DELEGATION REPORT

IRI Monitoring Mission to the Referendum

in the Russian Federation

April 25, 1993

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IRI MONITORING MISSION TO THE APRIL 25TH RUSSIAN REFERENDUM

Delegation Members

Mr. Alec Poitevint
Chairman, Southeastern Mineral, Inc.
Bainbridge, Georgia
(Delegation Leader)

The Honorable Andrew H. Card
Head of Transition, Office of George Bush
Washington, DC

Timothy J. McBride
Consultant
Alexandria, VA

Robert Dahl
Electoral Law Consultant
Washington, DC

Cecelia Cole McInturff
Consultant, Bond-Donatelli, Inc.
Alexandria, VA

Linda DiVall
President, American Viewpoint, Inc.
Alexandria, VA

Lori Murray
Legislative Assistant for Foreign Affairs
Office of Senator Nancy Kassebaum
Washington, DC

Shirley Moore Green
Office of George Bush
Washington, DC

Dr. Andrew Semmel
Legislative Assistant for Foreign Policy
Office of Senator Richard Lugar
Washington, DC

Dan Jones
Government Solutions Group
Dublin, Ohio

Deborah Steelman
Attorney
Washington, DC

Tom Karol
Shareholders Services Group, Inc.
Boston, Massachusetts

Robin Williams
Georgia State Representative
Augusta, Georgia

The Honorable Robert Kasten
President, Kasten and Co.
Washington, DC
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Three months ago, the National Endowment for Democracy’s Board of Directors approved a proposal from the International Republican Institute (IRI) to conduct a monitoring mission to the April 25th Russian referendum. Through the efforts of many people, the IRI was able to react to political events in Russia, which by that time were beyond prediction. The fact that the IRI assembled a distinguished delegation and surmounted immense logistical obstacles in a matter of weeks spoke to the importance of this moment in Russia’s history.

This report represents the end product of that effort. The International Republican Institute is grateful for the support it received from the National Endowment for Democracy, without which the referendum mission would not have been possible. The Institute also must thank the dedicated efforts of those individuals, led by IRI Board Member Alec Poitevint, who served as referendum monitors. Their recommendations and comments form the basis of this report.

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R. Bruce McColm
Washington, D.C.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The International Republican Institute (IRI) sponsored a twenty-one member monitoring team to the Russian referendum on April 25, 1993. The purpose of this monitoring mission was to identify the positive and negative features of existing voting procedures, and to make appropriate recommendations to refine Russia’s electoral process for future elections.

The IRI deployed monitoring teams to four cities, each selected because of the rather unique challenges they presented to the Russian electoral process. The deployment cities were Archangelsk, Voronezh, Chelyabinsk, and Khabarovsk. A fifth IRI team remained in Moscow to provide a national perspective and to monitor the referendum administration in the capital city and its environs. Throughout the mission, monitoring teams conducted meetings with election commissions, representatives of the executive and legislative branches of government, academics, political party activists, newspaper, radio, and television journalists, and voters. Briefings also were also conducted with the U.S. Embassy and the IRI Field Office in Moscow.

Pre-referendum predictions both in Russia and the West had projected a low voter turnout, given the lack of clarity in the ballot questions and voter apathy created by grim economic conditions. According to these predictions, voters were expected to feel that the referendum was simply a popularity contest with little immediate impact on their lives. The strong support for reform demonstrated in the referendum was a remarkable and unanticipated expression of the democratic spirit of the Russian people, who deserve recognition for their genuine enthusiasm for peaceful participation in the democratic process.

The Russian experience with the non-competitive ballots of the Soviet-era cultivated a fundamentally inaccurate perception of the nature and purpose of elections. During this period, the idea of a secret ballot was irrelevant since the element of choice was absent, ballot security was meaningless because the outcome of the process was a foregone conclusion, and rather than focusing on the administration of free and fair elections, local officials were more concerned with producing a high turnout which the political leadership could use to legitimize the communist regime.

As Russia’s first experience with voting in the post-communist era, the April 25th referendum provided a first opportunity to realize a genuinely free and fair electoral environment. As such, the IRI delegation broadened its scope beyond the technical aspects of voting and tabulation to evaluate the larger electoral climate. These areas include: the government’s commitment to an open process, the voter’s level of knowledge and understanding, the media’s ability to function objectively, and the role played by political parties and other democratic institutions.

The IRI delegation found that the referendum proceeded in an orderly manner without significant reports of fraud or intimidation. Nonetheless, civic education appeared inadequate regarding voting procedures and the concept of a secret ballot. In addition, the security
procedures for ballot production and distribution also were deficient and the tabulation methods employed by polling station commissions were inconsistent. As the electoral system matures in the post-communist era, there is a serious potential for these weaknesses to be exploited. The referendum hopefully has allowed these problems to be addressed at a stage when adequate remedies can be developed and implemented in anticipation of Russia’s first round of post-communist elections.

In addition to the weaknesses identified in the administration of the voting process, the IRI delegation also questioned the nature and origin of the four questions on the ballot itself. Under an agreement reached between Boris Yeltsin and the Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD) in December 1992, the April referendum initially was intended to seek popular approval for a draft constitution which would provide a legitimate foundation for a new government structure and clear the way for post-communist elections. When Parliamentary Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov backed out of the referendum agreement in January 1993, however, the purpose of the referendum became merely a pawn in the reinvigorated power struggle between legislative and executive branches. The CPD reconvened in March, stripped Yeltsin of many of his powers, and replaced the constitutional issue with four ballot questions, three of which were aimed at undermining Yeltsin.

The authority of both the czarist empire and the Soviet regime was based on the supremacy of state interests over those of the individual. If the current struggle for political power is to end, a new constitution is needed to overcome Russia’s age-old tradition of placing the interests of government institutions before those of the people. Furthermore, the principles outlined in a new constitution must be reinforced by significant reform of Russia’s government and civil institutions.

I. **Recommendations**

Since April 25th, much attention has been devoted to the referendum’s impact on the fortunes of various political figures. The larger issue, however, is the referendum’s impact on Russia’s ability to overcome its past and advance its own democratic transition. The IRI delegation makes the following recommendations to help Russia build and improve upon its electoral traditions and advance toward genuine democracy.

1) Russia’s constitution is a Soviet relic which is internally inconsistent and lacks popular legitimacy. To break the current paralysis in government, the Brezhnev-era constitution should be replaced by a post-communist document with a clearly defined and balanced division of power. In order to draft a document which will be broadly supported, competing power structures such as the national executive, legislative, and judicial
branches, as well as regional and local governments, should be brought into the drafting process. In addition to a new constitution, Russia’s leadership should press for a new election law which eliminates opportunities for fraud found in residual elements of the old Soviet process. A new election law should include the following components:

1.0) An overall commitment to transparency that provides specific mechanisms for access and oversight throughout the entire process.

1.1) The provision of adequate resources for election authorities to administer the process and fulfill their obligations as mandated by law.

1.2) The establishment of an independent and permanent Central Election Commission vested with adequate authority and resources to supervise a uniform and equitable process. Commission membership should include representatives of all major parties.

1.3) A provision to establish and maintain accurate voter registry lists for the exclusive purpose of elections. Voter lists should be available to all political parties, civic and non-government organizations, and accessible to the population at-large so that timely corrections can be made to insure accuracy and prevent either the intentional or accidental disenfranchisement of voters.

1.4) A uniform system of voter identification and absentee voting.

1.5) The level of security in the production and distribution of ballots should be improved.

1.6) A provision providing access to election results at each level of the tabulation process to all interested parties. Final results at the precinct level should be published. All voting materials and records must be secured and preserved for a reasonable time after the elections.

1.7) A complaint and adjudication process which provides a forum to challenge electoral commission decisions and contest election results. Civil and criminal penalties for violations of the election law also should be specified.

1.8) New guidelines for political parties enabling them to compete with sufficient funding and media access.
1.9) Full consideration should be given to the merits parliamentary elections on a proportional basis, with voters casting ballots for party lists and a minimum threshold of popular votes required to be seated. This system helps strengthen the role of political parties and builds more stable government coalitions.

2) Specific problems in the old process also should be addressed in writing a new law.

2.0) While a genuine effort to enhance ballot security, the current requirement of two official signatures on the back of each ballot created an excessive logistical burden. Access to certified ballots in future elections should be limited as much as possible prior to election day.

2.1) The traditional method of marking ballots by crossing out what the voter doesn’t support should be reevaluated and weighed against other methods. The current procedure may lead to greater problems as ballots become more complex in increasingly competitive elections.

2.2) The referendum lacked a clear procedure for replacing a spoiled ballot in situations when the voter has realized he has made a mistake but has yet to cast the ballot. A new election law should provide a uniform method for providing a replacement ballot and invalidating the spoiled ballot.

2.3) Better control and supervision of the "mobile ballot box" must be reconciled with the worthy desire to provide ballot access for voters unable to travel to polling stations.

3) To avoid designing a new election law that favors the narrow interests of a particular group, election law "roundtables" should bring together representatives of the legislature, the executive branch, political parties, regional government, the media, and other groups to participate in the drafting process. These roundtables also should establish a clear timetable for elections to allow political parties and electoral commissions sufficient time to plan and implement their respective logistical efforts.

4) Once a new constitution and a new election law have been adopted, Russia should hold a new round of elections to provide a legitimate basis for governance. New elections would also be a catalyst for civic activism and accelerate the now lethargic pace of
political party development. Only through active participation in a competitive multiparty system will political parties gain greater acceptance from the population at-large and establish themselves as durable civil institutions. Political parties should seek to increase their organizational capacity to achieve the following goals:

4.0) Fielding a full slate in national elections to minimize the number of candidates running unopposed and provide voters with the element of choice essential to democratic elections.

4.1) Building coalitions which will discourage the atomization of political parties, help diverse groups achieve otherwise unattainable common goals, and present the voters with a simplified political landscape. Through the establishment of a loyal opposition, coalitions also can play an important role in governing.

4.2) Developing clear messages consistent with coherent party platforms.

4.3) Providing domestic observers and other election administration officials.

4.4) Conducting a sustained "get-out-the-vote" effort, including: the identification of potential supporters, providing information on issues, candidates, and party platforms, personal contact and communication with voters, and even providing transportation to polling sites on election day.

5) The government, political parties, and non-governmental organizations should conduct civic education programs to explain and clarify the voting process and provide the voter with a rational basis for choice.

5.0) Domestic observers and polling station workers not familiar with the requirements of competitive elections should be provided with education and training.

5.1) Copies of the new election law should be readily available to political parties, the media, foreign observers and other interested parties.

5.2) Voter education needs to be provided on specific ballot procedures as well as larger concepts; such as, the need for a secret ballot and the importance of each individual voter in the overall process.
5.3) Party platforms and candidate programs should be communicated and discussed through wider media access.

6) Fundamental reforms must be undertaken to strengthen other civil institutions essential to the electoral process. A transition to democracy supported by a civil society is a long-term endeavor that requires a broad-based and sustained effort.

6.0) Both governmental and non-governmental participants must be committed to learning from past mistakes, eliminating weaknesses, and continually seeking ways to further improve the system. Immediately after Russia’s first round of post-communist elections, the process should be reviewed, problems identified, and additional amendments made to the election law to improve the process for the next round of elections.

6.1) The creation of independent and financially stable print and broadcast news organizations which provide an objective source of information is vital in a free society. National and local authorities should resist the temptation of media control and, whenever possible, seek to facilitate the autonomy of media organizations.

6.2) A provision for a continued role for international observers in elections should be established. This would provide an external mechanism to add legitimacy to the process and demonstrate a long-term commitment to the world community. The rights and responsibilities of international observers should be established along with a universally recognized process for accreditation.
CHAPTER ONE - BACKGROUND INFORMATION

I. A Constitutional Crisis

The structure of Russia’s national government was created in the Soviet Union’s waning days. Russia’s current 1,033-member Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD) was elected in March 1990 as the CPD of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). It was modeled after the larger USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, which was elected in 1989 and dissolved with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev created these government bodies to pull power away from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) once he realized it would resist substantive reform.

The Russian Congress of People’s Deputies is a three-tiered body. The entire membership meets bi-annually, but a smaller body elected from within its ranks called the Supreme Soviet stands in continuous legislative session. From within the Supreme Soviet comes the Presidium, a smaller council headed by a chairman who exercises authority over the entire body. Boris Yeltsin was elected Chairman of the CPD at its first session in the summer of 1990.

As a new government body, the CPD was just beginning to break away from the traditional "rubber-stamp" role of legislatures in the Soviet era and, consequently, its deputies lacked even a rudimentary understanding of parliamentary procedures. Ordinary members of the USSR’s national, regional, and local legislatures (or soviets) were seldom involved in policy formulation because these bodies traditionally were controlled by the Communist Party. Legislation usually was unanimously approved, with voting conducted by a show of hands rather than secret ballot, all in sessions that lasted just a few days.

The Russian presidency was created by popular referendum in March 1991. Presidential elections were held in June 1991 and Boris Yeltsin, with 57% of the vote, was elected over five other candidates. He was replaced as Chairman of the CPD by a former deputy, Ruslan Khasbulatov. Under the Russian Law on the Presidency, Yeltsin took with him many of the executive powers he enjoyed as Chairman of the CPD. Subsequently, in the aftermath of the August 1991 coup-attempt, presidential powers were further enhanced.

A third branch of government, the Constitutional Court, was established at the Fourth Congress of People’s Deputies in October 1991, but its conceptual origins pre-dated the August coup. Chaired by Valerei Zorkin, it is the first such court in Russia’s history. While only 13 judges have been appointed at this point, the full complement is legally set at 15 members.
The Struggle for Power

The political power struggle which emerged in 1992, and worsened considerably in 1993, was framed primarily around the issue of economic reform. During the Cold War, the state's economic planners poured exhaustive resources into defense production. Approximately 25% of the workforce in the Russian Republic was employed by the military-industrial complex, which controlled half of all manufacturing. Defense procurement dropped 80% in 1992 and produced devastating economic effects. The pain of defense conversion was intensified by the enormous task of converting from the command economy to a free-market system. The abolition of price controls in January 1992 led to an inflation rate by the end of the year of over 2,000%. Yeltsin's privatization plan introduced in the Fall of 1992, designed to end state subsidies by selling-off profitable businesses and closing inefficient ones, threatens a wave of unemployment in 1993.¹

But the underlying cause of the political power struggle in Russia has been the absence of a new constitution, which delineates a clear division of power. In 1992, the Russian Congress of People's Deputies continued to operate under the constitution inherited from the USSR. This product of the Brezhnev era was designed to act as an ideological statement rather than organize the functions and relationships of political institutions. But as with many other Soviet institutions of the time, there was an enormous gulf between constitutional theory and practice. The constitution now lacks popular legitimacy, having been amended over two hundred times in a fervid attempt to create a functional document within the post-communist environment.

When the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies convened in March 1991, most deputies were supportive of Yeltsin because they realized that Gorbachev's power was vanishing. By backing Yeltsin in his political battle with Gorbachev, they hoped to inherit the powers of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Two major victories in 1991 helped Yeltsin consolidate his support in the CPD. The first was his election as president in June; and the second was his stand against the coup-plotters in August which led to the banning of the CPSU and Gorbachev's ultimate fall from power in December of that year.

During the Fifth Congress of People's Deputies in October 1991, Yeltsin received additional authority from the CPD to appoint regional administrative heads and rule by decree to carry out economic reforms. In addition, Yeltsin acquired the authority to form his own government without consulting the legislature. This power was jealously guarded because of the vast administrative empires reaching downward from the numerous government ministries. Yeltsin appointed himself prime minister and formed a government consisting almost entirely of radical reformers. He made a long-time associate, Gennadi Burbulis, his State Secretary, and appointed Yegor Gaidar Deputy Prime Minister for Financial and Economic Policy. The Gaidar
team proceeded to launch its ambitious program of economic "shock therapy" in January 1992 by lifting price controls and implementing a floating exchange rate.

Yeltsin still lacked a mechanism to exert influence and control over the regions. Once appointed, many of the regional administrative heads did not feel obligated to remain loyal. In other regions, the administrative authority of the local executive branches was challenged by old guard communists in the territorial soviets. Yeltsin, therefore, used his power of decree to appoint presidential envoys which overlapped the regional administrative heads and were intended to counter bureaucratic resistance to reform at the local level.

In April 1992, the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies extended the extraordinary powers granted Yeltsin in the Fall of 1991 as a way of avoiding responsibility for the expected economic collapse after the difficult winter. When it became clear, however, that the Yeltsin-led government had somewhat stabilized its position, the Congress feared losing its influence. The deputies forced Yeltsin to give up the post of Prime Minister, but he was able to place Gaidar in the post in an acting capacity. Three representatives of the industrial lobby were brought into the government as deputy prime ministers to Gaidar: Vladimir Shumeiko, Georgi Khiza, and Viktor Chernomyrdin, a former oil and gas minister. In addition, the government granted an additional 200 billion rubles in state subsidies for industry. In return, Yeltsin managed to gain the CPD's endorsement in principle to a new constitution. Furthermore, while forced to depart the government, Yeltsin transferred many of his executive powers to the presidential apparatus. The Gaidar government remained responsible for the management of the economy. Security, defense, and foreign affairs, meanwhile, came under Yeltsin's newly formed Security Council, which acted as a shadow cabinet.

The Sixth CPD found itself in the position of attempting to pull power away from the strong executive which it helped create. Khasbulatov seemed nostalgic for the period before the creation of the Russian presidency, when the executive was subordinate to the Chairman of the Presidium. In the summer of 1992, the Presidium established its own 5,000 member security force and assumed control of the Central Bank, which proceeded to ease its credit policy to state industry and thereby fueled inflation. In taking these measures, Khasbulatov invoked the authority of the Soviet constitution which proclaimed the legislature to be the supreme organ of state authority. But as with many other soviet institutions, there was an enormous gulf between constitutional theory and practice.

As the CPD forced Yeltsin into a series of concessions during 1992, Yeltsin always sought compromise which returned him the larger goal of passing a new constitution which would clear the way for elections to a new legislative body. As the deputies clung to the old Soviet constitution, Yeltsin's dilemma lay in the fact that the CPD was the only body with the legal authority to make constitutional amendments or promulgate an entirely new document.
Two basic draft constitutions emerged in 1992: Sergei Shakrai, as Yeltsin's State Counselor, introduced a draft in the spring which proposed stronger executive powers. In the fall, a draft was introduced by Oleg Rumyanstev, Executive Secretary of the CPD's Constitutional Commission, which favored a stronger legislature. But of these and other constitutional drafts which have surfaced in the last year and envision various forms of presidential or parliamentary systems, all contemplate abolishing the CPD and replacing it with a bicameral legislature.

When the Seventh CPD gathered in December 1992, it rejected Yeltsin's choice of Gaidar as Prime Minister and forced him to accept Viktor Chernomyrdin as a compromise candidate. Yeltsin also dismissed Burbulis as State Secretary but was able to retain Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, another frequent target of conservative deputies. In return for Yeltsin's concessions, the CPD agreed not to suspend his power of presidential decree and to hold a constitutional referendum on April 11th, asking whether Russia should be a parliamentary or presidential system.

In late January 1993, Khasbulatov withdrew his support for a referendum, suggesting a postponement because Russia was in the midst of an economic crisis. The CPD reconvened in early March 1993 for an extraordinary session in which the deputies voted to cancel the April 11th referendum, assume the authority to overrule presidential decrees, and establish parliamentary control over state radio and television.

Fearing the CPD would neutralize or even abolish the Russian presidency, Yeltsin declared presidential special rule in a nationally televised speech on March 20, 1993. The period of special rule, Yeltsin announced, would last until April 25th, the new date set for the referendum. In response, the CPD reconvened again in late March to vote on articles of impeachment against Yeltsin. On March 28, 617 of 1,033 deputies voted to impeach Yeltsin, only 72 fewer than the two-thirds needed to remove him from office. Once their impeachment attempt failed, the CPD proceeded to hijack the referendum process by replacing the constitutional question with a series of four questions clearly weighted in their favor. The four questions were:

1) Do you trust the President of the Russian Federation?

2) Do you approve of the socio-economic policy pursued by the President and the government of the Russian Federation since 1992?

3) Do you deem it necessary to hold early presidential elections?

4) Do you deem it necessary to hold early elections of the people's deputies?
To make it even more difficult for Yeltsin to prevail, the CPD set the margin of victory at 50% plus one of Russia’s 107 million eligible voters as opposed to 50% plus one of total turnout. In a decision issued on April 21, the Constitutional Court reduced the threshold to 50% of turnout on questions one and two, but let stand the 50% of total voters requirement on questions three and four. Since a positive outcome for both the third and fourth questions would be irrelevant in the absence of a new constitution, Yeltsin still contemplated holding a separate poll on the constitution which would parallel the four ballot questions. Yeltsin later dropped this idea because he could not ensure its universal administration, but publicly stated he would consider a positive vote for him a mandate for a new constitution.

The four ambiguous ballot questions, now with two sets of rules, lacked a clear, legal mechanism to translate the outcome of voting into decisive and definitive action. While the referendum would go forward, it had deteriorated into a popularity contest which would throw political momentum to either Yeltsin or Khasbulatov, who then could interpret the referendum results to his own political advantage.

Throughout this struggle for power, the Constitutional Court became more of an arbiter of political disputes than a forum of final appeal designed to protect the country’s constitution and laws. Since its establishment, the Constitutional Court has heard twelve cases and reviewed approximately 1,600 complaints concerning the constitutionality of specific legal practices. Although the justices are technically forbidden to rule on political questions, most of the issues they have considered have had distinct political ramifications. For example, the Court has ruled unconstitutional parts of Yeltsin’s decree banning the CPSU, his decree banning the extremist National Salvation Front, and his declaration of special rule. The major problem the Court faces is that it must operate within the confines of a non-democratic constitution.

**Regional Issues**

Chaos in government has not been limited to Moscow. Power struggles also have led to government paralysis in many of Russia’s 89 regional administrative units, including 21 ethnically-determined republics with large non-Russian populations and traditionally extensive powers of local government. Both the vertical and horizontal administrative discipline once imposed by the Party vanished with the abolition of the CPSU, leaving national authorities without a mechanism to enforce decisions at the regional and local level. Yeltsin’s naming of presidential envoys created a third center of power at the regional level which compete for political dominance with the heads of executive administration and the regional soviets.

Without a durable agreement on power sharing between Moscow and the various regions of Russia, the jurisdictional boundaries within different levels of government also remains
unclear. In the first nine months of 1992, the regional soviets adopted 13,000 legislative acts that the Russian Prosecutors Office subsequently declared in conflict with the law. Furthermore, eight of the republics declared Yeltsin’s declaration of presidential rule unconstitutional. The central government and 19 of republics signed a Federation Treaty in March 1992 which defined relations between the two levels. The Treaty gave the regions new powers, extending their influence over foreign policy, foreign trade, land and natural resources, and ownership rights. But, in the absence of a new constitution, it has remained a lifeless document. Some regional leaders opposed the April 25th referendum on the grounds that a new constitution would be used to deny them powers granted under the Federation Treaty.

Many members of the CPD also opposed Yeltsin’s plan because the central government must rely upon local authorities to organize and conduct the referendum. They believed the federation’s republics and regions would use the referendum to expand their own rights and powers by putting additional questions on the ballot. In this scenario, the deputies saw an ominous similarity to the all-union referendum in 1991, which Gorbachev had proposed as a device to speed up the signing of a new Union Treaty and thereby preserve the USSR. In Georgia and Armenia, however, the all-union referendum was not held. The Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania held referendums on independence in place of the all-union referendum. In other republics, the referendum was used as an opportunity to place additional questions on the ballot, such as the initiative in Russia to create a republican presidency. Consequently, rather than preserving the union, many saw Gorbachev’s referendum as accelerating the devolution of power from Moscow and, ultimately, the disintegration of the USSR.

The deputies saw a second parallel to the events of 1991, when the republics of the USSR refused to transfer tax revenues to central authorities. Though Russia’s regions are weaker in this respect than the former soviet republics, which were responsible for all tax collection, they can still hold Moscow hostage. In 1992, 44% of total government revenue was raised locally.3

These fears found concrete expression regarding the Chechen Republic, which passed articles of secession in March 1992 and took steps toward defining Chechen citizenship and issuing a local currency. The Republic of Tatarstan has refrained from an official proclamation of independence, but it did move toward greater autonomy in November 1992 by holding a popular referendum on sovereignty, withholding federal tax revenues, and issuing its own vouchers to privatize state property.

Although the majority of the republics didn’t want full independence, they were quick to assert themselves in the power vacuum of 1992 to gain more autonomy from Moscow. In early April 1992, for example, the Republic of Mordovia declared itself the highest government authority, abolished the office of the region’s first post-communist president, and set about to
revive socialist methods. A fifth question was added to the April 25th ballot by the Republic of Bashkortostan’s soviet, which sought greater economic autonomy for the republic through the right to dispose of mineral resources, engage in foreign economic activity, define the principles of taxation, and create legislative and judicial systems. Chelyabinsk also added a fifth question to the referendum to replace the Yeltsin-appointed administrative head (see p. 44).

II. Political Environment

Electoral Traditions

The RSFSR law on referenda used for the 1991 all-union referendum was the operative law for the April 25th referendum. This vague law lacks legitimacy since it was designed to satisfy a different set of criteria in the non-democratic communist elections. In addition to the legal guidelines, there were many visible remnants of the old system in the April 25th referendum, including red curtains on voting booths and the Soviet hammer and sickle emblazoned on ballot boxes. Moreover, polling station commissions usually were composed of the same individuals who administered the Soviet elections. Voter registry lists left over from the communist era were of such poor quality that localities frequently reverted to other lists for the April 25th referendum, such as those used for the issuance of privatization vouchers in the Fall of 1992.

Under Brezhnev and his predecessors, the administration of single-candidate elections was an empty ritual designed to legitimize the government rather than a genuine exercise in choice. The voter was presented with a ballot including the name of only one candidate, and simply dropped the ballot into the box. Curtained voting booths were provided but their use was suspect. The voter was thought to have crossed the name out, the only way of registering a vote against a single candidate, if the booth was utilized. Polling station chairman usually represented an authority figure in the voter’s life; such as a factory director, a state farm manager, or a local party official. Soviet society placed a premium on civic duty and unanimity, and there were subtle social pressures as well as the watchful gaze of the polling station chairman to encourage conformity. The practice of crossing out a candidate, therefore, was seldom employed in a decisive way. In the local USSR elections in 1980, only 77 out of 2 million candidates failed to get elected because the number of scratched ballots exceeded the unmarked ballots.4

Balloting was sometimes conducted at the workplace, such as large factories, to insure universal participation. But electoral commissions had other methods to guarantee a high turnout figure. A registered voter unwilling to participate could claim a prior commitment and obtain
an absentee certificate. In some urban areas, as much as 25% of the voters received such certificates, which were readily granted by local authorities who wished to maintain their high turnout numbers. The typical "99% turnout" of the Soviet-era elections actually represented those registered voters who participated, but excluded unregistered voters and registered voters who obtained an absentee certificate.5

Given the non-competitive nature of elections in the USSR, election campaigns were essentially a turnout-driven process which revealed the organizational depth of the Communist Party. The heart of an election campaign was the agitkollektiv (agitation group), similar to volunteer canvassers found in western-style registration drives or get-out-the-vote efforts. Such groups were mobilized within a few months of the election date, with each "agitator" given the responsibility of encouraging the participation of a list of fifteen to twenty people.

The March 1989 elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR were the first multi-candidate elections in Soviet history. They represented an incremental, albeit "managed from above," step toward a more open society. But they were not truly democratic. Of the 2,250 members of the congress, 1,500 deputies were drawn from territorial constituencies. Half of the seats allotted to the territories were determined on the basis of population density and half were divided equally among union republics and autonomous regions. Candidates were nominated through CPSU structures and its officially sanctioned public organizations. The final share of 750 seats were allocated specifically to public organizations - those being the CPSU and its adjunct societal structures such as the Academy of Sciences, the Komsomol, and creative unions -- which also served as mechanisms for nominating the territorial candidates. Party officials ran unopposed in 399 districts. However, 1,101 districts did have competitive (i.e. multi-candidate) elections with 2,895 candidates in all.

On March 4, 1990, elections were held for the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Article VI of the Soviet Constitution, which legally established the CPSU’s monopoly in Soviet society, had been repealed in February 1990, only one month before the elections, allowing candidates other than those nominated by the access to the ballot. This reform occurred too late for opposition party organizations to form, mobilize support, and compete significantly in the March elections against the communist political machine. More than 86% of the elected deputies were CPSU members, many of whom also ran unopposed.6

Although another important step in political reform, the March 1990 elections, and the campaign period which preceded it, were replete with charges by both election officials and candidates of violations of the law and other irregularities. Charges included "illegal manipulation of the nomination process, malfeasance and obstructionism on the part of election commissions, ballot box stuffing, and lack of access to the vote counting process."7
Party Development

Although the legal impediments to the establishment of political parties, established during the Soviet-era, have been removed, a fully functioning multi-party system has yet to develop in Russia. Several reasons exist for this phenomenon:

1) Political activists in Russia often describe people as "allergic" to the notion of parties. This is evidenced by the creative nomenclature, such as "union, movement, coalition, circle," used to distinguish new political groups from the old CPSU. Russians often have little patience for talk of political parties because of their long, exhausting, and largely negative experience with "the Party."

2) Post-Soviet society has progressed slowly from its monolithic state. There is an absence of clearly distinguishable economic interests among the Russian population at-large, since the state remains the principle employer. As such, a substantial middle class with vested interests in continued economic and political reforms has yet to emerge. Parties, therefore, are not needed to represent divergent economic interests.

3) Elections often can be a catalyst for party development. In Russia, however, open development of party structures began only after the March 1990 elections to the CPD. These elections were multi-candidate, but were still dominated by the CPSU. While Russian law allowed for multi-party presidential elections in June 1991, most of the candidates -- including Boris Yeltsin -- chose not to align themselves formally with political parties. Elections to the CPD and the Russian presidency originally were for five-year terms. Unless earlier elections are scheduled, new presidential and parliamentary elections won't take place until 1995 and 1996 respectively. Without a party function in governance and without elections in the immediate future, parties are hampered in their ability to develop a party platform, enhance their membership, receive endorsements from political leaders, develop resources, or recruit potential candidates.

4) Despite a more dynamic political environment, Russian politics since 1990 has retained the Russian tradition of the "cult of personality." With the disappearance of a clearly defined, singular competitor personified in the CPSU, parties in Russia often have succumbed to divisiveness and in-fighting. Powerful party leaders in Moscow and St. Petersburg use party structures for the attainment of personal goals and political aspirations rather than promoting party ideals and
policies. Fissures within party leadership organs and between the national headquarters and regional and local party chapters has undermined the viability and competitiveness of new entrants to the political process.

5) While a handful of parties have won converts among the deputies of the CPD, many of whom were elected under the auspices of the CPSU and its official structures, none of those deputies are now publicly committed to the platforms of the organizations they claim to represent. As such, deputies are not compelled to submit to the cohesive force of party discipline. Since they do not interpret their political careers as being connected to party support, the legislative process is chaotic and there is little connection between parties and governing. President Yeltsin’s decision to pursue populist politics rather than party politics established a precedent which has further undermined party development by weakening the link between parties and government.

6) Multi-party development also has been hampered by an inability of the parties themselves to define goals and build organizational strength in the post-communist era. Political activists have been slow to shake off communist management styles as well as conceptions about the purposes and functions of parties. Initially, political opposition movements were defined by what they opposed (i.e. communism) rather than what they supported. Little emphasis was placed on developing pro-active party platforms or a post-communist agenda. Coalitions began to splinter when the unifying element of anti-communism disappeared with the banning of the CPSU.

7) Lack of democratic traditions and the weak foundations of civil society in Russia also have hampered party development. Political parties have been unable to establish themselves as a necessary mechanism for organizing and voicing the views of various segments of society because of an insufficient understanding of the practice of political pluralism.

8) Infrastructure and communications problems among nascent political organizations diminish their competitiveness. The financial, technical, and human resources of pro-democracy groups are deplorable relative to the assets of apparatchiks in government, particularly at the local level, the strongly entrenched bureaucracy, and those political parties with strong roots in the former CPSU. Moreover, in difficult economic times, the capacity to recruit volunteers and raise funds is further reduced. Augmenting these shortcomings is a lack of sufficient communication, both horizontally and vertically, between party officials.
Political Parties

There are currently over 800 "political parties" in Russia, although a vast majority can be considered nothing more than political discussion clubs or special interest groups. Many are localized parties, frustrated with the power struggle in Moscow and the relative disinterest of national party leaders in regional and local politics. To suggest that even a dozen political parties exist which can claim status as national organizations (i.e., cohesive horizontal and vertical structures with significant regional organization, with membership in excess of 5,000, and access to some mechanism of political power) would be generous. As a result, political groups have coalesced into larger alliances and movements, with varying degrees of formal integration. As of the April 25th referendum, Russia's confusing political landscape was divided into three principal coalitions of party organizations: the radical reform coalition called Democratic Russia, the moderate reform and statist oriented Civic Union bloc, and the right-wing reactionary Red-Brown axis.

The limited fashion in which access to the ballot was opened to non-communist candidates under Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika contributed to the limited political party development. Broad-based political forces which emerged under Gorbachev's tenure, for instance, have since failed to coalesce into well-organized political parties. Although many of the candidates from the "public organization slate" in the 1989 elections were devout communists, less dogmatic, more reformist candidates were able to gain nomination through these structures and win seats in the CPD of the USSR. The Academy of Sciences, in particular, forwarded a slate of candidates replete with reformists. As a result, a core group of deputies, prone to "new thinking" in a much broader interpretation than envisioned by Gorbachev, gained access to power. To organize this "radical" minority, the Inter-Regional Group of Deputies (IDG) of the CPD of the USSR was formed in July 1989. The IDG had two main bases of support: Russian reformers and nationalist deputies (who favored greater autonomy and even secession from the Soviet Union). The unifying thread, which connected an otherwise diverse, and even incompatible, group of interests was a shared hostility to the party apparatus. The IDG functioned as a nascent opposition within the legislature and pushed the pace of economic and political reform.

Not until the March 1990 elections to the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, however, was the stage set for the development of political party opposition. The repudiation of the CPSU's monopoly on political power in February 1990 and the introduction of a more open political environment were vital to the development and growth of civic and political groups. But for many of the reasons cited in the previous section, party development since 1990 has been haphazard and a genuine multi-party system has yet to fully materialize.
Many Russian legislators, however, have shunned party affiliations; in fact, only 18% of the deputies within the legislature belong to any formal party organization, and even within these parties consensus seldom exists. The CPD is divided into some seventeen fluid factions within three main blocs which parallel the basic divisions represented by the three main coalitions mentioned above. Approximately 150 deputies are pro-reform, 375 are centrists, and 300 are right-wing hardliners. A fourth bloc of approximately 200 deputies remains independent. The nature and origins of Russia's three principle political coalitions are discussed below in greater detail.

1) Democratic Russia

The Democratic Russia Movement (DRM) has provided an umbrella for dozens of political parties, civic organizations, and reform-minded voters since its inception in October 1990. Democratic Russia grew out of a movement of voters clubs and the groundwork for its inception was laid at the conference of Russian voters' clubs in June 1990. The Movement was established formally at a founding Congress held in October 1990. Membership in the coalition was offered to pro-democracy groups and to individual members, who supported reform but remained wary of party politics. By March 1991, DRM chapters had been created in more than 300 towns and in all regional centers of Russia. That month a formal Coordinating Council was established, consisting of 48 members, of which six served as co-chairmen. Members of the Council represented working commissions, member political parties, and the individual membership. Throughout the next two years, the Coordinating Council was modified and restructured to address concerns about its representational and efficiency. In particular, a regional advisory council was added following complaints that the leadership-organ was dominated by Muscovites. Members of the coordinating council are elected by DRM regional congresses, the DRM Council of Representatives, and the leadership of member political parties.

As originally conceived, the primary aim of the DRM was to deprive the CPSU and its apparatus of state power. Positions thought to further this aim included the abolition of Article VI of the USSR Constitution and the creation of a multi-party system, the replacement of the twotiered legislative structure with a bicameral body, the adoption of a democratic press law, the promotion of private ownership, Russian sovereignty, and the observance of human rights. Following the collapse of the communist state, the DRM faced the daunting challenge of developing a new, detailed, pro-active agenda for the post-Soviet period. Given the primacy of economics in the current political environment, Democratic Russia has focused its efforts on support of issues, activities, and leaders thought to favor the implementation of radical economic reforms, particularly rapid and comprehensive privatization, unregulated markets, and free prices. In support of this policy and help spur economic reforms, through public pressure tactics such as demonstrations and petition drives, the DRM formed the Committee for Russian
Reforms, with local branches throughout Russia, in 1991.

At the Democratic Russia Congress in November 1991, the Movement faced its first major political test of the post-Soviet era. The Movement was plunged into a divisive internal policy debate following President Yeltsin's announcement that Russia's border with Kazakhstan should be redrawn to incorporate Russian communities in northern Kazakhstan. At issue was whether or not Russia could legitimately make claims on territory beyond the federation, whether force should be used to defend the rights of Russian minorities living in the newly independent republics, and whether or not such aims were consistent with the principles upon which the Movement had been founded. In the end, the permissibility of force separated the staunch nationalists from patriotic moderates. The Coordinating Council voted against endorsing Yeltsin's position, registering for the first time criticism of Yeltsin's policy. Three parties - the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR), the Christian Democratic Movement (RCDM), and the Constitutional Democrats (CDP) - all powerful members of the DRM, chose to withdraw their membership from the Movement.

While this important policy issue served as the catalyst for the split, additional issues -- both of a technical and personal nature -- further complicated the circumstances surrounding the event. Political parties were fearful that they were losing potential members to the DRM's growing individual membership and demanded that the DRM charter be amended to exclude individual memberships. Concerns were raised that individual members, who held a majority of the seats on the Coordinating Council, were using DRM structures to create a "super party," thereby maneuvering to gain a competitive edge over other parties in the coalition. In many cases, positions taken by prominent activists within the movement on both the technicality of membership and the issue of policy toward former republics tended to correspond to personal power bases established by the same individuals.

As the dust settled, the breach between the three parties and the Movement was not clear cut. In the case of the DPR and the RCDM, the parties' national leadership lacked support of the rank and file and exacerbated extant fissures within each organization. Some local chapters of the DPR, angered by the unilateral move of their leaders and supportive of the decision reached by the Coordinating Council of DRM, defied their national organizations and maintained their membership in the Movement. The RCDM suffered a similar fate. At the meeting of the DRM Council of Representatives in January 1992, the Movement suffered yet another blow to its internal cohesion as well as its external image as a viable coalition. Allegations that a new power elite, reminiscent of communist apparatchiks, had emerged within the Coordinating Council were forwarded by a fraction of powerful personalities within that organ. When this position was not supported by a majority of the delegates to the Council of Representatives and a request to put this issue to a vote of the entire Congress of DRM was denied by the Coordinating Council, those members of the Coordinating Council who had raised the charge
suspended their membership.

Despite internal discord and the growing pains associated with a radically altered political environment, the DRM retains the ability to mobilize broad-based grass-root support in favor of continued marketization and democratization through its Committees on Russian Reform and, more recently, through the pro-Yeltsin referendum coalition called Democratic Choice. The current Democratic Russia coalition consists of the following political parties and movements: the Christian Democratic Union of Russia, the Russian Christian Democratic Union, the Republican Party of Russia, the Liberal Union, the Free Labor Party, the Party of Constitutional Democrats, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Free Democratic Party of Russia.

**Christian Democratic Union of Russia (Ogorodnikov)**

The Christian Democratic Union of Russia emerged from a group publishing the *samizdat* "Christian Community Bulletin." Since 1989, the Bulletin was edited by former political prisoner and human rights advocate Aleksandr Ogorodnikov. Unwilling to participate in politics during the Soviet period, as participation would have legitimized the communist system, Ogorodnikov was suspected of being an extremist by other pro-democracy groups and was denied the right to take part in the DRM founding congress. Given its staunch position against the Soviet regime, the CDU was plagued by official intimidation and consequently was not registered until December 1991, after the communist regime had collapsed. Despite previous differences, the CDU and the DRM established a cooperative relationship in support of the development of parties and factions of radical reformers which led to eventual CDU membership in the Movement. The CDU advocates the development of a liberalized economy, the revival of Russian traditions, and the defense of human rights. In addition to its purely political agenda, the CDU has established several charity projects including soup kitchens and summer youth camps.

**Russian Christian Democratic Union (Yakunin)**

The Russian Christian Democratic Union, led by human and religious rights activists Father Gleb Yakunin, represents a collection of Christian Democratic party chapters that formerly were part of the Russian Christian Democratic Party and Movement, led by Victor Aksioutchits. But when Aksioutchits renounced DRM membership, embraced extreme Russian nationalism, and made his party a founding member of the People’s Accord Bloc, pro-Yakunin chapters chose to retain their DRM membership. These chapters favor private property, Christian spiritual revival, radical economic reform,
social security, and a reduced role of the state in all spheres of life.

**Republican Party of Russia (Shostakovsky)**

The Republican Party of Russia (RPR) was formed on the basis of the Democratic Platform which resulted from division within the Communist Party. Unable to generate genuine reform from within the Party, the Democratic Platform established a separate party, the RPR. The RPR favors the institutionalization of a market economy and private property, the establishment of a state based on the rule of law, the recognition of individual and human rights, and the creation of a social safety net. Several attempts at merger with the Social Democratic Party, designed to create a more competitive and viable organization, have failed. The party is chaired currently by Vladimir Lysenko and Vyacheslav Shostakovsky. The RPR enjoys popular support among intelligentsia and business people at the local levels and hopes to become a party of the emergent middle class.

**The Liberal Union (Murashev and Kasparov)**

A splinter group of the Democratic Party of Russia, the Liberal Union, formerly the Liberal Conservative Union, was founded by prominent political activist Arkady Murashev and the Russian world chess champion Gary Kasparov. In August 1991, the Free Democratic Party of Russia, the Party of Constitutional Democrats, the Free Labor Party, and a number of prominent political figures joined the Liberal Union.

**The Free Labor Party**

Established as a party of businessmen and professionals, the Free Labor Party opposed admitting former Communists to its ranks. The party espouses democratic principles including the establishment of a state based on the rule of law, multi-party elections, and political and economic pluralism. It promotes the growth of truly independent trade unions, stock commodities and exchanges, private property, and the introduction of a convertible ruble.

**Party of Constitutional Democrats (Zolotarev)**

Based on the pre-communist "Kadet" party, active in Russia between 1905 and 1917,
the Party of Constitutional Democrats was founded by Viktor Zolotarev in 1990. Internal divisions led to the formation of a splinter party, known as the Constitutional Democratic Party. Enjoying only a small following, the core of the party is comprised mainly of intellectuals who have, as yet, been unable to articulate a clear program which confronts present day realities.

**Christian Democratic Party (Chuyev)**

The Christian Democratic Party is a product of a power struggle within the Christian Democratic Union (Ogorodnikov), which resulted in the formation of a new party, led by Aleksandr Chuyev.

**Free Democratic Party of Russia (Ponomarev and Salie)**

A splinter group of the Democratic Party of Russia, which opposed party chairman Nikolai Travkin’s Bolshevik management style, the Free Democratic Party of Russia was founded in 1990 by Lev Ponomarev and Marina Salie. The party line emphasizes the importance of human rights and individual freedoms and calls for the practical realization of political pluralism, free enterprise, and private property.

In addition to these parties, numerous civic organizations also belong to the DRM. Among them are: the Anti-Fascist Center, the Memorial Society, the Defenders of the White House, the military reform society Shield, the Club of Voters in the Academy of Sciences, the Union of Young Russia. Private businesses and joint-ventures supporting the implementation of radical economic and political reforms support the DRM through their membership in the Association of Funds, the financial and technical arm of the Movement.

Several former members of the DRM, including the Peasants Party of Russia and the Social Democratic Party of Russia, have joined with the People’s Party of Russia and the Social Liberal Party to form a new pro-democracy coalition called the New Russia Bloc. In addition, there are several pro-democracy political parties which are unaffiliated with broader movements. These include: the Economic Freedom Party, the Russian Green Party, the Democratic Union Party, and the Republican Humanitarian Party.
2) Civic Union

Civic Union is comprised of several statist parties which support a significantly slower pace of economic reform than that advocated by the Democratic Russia Movement. Civic Union’s economic platform calls for the reintroduction of many elements of the Soviet command economy: state subsidies, production quotas and price controls, government management of the energy sector, and fixing the ruble rate administratively rather than through the open market. While favoring significant state economic role, however, the Civic Union does not advocate a return to communism. Civic Union proposes to save the extant Russian industrial structure from collapse by reestablishing partial government control over the economy. The stimulation of production through decentralization and privatization is seen only at a later stage of development. Members of the Civic Union were committed communists on an economic rather than ideological basis, and are now interested in introducing only those reforms necessary to maintain the overall structure and relationships of the Soviet system under which they benefitted.

When it comes to relations between the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, the leadership of Civic Union has indicated its preference for a recreation of the Soviet Union under a structure similar to that envisioned in Gorbachev’s all-union treaty proposed in March 1991. In addition, the leadership adamantly opposes the fragmentation of the Russia Federation on the basis of ethnic or regional divisions and some, in particular DPR Chairman Nikolai Travkin and Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, were highly critical of the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. Again, however, the major force behind the attempt to recreate the Union is economic feasibility. Not surprisingly, the Union’s powerful industrial lobby seeks to preserve its economic links with various industrial enterprises and raw material suppliers in the territories of the former Soviet Union.

Given these positions, the Civic Union stands in opposition to the Yeltsin Government and, in particular, the radical economic policies introduced by former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar. In conjunction with its desire to stabilize Russia’s economy and slow the pace of reform, the Civic Union opposes dissolving the Congress of People’s Deputies. The following parties and movements are affiliated with the Civic Union: the Movement for Democratic Reforms, the People’s Party of Free Russia, the All Russia Renewal Union, the Democratic Party of Russia, and the Social Democratic Center.

Movement for Democratic Reforms (Popov)

The Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms led by Gavril Popov, originally part of the international (i.e., all-Union) Movement for Democratic Reforms, has largely been absorbed into the Civic Union. With several of its group members now founding
members of Civic Union, the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms can be considered an affiliated organization. Formed as an all-Union movement in July 1991, the Movement for Democratic Reforms represented an attempt by prominent reformers to counter the hard-line nature of the CPSU. In June 1991, Eduard Shevardnadze, then a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, first declared the need to set up a broad-based democratic party in the Soviet Union. The former Soviet Foreign Minister viewed this new democratic movement as a viable counterweight to the Communist Party, making it a home for all disenchanted communists and reform-oriented forces. The MDR supported all Gorbachev policies and the passage of the Union Treaty. In the Fall of 1991, many former Communist Party leaders and local executives joined the MDR and expressed their desire to cooperate with the DRM. At the time, three members of the DRM coordinating council were simultaneously members of the MDR political council. Because many political coalitions did not demand exclusive membership, member parties and groups were able to maintain memberships in several movements.

In February 1992, the MDR Russian Branch held its founding congress in Nizhny Novgorod and elected former Moscow Mayor Gavril Popov as its chairman. The incompatible agendas of the DRM and MDR organizations prevented a formal merger. Most members of the DRM regarded the MDR as an organized structure of the former communist elites of the liberal faction that are trying to preserve their stature in a post-communist society. Moreover, many DRM leaders and activists have charged the MDR with aspiring to privatize state property for the benefit of the communist establishment. The relative inability of the MDR to take off as a major player in Russian politics stems from the fact that it is largely a top-heavy organization in which party leaders often seem to outnumber rank and file members.

People’s Party of Free Russia (Rutskoi)

Led by Russian Vice President Aleksander Rutskoi, the People’s Party of Free Russia (PPFR) was founded in August 1991. Its nearly 100,000 members are largely reformed communists. The PPFR was initially conceptualized as operating within the CPSU, but on the second day of the ill-fated hard-line coup, it bolted the Party. Although the PPFR supported Yeltsin during the August coup, in October 1991 it declared itself the legal successor to the CPSU and thereby heir to all Party property in Russia. Throughout 1992 and early 1993, Rutskoi became increasingly vocal in his criticism of the Yeltsin Government. Declaring Yeltsin’s attempt to establish Presidential Rule in March 1993 "unconstitutional," Rutskoi sided with the CPD during the ensuing power struggle and the 25 April Referendum. Rutskoi already has announced his intention to run for
president in future elections. The PPFR supports a market economy buttressed by strong social guarantees and favors mixed forms of ownership and means of production.

**All Russia Renewal Union (Volsky)**

Founded in May 1992 by industrialist Arkady Volsky, the All Russia Renewal Union represents the interests of directors of state-owned enterprises. Members of the Union fear Yeltsin's economic plans to privatize Russia's efficient plants and close the inefficient ones. State factory directors zealously want to protect their new-found independence from ministerial control, and, consequently, they can exert political influence over large groups of citizens owing their existence to these industrial dinosaurs. The Union promotes ownership rights of state enterprise directors and their continued active involvement in running the national economy. The Union endorses the creation of a socially-oriented, regulated, market economy.

**Democratic Party of Russia (Travkin)**

The Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) was founded early in 1990 by some members of the Democratic Platform of the CPSU and is chaired by Nikolai Travkin. The DPR is extremely well-organized and, in some organizational aspects, mimics the CPSU. Examples include: factory committees, youth groups, and a party school. Since its inception, the DPR has been plagued by splits within the party, but has survived these divisions. Accusations that Travkin has attempted to create a populist dictatorship within the party have been raised repeatedly by other activists in the party, and failed attempts to dilute Travkin's power within the DPR have led to the formation of numerous splinter groups.

An original group member of the Democratic Russia Movement, Travkin withdrew the DPR's membership in the DRM over disagreements with the DRM leadership over the acceptable means of maintaining the integrity of the Russian Federation and protecting the rights of Russians living in other countries of the former Soviet Union. Political power plays also were central to the split. Disenchanted with the increasingly self-interested approach of their chairman and his growing tendency to act independently of, and often in contradiction to, the party platform, many local chapters chose to maintain their membership in or close cooperation with the DRM. Those chapters loyal to Travkin subsequently joined a short-lived coalition, called National Consensus, with the Russian Christian Democrats and the Constitutional Democrats. Travkin broke ranks with this coalition in March 1992 and joined the Civic Union in June 1992. The
dichotomy, whereby some local DRM chapters are affiliated with political coalitions competing with the national organization of the DRM, has undermined efforts to create a clear party identity.

The DPR within the Civic Union tends to be more accepting of radical economic reforms than other members of the coalition. According to the party platform, the DPR calls for the recognition of individual and human rights, reiterates the necessity of the Commonwealth of Independent States and a strong national government in Russia, and support for free enterprise.

Social Democratic Center (Rumyantsev)

A splinter group of the Social Democratic Party of Russia, the Social Democratic Center is led by parliamentarian Oleg Rumyantsev. Rumyantsev is chairman of the constitutional drafting committee of the CPD and has forwarded a constitutional draft favoring a strong legislature.

3) The Red-Brown Axis

The Red-Brown Axis is a coalition of unrepentant former communists and rabid nationalists. Supporters of the military, its industrial complex, and Russian imperialism, this party forms a common bond between the extreme left and extreme right of Russia’s political spectrum. These reactionary forces frequently side with the Civic Union to oppose Yeltsin on economic issues, but see the dissolution of the Soviet empire as a major blow to the power and prestige of the Russian people.

Ultra-nationalist and communist splinter parties are organized under three umbrella movements - the Russian People’s Assembly, the National Salvation Front, and the Russian National Assembly. Ultra-nationalist parties include: the National Republican Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, the Russian National Union, the Council of Patriotic Forces of Russia, the Nashi Movement, the Russian National Patriotic Front, the Russian Revival Party, the Russian Party, and the Russian People’s Front. Communist splinter parties are: the Socialist Party of Working People, the Russian Communist Workers’ Party, Labor Party, All-Union Party of Bolsheviks, Union of Communists, Russian Communist Party, Russian Party of Communists, and Workers and Peasants Socialist Party. Some of the more prominent, though not necessarily influential, groups of the Red-Brown Axis are discussed below.
The National Salvation Front

Formed in October 1992, the National Salvation Front (NSF) was banned by Yeltsin in November 1992 for advocating the overthrow of the lawful government by violent means. This decision was overturned on appeal to the Constitutional Court in February 1993. The Front appears to have no program beyond opposition to all Yeltsin policies.

Pamyat

Pamyat, which means memory in Russian, is a nationalist fringe organization which is largely anti-semitic and supports the return to a monarchy. Some chapters of the Pamyat organization are openly anti-Semitic. Many party activists don military-style outfits, surround themselves with the symbols of fascism, and sympathize with the theories of German Nazism and Italian fascism. Several members of the organization have been arrested for inciting inter-ethnic hatred.

The Russian Communist Party (Zyuganov)

The Constitutional Court ruled in late 1992 that Yeltsin had acted unconstitutionally when he banned the organs of the Communist Party after the August 1991 coup attempt. The revived Communist Party of Russia (RCP) held a party congress outside of Moscow in February 1993 attended by approximately 650 delegates from local communist organizations across Russia. These delegates elected Gennadi Zyuganov chairman of the party’s Central Executive Committee. Zyuganov also serves as co-chairman of the National Salvation Front, and his election to the RCP chairmanship provides an informal connection between the two bodies.

The court’s decision, however, has not led to a widespread revival of the CPSU. Any of the reform elements which had not already left the Party, were driven out by the August 1991 coup attempt. The CPSU’s total absence of credibility with the Russian people was the key motivation for many former communists to find homes in new political organizations such as Civic Union. The communist party has reformed in Russia, but attracted only the most strident members of the former CPSU.

Liberal Democratic Party (Zhirinovskii)

Led by Vladimir Zhirinovskii, a candidate for the Russian presidency in the spring of
1991, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was founded in 1989. Despite its name, the LDP is neither liberal nor democratic. Extremely nationalist in orientation, the party has called repeatedly for the introduction of a state of emergency in Russia and the dissolution of all political parties. Despite his extremist orientation, Zhirinovskii received over six million votes in the June 1991 presidential election.

**Media Issues**

The Russian public's confidence in the media peaked at the height of glasnost in early 1990 when Russians still enjoyed their new-found freedom to criticize the system. Since then, there has been a steady erosion of the Russian public's trust in the press and the broadcasting media. A poll conducted in November 1992 indicated only 9% of Russians placed a great deal of trust in television, 8% in radio, and 6% in the printed press.\(^\text{10}\)

In 1992, the official press was forced to operate in a more competitive environment, in which they accepted fee-based advertising to cover their expenses rather than receive state subsidies. Higher paper costs and other inflationary pressures forced newspapers to make substantial increases in subscription prices, which resulted in a drop in circulation. The Russian government continues to finance the two main television companies: Ostankino (Channel One) and Russian Television (RTV). Both channels have consistently supported Yeltsin, resulting in a steady campaign by the CPD to assume control of television. The CPD is more concerned about television than other forms of communication because polls indicate that about 85% of Russians rely upon television as their primary source of information. Regional television channels outside of national control have been less supportive of Yeltsin.

Journalists regard attempts by the conservative Congress to control the media as the most serious threat to freedom of speech in post-communist Russia. At the same time, journalists also have been critical of Yeltsin's actions. The controversy over the Russian media began in the summer of 1992 with the parliament's attempt to assume control over the popular daily Izvestiya, which proclaimed itself independent after the August 1991 coup. Yeltsin established the Federal Information Center in December 1992 and appointed former Russian Information Minister Mikhail Polotarin as its head. Designed to promote his views among the government-financed media, the Center also was condemned by many journalists.

At the Eighth Congress of People's Deputies in March 1993, the CPD voted on a resolution on broadcasting that proposed putting both the Russian television channels and the ITAR-TASS News Agency, the main Russian wire service, under parliamentary control. The draft resolution also asked the president to propose new candidates for top managerial positions which would then be subject to parliamentary confirmation. It also banned the Federal
Information Center and set up its own watchdog committees to monitor press output. On April 27th, two days after the referendum, the Supreme Soviet adopted a decision to establish its own television and radio channels.

Russia's media institutions face a problem similar to those in Eastern Europe and other republics of the former Soviet Union. Journalists were accustomed to operating in an environment where news organizations were state organs designed to disseminate state propaganda. Basic skills of investigative journalism and objective reporting were not needed because the primary role of the news was to report and advance the party line dictated from above. The dearth of professional skills has led to a style of reporting in the post-communist era, especially in the print media, which tends towards a running commentary interspersed with random references to vague factual information.

III. The Referendum

Yeltsin began his referendum campaign upon his return from the Vancouver Summit in early April. During the campaign, Yeltsin told his supporters to vote yes on all four questions. Yeltsin evidently decided the simplified message of yes on all four questions was better than confusing voters with a complicated pattern of yes and no votes. Even though he was advocating early elections for himself by calling for four yeses, he felt the benefits outweighed the risks. In the last ten days of the campaign, however, the Democratic Russia Movement sought to generate support on Yeltsin's behalf but sent a conflicting message. Democratic Russia distributed millions of flyers and posters which encouraged Yeltsin supporters to cast their votes according to the "da, da, nyet, da" pattern.

Conversely, some of Yeltsin's opponents urged voters to cast their ballots by the "nyet, nyet, da, nyet" pattern. Other opponents of Yeltsin simply encouraged voters to stay home on the day of the referendum, hoping that a low turnout would either invalidate the referendum or at least make unattainable the higher threshold on the two questions calling for new elections. (The law required at least 50% of all eligible voters participate in order to make the referendum valid.)

Voting Procedures

The April 25th referendum was governed by the RSFSR Law on Referenda written by the Russian CPD for the all-union referendum in March 1991. Since the law itself was extremely vague, the actual characteristics of voting and tabulation also were determined by
processes established under older election laws, the administrative rulings of territorial electoral commissions, and local customs.

The referendum was a logistical undertaking of immense proportions which spanned Russia's eleven time zones. Under Russian law, three organizational levels were formulated to administer the referendum: the Central Election Commission (CEC) in Moscow, 89 regional and republic commissions, and about 97,000 individual polling station commissions. The main organizational burden of the referendum fell upon the territorial commissions which were responsible for printing the ballots, publishing voter lists, training and supervising the polling station commissions, monitoring compliance with the law, and tabulating the ballot protocols. The CPD allocated approximately 24.5 billion rubles for the republics and regions to carry out these administrative tasks.

The Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation is composed of 29 members, appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the CPD for a term of five years. To achieve diversity, members were selected on the basis of nationality and profession rather than political party affiliation. Only the chairmen and a full-time staff of six are paid. The powers of the Central Election Commission were limited to drawing district lines, approving the ballots and other official forms used in the process, declaring the results of the elections, and resolving complaints that arise in the campaign or voting process. Regional and local electoral commissions were formed by the regional soviets, although the law on referenda required that membership proposals from "public associations, work collectives, and steering committees situated in the territories as well as meetings of at least 150 citizens be taken into account."

In addition to the Central Election Commission, the government established a commission specifically to ensure the implementation of the April 25th referendum. The 18-member commission was chaired by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and included Yeltsin's Chief of Staff, Sergey Filatov; Deputy Prime Ministers Shumeiko, Shakrai, and Yarov; the ministers of security, internal affairs, and press and information; and the deputy ministers of defense and finance. The main tasks of the commission were to "settle all matters of material and financial backing for the referendum," coordinate the work of the central authorities in providing the commissions with "premises, equipment, and the means of transport and communication," and ensure public order during "mass events connected with the referendum."11

Each polling station commission was responsible for composing the lists of citizens eligible to vote (i.e., Russian citizens over the age of eighteen who are permanent or temporary residents within the polling station district). The law required lists to be posted at the polling stations and otherwise "made known to citizens with the help of other methods." Lists from previous elections generally were too inaccurate and, consequently, commissions frequently turned to alternate sources, such as housing lists or lists used to distribute privatization vouchers
last fall. The military was responsible for administering the referendum for the approximately 250,000 members of the armed forces stationed outside of the Russian Federation. Servicemen living within the borders of Russia were allowed to use public polling places, but many still voted with their military units.

The RSFSR Law on Referenda, and the previous Soviet and Russian election laws from 1989 and 1990, did not specify any procedure for validation of ballots by local commissions. Many polling stations, however, had unilaterally adopted the practice of stamping ballots in previous elections to satisfy a unique Russian cultural need - any document must have an official stamp in order to be legitimate. In an effort to enhance ballot security, the CEC issued a directive on April 2, 1993, which required the signatures of at least two commissioners on the back of each ballot at the polling site to validate the ballots. Since ballots, by law, arrived at least three days prior to actual voting, many commissioners started to sign ballots before the day of the referendum. Confusion over whether a stamp or two signatures was the correct method of validation led the CEC to belatedly state that either form was acceptable.

Polling sites operated between 7:00 am to 10:00 pm. When a voter arrived, the election commission would ask for identification, check the voter registration list, and issue the four ballots. The referendum law states that the internal passport or "other ID’s" were acceptable forms of identification. After verification of eligibility, the voter would sign a list acknowledging receipt and was then handed four separate ballot papers. The voter marked his ballot by crossing out what he did not support - in this case, either "yes" or "no" - and deposited the ballots in the ballot box, which in Russia is commonly referred to as the "urn." Article 32 of the referendum law states that "the citizen shall independently fill in their ballot papers in the voting booth by secret ballot. Those unable to do so without assistance can invite anyone who is not a member of the commission or an official public observer to the booth."

Voters could obtain an absentee certificate within thirty days of the referendum which would allow them to vote in a locality other than their place of residence. Two members of the polling station commission also were authorized to take a mobile ballot box to those individuals in their district (frequently to hospitals, the homes of senior citizens, and people in remote locations without transportation). Use of both the absentee ballot and mobile box was at the discretion of the polling station commission and required prior notice of 30 and 15 days respectively.

Ballot counts commenced immediately upon the closing of the polling site. Domestic observers also were entitled to view this part of the process. All unused ballots were first cut or marked in some way to be annulled. The commission staff then sorted and counted the valid and invalid ballots by hand. The official count was written and signed by all commission members, with the results called in to the regional commission and the full set of used, unused,
and invalid ballots transported to the regional soviet to be stored for sixty days. The referendum law provides for domestic observers in Article 4, which states that "representatives of work collectives, mass media, political parties, trade unions, and other public associations and movements shall have the right to take part in the verification of compliance with the referendum-related legislation." The law makes no other mention of observers.

**Referendum Results**

Approximately 65% of Russia's 107 million voters cast ballots on the four different questions. Yeltsin's support was strongest in the Far East, the Far North, Moscow, St. Petersburg and other large cities. Yeltsin received greatest support with better educated voters and voters under the age of thirty. Pensioners and the unemployed were generally the least supportive of Yeltsin. Yeltsin lost in 12 of the 21 autonomous republics. As yet another assertion of their of their independence from the central government, the Chechen Republic was the only republic in the federation were the referendum was not held, and an active boycott in Tatarstan limited turnout to 20%. The national results, as reported by the CEC, on each of the four questions are listed below.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Do you have confidence in the President of the Russian Federation?</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Do you approve of the socio-economic policies carried out by the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation since 1992?</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Do you consider it necessary to hold early elections for the President of the Russian Federation?</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4)</td>
<td>Do you consider it necessary to hold early elections for the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Federation?</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Figures for questions one and two are percentage of actual votes cast while figures for questions three and four are percentage of votes cast by all eligible voters.

Despite the high turnout and resounding support for Yeltsin on April 25th, the battle of interpretation was quickly joined in Moscow. Parliamentary chairman Rustam Khasbulatov said there were no clear winners and losers, while reiterating the CPD’s exclusive authority to change the Constitution. Yeltsin argued that the will of the people as defined in the referendum superseded any parliamentary claims. Since the people clearly supported him, Yeltsin claimed he was empowered to proceed with the process of adopting a new constitution.

Yeltsin proposed a draft constitution on April 29th which provided for a strong presidency, a prime minister and cabinet appointed by the president and confirmed by the legislature, and no provision for a vice president. According to this draft, the parliament would be a bicameral body elected to four year terms. The upper house, the Council of Federation, would provide territorial representation to Russia’s 89 distinct administrative units, and a lower house, the State Duma, would be chosen from electoral districts apportioned on the basis of population.

In addition, the draft constitution included specific protections for individual property rights and established a central bank independent of either branch. The constitutional court would be diminished in power, sitting together with representatives of two other courts to form a supreme judiciary. Major components of the 1992 Federation Treaty were also included in the draft constitution to define the relationship between the federal, regional, and republican governments. Yeltsin bypassed the CPD by asking each region and territory to send two representatives to a constituent assembly which convened on June 5th to debate and refine the draft. Yeltsin has yet to outline how a new constitution would be ratified once the constituent assembly produced the final draft.
CHAPTER TWO - DEPLOYMENT REPORTS

I. Moscow Report

Of Moscow's almost seven million registered voters, approximately 4.5 million (64%) participated in the referendum and Yeltsin won 3.33 million votes (74%) on the first question. The IRI monitors in Moscow noted the Russian people had a high level of enthusiasm for participating in the democratic process, but found voters largely skeptical that their individual vote would make a difference. In conducting their own informal exit poll, IRI monitors asked voters "are you better off today than two years ago?" The response was universally "no" in the economic sense. But many of the same voters professed support for Yeltsin despite the pain and sacrifice of conversion to a market economy because it meant a better life for their children.

While most regional and local legislatures are dominated by anti-reform forces which frequently conflict with more reform-oriented executive heads, Moscow illustrates that conflict between the soviets and the executives still can exist even when radical reformers have won a majority of seats in the local legislative elections. Moscow held mayoral elections in June 1991 to coincide with the presidential elections, which resulted in its first popularly-elected mayor, Gavril Popov. In June 1992, however, Popov resigned because, he claimed, the Moscow city soviet prevented him from implementing the reform platform upon which he campaigned. By presidential decree, Yeltsin appointed one of his deputies to the post, Yuri Luzhkov. Since then, the city soviet has attempted to organize new local elections without success.

Referendum Administration

Overall, the IRI monitors in Moscow found the referendum an impressive practice of democracy in terms of the structure and quality of the process at individual polling stations. However, the monitors found fault in: 1) the weak centralized control which allowed polling station chairmen a wide sweep of administrative discretion; and 2) the confusing nature of the ballot questions.

The IRI monitors attempted to meet with members of the Central Election Commission (CEC) but were completely frustrated in their efforts. First, no one the IRI contacted seemed to know where the CEC offices were located. Once the delegation was able to pinpoint the location of the CEC, they were told no one on the 29-member commission was available to meet with them. The CEC's reluctance to meet with IRI officials, perhaps, was attributable to the convictions of CEC Chairman Vasily Kazakov. In response to Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's offer of U.N. observers, Kazakov said that although "such a practice might be legitimate in developing countries of the third world, it was not in such a superpower as Russia." Kazakov also pointed out the fact that the RSFSR referendum law made no mention of foreign observers. It should be noted, however, that Prime Minister Chernomyrdin instructed the Foreign Ministry on April 21st to invite C.S.C.E., U.N., and other international organizations
to monitor the referendum.

The lack of strong central authority also complicated the delegation's efforts to obtain foreign observer credentials. The delegation was initially told that they had to be credentialed for every polling place they visited, each of which would collect their credential. The Foreign Ministry, however, later issued a blanket credential which entitled the IRI monitors to universal access. However, many polling station chairmen were confounded when presented with the Foreign Ministry's credential.

Unlike the rest of the Russia, which commonly drew domestic observers from social organizations and state enterprises, the 7,000 domestic poll watchers in Moscow were heavily representative of political parties. However, the IRI delegation in Moscow found many of these pollwatchers to have little understanding of how their presence would help guarantee the administration of a free and fair process. Anatoly Porshnev, Chairman of the Moscow Electoral Commission, noted in a post-referendum press conference that "electoral committees worked in an extremely nervous situation" and observers "became involved in controlling the voting procedures instead of preventing violations of referendum rules and regulations."14

The IRI monitors also saw voter confusion over the meaning of the questions, especially amongst older voters on questions one and two. One perplexed voter actually asked his polling station commission if they had a copy of Yeltsin's socio-economic plan, so he could peruse the specifics before casting his vote on question number two. The wording of the questions also was a source of confusion. For example, questions three and four asked whether it is necessary to hold early elections for the presidency and Congress of People's Deputies. A narrow interpretation of these questions might have led the voter to think he is deciding upon early elections to existing offices. On the other hand, a broad interpretation may could have led the voter to believe that supporting early elections was an implicit endorsement for a new constitution, since a new or amended constitution would be required for elections before the expiration of constitutionally defined terms of office.

Other voters were confused by the counter-intuitive method of marking their ballot (the voter crossed-out "yes" to vote "no" and vice versa). This practice, which required the voter to put his pen to the choice which he doesn't support, grew from the single-candidate elections of the communists. Voting in this fashion, however, becomes increasingly more complicated with multi-candidate elections. (For example, the June 1991 Russian presidential election required voters to cross-out five other names to select their candidate.)

From their experiences in Moscow, the IRI monitors also drew two larger conclusions regarding the referendum process for the entire country. Their first conclusion, was that Democratic Russia's effort in the final days of the campaign to mobilize support for Yeltsin, and
simultaneously change Yeltsin's initial message of four "yes" votes to "da, da, nyet, da," was a remarkable achievement. Secondly, the IRI monitors felt that the weak central electoral authority and the vague referendum law created enormous gaps in the process which could have led to wide-scale fraud. Although there were no indications of any organized conspiracy to alter the results of the April 25 Referendum, the IRI monitors felt that a new election law is needed to preclude fraud in future elections when the stakes will be considerably higher.
II. Voronezh Report

Located approximately 500 miles south of Moscow, Voronezh is a city which exhibits above average political sophistication. Once a ship-building center for Peter the Great, Voronezh’s economy grew to depend upon the Soviet defense industry with tangential industries centered around electronics. Although state orders have fallen-off by approximately 250%, about 30% of all Russian televisions, 40% of all computer hardware, and engines for space vehicles still are produced in Voronezh. Despite reductions in defense production, Voronezh has a great deal of economic potential for the development of a "high-tech" industry because of its extant scientific facilities and its well-educated and highly-trained workforce.

The critical issues for Voronezh’s citizens were inflation, unemployment, and the weak public infrastructure. While no one in Voronezh was going hungry, the shrinking buying power of the ruble limited the city’s ability to assist those in need. Voronezh, therefore, wants to increase the percentage of tax revenues it can keep for financing its own budget and reduce the amount turned over to the federal government.

Local initiative has driven reform in Voronezh, and the privatization process has begun to take root. Whether in the form of small businesses, market-oriented factories, privately-funded restoration projects, or home construction, indications of change dot the countryside. Many factory managers have sought to convert their plants to produce products of interest to potential joint venture partners and only 25% of land remains state-owned. One local political party, in conjunction with a regional university, started a school on market economics with the party subsidizing tuition.

On the political front, fifteen pro-democracy parties in Voronezh formed a local coalition in support of Yeltsin and continued reform. This local coalition overcame the divisions between national party organizations in Moscow, pooled resources, and coordinated efforts to support Yeltsin. Viktor Davydkin, Yeltsin’s Presidential Representative in Voronezh, supported the coalition’s efforts by providing office space, computer equipment, and moral support.

The Democratic Party of Russia (DPR), led by local chairwoman Katya Morgunova, was the most active and well-organized political party in the region with strong ties to rural voting blocs including farmers, pensioners, artisans, and members of the Russian Orthodox Church. At the local level, the party’s agenda focused on the development of private enterprise, the establishment of private ownership of land, improvement of the city’s infrastructure, and conversion of the military industrial complex to civilian uses in the fields of science and high technology. Another of the more prominent parties in Voronezh was the Republican Party of Russia (RPR), led by Boris Kuznetsov, who also served as a regional representative to the Coordinating Council of the Democratic Russia Movement. The RPR described itself as the
party of the middle class, representing professionals, entrepreneurs, trade unions, and the intelligentsia. Its primary focus at the local level included the improvement of infrastructure in the city, problems of crime and corruption, and social security issues. The RPR in Voronezh has designated social outreach, voter contact, and fundraising as top party priorities.

One IRI monitor noted that, while the democratic parties in Voronezh were more sophisticated than their counterparts in many other regions of Russia, they still suffered from the general population's resistance to the notion of political parties and, consequently, could count fewer than a thousand actual members. According to the regional governor, the communists have around 11,000 members. Parties that opposed Yeltsin included the National Salvation Front, the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, and the labor collectives.

Local government in Voronezh is comprised of a City Council with 180 members. Democrats have a stronger presence on the City Council, where they were able to negotiate the vice-chairmanship for one of their representatives, than they do on the Voronezh regional legislature, which is clearly dominated by conservative forces. At the last session of the regional soviet, only three of the forty members present were in favor of holding the referendum. Nevertheless, the soviet went forward with referendum plans. The regional governor, Ivan Shabanov, is the former First Secretary of the CPSU Committee in Voronezh and still proudly displays a large portrait of Lenin in his office.

According to Dr. Olga Zastrozhnaya, Vice Chairwoman of the Voronezh City Council, attitudes about government prior to the referendum were distributed evenly; with approximately one-third of the population supporting Yeltsin, one-third opposing him, and the remaining one-third indifferent. Everyone could agree, however, that they were disappointed with the political infighting in Moscow. Local government was held in slightly higher esteem than the national government, although policies such as higher rents, prices, and taxes were viewed as punishing the people for no particular purpose. Given the present economic hardships, being a popular politician in Russia is a difficult task regardless of party affiliation. Educating local residents on the larger design of economic reform, the benefits of democratic government, and the necessity of personal responsibility are all seen as priorities for future elections by democratic activists in Voronezh.

Referendum Administration

Official turnout was 71.9% of Voronezh's 1,930,228 registered voters. The results on question one, as a percentage of turnout, was 49.7% in the affirmative, on question two, 53% in the negative. In addition, approximately 40% of all eligible voters called for early presidential elections, while 46.5% called for early parliamentary elections.15 Yeltsin's
performance in Voronezh was substantially worse when compared to national results because of the strong anti-Yeltsin sentiment in agricultural areas.

Of the region's 1,650 polling sites, about 25% were located in Voronezh itself. The democratic coalition recruited approximately 120 pollwatchers from urban areas, who were sent to those rural areas where fraud was thought most likely. In addition, the democratic coalition also distributed about 1,000 leaflets encouraging people to become 'pollwatchers and describing the rights and responsibilities of domestic observers. The coalition also sent flyers through the mail encouraging the "da, da, nyet, da" pattern of voting, but the local soviet advised the post office not to cooperate. While most of the flyers were finally mailed, they were still not distributed in a few areas.

The regional referendum commission was, at first, reluctant to meet with IRI monitors; and later, when the meeting was held, the monitors noticed thousands of ballots stacked on the floor just inside the entrance when they first arrived and found the commission members defensive in answering questions. Political parties reported that the membership of the regional commission and the individual polling station commissions remained relatively static over the years, and that new members, specifically Yeltsin supporters, had been cleansed from the commission rosters. The presidential representative in Voronezh received letters documenting several cases in which the parties filed complaints with the election commission, which were met with unsympathetic ears and left the parties with no recourse.

Rather than stay in Voronezh or visit other urban areas in the region, the IRI monitors drove a five-hundred mile arc through the countryside. Most of the polling sites they visited were farm collectives, where change comes slower than in the city and pensioners and farmers who work on state collectives remain communist-backers. Women in these rural areas were not confident in discussing politics with the IRI monitors, but the men often had plenty of opinions. For example, in the village of Simeonovka, a group of older women told the observers to "go talk to the men."

Polling station #35, located in a school in the village of Borovoe, illustrated another problem with the composition of commissions. The headmistress of the school, although officially present as an observer, assumed control of the polling station. She counted ballots and advised other members of the commission whether specific ballots should be invalidated. Even though her decisions contradicted the referendum law on invalid ballots, the commissioners happily abided by her decisions because they were all teachers employed at the same school.
III. Archangelsk Report

Archangelsk is located 650 miles from Moscow and 200 miles below the Arctic Circle. As in other regions, challenges to Moscow's authority are common in Archangelsk. A proposal to elevate administrative status of Archangelsk to autonomous region has been discussed informally by the local soviet in hopes of boosting their status under a new constitution. In addition to regional demands for greater autonomy, ethnic issues also are prominent. In particular, the Pomyrs - ancient decreedents of the region who, according to legend, came from Denmark and settled with native Eskimo tribes - also are calling for greater rights and freedoms from Russia.

Unlike the situation in Moscow and in a vast majority of the regional and local soviets, a cooperative and productive working relationship has been established between various branches of government in Archangelsk. The Mayor, Yeltsin's presidential representative, and the Chairman of the parliament, maintain open and regular communication. Their flexibility and commitment to problem-solving are rare among Russia's current leaders. The support of the regional soviet and administration for economic and political reform have been essential for local initiatives encouraging development and growth of the non-governmental sector. Vast natural resources in the north, including oil, diamonds, and timber have brought foreign investors, maintained the existing work force, and ensured a stable foundation for the local economy. As for political organization, what pro-democracy activists may lack in resources, they make up for in access to elected officials and an open mass media. The Social Democrats, Democrats, and Democratic Russia are among the most organized parties in the region.

The Archangelsk regional soviet added a fairly innocuous question to the referendum ballot which asked: "do you agree that the streets, squares, and rayons of Archangelsk should not be renamed?" The fifth question asked voter approval to incur the cost of restoring the pre-Bolshevik names of streets and other public places, but also was viewed by the soviet as an instrument to boost referendum turnout.

Referendum Administration

The Archangelsk region is comprised of a population of just over one million people with around 420,000 voters. The region is divided into 319 separate polling sites, each administered by a local director and a staff of 5-10 people. The IRI delegation visited polling sites in the city of Archangelsk, the regional capital, as well as in the cites of Sevrodvinsk, Novodvinsk, and a polling site on a rural farming collective.
Almost without exception, the IRI delegation found voters to be comfortable with their understanding of voting procedures. Less clear to many voters was the meaning of the questions. When voters did have a question, they usually turned to the election staff for assistance. But election commissioners refused to entertain a common question, which was whom to support on the ballot. The IRI monitors in Archangelsk identified weaknesses in three areas of the voting process:

1) The process of granting absentee certificates seemed overly arbitrary due to the discretionary nature of the approval or disapproval of eligibility. Also, once approved, absentee voters simply were added to the list of eligible voters in a precinct. The IRI delegation neither saw nor heard of any point in the process when these amended lists would be compared between sites, making it possible for voters to travel to several sites within a single region far from their home and cast multiple votes.

2) While motivated by a commendable desire to ensure universal suffrage, the "mobile ballot box" also created numerous opportunities for fraud in the voting and tabulation process.

3) The majority of polling sites continued to stamp the back of ballots rather than employ the new procedure of signatures from two commissioners. Whether they used signatures or stamps, the IRI delegation found that the process was done in many sites prior to the election, providing access to the ballots several days before the referendum.

The IRI delegation also observed isolated irregularities. These included an overly cooperative and well-intentioned local election commission official who allowed voters to recast their ballots after the ballots boxes when those voters belatedly realized they had been marked in error. In addition, some unused ballots were not annulled at the conclusion of voting, other polling sites received an insufficient number of ballots (although additional ballots were available at the regional election commission office as needed), and ballots were issued to people faster than voting booths cleared. Of lesser concern was the short time available to election officials in preparing for the referendum.
IV. Chelyabinsk Report

The city of Chelyabinsk is located 900 miles from Moscow, on the Eastern side of the Ural mountains which divide the European and Asian parts of Russia. Chelyabinsk was a nuclear weapons research center that, as a closed military city, was off-limits to foreigners until last year. Its 1.5 million population, consequently, had little contact with the outside world. Chelyabinsk is a dinosaur of the Soviet Russia’s vast military-industrial complex. The sixteen nuclear “hot-spots” in the region which contain nuclear waste from weapons production provide a potent metaphor for the insensitivity of the previous regime to the health and welfare of its citizens.

In non-restricted areas of the region, massive and outmoded metal working plants produce steel. During the communist period, 90% of industrial output in Chelyabinsk filled military orders, but today only 10% of production is necessary to satisfy the requests of a shrinking military. With virtual collapse of the local economy and spiraling unemployment, the reform policies of the Yeltsin Government are not viewed warmly. In addition, while Yeltsin had the support of the national media in Moscow, the local TV and radio stations in Chelyabinsk were in the hands of Yeltzin’s opponents.

Given the grim economic situation in Chelyabinsk and the residual influence of state factory directors, the outcome of the referendum was remarkable: 71% of the voters expressed confidence in the policies of Yeltsin, while 65% approved his painful economic policies (roughly 10% higher than the national average). Surprised by the outcome, the President’s supporters felt that Yeltsin definitely had the popular backing to dismiss CPD but thought the actual impact of the referendum would be cloudy.

A small but energetic corp of political activists in Chelyabinsk agitated for democratic reforms and the observance of universal human rights throughout the eighties. The mass deportation of people in Chelyabinsk during the Stalin period and serious long-term environmental problems served as a rallying point for political groups and their supporters. The Memorial Society and Democratic Russia are now among the strongest and most popular groups in Chelyabinsk, but other political parties include the Party of Free Labor and Small and Middle Enterprise, the Republican Party, the Democratic Green Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Young Communists Party, and the Democratic Union of Kazakhstan (representing the Kazakh minority in Chelyabinsk, which is attributable to Chelyabinsk’s proximity to Kazakhstan).

Chelyabinsk is a textbook example of chaos in government and politics at the territorial level. The resources of pro-democratic forces are severely limited compared to the entrenched apparatchiks of the leftover communist regime. Various communist forces formed a bloc with national parties and worked to defeat Yeltsin in the referendum. In addition, the communists
dominated the regional soviet and asserted increasing local governmental control to restrict political openness and limit grass-roots activism. In early 1993, the Chelyabinsk regional legislature announced it would not be bound by decrees emanating from Moscow. More recently, the legislature took measures to suspend the public sale of shares of state-owned enterprises under Yeltsin's voucher system of privatization.

Then in March 1993, the local soviet added a fifth question to the ballot to elect a regional governor to replace Vadis Solovyov, the former mayor of Chelyabinsk appointed by Yeltsin shortly after the August 1991 coup attempt. Solovyov replaced Pyotor Sudim, the current chairman of the local supreme soviet, who as governor at the time of coup, tacitly supported the coup-plotters. In March 1993, the soviet voted to hold elections to replace Solovyov. Solovyov, however, refused to run because he felt that his participation would have legitimized the soviet's action. The regions' high-court ruled the election illegal and Yeltsin issued a presidential decree also calling the vote illegal. Both were ignored by the legislature. Solovyov told IRI monitors that he felt the controversy of executive authority had the potential to spark violence.

Referendum Administration

There were 3,206 polling stations in the region, which had a total population of approximately four million, with 800 of the polling stations located within the city limits of Chelyabinsk. The regional referendum commission provided polling station workers with a one-page set of instructions on ballot administration. Between 400 and 500 people had agreed to be domestic observers on the day of the referendum, but organizers expected only 80 would actually show up at their designated polling stations.

One experienced district electoral chairman illustrated how the nature of elections had changed when he told IRI monitors that elections actually had become easier in the post-communist era. Election chairman formerly were responsible for get-out-the-vote (gotv) efforts under the soviet's turnout-driven process. While the role of election officials has diminished, nascent political parties and other democratic institutions, however, have yet to fully assume the gotv role abandoned by the election commission. The IRI monitors also saw a more direct role for parties in the administration of the balloting process itself. The pro-democratic parties were frequently under-represented on electoral commissions since appointments were made by the regional soviet.
V. Khabarovsk Report

An industrial hub of Russia's Far East and with abundant natural resources and warm water ports, Khabarovsk is a city in which politics, economic reform, and a strong mafia overlap. Located on the Manchurian border and over 5,000 miles from Moscow, Khabarovsk is truly on Russia's frontier.

Brezhnev relied upon a system of patronage to maintain discipline among rank and file CPSU members. To disobey the center meant a loss of privileges and being forced to return to the squalid standard of living of an average Russian. Fear of Party reprimands and the loss of privileges kept bureaucratic greed and corruption in check. The disappearance of party discipline resulted in a flourish of corruption in many cities as black marketeers moved into the open. Since Khabarovsk has historically been more removed detached from Moscow's reach by virtue of its location, the market reforms and loosened government control of the post-communist period brought the unchecked development of the Russian mafia. Various gangs fight for control of turf and corrupt business connections are rumored to exist at the highest levels of the local and regional governments. This atmosphere of lawlessness has inspired several journalists in Khabarovsk to write nostalgically about the relative order and stability of the Soviet period.

The more extreme political elements in the region support the notion of an independent Far East Republic which would formalize its autonomy from Moscow. The political spectrum in Khabarovsk also includes hard-line communists, democrats, and simple opportunists. Among the most visible pro-democratic groups are the Democratic and Republican parties and the Democratic Russia Movement. Political organizations in Khabarovsk are weaker than in the western portions of Russia, although they do appear better organized and more sophisticated than their counterparts in Siberia. As is generally the case, however, pro-democracy forces have extremely limited resources. Some party chairmen, perhaps spurred by the dynamism in the region, have been particularly creative in building their organizations, but cannot compete with those in positions of privilege who inherited control of Communist Party resources.

With the uninhibited growth of the mafia, some fear democratic reforms will empower elements of organized crime rather than political and civic organizations. A local opinion survey revealed that about 90% of those interviewed considered the existence of political parties unnecessary and dimming the prospects for a new generation of grass-roots political leaders untainted by corruption.

The IRI monitors thought the populace was well-informed about the four questions on the ballot. The two local newspapers provided daily coverage in the final week before the referendum. Several times, the specific language of the ballot questions appeared in articles
concerning the referendum. National papers sold in Khabarovsk, specifically Rossiskaya Gazeta and Izvestia, also printed information about the referendum. The local television broadcasts included appeals from artists to vote for Yeltsin and interviews with soldiers who opposed Yeltsin. It seemed that anyone who wanted information about the referendum easily could acquire it by watching television. Even assuming a resident of Khabarovsk did not read the paper, watch television, or speak to anyone, he would still have received an "invitation" to vote which listed the four questions on the ballot, his polling site location, the times when his poll would be open, and a telephone number to call with additional questions.

In speaking with the IRI delegation, referendum organizers from various spheres emphasized two major problems in preparing for the referendum - lack of time and lack of money. Possible fraud at the local and territorial level came in a distant third. Irina Strelkova, Chairperson of the regional referendum commission, told IRI monitors that the referendum commissions were made up of the same people that worked on elections in the communist era, rather than more politically diverse groups of people, because these were the only people with experience who could serve on the commissions with such short notice.

Central election authorities in Moscow allotted 201.5 million rubles for carrying out the referendum in the Khabarovsk Territory. This sum was not sufficient to serve the 1,031 open and 226 closed polling sites located in the territory. Ms. Strelkova explained that costs for the territory were especially high because a significant amount of the population lived in remote areas which could only be reached by air. Referendum commissioners from these outlying areas were required to hand deliver their protocols by April 27th which required them to take costly plane flights to Khabarovsk. Referendum materials also had to be shipped to these outlying areas.

Fraud was not a major concern of many of the people the IRI monitors spoke with, although Democratic Russia was upset that they would not be able to gather enough observers for all the polling sites in the Khabarovsk territory. Nonetheless, they estimated that they would have 300 observers on election day. When asked about the chances of fraud, the governor of Khabarovsk, Viktor Ivanovich Ishaev, stated that "only one party (i.e., the communists) would be likely to cause fraud and they are advocating that people not take part in this referendum."

A general dissatisfaction with the four questions on the referendum ballot pervaded both formal and informal discussions. The governor of Khabarovsk opened his meeting with the IRI delegation by commenting that the number and content of the questions on the ballot were stacked against Yeltsin. He emphasized the fact that three of the four questions challenged the president’s actions while only one of the four questions asked for an evaluation of the performance of the Congress of People’s Deputies. Many people said that the referendum would not solve the basic problems facing Russia nor would it resolve the power struggle between the
executive and legislative branch and reformist and conservative powers.

Referendum Administration

Khabarovsk Krai has 1.85 million inhabitants (including 600,000 residents of the city of Khabarovsk). Turnout for the referendum was lower than the national average with only 58% of the electorate taking part in the voting. On question one, however, 70% replied in the affirmative, which was far above the national average of 58.7%.[17] The regional administration in Khabarovsk established district, city, and city zone commissions which established a clear hierarchy of authority. The hierarchy of responsibility combined with the systematic dissemination of information led to the IRI monitors to conclude that there were no significant problems in the administrative process of the referendum.

Most of the polling sites visited by the delegation were located in the city of Khabarovsk. They were situated in schools, public buildings, and factories. The atmosphere outside the polls was like a bazaar. At many polling sites, the state was selling pastries, smoked fish, and even vodka. Television sets and radios were blaring loudly at the threshold to the polls and sometimes inside the polling places proper. At polling site #36, nothing was being sold and there was no radio playing causing one voter to exclaim, "What kind of a polling site is this, no music!" The polls the IRI delegation visited in the countryside and near the large chicken processing plant outside of Khabarovsk displayed much of the same festive atmosphere. The hallways leading to polling site #29 of the Khabarovsk territory were still decorated with socialist-realist art glorifying the worker, and the T.V. was blaring so loudly inside the polling station that it was difficult to ask questions of the election commissioners.

The most problematic element of voting encountered by IRI monitors was a misunderstanding on how the ballot should be marked. The ballots in Khabarovsk stated in bold letters that the voter should cross out the word that was "not needed" or "unnecessary." It was the delegation's understanding that voting in this manner had been standard procedure in Russia, but, nevertheless, election commissions at more than half of the polls said some people were confused about how to mark the ballot.

Confusion was lower at polling places where a clear explanation of the voting procedure was posted inside the voting booth. Explanatory posters were located inside the voting booths at approximately 30% of the polling sites which the IRI monitors visited. At Khabarovsk city polling site #38, located in a factory which makes dishes, the election chairperson told us that many of the elderly people did not understand the voting process. The chairperson went on to say that the commission would explain the process to anyone that needed help but that they were forbidden to enter the polling booth with the voter. At city polling site #12, the chairperson of
the commission said that he was unable to give out any information about how to mark the ballots correctly.

The procedure for dealing with spoiled ballots varied greatly. At most polling sites, voters who mistakenly marked their ballots were not allowed to get a clean ballot and vote again. They were effectively disenfranchised because they did not correctly understand the voting system or carelessly marked their ballots. At a few polling sites, voters who spoiled their ballots were allowed to explain in writing on the ballot the reason for their mistake, correct the mistake, and then deposit their ballot in the ballot urn. At one station outside the city, the commission staff demonstrated either a complete misunderstanding or an utter disregard for the concept of a secret ballot. A voter who spoiled the ballot had to write an explanation for his mistake and sign the corrected ballot before depositing it in the voting urn.

Lack of uniformity in the signatures on the back of the ballots also was of concern to the IRI delegation. In most of the polling sites the procedure of two signatures on the back of each ballot was followed correctly. However, in at least two polling sites, the signatures were in different locations on the back of the ballot. When Mr. Alexander Bekhtold, an observer from the Democratic Russia Movement, informed the election commission chairman at one site that the signatures were in different places and that this violated the regulations, the chairman responded that no one had informed him of this regulation. A serious problem arose at one polling site where one of the commissioners who was designated to sign the ballots fell ill, and was only able to sign half of the ballots. The polling site then decided that they would put a stamp on the remaining ballots in place of his signature. One of the voters noticed that her ballot contained the stamp and complained to the voting commission fearing that her ballot would be invalidated.

The most serious weakness which the delegation witnessed was the lack of ballot security. Four stacks of paper ballots were placed in front of each member of the election commission at the polling sites. The stacks often were not of equal heights, leading monitors to believe that the number of each of the four ballots parceled out to the election commissioners was not counted in advance. Thus, it would be easy for an unscrupulous election commissioner to siphon some ballots off the top, leave to take a break, and hand the ballots to a friend waiting in the corridor who would then mark them and deposit them in the ballot box, without the commission being able to account for the added ballots.
POST-COMMUNIST COMPARISONS

There is no technical formula for democracy which can be applied universally to all nations. The characteristics of democratic government which emerge in any particular country are determined as much by indigenous political traditions and popular culture as by universal principles. But in comparing Russia's progress to the post-communist transitions of Eastern European and other nations of the former Soviet Union, it is possible to discern some basic principles in the processes of democratic development.

In those East European countries in which the first post-communist election swept into office an opposition coalition, such as Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, democratic legitimacy enabled governments to pursue unpopular reforms and the first signs of economic recovery now are appearing. In contrast, the countries where recession has been deepest, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, ex-communists won the first round of free elections and multi-party development was subsequently frustrated.\(^{18}\)

While democratic transitions have led the nations of Eastern Europe down divergent paths, all share the common pattern of post-communist constitutions and new elections to form governments with a popular basis for legitimacy. Constitutions were ubiquitous in communist states, but the actual operation of these systems was more often governed by a set of unwritten rules than by statute. Russia has yet to complete the constitution drafting process or even adopted a temporary set of rules for an interim government.

Since the 1990 elections, the CPSU's legacy has further weakened the development of democratic institutions in Russia. For more than seventy years, the monolithic one-party structure prevailed. With its collapse, a political void appeared which separated the mass of people at the base of society from the government structures at the top. Much like Ceausescu's Romania, one of the most severely repressive states in communist Eastern Europe, Russia did not possess alternative institutions to one-party dictatorship. Other states of Eastern Europe did manifest a nascent civil societies which provided a foundation upon which the first building blocks of post-communist reconstruction could be placed. For example, Hungary had an emergent political opposition, Poland had the Solidarity trade union, and Czechoslovakia had the underground dissident movement "Charter 77," led by Vaclav Havel.

In addition to Russia, many other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, such as Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine, suffer from ill-defined constitutions leftover from the Soviet era. The governments of these countries often point to the political instability in Moscow as a reason to stay clear of democratic reform. If Russia is able to peacefully and conclusively resolve its constitutional crisis, it will give cause for other states to follow suit. If reactionary forces are able to consolidate their position in Russia, their counterparts in other territories of the CIS may be emboldened to do the same.

Once Russia has held elections, it is likely to encounter many of the problems of democratic consolidation already challenging its East European neighbors. Democratic coalitions
in Eastern Europe which found victory at the polls often encountered disintegration and defeat upon assuming power. These coalitions, brought together to stage the mass demonstrations which threw-out ossified communist regimes, collapsed into chaos after winning their first elections. The decomposition of Solidarity in Poland, Sajudis in Lithuania, and Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia bears witness to the problem of popular disappointment and cynicism which can accompany a nation’s first experience with democracy.

The atomization of political interests also complicated the task of governing, as the nations of Eastern Europe rapidly moved from single-party states to the opposite extreme. For example, there are now 67 political parties in Poland and 74 in Romania. In only one country, Albania, did any single party win more than half the seats. Ruling parties, therefore, often are unstable ruling coalitions because no single party can form a majority government.
БЮЛЛЕТЕНЫ
для голосования на всероссийском референдуме
25 апреля 1993 года

Одобряете ли Вы социально-экономическую политику, осуществляющую Президентом Российской Федерации и Правительством Российской Федерации с 1992 года?

ДА

НЕТ

ненужное зачеркнуть

Бюллетень признается недействительным, если в нем зачеркнуты или оставлены оба слова.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Доверяете ли Вы Президенту Российской Федерации Б. Н. Ельцину?</th>
<th>Если Вы хотите быть уверенны в своем завтрашнем дне — то на вопрос: «Доверяете ли Вы Президенту?» Вы ответите: «ДА!»!</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Да. ✗. (ненужное зачеркнуть)</td>
<td>Да</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Одобряете ли Вы социально-экономическую политику, осуществляемую Президентом Российской Федерации и Правительством Российской Федерации с 1992 года?</td>
<td>Если Вы хотите жить в стране с сильной и эффективной экономикой, где каждый может работать и зарабатывать, — то на вопрос: «Одобряете ли Вы социально-экономическую политику, осуществляемую Президентом и Правительством?» Вы ответите: «ДА!»!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Да. ✗. (ненужное зачеркнуть)</td>
<td>Да</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Считаете ли Вы необходимым проведение досрочных выборов Президента Российской Федерации?</td>
<td>Если Вы считаете, что Президент, законно избранный народом, должен и может нести ответственность за судьбу страны, — то на вопрос: «Считаете ли Вы необходимым проведение досрочных выборов Президента?» Вы ответите: «НЕТ»!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✗. Нет. (ненужное зачеркнуть)</td>
<td>Нет</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Считаете ли Вы необходимым проведение досрочных выборов народных депутатов Российской Федерации?</td>
<td>Если Вы хотите, чтобы депутаты думали о Вас, а не о самих себе, — то на вопрос: «Считаете ли Вы необходимым проведение досрочных выборов народных депутатов?» Вы ответите: «ДА!»!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Да. ✗. (ненужное зачеркнуть)</td>
<td>Да</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ПАМЯТКА НАБЛЮДАТЕЛЯ

1. За 30 минут до начала голосования удостоверьтесь, что участок, куда Вы пришли, Ваш, представляет председатель избирательной комиссии и представьте свои полномочия.

2. Проконтролируйте все стадии приготовления к голосованию и установите, нет ли попыток скрыть наличие дополнительных бюллетеней. Удостоверьтесь в отсутствии бюллетеней в урнах непосредственно перед их опечатанием.

3. Имейте при себе формы официального протокола о нарушениях, ручку, валик из заколов и положений, регулирующих процедуру голосования, список необходимых телефонов, желательно фотоаппарат и диктофон.

4. Внимательно следите за тем, чтобы имена граждан, пришедших на участок, значились в регистрационном списке. Не допускайте голосования по нескольким паспортам, даже если голосуют правильник. В следующий раз Вы не узнаете оппонента, как таким же способом проголосует национальный.

5. Особое внимание уделяйте контролю за выносами урнами. Во всех случаях, сопровождайте их до места голосования обратно.

6. Следите за тем, чтобы против фамилии присутствующего выставлялась соответствующая отметка.

7. Следите, чтобы в момент голосования в кабине был только один человек.

8. Тщательно контролируйте подсчет голосов. В случае нарушений заявиите наказанный протест и составьте акт.

9. По окончании всех заданий сообщите в штаб.

10. Запоминайте типичные виды нарушений:
- незаконное оказание помощи в кабине;
- незаконное голосование (не житель района);
- многократное голосование (посещение голосования разных участков под именем умерших, сменяющих место жительства, не пришедших голосовать);
- нарушение права на настоящий урну для варане заполненных бюллетеней вне участка;
- отсутствие участников в день голосования;
- отсутствие наблюдателя (лежачие взгляды, разговоры и т.д.);
- обвинения при подсчете голосов;
- наведение заведомо вандалы или несанкционированной форме блюдеи.
Organizational Chart: Structures of the Democratic Russia Movement

Regional Advisory Board

Democratic Russia Movement Coordinating Council

Association of Funds

Member Business Organizations

Political Parties Leadership Body (National Level)

Faction of Democratic Russia Deputies in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet & Congress of People's Deputies (National Level)

People's Deputies (at the Regional Level Representing the Democratic Russia Movement)

Public Organizations Leadership Body (National Level)

Public Organizations (At the Regional Level)

Department of Political Parties (Regional Level)

Department of Political Parties (Local Level)

People's Deputies (At the Local Level Representing the Democratic Russia Movement)

Public Organizations (At the Local Level)
NOTES


5. Sakwa, (p.158)


9. U.S. Embassy, Moscow, April 1993


11. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, (FBIS)*. April 21, 1993, (p. 33)


13. *FBIS*. April 6, 1993 (p. 43)


17. FBIS, April 28, 1993, p.45

18. *The Economist*, April 24, 1993
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IRI RUSSIA REFERENDUM REPORT

The Russian people returned to the polls on April 25, 1993 for the first time since the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. In a referendum, Russian voters were asked to cast ballots on three specific questions: whether they supported President Yeltsin; Yeltsin's policies; and whether there should be early parliamentary and presidential elections. The Russian people gave Yeltsin a strong endorsement. They failed, however, to provide the sufficient number of votes to call for new elections.

The IRI felt a monitoring mission to the referendum was crucial because it was the first time voters had gone to the polls in Russia without the guiding hand of the Communist Party. The referendum provided an opportunity to identify weaknesses in Russia's electoral process, and, hopefully, it will allow adequate remedies to be developed and implemented in anticipation of the first round of post-communist elections this fall. The IRI monitors arrived at the following conclusions:

- Russia's electoral process is an amalgamation of election laws passed under perestroika, practices inherited from the single-candidate elections of the communists and cultural traditions. In addition, the vagueness of the election law allows for wide administrative discretion and, consequently, inconsistent practices. Such gaps easily could be exploited and lead to electoral fraud and abuse.

- An entirely new election law, therefore, is needed to provide a single set of rules designed to govern in a democratic environment.

- In addition to a new election law, a new post-Soviet constitution is needed, or at least a transitional agreement for power-sharing, to allow national leaders in Moscow to move beyond the current power struggle.

- The Democratic Russia Movement should be commended for its logistical effort which mobilized support in the final days of the referendum. Through its own accomplishments, the Democratic Russia Movement moved Russia another step closer to becoming a genuine multi-party state.

- Finally, the Russian people should be commended for their peaceful participation, the high level of voter turnout, and their genuine enthusiasm for the democratic process despite the vague nature of the four ballot questions. The May Day violence in Moscow which followed the referendum was limited and should not blemish the overall record of the Russian people.

The referendum's political impact remains uncertain. In early June, Yeltsin bypassed the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) and convened a Constituent Assembly (composed of two representatives from each of Russia's 89 territories) assigned with the task of drafting a new constitution. Although the Assembly passed a draft document on July 12, the legal path Yeltsin will pursue in its promulgation is unclear.