheets strewn on the floor, tally sheets being completed at the BEC, open unused ballot packages, unsealed completed ballots bags, and the presence of many unauthorized persons.

VII. Security

There was a higher visibility of security on this day than on June 25. Areas where there were outbreaks of violence on June 25 had heavy security. For example, the BEC in Kenscuff that was burned down on June 25 had more than 15 armored carriers and many special forces units. In the North, the level of security was also very high.

The large presence of UNMIH and CIV/POL forces prevented any notable outbreaks of violence on election day.

VIII. Low Voter Turnout

Once again, there was no organized civic education effort. The UNMIH did initiate some limited civic education efforts but could not take the place of the CEP. UNMIH messages mainly were concerned with limiting violence and discouraging the destruction of voting materials.

The turnout varied from less than five percent in some areas to 35 percent in others. This could be attributed to the number of parties that were boycotting the process, voter fatigue, lack of understanding of holding another election, or the lack of any political campaign.
PRESS RELEASE

The Provisional Electoral Council hereby informs the public in general and the electorate in particular that the results of the vote of this past June 25 will be announced on Tuesday, July 11, 1995 after 5:00 pm.

On this occasion, the locations will be publicized for the partial elections that will be held on Saturday, July 22, according to the recommendations of the BEDS [departmental electoral offices] and based on the criteria decided by the Provisional Electoral Council in its July 3, 1995, communiqué.

On that same day, the list will be made public of the candidates disqualified and excluded from the elections both at partial elections level and at 2nd round level, by virtue of the penal provisions of the electoral law (cf. Articles 118 through 136) for having sponsored acts of violence and intimidation against voters and employees of the electoral machinery of the areas concerned.

The Provisional Electoral Council takes the opportunity to launch an appeal for calm to the population in general and the impatient voters in particular so they don’t play the game of the poor losers and the forces against change, whose goal it is to achieve the annulment of the elections of June 25, 1995, during which more than 1.5 million citizens in over 117 of the country’s 134 municipalities made known their choice for a democratic Haiti, a new parliament and the Construction of a legitimate state.

[signature]  [signature]
Gérard INNOCENT   Jesi CHANCY-MANIGAT
TREASURER  GENERAL-SECRETARY
[letterhead information]
Conseil Electoral Provisoire

Port-au-Prince, le 9 juillet 1995
PAC/CEP/Imib/ 504

NOTÉ DE PRESSE


A cette occasion, seront publiquement rendus les lieux des élections partielles qui se tiendront le samedi 22 juillet prochain, selon les recommandations des BED et à partir des critères arrêtés par le Conseil Electoral Provisoire dans son communiqué du 3 juillet 1995.

Ce même jour sera rendue publique la liste des candidats disqualifiés et exclus des compétitions tant au niveau des partielles que du 2nd tour, en vertu des dispositions pénales de la loi électorale (réf. art. 118 à 136 inclusivement) pour avoir commandité des actes de violence et d’intimidations sur la personne des électeurs et des employés de la machine électorale des zones concernées.

Le Conseil Electoral Provisoire profite de l’occasion pour lancer un appel au calme à la population en général et aux électeurs impatients en particulier pour qu’ils ne fassent pas le jeu des mauvais perdants et des forces anti changement dont le but est de parvenir à l’annulation des élections du 25 juin 1995, durant lesquelles plus de 1,5 million de citoyens ont signifié dans plus de 117 des 134 communes du pays leur choix pour une Haïti démocratique, un nouveau parlement et la Construction d’un état de droit.

Gérard INNOCENT
TRESORIER

CHANCY MANIGAT
SECOURTAIRE GÉNÉRALE a.i.

Rue Oscar No. 9, Pècot, Port-au-Prince, Haiti
Tél.: 45-1037, 45-1527, 45-1687, 45-5689 • Fax: 45-5018
Provisional Electoral Council

Port-au-Prince, July 11, 1995

PAC/CEP/lmjb/513

COMMUNIQUE

The Provisional Electoral Council communicates the results of the first round of the elections of June 25, 1995, for the positions of Senators and Deputies of the following 7 departments: West, Central, South, Southeast, Artibonite, Northeast and Northwest. For the time being, only the results for the positions of Deputies for the other two departments have been provided: Grand-Anse and North. Those of the Town Halls and Ward Councils will be published in the coming hours.

The CEP will confirm the date for holding of the partial elections after consulting with the concerned Haitian printers.

Twenty-one partial elections will be organized on the basis of the criteria defined by the CEP, consulting with the Departmental Electoral Offices, to wit:

1. The Municipalities where there was no election.

2. The Municipalities where the material was destroyed after the vote.

3. The places where less than half the polling stations were able to operate.

[seal & signature]
Anselme REMY
CHAIRMAN

[seal & signature]
Léon MANUS
VICE-CHAIRMAN

[letterhead information]
COMMUNIQUE


Le CEP confirmera la date de la tenue des élections partielles après consultation avec les imprimeurs haïtiens concernés.

Vingt et une élections partielles seront organisées sur la base de critères définis par le CEP, en consultation avec les Bureaux Electoraux Departementaux, savoir :

1. Les Communes où il n’y a pas eu d’élection.

2. Les Communes où le matériel a été détruit après le scrutin.

3. Les endroits où moins de la moitié des bureaux de vote ont pu fonctionner.
Provisional Electoral Council

Port-au-Prince, July 18, 1995

COMMUNIQUE

The CEP hereby informs the electorate in general and the candidates in particular that the partial elections will be held on Sunday, August 6 in the departments [regional divisions] of Southeast, South, Northeast, Northwest, Grand-Anse, Artibonite, West, and North for the Senators, Deputies and Municipal Councils.

After verification, the BECs [municipal electoral offices] will display the electoral lists at the main door of the polling stations, at least three (3) days before the beginning of the voting operations. This is to allow the voters to make sure that their name figures on the lists and to be able to precisely identify the polling stations.

The CEP reminds those in charge that the voting operations begin at 6:00 am and end at 6:00 pm, in conformity with Article 104 of the electoral law of February 1995.

Nevertheless, the BDEs [departmental electoral offices] have the latitude to leave to the discretion of the chairmen of the polling stations the management of the 12 hours planned for the vote to take place. Also, Article 101 of the electoral law requires that any delay be noted in the record of opening of the operations.

The CEP takes this opportunity to remind those in charge of the polling stations that voters who are in line at the time of closing are authorized to vote. The chairman of the polling station will see to it that this number is noted in the record, in such a way that no other voter is added to the quantity present at the time of closing.

[seal:] CEP
CEP Press Office
Conseil Electoral Provisoire

Port-au-Prince, le 18 Juillet 1995

COMMUNIQUE


Après vérification, les BEC feront afficher les listes électorales à la porte principale des bureaux de vote, trois (3) jours au moins avant le début des opérations de vote. Ceci, pour permettre aux électeurs de s'assurer que leur nom figure sur les listes et de pouvoir identifier avec précision, les bureaux de vote.

Le CEP rappelle aux responsables que les opérations de vote débutent à 6h30 du matin pour prendre fin à 6h00 du soir, conformément à l'article 104 de la loi électorale de Février 1995.

Cependant, les BED ont la latitude de laisser à la discrétion des présidents des BIV la gestion des 12h précises pour le déroulement du scrutin. Aussi, l'article 101 de la loi électorale exige que tout retard soit notifié dans le procès-verbal d'ouverture des opérations.

Le CEP profite de l'occasion pour rappeler aux responsables des BIV que les électeurs se trouvant en ligne au moment de la fermeture sont autorisés à voter. Le président du BIV veillera à ce que ce nombre soit notifié dans le procès-verbal, de façon à ce qu'aucun autre électeur ne s'ajoute à la quantité présente au moment de la fermeture.

Bureau de Presse du CEP
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURAL PARTY [PAIN]
COMMUNIQUE

The National Industrial Agricultural Party (PAIN) insists on alerting National and International public opinion to the fact that henceforth it will grant no validity to the partial elections announced for Sunday, August 13, 1995, by a CEP [Provisional Electoral Council] made up solely of members of the LAVALAS Party.

On the eve of this new unacceptable vote, the PAIN insists on confirming that its choice not to participate in such elections remains unchanged.

As a result, as was already emphasized in the preceding communiques, no PAIN candidate is authorized to show up at these partisan elections nor to use the Party’s emblem, and even less to maintain it in the ballot of the CEP.

It is still understood that the PAIN remains solidary with the resolution made by the 24 political parties at the Holiday Inn Hotel on Friday, July 28, 1995, concerning the new terms proposed to resolve the crisis caused by the coup d’état of the BALLOT BOXES carried out scandalously by the defunct CEP of Anselme Remy during the FRAUDULENT elections of last June 25 which led to the putting in place of equally inadmissible Town Hall and Ward Coalitions.

The PAIN will only pay attention, within the scope of a joint solution to the crisis, to a set of conditions freely and jointly accepted by all the Political Parties without whose consent no election is valid.

Port-au-Prince, August 11, 1995.
For the MANAGING COMMITTEE,
LOUIS DEJOIE II
CHAIRMAN
[seal: PAIN]
PARTI AGRICOLE INDUSTRIEL NATIONAL.

COMMUNIQUÉ.

Le Parti Agricole Industriel National (PAIN) tient à alerter l'opinion publique Nationale et Internationale sur le fait que, d'ores et déjà, il n'accordera aucune validité aux élections partielles annoncées pour le dimanche 13 Aout 1995 par un CEP composé uniquement des membres du Parti LAVALAS.

A la veille de ce nouveau scrutin inacceptable, le PAIN tient à confirmer que son option de non participation à de telles élections reste et demeure inchangée.

En conséquence, comme cela a été déjà souligné dans les communiqués précédents, aucun candidat du PAIN n'est autorisé à se présenter à ces joutes partisanes, ni à utiliser l'emblème du Parti, et encore moins à le maintenir dans le bulletin du CEP.

Il demeure entendu que le PAIN reste solidaire à la résolution prise par les 24 partis politiques, à l'hôtel Holiday Inn, le vendredi 28 Juillet 1995 concernant les nouvelles conditions proposées pour résoudre la crise engendrée par le coup d'État des UHNES opéré scandaleusement par le défunt CEP d'Anselme Rémy au cours des élections FRAUDULEUSES du 25 Juin dernier qui ont donné lieu à des installations de Cartels de Mairies et de Casco également inadmissibles.

Le PAIN n'accordera de l'attention, dans le cadre d'une solution conjointe de la crise, qu'à un ensemble de conditions librement et communément admises par tous les Partis Politiques sans l'accord desquels, aucune
tion n'est valable.


Pour le COMITE DIRECTEUR,

[Signature]

PRESIDENT.

LOUIS DEJOIE II

PAIN
XVIII. September 17 Run-off Elections
SEPTMBER 17 RUNOFF ELECTIONS

In the runoff elections on September 17, there were 126 candidates (110 for Deputy, 16 for the Senate) in all nine departments. All of the political parties except those part of the Aristide backed platform boycotted these elections. The results from the election were released on September 28.

The elections were marked by a low turnout which varied by region (from 5 to 50 percent). This may be attributed to the lack of political party activity, the boycott of the political parties, the lack of a civic education campaign, and voter fatigue.

The election workers had received additional training in advance of these elections and their ability to administer the process itself had improved. In the North, Grand-Anse and West departments where IRI had observers, the opening and closing processes went smoother than on June 25 partly due to the low turnout and partly because of the additional training.

IRI observers reported the presence of pollwatchers from the parties that were participating but to a varying degree in different regions. IRI observers did not report seeing any members of the USCE.

The security for this election was very tight and the increased presence of Haitian police in this effort was noted by IRI observers in the three departments visited. More classes of police cadets have graduated since the last election.

Similar problems with the ballot collection as witnessed on June 25 and August 13 were again reported in the North and West departments. The organization of the materials had marginally improved but in the West department there were still marked ballots and tallysheets strewn across the floor in the Delmas BEC and the Carrefour BEC. At the counting centers in Port-au-Prince, the ballots are being stored without security.
FNCD
NATIONAL FRONT FOR CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY
[letterhead information]

POSITION OF THE FNCD CANDIDATES

=================================================

Considering the position expressed by the FNCD denouncing the June 25, 1995 elections. Whereas the recommendations made by the FNCD to rectify the masquerade of June 25 were never taken into consideration.

Whereas, with no regard for all our claims and those of Haiti’s political class, the CEP [Provisional Electoral Council] persists on the path of irresponsibility by organizing on August 13, 1995, so-called partial elections that the population stayed away from, and it plans to finalize its election parody on September 17, 1995.

Whereas the CEP, by ratifying the electoral frauds, helped to widen the gulf of division in Haiti’s political class and, consequently, to jeopardize the future of democracy in Haiti:

- Reiterate our determination not to sanction the scandal of June 25, 1995.
- Reaffirm the FNCD’s position, to wit:
  a) Representation of the political parties within the electoral machinery.
  b) A committee to evaluate the June 25, 1995 election day.
- Renew our trust in the two (2) spokespersons: Mr. Evans PAUL and Dr. Turneb DELPE, signatories of all the documents demanded by the CEP to officialize our candidature.
- Urge the population to have faith in our approach, the only approach able to guarantee a reliable, durable democratic transition.

Port-au-Prince, September 6, 1995.

The candidates’ signatures follow:

[page in Creole]
OF THE FNCD CANDIDATES IN THE SECOND ROUND OR QUALIFIED TO PARTICIPATE IN SO-CALLED PARTIAL ELECTIONS.

Wilson PIERRE (Limonade) [signature]
Limongy JEAN (Petit Gouave) [signature]
Ramel ALTIDORT (2nd district St. Marc / Verrettes) [signature]
Milord SAMUEL (Dept. of l’Artibonite) [signature]
Nicodeme MARDY (3rd district Cornillon) [signature]
Pierre MICHELET (1st district P.V. / Kenscoff) [signature]
Desroches SERGE (Dept. of l’Artibonite) [signature]
Cecile AMERICE (2nd district Port-au-Prince) [signature]
Varnel DURANDISSE (Leogane) [signature]
Jaksonne GEORGES (3rd district Savanette / Baptiste) [signature]
Delpe TURNEB (The West) [signature]
Andre PAULETTE (2nd district Belladere) [signature]
Jean Louis FIGNOLE (Dept. of the Center) [signature]
In Robert JUSTAFORT (Gde R. of the North) [signature]
Louis ROLDOL (Bassin Bleu) [signature]
Moreau FRINES (Baraderes) [signature]
Baptiste MARCEL (3rd district Port-au-Prince) [signature]
Gaudner IFRENE (Jean Ravel) [signature]
Malon JEAN (Croix des Bouquets / Thomazeau) [signature]
Enock FAROUL (Ganthier / Fonds-Verrettes) [signature]
Gerard Benoit (Belle [illegible]) [signature]
POSSESSION DES CANDIDATS DU FNCD


Considérant que les recommandations faites par le FNCD pour corriger la mascarade du 25 Juin n'ont jamais été prises en considération.

Considérant qu'on a mis de toutes nos revendications et celles de la classe politique Haïtienne, le CEP persiste dans la voie de l'irresponsabilité en organisant le 13 Aout 95 des prétendues élections partielles boudées par la population et projetée de finaliser sa parodie d'élection le 17 Septembre 95.

Considérant que le CEP en homologuant les fraudes électorales a contribué à élargir le fossé de la division dans la classe politique Haïtienne et par voie de conséquence, mettre en péril l'avenir de la démocratie en Haïti :

Nous, candidats du FNCD
- Réaffirmons la position du FNCD à savoir:
  a) La représentation des partis politiques au sein de la machine électorale.
- Renouvelons notre confiance aux deux (2) Porte Parole : Mr Evans PAUL et Dr Turnerb DELPE, signataires de tous les documents reclaimés par le CEP pour officialiser notre candidature.
- Exhortons la population à faire foi dans notre démarche qui est la seule capable de garantir une transition démocratique fiable et durable.

Fait à Port-au-Prince le 6 Septembre 1995.

Suivent les signatures des candidats:
POZISYON KANDIDA FNCD YO

Lè nou konsidere pozisyon Fyon Nasyonal pou Chanjman ak Demokrasi (FNCD) nan donanse eleksyon 25 Jen 1995 yo.

Lè nou konsidere rekòmandasyon FNCD te fè pou korieje maskarad 25 Jen an, KEP là pa-t jan-m pran yo an konsiderasyon.

Lè nou konsidere, malgre revandikasyon FNCD ak tout klas politik la, KEP la kontinye nan chimen malveyans, lè li oganize svadizan eleksyon pasyèl nan dat 13 D awou 1995 pandan tout pép Ayisyen an te ret chita lakay yo, epi tout manigans KEP s-a ap mennen pou eseye fin fè eleksyon an nan dat 17 septanm kap vini-a.

Lè nou konsidere KEP a, nan fason li fèmen je li sou fwod 25 Jen yo, travay pou louvri twou divisyon nan mitan klas politik la pi laj epi me te avni demokrasi a an danje.

Nou monm kandida FNCD yo:
- Nou fè tout monn konnen, nou kontinye pa rekonèt eskandal publik 25 Jen 1995 la
- Nou fè konnen yon lòt fwa ankò nou dakò ak pozisyon FNCD pran sou zafè eleksyon an:
  1) Se pou pati politik yo gen reprezantan yo nan machin elektorol la.
  2) Se pou gen yon komisyon evalyasyon ki pou evalye joumen elektorol 25 Jen 95 la.
  3) Nou renouvè konfysans nou bay 2 pòt pawòl yo.: M. Evans PAUL ak Dr Turneb DELPE, yo menm ki siyon tout dokiman KEP a reklame pou nou kapab ale nan eleksyon.
- Nou mандe popitsasyon an pou yo konprann demach nòp fè yo, sòl mwayen ki kapab garanti yon tranzisyon demokratik kredib epi dirab.

Potòprens jou ki 6 Septanm 1995

Non kandida ki siyen yo:
PIERRE Wilsen (Limboula)
JEAN Limbouly (Petit Guave)
ALBERTON Rabel (1er Circ. St Marc / Verrettes)
SAMPSON Milord (Dept. de l'Artibonite)
MARDY Nicolette (1er Circ. Cornillon)
MICHELET Pierre (1er Circ. P.V. / Kenscoff)
SILVE Deauchene (Dept. de l'Artibonite)
MAURICE Cecile (2e Circ. Port-au-Prince)
DURANDISSE Varnel (Loogane)
GEORGES Julesonne (2e Circ. Savanette / Baptiste)
TURNED Delpe (L'Ouest)
PAULETTE Andre (2e Circ. Dalladere)
FIGNOLE Jn Louis (Dept. du Centre)
JUSTAPORT Jn Robert (Gde R. du Nord)

ROLDO Louis (1er Circ. St Marc)
PRIVES Morneau (Baradere)
MARCEL Baptiste (2e Circ. Port-au-Prince)
IRRENE Gaudson (Jean Rabel)
JEAN Molon (Croix des Bouquets / Thomazeau)
PARKER Enoch (Ganthier / Fonds-Verrettes)
GERARD Benoit (Selie Anse)
THE PANPRA AND THE SEPTEMBER 17, 1995 VOTE

The September 17, 1995 elections have taken place. Everyone noted that the Haitian people did not budge. They stayed home.

According to our calculations based on data provided by our various coordinating bodies throughout 9 departments [regional division], and those of numerous news agencies scattered throughout the country, we are able to establish the participation rate at around 5.5%. The call of the President of the Republic, sent out from Hinche on Thursday, September 14 was not listened to. The numerous times the US Embassy spokesperson took a stand in favor of the September 17 election remained ineffective.

The chairman of the Provisional Electoral Council tried to explain this indifference of the Haitian people by a so-called inexperience with second rounds. This explanation is too easy and too short. It’s not worth it to dwell on it.

For its part, the PANPRA thinks it is utopian to believe that the electoral process could be continued without the participation of the political parties who had committed themselves to it as of June 25, 1995. Like it or not, the Haitian people have once again followed their call for abstention.

The PANPRA takes this opportunity to thank all of its activists, all of its sympathizers and all those who are struggling to establish a genuine legitimate state, for their resoluteness and their serenity during the September 17, 1995 election.

There was no competition, so there were no elections. The elected representatives of June 25, August 13 and September 17 will have no legitimacy.

As a result, the PANPRA invites the authorities of the country and the international community to draw the lessons that must be drawn before committing themselves in the final phase of the electoral process, to wit, the organization of the presidential elections which will meet with the same fate if one persists on the same path.

Port-au-Prince, September 18, 1995
Sorges GILLES, PANPRA General Coordinator

[letterhead information]
PARTI NATIONALISTE PROGRESSISTE ET REVOLUTIONNAIRE HAITIEN

PANPRA

LE PANPRA ET LE SCRUTIN DU 17 SEPTEMBRE 1995

Les élections du 17 septembre 1995 ont eu lieu. Tout le monde a constaté que le peuple haïtien ne s'est pas déplacé. Il est resté chez lui.

Selon nos calculs faits sur la base d'informations fournies par nos différentes coordinations, à travers les 9 départements, et des celles des nombreuses agences de presse disséminées dans le pays, nous sommes en mesure de fixer le taux de participation autour de 5,5%. L'appel du Président de la République lancé de Hinche le jeudi 14 septembre, n'a pas été écouté. Les nombreuses prises de position du porte-parole de l'ambassade américaine en faveur du scrutin du 17 septembre sont restées sans effet.

Le président du Conseil Electoral Provisoire a essayé d'expliquer cette indifférence du peuple haïtien par une soi-disant inexpérience des seconds tours. Cette explication est trop facile et trop courte. Cela ne vaut pas la peine de s'y attarder.

De son côté, le PANPRA pense qu'il est chimérique de croire qu'on pouvait continuer le processus électoral sans la participation des partis politiques qui s'y étaient engagés dès le 25 juin 1995. Qu'on le veuille ou non, le peuple haïtien a une fois de plus suivi leur mot d'ordre d'abstention.

Le PANPRA profite de l'occasion pour remercier tous ses militants, l'ensemble de ses sympathisants et tous ceux qui luttent pour l'établissement d'un véritable État de droit, de leur fermeté et de leur sérénité lors du scrutin du 17 septembre 1995.

Il n'y a pas eu de compétition, donc il n'y a pas eu d'élections. Les élus du 25 juin, du 13 août et du 17 septembre n'auront aucune légitimité.

En conséquence, le PANPRA invite les autorités du pays et la communauté internationale à tirer les leçons qui s'imposent avant de s'engager dans la phase finale du processus électoral, à savoir l'organisation des élections présidentielles qui auront le même sort si on persiste dans la même voie.

Port-au-Prince, le 18 septembre 1995

Serge GILLES, Coordonnateur général du

5, RUE Marcellin Port-au-Prince HAITI Tel: 22 43 66
22 43 77