



TIMOR-LESTE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
JULY 22, 2017

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On July 22, 2017, Timor-Leste held parliamentary elections for the third time to elect the country's fourth National Parliament.¹ Following a peaceful and well-run presidential election on March 20, the July parliamentary elections included 20 parties and one coalition contesting 65 parliamentary seats. Based on findings from its long- and short-term international election observation missions, the International Republican Institute (IRI) can report that the 2017 parliamentary elections were well-administered and conducted in a peaceful, open and transparent manner.

With funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), IRI conducted a long- and short-term international election observation mission to observe Timor-Leste's parliamentary elections on July 22. IRI's long-term international election observation mission included two observers who deployed during the 30-day campaign period prior to elections. The two long-term observers assessed the pre-election environment to report and document any campaign or electoral violations and identify potential issues ahead of Election Day.

On July 19, 2017, IRI released its report on Timor-Leste's Pre-Election Environment. Based on observations from 114 meetings and events with election-related stakeholders, IRI's long-term observers found the pre-election environment to be calm, with minor safety concerns and close cooperation between electoral actors to ensure a peaceful and orderly elections process. The short-term election observation mission included 20 international observers from the United States and Australia, who observed the opening, voting, closing and counting procedures on Election Day, visiting a total of 118 polling stations. Both the long- and short-term international election observation missions covered all of Timor-Leste's 13 municipalities.

Following observations on July 22, IRI released a preliminary statement² stating that Timor-Leste's parliamentary elections were "credible and met international standards for free and fair elections." IRI observers noted a clear commitment among election officials, voters and the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL) to ensure the process was conducted smoothly and without error. IRI also noted a strong presence of political party polling agents and domestic observers, particularly from the Timorese civil society group, *Observatorio da Igreja Para Os Assuntos Sociais* (OIPAS), whose presence contributed to the legitimacy and credibility of the elections process. Women also featured prominently as election officials, serving in multiple roles from polling center president to identification checking officials.

Despite the overall competency and professionalism of polling staff, IRI noted minor procedural and structural imperfections, which did not affect the overall credibility of the election results, but represent areas of improvement for Timor-Leste's electoral system. IRI

¹ Constituent Assembly elections were held in 2001 and elections for the National Parliament were held in 2007 and 2012.

² Please see Appendix A for IRI's Preliminary Statement.

has therefore developed a series of recommendations outlined in this report to address these inconsistencies and strengthen Timor-Leste's future electoral processes. A summary of IRI's recommendations includes:

- Timor-Leste's election management bodies (EMBs) should comply with the legal obligations to publicly post voter rolls following a voter registration period and publicly disseminate political party candidate lists.
- Reform campaign finance regulations to place caps on donations and ensure the proper enforcement of financial reporting to increase transparency in campaign spending and fundraising.
- Preserve the independence and autonomy of the National Election Commission (CNE) by ensuring a proper allocation of resources and the neutrality of commissioners.
- Ensure polling centers are properly furnished with electrical lighting and are easily accessible for persons with disabilities.
- Consider reforms to polling center counting procedures to maximize the efficiency of polling station staff and reduce the probability of ballot box recounts.
- Conduct additional training on polling center counting procedures for electoral officials and political party agents to reduce counting time and minimize the risk for disputes in administering electoral procedures.

INTRODUCTION

IRI in Timor-Leste

Since the restoration of Timor-Leste's independence in 2002, IRI has become a trusted resource among Timorese civil society, members of parliament and political parties in helping to develop democratic institutions. As the only non-governmental organization (NGO) to work directly with Timor-Leste's political parties since 2000, IRI's initial work prepared political parties for the 2001 constituent assembly and the 2002 presidential elections. Since then, IRI has provided technical assistance during every subsequent election, including conducting an international election observation mission during Timor-Leste's 2012 parliamentary elections.

In the lead-up to the 2017 parliamentary elections, IRI worked with political parties to enhance their capacity to plan and implement more inclusive, issue-based campaigns. As part of its programming to strengthen political parties, IRI trained more than 500 party members through a series of Campaign Management Schools to help Timor-Leste's major political parties develop effective campaign strategies that include grassroots citizen engagement, communicating consistent messages to the public, fully engaging women and youth members in campaigns, candidate recruitment and leadership development. IRI also held five one-day single-party Campaign Training Academies to equip women and youth candidates with the skills they need to succeed in a closed-list electoral system.

IRI has also conducted six public opinion polls in Timor-Leste, surveying more than 8,000 individuals since 2003. Prior to the 2017 parliamentary elections, IRI conducted national public opinion polls in November 2016 and May 2017 to solicit views from a broad cross-section of voters on a range of subjects, such as government and political party perceptions, economic priorities, participation in public life, political reform and the parliamentary and presidential elections.³

IRI's 2017 Election Observation Mission

For the 2017 parliamentary elections, IRI designed and implemented a long- and short-term international election observation mission. The long-term observation mission assessed the pre-election campaign environment across the country by observing voting preparations, campaign strategies and other pre-electoral activities well in advance of the parliamentary elections. From June 21 to July 15, IRI's two long-term observers deployed throughout the country to thoroughly assess the pre-election environment in each municipality. Each long-term observer interviewed electoral stakeholders including political party leaders, election administration officials, municipality administrators, national police, international observers and civil society activists. The long-term observers also examined the practical application of the electoral law, observed the performance of electoral institutions,

³ IRI's public opinion polls can be found at <http://www.iri.org/news-and-resource>.

researched voter registration and voter education efforts, witnessed campaigning and monitored media coverage of the elections.

IRI's short-term international election observation mission was fielded from July 18 to 25 and included 20 accredited international observers who deployed to each of Timor-Leste's 13 municipalities. Prior to deploying, observers attended two days of briefings in Dili with the U.S. Embassy, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the European Union (EU), OIPAS, political party representatives and former president of Timor-Leste, José Ramos-Horta. The briefings were designed to ensure each observer had a comprehensive understanding of Timor-Leste's electoral systems and processes, Election Day procedures and their roles and responsibilities as accredited observers.

IRI's short-term international election observation mission was co-led by Randy Scheunemann, a foreign policy expert and IRI Board Member; Bruce Edwards, International Secretary of the Liberal Party of Australia; and Thomas Garrett, IRI's Vice President of Programs.⁴

⁴ Please see Appendix B for a complete list of short- and long-term international election observers.

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS

Electoral Framework

Timor-Leste is a representative democracy with both the president and parliament directly elected by Timorese citizens. Timor-Leste's parliament is unicameral, consisting of 65 seats with members elected to five-year terms. Once elected, the most voted party or alliance of parties with a parliamentary majority is given the mandate by the president to designate a Prime Minister and form a government. Members of the National Parliament are elected based on one national constituency (members are elected at-large and not by a certain municipality or sub-municipality) and through a closed-list proportional representation system in which voters cast their ballots for political parties rather than candidates.

The campaign period lasts for 30 days with a two-day blackout period prior to Election Day. Parties wishing to contest the elections must submit a list of 65 candidates plus 25 reserve candidates, which must be validated by the Court of Appeal to ensure all candidates meet the eligibility requirements. Timor-Leste also has a mandatory gender quota which requires one out of every three candidates on a party list be a woman. Once the election results are validated by the Court of Appeal, seats in parliament are allocated to each party based on the D'Hondt method of apportionment (a highest averages method for allocating seats in the party-list proportional representation system), providing that the party meets the required national four percent threshold.⁵

Timor-Leste has two main institutions responsible for electoral administration: The National Election Commission (CNE) and the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE). The principal responsibilities of the CNE under the electoral law and regulations are to supervise all phases of the electoral process, ensure the enforcement of the constitutional and legal provisions relating to elections, safeguard the freedom and equal opportunity of electoral and candidate information and guarantee the equal opportunity and treatment of all citizens and candidates. CNE's election responsibilities also include monitoring the activities of STAE, receiving and handling electoral complaints, monitoring the media, notifying the public prosecutor of any electoral offence and preparing the provisional national results for submission to the Court of Appeal for validation.

STAE's election responsibilities are to ensure the readiness of all polling stations and centers, including the hiring and training of electoral staff, planning for and executing the logistical arrangements for Election Day, drafting electoral regulations and conducting voter registration and education. STAE is also responsible for accrediting all domestic and international election observers, media and political party agents and publishing the Electoral Calendar in the Official Gazette.

⁵ Prior to 2017 elections, the Law on the Election of National Parliament was amended to increase the threshold for parliamentary representation from three to four percent.

Legal Framework

Timor-Leste's legal framework for administering elections provides an adequate basis for the conduct of free and fair elections and largely subscribes to international norms and standards for democratic elections. However, despite a strong regulatory basis for the management and conduct of elections, additional scrutiny or reform is needed in several areas.

Legal provisions for the 2017 parliamentary elections can be found in Law No. 9/2017 on the Election of the National Parliament, Law No. 7/2016 on the Electoral Management Bodies, Law No. 2/2016 on Political Parties, Law No. 2/2016 on Voter Registration and Law No. 6/2008 on the Financing of Political Parties. Additional provisions are found in Articles 63 and 65 of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, which provides all Timorese citizens the right to participate in political life, and in Chapter IV of the Penal Code which outlines electoral crimes. Subsidiary legislation for the 2017 parliamentary elections includes:

- Decree No. 16/2017, which regulates the nomination of candidates on party lists;
- Decree No. 17/2017, which regulates oversight activities, electoral observation and media coverage;
- Decree No. 18/2017, which regulates the election campaigns;
- Decree No. 19/2017, which regulates out-of-country voting; and
- Decree No. 21/2017, which regulates the organization and operations of polling centers and the voting, counting and results tabulation procedures.

As noted by international observers in 2012,⁶ although the Law on the Financing of Political Parties prohibits funding from a number of sources including foreign individuals, domestic and foreign corporations and anonymous donors, there is no cap on the amount of funding parties may receive from eligible donors or how much campaigns can spend. There has also been a lack of effective enforcement of campaign financial reporting, with parties and the CNE failing to comply with the time limits for submitting and publishing audited accounts.

Recent Changes to the Electoral Law

Prior to the 2017 elections, several notable amendments were made to Timor-Leste's electoral laws:

- The mandate for verifying and screening candidate lists for eligibility was transferred from the CNE to the Court of Appeal;
- The mandate for approving election regulations was transferred from the CNE to the Council of Ministers;

⁶ "Timor-Leste, Final Report, Parliamentary Election 2012." *European Union Election Observation Mission*, 28 Sept. 2012, http://www.eods.eu/library/EUEOM%20FR%20TIMOR%20LESTE%2028.09.2012_en.pdf.

- The threshold for political party representation in the National Parliament was increased from three to four percent;⁷
- Responsibility for civic education was transferred from the CNE to STAE, although the CNE maintains a role in civic education information dissemination;
- The number of CNE commissioners was reduced from fifteen to seven, removing the appointment of representatives of civil society organizations;⁸ and
- The introduction of out-of-country voting including the rules and regulations for electoral administration abroad.

These changes included a reduction in the mandate and number of CNE commissioners, which elicited concern from domestic and international stakeholders about the autonomy of the CNE and their ability to adequately supervise the electoral process. The removal of civil society representatives results in four out of seven commissioners being elected by the National Parliament, or appointed by the Government – potentially giving future governing majority coalitions the ability to dominate the make-up of this independent electoral body. Although the changes to the CNE did not appear to compromise the credibility of the 2017 parliamentary elections or the performance of the CNE, these amendments have the potential to affect the CNE’s impartiality and independence in future elections.

Finally, the late promulgation of the electoral laws and regulations before both the 2017 presidential and parliamentary elections hindered the ability of the CNE and STAE to oversee the electoral process and train election staff according to the finalized electoral regulations. In future elections, all election laws and regulations should be finalized no later than six months before the projected election date to allow appropriate time for EMBs to administer the election process according to the legal requirements.

Voter Registration

Timor-Leste has universal suffrage with a voting age of 17, although voters may register by the age of 16 years old. To obtain an electoral ID card, voters must register with STAE during a set voter registration period prior to elections. Voters must present a national identity card, passport, birth certificate, certificate of baptism or an alternative religious personal certificate to obtain an electoral ID card. Once the identity of the voter has been confirmed, the registration officer completes the registration form for the voter and then collects the voter’s biometric data. Voters are registered and must vote in the *suco* (village) where they hold residency.

For the 2017 parliamentary elections, the voter registration period took place from April 8 to June 10 to allow voters to update their voter information and new voters to register. According to Article 17 of Government Decree No. 12/2016, STAE is legally required to

⁷ The law was originally amended to increase the threshold from three to five percent; however, this was opposed by the Council of Ministers.

⁸ The previous Law 5/2006 on Electoral Management Bodies provided for one CNE commissioner to be nominated by the Catholic Church, one nominated by the remaining religious faiths and one by a civil society women’s organization.

publicly post the voter register for a period of three to five days to allow voters the opportunity to correct or update their voter information. The final voter list included 760,907 voters, including out-of-country voters, representing approximately a 2.4 percent increase in the total number of voters from the March 2017 presidential election. Women constituted 48 percent of registered voters.

Out-of-Country Voting

The 2017 elections were the first in which out-of-country voting was conducted for Timorese citizens residing overseas. During the 2017 presidential election, overseas voting was conducted in Sydney and Darwin, Australia, and in Lisbon, Portugal, with a 39 percent voter turnout in these locations. For the parliamentary elections, overseas voting was expanded to include London, United Kingdom, Seoul, Republic of Korea, and Melbourne, Australia. STAE officials were sent to each of these locations to conduct voter registration in May 2017. The total out-of-country voter registration for the parliamentary elections was 2,122 voters, an increase of 723 voters from the March 2017 presidential election.

Electoral Procedures

For the 2017 parliamentary elections, Timor-Leste had 837 domestic polling centers comprised of 1,112 polling stations, an increase in 148 polling centers and 174 polling stations from the March 2017 presidential election.⁹ Polling centers in Timor-Leste are commonly comprised of one or more polling stations depending on the available space and the number of voters registered in that *suco*. Each polling station is comprised of 10 electoral officials, including: a polling center president (*brigada*) responsible for overseeing the polling center and its polling stations; a polling station secretary responsible for a single polling station; four identification verification officials; a ballot paper controlling official; a ballot box controlling official; an indelible ink application controlling official; and two queue controlling officials. In advance of the parliamentary elections, STAE trained a total of 11,180 polling station officials, many of whom also worked during the March 2017 presidential election and exhibited sufficient competency in performing their electoral roles and responsibilities on Election Day.



STAE identification verification officials confirm that the voter has been registered on the suco voter roll before issuing a ballot.

⁹ "Elections in Timor-Leste: 2017 Parliamentary Elections, Frequently Asked Questions." *International Foundation for Electoral Systems*, 17 July 2017, http://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/2017_ifes_timor_lete_parliamentary_election_faqs_final.pdf

Timor-Leste does not have an absentee ballot system, therefore voters wishing to vote on Election Day must appear in-person at a polling station in the *suco* where they are registered. Accredited domestic election observers, polling station officials, government workers and PNTL officers on duty during Election Day can vote in any polling station regardless of the *suco* with which they are registered. Voters in prison and hospitals with an up-to-date electoral ID card have the right to vote in mobile voting booths during fixed times on Election Day. The 2017 parliamentary elections included nine mobile voting locations at six hospitals and three prisons.

Polls on Election Day open at 7 a.m. and close at 3 p.m. PNTL officers and campaign propaganda are not allowed within 25 meters of polling centers, although police officers may enter a polling station at the request of the polling center president. Political parties may appoint up to five party agents per polling station, but may only have one party agent present within each polling station at a time. Voters must present an electoral ID card to the identification checking official in order to vote. Voters may also present a national ID card or valid passport providing they are registered on the voter roll of that *suco*.¹⁰

Each voter is given one ballot showing the name and flag of each political party contesting the elections.¹¹ The ballot must be signed and stamped by the ballot paper controlling official before issuing it to the voter. Once a voter is issued a ballot, they may proceed to a secret voter compartment and mark his or her choice by putting a mark or punching the white square in the same line as the political party or coalition for which he or she intends to vote. Persons with disabilities may ask a person of their choice to assist them in voting. Persons with disabilities, pregnant women, elderly individuals and women with children are also given priority in the voting queue. Once voting is completed, the voter must fold the ballot in quarters, deposit it in the ballot box and apply indelible ink up to the cuticle on his or her right index finger.



A polling station official helps a voter apply indelible ink after voting. (Liquiça, Timor-Leste)

¹⁰ In an amendment to Decree No. 21/2017 on the regulation and organization of polling centers and electoral procedures, if a *suco* contains more than one polling center, STAE is to issue a sticker to be placed on the voter's electoral ID card to identify the nearest polling center where the voter will be assigned to vote. Voters were to collect stickers from STAE's offices between July 10 and 20; however, the use of voter stickers did not appear to be uniformly enforced by STAE during the parliamentary elections as observed by IRI.

¹¹ Please see Appendix F for a copy of the ballot for the 2017 parliamentary election.



The polling center president reads aloud the result of the ballot. (Dili, Timor-Leste)

Voters who enter the queue by 3 p.m. on Election Day are allowed to vote and cannot be turned away. Once all voters have completed voting, polling officials must complete closing procedures by counting and marking the unused and cancelled ballots and counting the number of voters marked off on the list of voters. The counting of the ballots occurs at the polling center level and is overseen by the polling center president, who must mix the ballots of all polling stations and verify that they have been properly signed and stamped by the ballot paper controlling official. Once all the ballot papers have been unfolded and placed in stacks of 50,

the polling center president reads the result of each ballot aloud with the front side visible to party agents and election observers. If the ballot is determined to be invalid, the president must display the reason for the decision. The result is then tallied on a large sheet in the polling center and ballots are grouped in piles by candidate.

Once counting is completed, the results must be recorded in the official electoral minutes and posted in a visible place in the polling station – after allowing party agents to sign or receive a copy of the minutes. Party agents or voters are allowed to file objections or claims regarding the electoral operations at any time during the operating hours of the polling station by completing a form for submission to the CNE. Once counting has completed, the tallies must be reconciled with the total number of ballots received and the total amount of voters marked as having voted. Finally, the ballots must be placed in separately marked envelopes according to their result or classification (unused, rejected, invalid, cancelled, abandoned or blank), placed in the empty ballot box and sealed for transportation to the municipal tabulation center.

The electoral procedures summarized above were largely adhered to as observed by IRI's international short-term election observers. However, a number of discrepancies and procedural flaws were observed, particularly in the counting processes in several municipalities. Additionally, during both the presidential and parliamentary elections, observers noted the inconsistency in decisions by polling station officials on what constituted a valid or invalid mark on a ballot and a failure to properly check for ink on voters' fingers before entering the polling station – currently the only protection against double-voting in Timor-Leste.

POLITICAL CONTEXT

These were the third parliamentary elections in Timor-Leste and the first parliamentary elections administered without significant support from the United Nations (UN).¹² Timor-Leste held Constituent Assembly elections in 2001 and, following the restoration of independence in 2002, held parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2012. IRI's 2012 international election observation mission found the 2012 parliamentary elections to be calm and well-organized by Timor-Leste's EMBs, increasing confidence that the 2017 electoral environment would be similarly well-run and peaceful, as opposed to the more volatile 2007 electoral environment.

2017 Presidential Election

The March 2017 presidential election served as a precursor to the more contested July parliamentary elections and demonstrated the competency of Timorese electoral authorities to administer a peaceful and transparent election process which legitimately reflects the will of the Timorese electorate.

The March 20 poll resulted in the election of Francisco Guterres "Lú-Olo", the former President of the Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste (FRETILIN), who defeated seven other candidates in a single-round vote. Lú-Olo's candidacy was backed by both FRETILIN and the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT), who governed in a de facto government of national unity since the resignation of Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão in 2015. Lú-Olo won the election with 57.1 percent of the vote, surpassing the 50+1 requirement and thus avoiding a run-off with the Democratic Party's (PD) candidate, who gained 32.5 percent of the vote. Voter turnout was 71.2 percent – the lowest voter turnout to date and seven percent lower than the first-round of the 2012 presidential elections. A potential cause of the lower-than-average turnout may have been due to the perception that the outcome was largely pre-determined due to the significant support Lú-Olo received from the two largest parties.

Interestingly, despite 66 percent of Timorese stating in IRI's November 2016 poll¹³ that they were "very concerned" about electoral violence taking place during the 2017 presidential election, only two percent of respondents actually observed violence taking place during the election.¹⁴ The absence of violence, in addition to the transparent and credible management of the presidential election by Timorese EMBs, contributed to positive momentum heading into the July polls.

¹² The United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) completed its mandate on December 31, 2012. UNMIT was established in August 2006 following a major political, security and humanitarian crisis in Timor-Leste in the spring of 2006.

¹³ "National Public Opinion Survey of Timor-Leste." *IRI*, November 2016, <http://www.iri.org/resource/timor-leste-poll-reveals-widespread-optimism-overwhelming-intent-vote-upcoming-elections>.

¹⁴ "National Public Opinion Survey of Timor-Leste." *IRI*, May 2017, <http://www.iri.org/resource/timor-leste-poll-almost-half-country-undecided-ahead-national-elections>.

Generational Shifts and Campaign Issues

Two-thirds of Timor-Leste's population is under the age of 25, with approximately 150,000 first-time voters participating in the 2017 election cycle (approximately 20 percent). The 2017 elections are also the first in Timorese history to include a voter population with no living memory of the 1975-1999 Indonesian occupation. Focus group discussions with voters aged 17 to 20 conducted by Belun and Counterpart International found that government and parliamentary representatives are viewed primarily from either a neutral or critical stance. Focus group participants noted that many of the campaign promises made since independence such as improved roads, electricity, clean water and increased employment opportunities were not carried through once these parties took office.¹⁵

Many participants also noted unequal development between rural and urban geographic areas as a major issue. According to IRI's May 2017 national public opinion poll, 57 percent of respondents believe the lack of broadly-instituted development across the country is the reason why the country is moving in the wrong direction. Additional concerns measured in pre-election surveys included the need for economic diversification and the level of state-related corruption, particularly in relation to the tendering of government contracts. According to a 2016 *Tatoli!* poll, 62 percent of respondents believe the procurement of government contracts had some level of corruption.¹⁶ The tendency to grant contracts based on relationships rather than merit was also cited as a cause for concern among the youth focus group participants, and corruption was named as an additional reason for the country moving in the wrong direction in IRI's polling.

Additional issues cited as the most important facing the country include: roads (the number one concern at 42 percent), followed by employment (nine percent), education (nine percent), and electricity access (four percent).¹⁷ IRI's May 2017 poll also indicated a decline in those who believe that Timor-Leste is headed in the right direction, with a 15-point drop from IRI's previous nationwide survey, conducted in November 2016. The number who believe the country is headed in the wrong direction rose by 10 percent, from 21 percent in November 2016 to 31 percent in May 2017.

Political Parties

On June 11, 2017, the Court of Appeal approved the candidacy of 20 parties and one coalition to be included on the ballot for the 2017 parliamentary elections. The one approved coalition, *Bloku Unidade Popular* (BUP), was formed from the parties *Partido Milenium Democratico* (PMD), *Partido Liberta Povo Ailaba* (PLPA), and *Partido Democratica Republica de Timor* (PDRT).

¹⁵ "New Voices: The Engagement of Young Timorese in the Political Process." *Counterpart International*, Belun, December 2016, http://counterpart17.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Report-New_Voices-English_version-Counterpart_International.pdf.

¹⁶ "Timor-Leste 2016 *Tatoli!* Public Opinion Poll." *The Asia Foundation*, 2016, <https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/2016-Tatoli-Survey-Report-ENGLISH.pdf>.

¹⁷ "National Public Opinion Survey of Timor-Leste." *IRI*, May 2017.

Of the 22 political parties and one coalition who submitted candidate lists by the deadline of June 1, one list from the Timorese Popular Party's (PPT) was rejected, as were two from the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT), which submitted two competing lists. Following the rejection of appeals against these decisions by the Court, a lottery was held to determine the ballot order of the contesting political parties and coalition.


Since 2007, politics in Timor-Leste have been dominated by FRETILIN and CNRT, who have each held the majority of seats in the National Parliament. Many of Timor-Leste's dominant political figures have emerged from these two parties. Smaller parties have won between two and 11 seats, such as PD who won eight seats in both the 2007 and 2012 elections. The results of IRI's May 2017 poll showed five parties receiving support of one percent or more: FRETILIN with 28 percent; CNRT with eight percent; PD with five percent; the Popular Liberation Party (PLP) with two percent; and *Kmanek Haburas Unidade Nasional Timor Oan* (KHUNTO) with one percent. The highest response rate, however, was among undecided voters, who represented 46 percent of respondents.

Televised debates for political party representatives were held on July 17 and 18 (with repeat broadcasts on July 19) to provide voters with the opportunity to hear representatives outline their party's platform and positions on campaign issues. Due to the large number of parties contesting the elections, four three-hour debate sessions were held, consisting of representatives from between five and six different political parties. Although political party representatives mainly responded to questions posed by the moderator rather than challenging the opposing parties' viewpoints, the program was seen as a positive contribution to enhancing issue-based campaigning and platform development in Timor-Leste.

PRE-ELECTION OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

From June 21 to July 15, IRI's long-term observers attended 114 meetings or events including: 34 campaign events held by 13 different political parties; 24 meetings with diplomatic or international organizations; 20 meetings with the CNE or STAE; 18 meetings with political party leaders or representatives; six meetings with the PNTL; six meetings with government officials; four meetings with civil society and domestic observer groups; and two meetings with private citizens.

Overall, IRI's long-term observers (LTOs) reported a calm, peaceful electoral environment in which all political actors, police and electoral authorities reinforced their desire for a secure, peaceful and orderly campaign process. As stated by electoral stakeholders on more than one occasion, many officials viewed this election as a test of maturity for Timor-Leste's young democracy. Electoral stakeholders commonly referred to agreements that were signed between political party leadership, police and church representatives to ensure there were no security issues during the campaign. In Liquiça, meetings were held among municipal STAE and CNE officials, police and party leaders, indicating a deliberate effort to ensure a positive and close coordination between all electoral institutions and actors. Party leaders called for mutual respect and understanding between members of opposing parties and emphasized the need for tolerance and non-violence at all party events. From discussions with EMB officials, long-term observers reported that STAE and CNE appeared well-prepared for the electoral process, drawing on their recent experience from the presidential election, and coordinated significantly with political parties, police and community leaders to ensure all electoral regulations and protocols were understood and followed.



Electoral Administration

Generally, the CNE and STAE worked together closely to prepare for the elections. According to interviews with IRI's long-term observers, nearly all electoral stakeholders throughout the country expressed confidence in the competency and neutrality of the CNE and STAE as independent organizations. STAE repeatedly mentioned to IRI's LTOs that a significant number of their officials worked during the March 2017 presidential election and October 2016 *suco* elections and therefore gained significant experience in conducting and supervising Election Day electoral processes.

A particular focus of the CNE was ensuring parties adhered to the campaign schedule, commonly intervening when parties' scheduled campaign activities conflicted. In Liquiça, the CNE successfully mediated a scheduling conflict between FRETILIN and the United Party for Development and Democracy (PUDD) on June 20, Frenti-Mudança and CNRT on June 28, and the Hope of the Fatherland Party (PEP) and CNRT on July 11 in Oecusse. Both LTOs reported seeing CNE officials at all campaign events – with up to two dozen officials present at larger rallies, such as a KHUNTO rally in Dili on July 4 which had approximately 1,500 attendees.



CNE election officials observe a campaign rally in Laga, Baucau in early July 2017.

Both election management bodies also drew on their recent experience from the presidential election and implemented positive changes to improve the efficiency and conduct of the parliamentary elections. Of significance was the increase in the number of polling centers from 693 to 837, helping reduce wait times for voters in heavily populated *sucos*. Both STAE and CNE officials in Ermera, Liquiça, Aileu and Ainaro reported hiring additional staff to oversee these new polling centers and monitor the start of the busy campaign season. Short-term observers who visited these new stations on Election Day reported that the polling station staff were well-trained and the voting process was efficient and orderly.

Issues and Concerns Among Electoral Administration Stakeholders

Some concerns expressed by STAE officials prior to the elections included:

- Impassable roads due to rain and the lack of functioning vehicles to transport voting materials to remote locations;
- The lack of electricity in some polling stations, and;
- Poorly trained party agents causing disputes on Election Day.

In Bobonaro, concerns were mitigated by developing a plan to use rented horses to transport sensitive voting materials. Likewise, in Viqueque, EMB officials developed a contingency plan to have villagers carry voting materials across impassable stretches of roads. In an interview with LTOs on July 4, a STAE coordinator in Dili explained that STAE was working with the electric company to address the lack of electricity in some polling centers; however, many of the lights in the schools and public buildings where polling centers are located are often stolen or broken, requiring STAE to check the lighting in each of these buildings. Regarding poorly-trained party agents, a STAE official in Ainaro commented that while STAE held a training for party agents in Dili, it was not sufficiently well-attended.

Common concerns expressed by the CNE included:

- Parties not adhering to their campaign schedule, with events frequently canceled without informing the CNE;
- Parties placing stickers on traffic signs or over another party's stickers,
- Reports of improper use of state resources, and;
- Vote-buying.

In most cases, CNE officials were able to mediate conflicts over scheduling and the placement of party propaganda. However, in Ainaro, the CNE official referred IRI's LTO to speak with the Human Rights Ombudsman (PDHJ) and the Anti-Corruption Commission (KAK) about the reported misuse of state resources. In Oecusse, accusations surfaced about an administrative post chief who held an event at his residence with the stated intent of discussing pensions, but instead used the opportunity for campaign purposes.

According to observations recorded by LTOs, *suco* and municipal officials in Baucau, Lautem, Oecusse and Viqueque were also seen campaigning and wearing political party attire during working hours, which violates the code of conduct requiring them to take personal leave to participate in campaign activities. This violation was commonly reported against the staff of the Zone for Social Market Economy (ZEESM) in Oecusse. CNE officials in Bobonaro and several other districts also reported rumors of vote-buying, but no official reports to the CNE were made. Parties also frequently mentioned vote-buying while campaigning – often accusing opposing parties of the act while encouraging voters to take the party's money, but vote for their party instead.

The largest concerns expressed in LTO interviews with the PNTL included minor traffic violations, such as the lack of helmets or motorcycles without mufflers (a particular concern in large motorcycle rallies). The PNTL in Dili reported confiscating more than 20 motorbikes as of July 6 and collecting more than \$27,276 in fines, far more than in previous months. The PNTL was also active in setting up road checkpoints around campaign areas and maintaining a heavy police presence at many CNRT rallies in the western municipalities, often accompanied the Public Order Battalion (BOP) or riot police.

Additional issues regarding electoral administration were noted by international and domestic organizations who monitored or assisted Timor-Leste's EMBs in preparing for the 2017 parliamentary elections. According to Government Decree No. 12/2016, voter lists

must be displayed in all *sucos* and *aldeias* (hamlets) following a voter registration period to allow voters and interested parties to review and request any amendments. STAE's internal schedule specified that lists would be displayed between June 13 and 20; however, no international observers reported seeing the lists posted.

In addition, according to Article 11 of Government Decree No. 16/2017, following the announcement of the approved party candidates by the Court of Appeal, STAE is required to promote the public dissemination of candidate lists through national radio and other media for a period of three days. Despite calls from domestic civil society organizations (CSOs), this requirement was not fulfilled, prompting CSOs to share candidate lists through alternative communication channels.¹⁸

Finally, the late release of funds to Timor-Leste's EMBs created some concerns among international donors that electoral preparations would not be completed in time. However, through the support and cooperation of international donor organizations, STAE was able to complete its trainings before the elections.

Media

IRI's LTOs witnessed Timor-Leste's most prominent media outlets, Radio Television Timor-Leste (RTTL) and National Media Group (GMN), covering nearly every campaign rally, regardless of the size of the event or which party was holding it. IRI only observed one rally where RTTL was not present. The extensive and wide-ranging coverage by these networks suggests a clear intent to comply with Article 19 of Government Decree No. 17/2017 which requires media professionals to give equal treatment and opportunity to the various candidates. By contrast, the FRETILIN-affiliated outlet, Radio Television (RTV) Maubere, was only observed covering FRETILIN events. One new online media outlet, Tafara.org, was witnessed covering a KHUNTO rally in Gleno on June 22.



RTTL was present at nearly every campaign event attended by IRI's LTOs. (Ainaro, Timor-Leste)

The CNE's online publication of the official campaign schedule aided media outlets and reporters in attending and covering campaign events. The ready availability of this information on a consistent basis from one accessible source made it easier for media to locate campaign events around the country.

Most importantly, IRI observers did not witness any infringement or lack of protection for press freedoms during the pre-election period. Media outlets were free to cover campaign

¹⁸ CSOs who assisted in disseminating candidate lists included IFES and La'o Hamutuk.

events as they saw fit and IRI observers did not see any evidence of government bodies, political parties or other stakeholders seeking to prevent them from covering any aspect of the campaign. It should be noted, however, that political parties in Timor-Leste are permitted to buy paid advertising on state-owned media. This resulted in unequal public media coverage for parties who were financially unable to purchase air-time during the parliamentary campaign. Moreover, the capacity of Timor-Leste's media remains weak, with limited investigative reporting on parties' political platforms or campaign financing.

Social Media

This year's elections were the first in Timor-Leste where social media featured prominently in campaign strategies. Although the majority of the 21 parties and coalitions were not active on social media, FRETILIN and PLP both maintained active Facebook pages throughout the campaign. Both parties used the social media platform to regularly post campaign updates, videos of their rallies and photos from supporters across the country.

FRETILIN's Facebook page earned 20,195 likes and 20,445 followers, whereas PLP's Facebook page earned 48,364 likes and 48,475 followers. During the campaign period, FRETILIN posted approximately 120 campaign videos on its Facebook page, many showing FRETILIN supporters displaying the campaign's "plus" sign hand slogan. PLP posted approximately 84 videos to its Facebook page during the same period, many featuring PLP's president, TMR. PLP's videos received between 1,000 and 35,000 views compared to FRETILIN's most viewed video at 12,000 views. PD was one of the only parties to actively use a YouTube channel, posting approximately 72 videos between April 2017 and the end of the campaign period in July 2017.

Campaigning

IRI observers attended 33 campaign events across the country held by 13 political parties including: CNRT, FRETILIN, KHUNTO, PD, PLP, PUDD, PSD, PEP, FM, the Christian Democrat Party (PDC), the National Unity of Timorese Resistance (UNDERTIM), Timorese Democratic Union Party (UDT) and the Timorese Popular Monarchy Association (APMT).¹⁹ A commonality among political parties was an emphasis on the need for tolerance, respect and non-violence during the campaign period and on Election Day. Leaders of political parties frequently reminded their supporters to pay respect to competing parties and uphold the values of democracy. According to IRI's long-term observer based in the western municipalities, this election environment appeared less competitive and more muted than the 2007 elections he previously observed. Parties were also observed conducting more issue-based, grassroots campaigns that included substantive policy platforms – a positive outcome that IRI has worked to achieve since the early 2000s.

¹⁹ See Appendix D for a complete list of all campaign events observed by IRI's long-term observers.

Rallies

Rallies were the most prominent form of campaign activity utilized by Timor-Leste’s political parties. Rallies typically began with the playing of the national anthem, or “Patria”, followed by a moment of silence for those who sacrificed their lives in the struggle for independence. The party’s municipal coordinator would then take the stage, followed by speeches by the party’s secretary general or president. Crowds ranged in size from 100 to 6,000 people, depending on the geographic location and the political party holding the rally. Motorbikes featured prominently in urban settings, with large motorcycle convoys displaying colorful party flags. Supporters were commonly transported to the campaign grounds in large yellow dump trucks, with up to 20 dump trucks arriving at rally sites. Traditional dance troupes, body paint, synchronized chants and party songs were common forms of entertainment between political speeches by party leaders.



CNRT leaders engage with the crowd during a campaign rally in Lautem, Timor-Leste.

Although FRETILIN’s rallies were the largest attended on average, CNRT’s rallies received a large following due to the presence of CNRT’s president and national hero, Xanana Gusmão, who attracted large, rambunctious crowds at nearly every campaign stop. Uniquely, CNRT’s rallies were observed following the same choreographed routine at each location, even using drones to document campaign rally footage.²⁰

Grassroots Campaigning

Unlike larger parties who possessed the ability to draw large crowds through rallies, many smaller or less well-funded parties practiced effective resource management during the 2017 campaign by holding smaller-scale community dialogues or door-to-door campaigns. Adriano du Nascimento, a former president of PD, explained how their campaign communication strategy focused on having a larger number of small rallies at the sub-municipal level in targeted municipalities, rather than a smaller number of large rallies at the municipal level. PD also effectively targeted voters in specific municipalities, utilizing

²⁰ CNRT rallies would begin with the arrival of Xanana Gusmão who would greet supporters and interact with the crowd through handshakes or hugs. Following introductions by the CNRT municipal coordinator, Gusmão would speak to the crowd for up to an hour, often drawing reference to the days of the resistance while highlighting the resilience of the Timorese people. Supporters, commonly veterans, were then welcomed onstage to share their individual stories while being consoled by Gusmão.

different messages and tactics depending on the levels of support. As Nascimento remarked, PD's strongest electoral bases were in Lautem, Ermera, Cova Lima, Bobonaro and Oecusse; therefore, PD utilized the data from public opinion polling to develop targeted messaging strategies to develop support in other geographic areas.²¹ These voter targeting strategies were emphasized as part of IRI's campaign training curriculum.

Door-to-door campaigning was also utilized prominently by PLP, who organized this activity in each *suco* to distribute party brochures and speak to voters about their priorities. A popular talking point for the PLP campaign was underscoring TMR's visits to all 442 *sucos* while he was in office. This had the intent of portraying PLP as a party that listens to people's concerns and, as described by PLP's coordinator in Bobonaro, "will liberate the people from poverty and starvation." Many other parties, such as the Socialist Party of Timor (PST), CNRT and PSD included door-to-door campaigning on the CNE's official campaign schedule; however, due to the transient nature of the activity, it was difficult for LTOs to observe whether or not the activity actually took place.

Despite their ability to also hold large rallies, even well-funded parties grasped the importance of grassroots campaigning as evidenced by smaller *suco*-level "mini-campaigns," which were utilized by CNRT and FRETILIN, as well as PD and UNDERTIM. The "mini-campaign" events were often unscheduled, spontaneous gatherings where party leaders would discuss their party's platform with approximately 100 to 200 supporters, followed by a question and answer period.

Campaign Messages

While many campaign rallies focused prominently on the legacy of the resistance movement and restoring independence to the country, there was a noticeable increase in parties addressing substantive public policy issues compared to past elections.²²

At rallies held by KHUNTO, speeches by political party leaders outlined three major policy priorities:

- Peace and stability – especially regarding Timor-Leste's relationship with Indonesia, its accession to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), its treatment of the PNTL and the Falintil-Federal Defense Forces of Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) and cooperation with other Asian nations;
- Social justice and equal treatment for all citizens;
- Providing equal educational and development opportunities to all Timorese citizens.

²¹ IRI conducted poll briefings with political parties following the release of its November 2016 and May 2017 national public opinion polls. The Asia Foundation also released its 2016 *Tatoli!* poll in June 2017.

²² Another common pattern among parties was for political leaders to make reference to traditional indigenous beliefs, harkening back to Timor-Leste's local customs, symbols and sacred places (despite the fact that the country is 97 percent Catholic). For example, if it had recently rained, party leaders would mention that the rain represents "victory" or declare that government ministers and elected Members of Parliament should be sworn-in in front of sacral houses (*lulik*) or on the top of Mount Ramelau, a sacred place in Timorese culture.

In a speech in Lautem, CNRT’s Deputy Finance Minister laid out CNRT’s five priorities; which were reinforced by other CNRT supporters throughout the campaign:

- To guarantee peace and stability by improving the professionalism of the PNTL and F-FDTL;
- To strengthen the four constitutional pillars: Parliament, President, Government and the High Court;
- Government decentralization through the creation of municipal assemblies;
- The continued development of large and small infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, schools and hospitals;
- To develop the local economy through advancing the private sector and improving the agriculture, farming, livestock and tourism sectors.

FRETILIN’s political party platform was widely observed as being the most comprehensive and professionalized of the campaign. FRETILIN’s political party slogan, “Improving Timor-Leste for the Better” included a 40-page political party platform that was condensed into a “6 H” political agenda representing:

- *Hadiak* – “fixing” the wrong things being done by the current government;
- *Harii* – “building” a new model of development;
- *Hametin* – “strengthening” peace and stability;
- *Haburas* – “improving” the economy;
- *Habelar* – “spreading” the nation’s development across Timor-Leste to involve all citizens;
- *Hamoos* – “cleaning” up corruption and nepotism.

FRETILIN also visualized their party’s message through a hand gesture featuring subjects making a plus sign with their fingers, representing improvement and hope in areas such as education and healthcare. This visual advertising scheme was used on billboards, posters and social media, showing a strong distinction between the highly personality-centric campaign of 2012.²³



FRETILIN’s Facebook page featuring their slogan and “Improvement and Hope” hand gesture.

Many smaller parties adopted campaign messages that were highly critical of the past 15 years of government programs. UDT’s President Gilman A. Exposto, for example, argued that even though Timor-Leste has been independent for 15 years, there are many rural areas which have not experienced any development at all, where many people still have to fetch water from rivers or live without

²³ “Timor-Leste Parliamentary Elections July 7, 2012.” IRI, 2012, http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/fields/field_files_attached/resource/timor-leste_2012_parliamentary_elections-_final_report-.pdf.

electricity. At a PUDD rally in Viqueque, President. Antonio da sá Benevides emphasized PUDD's identity as an emerging party, one which will bring new members and fresh ideas to the National Parliament, making reference to the scourge of corruption and lack of any substantial development in Viqueque over the past 15 years.

PLP, as well as FM and KHUNTO, were the most outspoken on issues of government corruption and nepotism, making their central campaign themes a rejection of the policies that have been implemented in Timor-Leste since the restoration of independence in 2002. Several party leaders highlighted that many of the large infrastructure development projects being implemented by the national government are not benefiting the majority of Timorese people. Instead, they argued the government should invest in basic rural infrastructure and educational opportunities for youth. Even FRETILIN leaders such as Secretary General Mari Alkatiri and Vice President Aniceto Guterres made note of unequal or inadequate development efforts across the country during the past 15 years, remarking that aside from a countrywide electrical grid, little improvement has been made in regard to clean water, healthcare, road construction and the quality of public buildings.



PLP President Taur Matan Ruak speaks at a campaign rally in Laga, Baucau.

Even FRETILIN leaders such as Secretary General Mari Alkatiri and Vice President Aniceto Guterres made note of unequal or inadequate development efforts across the country during the past 15 years, remarking that aside from a countrywide electrical grid, little improvement has been made in regard to clean water, healthcare, road construction and the quality of public buildings.

In contrast, parties who have previously held office, such as PSD, made an effort to emphasize their previous accomplishments while in office. PSD noted that the economy grew by 14 percent during their time as part of the fourth constitutional government. CNRT supporter and former Secretary of State for Security, Mr. Francisco Guterres, gave CNRT credit for solving the 2006 refugee problem in only two years, arguing that most people thought it would take between 10 and 15 years to solve the problem. Both Mr. Guterres and other CNRT figureheads, such as former Defense Secretary of State, Mr. Julio Thomas Pinto, encouraged the continuation of “mega-projects” such as the *Tasi Mane* petroleum infrastructure project in Suai and the ZEEISM project in Oecusse, both pet projects of the previous CNRT-led governments.

Some parties used voter targeting to target specific voter cohorts or the particular needs of the municipalities and sub-municipalities where they were campaigning. As observed during a PDC campaign event on June 22 at a marketplace in Manatuto, representatives spoke with vendors to explain their party's “3 HK” vision (*Hadia/Hasai/Hamoso/Kontinua*, “With God We Can Fix, Improve, Create and Continue”). As PDC representatives explained to IRI observers and journalists present at the event, PDC deliberately chose the marketplace as a place to promote their message to the small enterprises of Manatuto. In Dili on June 21, FRETILIN held a campaign event at Universidade Oriental Timor Lorosa'e (UNITAL)

attended by Secretary General Alkatiri and Prime Minister Rui Araujo, who invited students and youth to engage politically and work for development and the betterment of society. FRETILIN also held meetings with CSOs specifically focused on persons with disabilities and women's rights.

These examples indicate that parties are becoming more conscious of constituent concerns, and voters are more actively seeking policy solutions from their political leaders. However, despite the indication that many political parties are placing more emphasis on policy platforms, it should be noted that for many parties, large and small, rhetoric remains vague and lacks important details on how policy proposals – such as urban planning projects, civil servant salary increases or educational scholarships – would be paid for or enacted were the party to be elected to Parliament.

Issues and Concerns During the Campaign Period

Throughout the pre-election observation period, IRI observers sought to monitor events held by a number of smaller parties that were canceled without notice, postponed, or significantly deviated from what was listed on the CNE official campaign schedule. While trying to observe scheduled door-to-door campaigning by PST in Laleia, Manatuto and PSD in Venilale, Baucau, IRI's observer was unable to find any party members campaigning during the scheduled time. Similar situations occurred in Manufahi during scheduled Maubere Movement for People's Liberation (MLPM) and National Development Party (PDN) events. CNE delegates in Baucau and Viqueque reported having the same difficulty, with CNE delegates arriving at scheduled campaign events where no party members were present, or witnessing unscheduled campaigns taking place. This perhaps reflects the organizational and financial deficits many small parties face, which can undermine their ability to hold events and activities in a disciplined manner and properly communicate scheduling changes to the CNE.

Rumors also circulated about political parties attempting to buy votes. As the campaign period progressed, many political parties accused each other of buying votes. Some even encouraged voters to take money or gifts from other parties but not to actually vote for those parties. In addition to political parties, CNE and PNTL representatives mentioned rumors about vote-buying to IRI observers, but had not received any formal complaints by any political party at the time of speaking.

Minimal violence was witnessed throughout the 30-day campaign period. Violence usually involved rowdy campaign attendees who were frequently intoxicated, but there was no evidence to suggest any of the violence was organized or systematic. For example, after a rally in Lacluta, Viqueque there was an altercation involving KHUNTO party supporters which left four houses damaged and a motorcycle destroyed. In the majority of incidents reported, the PNTL were quick to respond in an appropriate and effective manner.

Participation by Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities

Through observations and interviews with political party representatives during the 2017 campaign season, it is apparent that many parties recognized the need to target youth and women voters as a way to capture the support of these influential voting classes. This represents a significant shift from past elections, when youth and women voters received limited attention from political parties.

At rallies, many parties spoke briefly about women's issues and acknowledged their importance. At a PD rally on June 27, Justina Bareto, a female candidate for PD, took the stage to express her party's intention to promote gender balance and equality. At a PSD rally in Ainaro, Qiteria da Costa, PSD's President for Women's Issues addressed gender issues as well as the importance of vocational opportunities for women and youth. FRETILIN also sought to address women's issues at a meeting held in Dili on July 5. At the event, Mari Alkatiri spoke extensively about the commitment made by 10 political parties at the start of the campaign period to ensure gender equality in political parties, allocate adequate budgeting for women and youth organizations, ensure that women are not placed third on the candidate lists and protect the rights of children. Alkatiri also spoke extensively about issues such as domestic violence and the role of cultural norms in perpetrating violence against women. However, despite a deliberate intention to mention women's issues at campaign events, most parties have yet to mainstream gender and women's issues into substantive policies or platforms.

Young people were a prominent voter demographic in these elections given that 60 percent of Timor-Leste's population is under the age of 25, and 60 percent of this age group is unemployed. Many parties acknowledged the importance of youth and demonstrated an active effort to court the youth vote. FRETILIN, FM, KHUNTO, PD and PLP promoted policy prescriptions aimed at youth voters, such as decreasing unemployment and increasing educational opportunities. PD made a deliberate effort to target undecided young voters who placed less emphasis on the historical legacy of resistance-era political parties. FRETILIN also engaged with youth through campaign events with civil society organizations in Dili and elsewhere.



Young male supporters at a KHUNTO rally in Manatuto, Timor-Leste.

KHUNTO's surge in popularity was perhaps the most significant sign of the burgeoning youth vote. KHUNTO, a party once strongly affiliated with the violent "martial arts gangs,"²⁴ referred to themselves as "a party for youth, a party for young people" and experienced a

²⁴ Martial arts gangs are extrajudicial groups which were outlawed in 2013. These groups have been linked to politically-motivated violence and are commonly comprised of disaffected male youths.

strong turnout from youth voters at their campaign rallies. KHUNTO rallies ranged in attendance from 400 to more than 1,000 supporters, of which approximately 60 percent were under the age of 30 and 65 percent were male. Interestingly, despite the strong support from the young male population, KHUNTO is one of the only parties with a female president.

Despite the increased attention paid to women and young voters, persons with disabilities (PWD) received limited attention from political parties during the campaign. This represents an area for improvement for Timorese political parties, especially considering Timor-Leste is a post-conflict country with a significant population of PWD. Aside from FRETILIN holding campaign events with activists for the rights of persons with disabilities in Dili in early July, IRI observers witnessed limited PWD-targeted campaign rhetoric at other parties' campaign events. However, PD, PSD and KHUNTO did recognize PWD and related public policy issues at events they held in Liquiça, Dili and Manatuto, respectively.

Civic and Voter Education

The CNE and STAE conducted extensive civic and voter education programs throughout the country beginning in May. To ensure effective implementation, STAE hired additional staff and coordinated activities with municipal and *suco*-level officials to ensure their effectiveness. The CNE conducted extensive civic education programs targeted at political party leaders, elderly citizens and young voters at the municipal and sub-municipal level. These programs focused on electoral laws and regulations, the system of government and how to register to vote, among other subject areas. In Dili, the CNE completed election monitoring training for official election monitors who were deployed to polling stations on Election Day.

STAE also developed programs targeted at specific demographic groups. In Aileu, for example, the STAE municipal office timed voter education activities with mobile bank subsidy and pension distributions, allowing STAE to more effectively reach these voters. In Dili, STAE held a “young voters” festival on July 16 that sought to engage young voters in the electoral process. Voter education programs have included activities such as visiting secondary schools and screening educational videos to promote civic participation, discourage vote-buying and teach voters how to vote. These public service announcements (PSAs) also played on national TV and provided important information for Election Day, including the operating hours of polling stations, the rights of PWDs and appropriate forms of voter identification.



A voter education billboard in Lautem, Timor-Leste.

In addition, many political parties provided how-to-vote information to attendees and supporters at their rallies. For example, IRI staff observed poster-sized mock ballots at some

rallies demonstrating how to vote for a certain party. While these efforts were only targeted at voters supporting a specific party, they were nonetheless valuable and helped supplement STAE's voter education programs.

Difficulties in conducting voter and civic education efforts included reaching voters in geographically isolated *aldeias*. Due to infrastructure limitations, it was difficult for STAE staff to travel to rural areas to conduct voter and civic education programs. Additionally, STAE officials noted the need for better training for political party observers, as they stated that the agents created problems during the March 2017 presidential election. Although STAE conducts training for party agents in Dili, it is not always well-attended.

Recommendations to Improve Pre-Election Electoral Processes

Based on the observations outlined above, IRI has provided the following recommendations to improve Timor-Leste's electoral framework and electoral processes in the pre-election campaign period.

- **Publicly post voter rolls following a voter registration period:** STAE should comply with their legal requirement outlined in Government Decree No. 12/2016 to publicly post the voter register in all *sucos* and *aldeias* following a voter registration period. Allowing voters to review, update and/or change their voter information prior to Election Day will reduce the likelihood of voters being declined the right to vote on Election Day.
- **Public dissemination of candidate lists:** To promote transparency and the freedom of information for voters, STAE should comply with the legal requirement to publicize party candidate lists. The public dissemination of candidate lists will assist Timorese voters in making informed choices on Election Day and enhance the representative function of elected Members of Parliament (MPs).
- **Campaign finance reform:** Many smaller parties were unable to hold campaign events in a disciplined and organized manner, or were unable to properly communicate their message to voters due to their lack of funding. Larger, well-established parties who possessed the advantage of incumbency and were able to solicit unlimited donations with little enforcement of financial reporting requirements possessed an unfair advantage during the campaign season. Campaign finance reform, including caps on campaign donations and spending and enforcement of those regulations, will help level the playing field and provide more equal opportunity between large and small parties. Revisions to political finance rules should promote the comprehensive, transparent and timely public disclosure of funding and expenditures by political parties and candidates, and effective sanctions for non-compliance.
- **Ensure the timely release of EMB funds and early promulgation of electoral laws and regulations:** Although the duties of the CNE and STAE were sufficiently

performed during the pre-election period, the late release of funds to the EMBs required the intervention of international donor organizations who were present in Timor-Leste to assist in conducting voter and civic education initiatives. Had these donor organizations not been present to provide supplemental funding, it is questionable whether STAE and CNE would have been able to complete their training for polling station staff and observers. In addition, the late promulgation of electoral laws and regulations complicated the efforts of the CNE and STAE to appropriately oversee the electoral process and fulfill their electoral obligations. Therefore, all electoral laws and regulations should be finalized no later than six months before the projected election date and the Government of Timor-Leste should ensure Timor-Leste's EMBs receive their funding in a timely manner to prevent a reliance on external support.

- **Preserve the independence and autonomy of the CNE:** The reduction in the mandate of the CNE, the lack of tenure for CNE commissioners and the shift in responsibilities towards STAE brings into question the ability of the CNE to perform its legal responsibilities to independently supervise and oversee the conduct of elections as outlined in Law No. 7/2016. The ability for the CNE to function as an independent body, separate from any central or local political power, is an essential component to ensure public trust and confidence in the conduct of democratic elections. Therefore, the preservation of CNE's autonomy should be paramount as Timor-Leste prepares for future elections.
- **Increase public awareness of vote-buying:** Although no official reports of vote-buying were documented by IRI LTOs, rhetoric from party leaders and rumors heard by the CNE and STAE indicate that vote-buying is still being used as a tool to influence voters. Despite the CNE producing civic and voter education videos during the 2017 campaign that discouraged the practice of vote-buying, additional educational efforts should be undertaken to ensure a proper public understanding of the illegality of vote-buying.
- **Reassess the benefit of out-of-country voting relative to cost:** Although every Timorese citizen should be provided the right to vote, including the Timorese diaspora, only 2,122 overseas voters registered to vote in the 2017 parliamentary elections in the six locations where overseas voting was conducted. Following the voter registration period for the parliamentary elections, only an additional 723 voters were registered despite the considerable logistical and financial resources that were invested. Voter turnout for the 2017 presidential election was only 39 percent. Timor-Leste's EMBs should therefore analyze the benefit of conducting overseas voting relative to its cost and entertain alternate mechanisms for providing voting to overseas citizens.

ELECTION DAY OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

IRI's international short-term election observation mission included 13 teams of 20 international observers who observed Election Day proceedings in all 13 municipalities of Timor-Leste, visiting a total of 118 polling stations.

Overall, Election Day was well-run with isolated incidents and irregularities. As Timor-Leste is a young nation with limited experience in independently running nationwide elections, many of the issues highlighted here will likely resolve themselves as the electoral system matures. Nevertheless, the minor inconsistencies noted in the following pages merit attention from Timor-Leste's EMBs, political parties, CSOs, international and domestic observer groups and non-governmental organizations.

IRI's observers used three separate checklists to observe the opening, voting, closing and counting procedures across Timor-Leste. The checklists were drafted according to Government Decree No. 21/2017 which regulates the organization and operations of polling centers and the voting, vote counting and tabulation of results procedures. Observers recorded their observations through the Kobo Collection smartphone application, which uploaded responses directly to the platform's web interface so that data could be aggregated and accessed in real-time through a Command Center based in Dili.

Electoral Procedures

The execution of Election Day procedures, especially in regard to the counting process, was varied across the country. Collectively, any inconsistency in the application of these procedures had little impact on the validity of the election results, but did greatly impact the closing proceedings of several polling centers. For the majority of polling stations, the opening and voting procedures were adequately followed, albeit with a few minor indiscretions. The counting procedures proceeded in a less disciplined fashion, with multiple polling stations having to conduct multiple re-counts in order to properly reconcile vote totals.

Opening Procedures

IRI observed opening procedures in all 13 municipalities. IRI's observers found opening procedures proceeded smoothly with no observer reporting any occurrence that appeared to influence the integrity of the opening procedures in any way. All polling stations received the requisite voting materials from STAE, all polling staff were present and on-time, and, with the exception of Manatuto, all polling stations were promptly opened at 7 a.m.²⁵

Polling station secretaries followed the appropriate opening procedures, such as ensuring all ballots and sensitive voter materials were kept in full view of observers and party agents

²⁵ The polling station in Manatuto opened at approximately 7:15 a.m. as the polling station staff seemed unfamiliar with the opening procedures, causing the process to proceed more slowly than typically necessary.


at all times, and the inside of the ballot box was properly displayed to show that it was empty before being sealed. The majority of PNTL officers maintained the required 25-meter distance from the polling station, and correctly followed protocol by removing their firearms before entering the polling station in order to vote. In four municipalities, PNTL officers were within the 25-meter perimeter; however, the officers expressed no ill intent and their presence did not disrupt the opening procedures in any way.

Voting Procedures

IRI observed voting procedures in 102 polling stations and found the execution of voting procedures to be satisfactory with a few minor flaws. The environment around all polling centers was peaceful, with many observers reporting a lively, festive atmosphere akin to a community gathering. Voting lines were longest in the morning, with lines tapering off by around midday. With the exception of two instances, PNTL officers remained outside the 25-meter perimeter and no campaign propaganda was seen within the vicinity of the polling center.

According to interviews with polling center presidents and secretaries, all polling stations received the necessary voting materials except for one in Aileu which did not receive enough ballots. To address this shortage, the polling staff were able to procure additional ballots from a nearby polling station with no negative impact to the voting process. There were additional reports of this happening in Ainaro.

In all of the polling stations observed across the country, voters’ electoral ID cards were examined by the identification officer; however, there was no systematic effort to compare the voter’s appearance with the photo on the voter ID card. After examining the electoral ID, the voters’ names were consistently marked off on the official voter registration list. Voters were witnessed being turned away in only three instances: one was underage; one did not have an electoral ID card, only a photocopy; and one was registered in Baucau instead of in the municipality where she was trying to vote. In the first two instances the voters turned away with minimal protest, however in the third instance the voter was the wife of a PNTL officer. After calls with STAE and the CNE, the voter was able to vote despite not being on the voter registration list for that *suco*, indicating preferential treatment for a PNTL family member.



Other instances of voters being turned away as reported in interviews with the polling center president included 13 instances of voters not being in the right *suco* or not on the *suco* voter


list,²⁶ and six voters who did not have the proper ID or only possessed a photocopy of their electoral ID and five underage voters. Some of the underage voters possessed an electoral ID card, but were confused on why they were unable to vote. Since citizens who are 16 years of age may register to vote and receive an electoral ID, it should be made clear that these voters will only be able to participate in elections once they turn 17.

In one outstanding case, a voter was witnessed being arrested in Ainaro for taking a photo of his ballot. As this is a prosecutable offense, additional voter education should be conducted to ensure voters understand the appropriate rules of conduct for voting. In some polling stations, this was addressed by not allowing phones or cameras into polling stations or by setting up a depository for devices to be held. These processes should be enforced uniformly in future elections.

Irregularities in Voting Procedures

Despite the overall exemplary conduct of voting procedures, there were several areas where systematic irregularities were observed:


- Polling stations were inaccessible to persons with disabilities in 65 percent of the polling stations observed. In the majority of cases, the polling station was deemed inaccessible due to the presence of staircases or obstructed pathways that had to be maneuvered. In several cases such as in Ermera and Liquiça, polling stations were located on steep hills, making them inaccessible to PWDs. Although polling officials were observed assisting PWDs by carrying wheelchairs in and out of polling stations, many of Timor-Leste's polling stations are located in public buildings, and could be easily equipped with ramps.
- Polling Station
Accessibility for Persons
with Disabilities**



Category	Percentage
Inaccessible	65%
Accessible	35%

■ Accessible ■ Inaccessible
- In several instances, such as in Bobonaro and Liquiça, ballot paper controlling officials were pre-stamping a large number of ballots before voters had entered the polling station. Although the likely intention was to increase the speed of the voting process, pre-stamping ballots increases the likelihood that the ballots will smudge if they are placed on top of one another, therefore invalidating the ballot.

²⁶ IRI was unable to determine in each instance whether the reason for voter denial was due to the voter mistakenly appearing in the wrong polling station, if there was an error on the voter registration sheet or if the voter had failed to properly register.



➤ In 61 percent of polling stations observed, electoral officers were not observed checking voters' fingers for signs of indelible ink. Although IRI's observers did not observe any voters placing a ballot in the ballot box with pre-existing signs of ink on their finger, the use of indelible ink is the only protection against double-voting in Timor-Leste. Therefore, electoral officers should enforce this procedure to ensure this oversight does not allow for voters to attempt to cast multiple ballots.

➤ By late morning, many of the ballot boxes were excessively full, making it difficult for voters to place their ballot in the box without causing rips and tears. The polling station secretary was witnessed pausing voting so that

procedures for displaying and sealing a new ballot box could be conducted. In several stations this had to be done several times before the close of voting at 3 p.m., requiring polling officials to repeat the process multiple times or request additional ballot boxes from STAE.

Closing and Counting Procedures

IRI observed closing and counting procedures in 13 polling centers in 12 municipalities.²⁷ Closing procedures were performed in a perfunctory manner with all polling stations closing on time at 3 p.m. after giving all remaining voters in line the opportunity to vote. Polling center presidents largely subscribed to the counting procedures as regulated and were observed to accurately read aloud the seal number on the ballot boxes, allowing party agents to confirm the numbers before opening the ballot box in full view of observers, party agents, media professionals and electoral officers. Ballots were then properly inspected and rejected if they were not signed and stamped and the result of the ballot was read aloud and recorded on a large tally sheet. However, despite the general adherence to the counting procedures, several polling centers incurred a number of difficulties following the counting procedures as prescribed, or were unable to perform them in a succinct and sufficient manner.

Irregularities in Counting Procedures

On Election Day, polling center counting procedures were observed to be the most inconsistent across the country. Below are a number of instances where counting procedures deviated significantly from the prescribed regulations or were conducted in a manner that was not conducive to an orderly and efficient electoral process:

²⁷ Closing and counting was unable to be observed in Liquiça.

- At the polling center observed in Bobonaro, the vote counting process took a total of 12 hours to complete (from 3 p.m. to 3 a.m.²⁸). The polling center had a total of four ballot boxes from two polling stations with a total of 648 ballots to be counted. The counting process proceeded extremely slowly as the polling center president was the only official in charge of selecting, unfolding, inspecting and announcing the result of the ballot, resulting in approximately two votes being processed per minute. The counting procedures were also altered several times throughout the evening, with votes being called out in three different variations: by party number, by number and party name and by party name followed by the word “valid.” Changes to the procedures were often undertaken at the request of party agents, who played a very vocal role in overseeing the process. Party agents also raised several queries during the counting process, such as questioning the tally being kept, offering suggestions on ways the counting process could be speeded up and concerns about the space allocated to each party on the large tally sheet. The queries were often taken as points of order directed at the presiding officer and were not decided on through any formal decision-making protocol or through the consensus of at least six electoral officers as specified in the electoral regulations. It could be perceived that the count was conducted in a manner more in line with the wishes of the challenging party agents than strictly in accordance with STAE procedures.
- In Oecusse, Lautem and Baucau, the counting process was also extremely drawn-out, with counting lasting until approximately 1 a.m. In Baucau, a total of nine ballot boxes were counted at one polling center. In Oecusse, Lautem, Manatuto and Ainaro up to four recounts had to be conducted as there were considerable issues in reconciling the number of voters marked off on the list as having voted and the number of ballots counted. In Oecusse, multiple recounts were conducted and each time the totals grew further apart, inciting agitation from the crowd and party agents. This resulted in a FRETILIN party agent filing an official complaint as the tallies were unable to be rectified.
- In Lautem, a total of seven complaints were filed to appeal the decision of the presiding officer on which votes were considered to be null and void. Complaints were also filed by party agents in Manufahi against decisions declaring ballots to be null and void.
- In half of the polling stations observed, counting procedures lasted longer than eight hours. This resulted in significant fatigue among the polling station officials, domestic observers and party agents who were present at polling stations since approximately 6 a.m. that morning. The resulting exhaustion was visible to observers and increased the potential for human error in the tallying process and resulted in decreased concentration from party agents and domestic observers.

²⁸ The end time was reported to IRI’s observer the following morning as the observer was unable to observe until the end of the count.

- In addition to the long hours on Election Day which often lasted past nightfall, many polling centers did not have adequate lighting or enough available space for party agents and observers to view the counting process. In Manatuto and Ainaro, alternative lighting sources had to be provided using flashlights. Many polling centers also did not have enough space for the ballots to fit properly on the table, increasing the chances for ballots from separate piles to be intermixed.
- In Dili and Viqueque, not enough envelopes were provided for the amount of ballots from each party, requiring polling officials to acquire additional envelopes from STAE or use other envelopes that were marked for a different classification of ballots. The large ballot size also made it difficult to fit all the ballots for one party into one large envelope – or even several large envelopes.

In Timor-Leste, the process of closing and counting is often a public spectacle with large crowds observing the count in open-air buildings. As such, polling officials often had a difficult time maintaining a calm atmosphere so that polling staff could conduct their work without disruption. Often, polling center presidents or even PNTL officers would have to interject to quiet boisterous crowds. In a number of cases, such as in Lautem and Manatuto, polling center presidents were observed to be uncomfortable under the high degree of scrutiny from the crowds. In the instances cited above, this may have impacted the polling center presidents' ability to concentrate on their tasks and perform their duties, contributing to increased indiscretions in the counting procedures.

Recommendations to Improve Election Day Procedures

The following recommendations have been amalgamated from the above observations of Election Day electoral procedures in order to provide targeted, practical and meaningful feedback to Timor-Leste's electoral stakeholders so that they may easily implement electoral reforms to enhance Election Day processes.

- **Enforce the consistent checking of voters' fingers for indelible ink prior to voting:** Until Timor-Leste's voter file is updated to an electronic voter database or Timorese voters are assigned to singular polling stations, the only protection against double-voting is the application of indelible ink. To avoid repeat voting, queue controlling officers should consistently examine voters' fingers for signs of ink before entering a polling station. Greater voter education should also be conducted to emphasize the purpose of inking, as multiple voters were witnessed refusing to apply ink or trying to remove it outside the polling station after voting.
- **Additional training on polling center counting procedures:** In an effort to increase the confidence and competency of polling center presidents to oversee the counting process in tense and noisy environments, more training should be conducted so that these officials can perform their duties in a calm and confident manner. The training curriculum should incorporate training on unexpected scenarios such as disputes with party agents and errors in reconciling ballot counts.

Additional mock election exercises would also be beneficial to help polling center presidents rehearse the proper electoral procedures before they are to implement them on Election Day. Finally, more training needs to be conducted on what constitutes a null and void ballot as there were numerous inconsistencies across polling centers which often became cause for dispute.

- **Reform the polling center closing and counting procedures:** The counting procedures as currently regulated do not maximize the efficiency of the polling center staff and are unable to be completed in a timely and effective manner. In polling centers with more than one polling station, there was often a far greater burden on senior officers as many of the junior officials had no clear role in the counting process. As the electoral law stipulates that only the polling center president and secretary are to perform these procedures, suggested reforms for maximizing counting efficiency would be to conduct counting at the polling station level under the authority of the polling station secretary who is then responsible for managing the assigned roles and functions of the polling station staff. This will also decrease the amount of time it takes to conduct the count by allowing multiple ballot boxes to be counted simultaneously. By decreasing the length of time it takes to complete the counting procedures, polling station staff will be less likely to suffer simple mistakes such as miscounts.
- **Ensure each polling center is accessible to persons with disabilities and has appropriate facilities to conduct counting procedures:** In several observances, insufficient lighting made it difficult for polling center staff to complete the counting procedures. Undeveloped walkways and the lack of ramps also made polling stations inaccessible to persons with disabilities. Although inadequate infrastructure remains a nationwide obstacle, additional efforts should be made to choose polling centers which are outfitted with proper lighting and are easily reachable. As polling often takes place in public buildings, renovations to better accommodate PWD would be valuable addition to public venues.
- **Reexamine the size and design of the ballot:** Acknowledging the need for the ballot paper to display the party name, acronym, flag or symbol of each candidate, further consideration should be made to reducing the size of the ballot so that it will be less likely to suffer rips and tears while being placed in the ballot box, and ballot boxes will hold more ballots. The size of the ballot paper is also larger than the available writing surface inside each voting compartment, thus requiring voters to often bend or fold the ballot in two, increasing the chances of tearing and double-marking which may result in the ballot being declared invalid. Although the ballot paper should also be large enough so party agents are able to clearly see the result, in most situations the current set-up of the polling center does not allow party agents to be close enough to examine the ballot regardless of its size.


Electoral Actors

The professionalism of the CNE, STAE, political party agents and domestic observers on Election Day was widely admired by IRI's observers. The conscientiousness of the voters in complying with the voting regulations and processes was also indicative of the voters' dedication to advancing Timor-Leste's democratic processes. In the pre-election period, electoral stakeholders were open and forthcoming and were willing and able to provide long-term observers with reliable and accurate data on Election Day preparations.

Polling Staff

The performance of polling station electoral officers demonstrated the clear competency of Timor-Leste's EMBs to manage national elections without significant international support. The CNE and STAE should be commended for their proficiency in conducting a sound and credible electoral process. Polling officials were on-task, well-trained and complied with Election Day procedures with few minor procedural irregularities. At the start of opening procedures in all municipalities, all 10 electoral officers were punctual and present in STAE-issued uniforms and identification. During voting, full attendance was observed at each polling station, except in two instances where it was difficult to determine if all electoral officers were present as there were no voters and staff were moving about the center.

Significantly, out of the 118 polling stations observed, 75 (64 percent) had more than four female polling station officials. This is a positive step towards improving women's political participation in Timor-Leste, and Timor-Leste's EMBs should be recognized for their positive promotion of gender inclusivity among polling staff. A significant number of polling staff were also young and should be encouraged to continue their involvement as electoral actors in future elections.



In interviews with the polling station secretary or polling center president, all remarked that electoral officers had received training and reference materials on Election Day procedures, but noted discrepancies in the length of training provided. While the majority of officers reported receiving two days of training, some officials reported receiving between one day to one week of training.

One noticeable observation during Election Day was a perceptible sense of nervousness among some polling staff in the presence of international observers. In Lautem and Viqueque, polling center presidents seemed highly uncomfortable when international observers arrived to observe closing procedures. In a separate incident, an IRI observer was denied access to a polling station, and in several instances observers were only allowed to

enter the polling station for a limited amount of time. Although these were isolated rather than systematic irregularities, polling station officials should receive increased instruction on the purpose of international election observers.

Some polling center presidents were also overly stringent in their execution of the electoral procedures. In a polling station in Bobonaro, the electoral officials would only allow three voters in the polling station at a time. In numerous observed instances, there was an overly strict interpretation of what constituted an invalid ballot. Many polling center presidents would invalidate any ballot where any part of the voter's mark was outside of the outlined box for a party – disregarding the fact that the voter had indeed provided a “clear and unambiguous choice” for one political party. Standardization of these decisions should be reinforced in future elections and further specificity on what constitutes an invalid ballot should be defined by Timor-Leste's EMBs.

Party Agents

The presence of political party agents (*fiskas*) was widespread, greatly contributing to the transparency, legitimacy and credibility of elections. Party agents were present in 79 out of 102 polling stations observed during voting hours with anywhere from one to 18 agents present at any one time. There was also a wide array of parties who deployed party agents. At one polling station in Manufahi, there were 17 party agents present from eight different political parties²⁹. In the polling stations with party agents present, 86 percent were determined to be attentive to the voting process, including keeping tallies of the number of ballots cast and tracking the gender disaggregation of voters at that polling station.

Despite the high numbers of party agents scrutinizing the polls on Election Day, training and coverage among political party agents was highly varied. FRETILIN party agents were present in almost all polling stations visited and were observed completing checklists provided by the party. In many cases, FRETILIN party agents exhibited an in-depth knowledge of the electoral procedures and were able to accurately recite regulations off-hand. PD party agents were also widely observed across the country, but coverage by other parties was more sporadic. It should be noted, however, that both FRETILIN and PD party agents were



Political party agents observing voting procedures in Manatuto, Timor-Leste.

²⁹ It should be noted that according to Government Decree No. 17/2017, only one candidate agent from each party or coalition of parties may be present in the polling station in order not to disrupt the regular functioning of voting operations.

abundantly noticeable as they were attired in brightly colored shirts designed by their respective parties. In FRETILIN's case, their party agent shirts were colored red, yellow and black, the colors of the Timorese flag, but also FRETILIN party colors. PD's shirts were blue, also similar to their official party colors. Although neither parties' shirts displayed the name of the party, both parties' agents were easily recognizable, which may serve as a violation of the prohibition of campaign propaganda within polling stations.

Over the course of Election Day, some of the party agents were observed taking an over-active role in the managing of the electoral procedures. In one instance in Manatuto, the party agent questioned the IRI observer's presence in the polling station. Agents were quick to challenge voters, observers or STAE staff who they perceived to be too close to the ballot box. While attentiveness is essential to ensure election protocols are complied with and fraud is avoided, party agents should maintain a proper balance between raising concerns when necessary and choosing when to formally submit a complaint when an overt breach of electoral procedures is observed. Party agents should refrain from interjecting in the voting process in a manner that is bellicose or disruptive to the concentration of the polling officials. Concerns of this nature were raised in the pre-election period in interviews with CNE and STAE officials.

Domestic and International Observers



International and domestic observers conduct an interview with a polling station secretary in Dili.

Domestic and international election observers play an instrumental role in contributing to the transparency and legitimacy of the electoral process. For the 2017 parliamentary elections, Timor-Leste accredited 3,283 domestic observers and 174 international observers. The accreditation process was well-managed by STAE who provided all observers with the appropriate identification to use on Election Day.

Domestic observers were accredited from a variety of organizations including: OIPAS, with 837 observers (one for each polling center); Ra'es Hadomi Timor Oan (RHTO), which fielded 130 observers to monitor disability access; and Belun, which fielded 115 observers. Domestic observers from government organizations such as PDHJ and KAK were also accredited. IRI reported domestic observers in 53 percent of polling stations observed during voting

hours. OIPAS observers were the most prevalent as they fielded observers in each polling center nationwide.

Along with IRI, there were a number of international election observers deployed across the country. The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) fielded five observers, the EU Election Observation Mission conducted a long-term observation mission with 26 observers who were also present to observe on Election Day and the Australian Timor-Leste Friendship

Network fielded 62 observers. Observers from the Australian, U.S. and Korean Embassies were also accredited and were joined by parliamentary delegations from the European Parliament and New Zealand.

Overall, IRI's international observers were afforded the rights and freedoms outlined in Government Decree No. 17/2017, including the right to access all polling centers; monitor the voting process; interview electoral officials, party agents and voters; and observe the vote tabulation processes. There was only one instance in which an IRI observer was denied access to a polling station. Some polling station presidents did exhibit unease with the presence of IRI observers and tried to dissuade them from entering the polling station. In one polling station in Viqueque, electoral officials were hesitant to allow IRI observers to enter, which may have been due to the fact that one of the ballot boxes was missing the appropriate labeling.

Recommendations to Improve the Performance of Electoral Actors

Below are recommendations on approaches to improve the performance of electoral actors on Election Day.

- **Conduct additional training for political party agents throughout the country:** Reiterating concerns expressed by CNE and STAE officials in the pre-election period, party agents in some localities were observed to be overly aggressive in scrutinizing the election. In addition, there appears to be a lack of coherence on the process for formally submitting a complaint and challenging a ballot. Increased training for political party agents should be conducted across the country (specifically outside of Dili to encourage higher attendance rates) so that party agents clearly understand their legal roles and responsibilities on Election Day.
- **Retain polling staff from election to election:** The retention of polling officials from the 2017 presidential to parliamentary elections made a noticeable difference in the confidence levels and abilities of polling officials. During the electoral interim period STAE and CNE should continue to engage with polling staff as a way to further advance their knowledge on electoral processes and remain engaged until the following election period.
- **Provide guidelines on appropriate uniforms for political party agents:** Significant concerns were raised about the appropriate attire for party agents as some parties seemed to take advantage of the lack of legal regulations by outfitting their agents with shirts which reflected their parties' official colors. The CNE and STAE should consider placing restrictions on the appropriate uniforms for accredited political party agents.

ELECTION RESULTS

The 2017 parliamentary elections resulted in five political parties meeting the four percent threshold to gain representation in the National Parliament. FRETILIN, CNRT, PD, PLP and KHUNTO gained representation in Parliament, with PLP and KHUNTO being represented for the first time. Although the swing of votes to PLP and KHUNTO resulted in a reduced share of valid votes for all parties, CNRT's percentage of votes dropped significantly from 36.7 percent in 2012 to 29.5 percent in 2017. FRETILIN's vote share dropped by .2 percent to 29.7 percent and PD's dropped by .5 percent. KHUNTO's vote share increased by 3.5 percent compared to the 2012 elections.

Voter turnout was high at 76.74 percent, almost six percent higher than the 2017 presidential election and approximately two percent higher than the 2012 parliamentary elections. Out-of-country voter turnout was lower at 51.27 percent, although this was significantly higher than the 2017 presidential election. Encouragingly, voter turnout was roughly equal between men and women, with 51.42 percent male voters and 48.58 percent female voters. This was an improvement from the presidential election in which female voter turnout was 63 percent among registered female voters, compared to 78 percent among registered male voters.

Interestingly, the increase in threshold from three to four percent made no mathematical difference in the parties represented in parliament, with no party polling between three and four percent. About 13.2 percent of votes were attributed to parties which did not pass the threshold, a decrease from approximately 20 percent in 2012. Approximately two percent of votes were deemed invalid. The table below provides the percentage of votes received from each party as well as the number of seats allocated in the National Parliament. No appeals to the provisional election results were filed, allowing the Court of Appeal to verify the election results on August 1.

2017 Timor-Leste Parliamentary Election Results			
Party	Votes	Percentage	Seats
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN)	168,480	29.7%	23
National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT)	167,345	29.5%	22
Popular Liberation Party (PLP)	60,098	10.6%	8
Democratic Party (PD)	55,608	9.8%	7
Kmanek Haburas Unidade Nasional Timor Oan (KHUNTO)	36,547	6.4%	5
United Party for Development and Democracy (PUDD)	15,887	2.8%	0
Timorese Democratic Union (UDT)	11,255	2.0%	0
Frenti-Mudança (FM)	8,849	1.6%	0
Hope of the Fatherland Party (PEP)	6,775	1.2%	0
Timorese People's Monarchy Association (APMT)	5,461	1.0%	0
Bloku Unidade Popular (BUP)	4,999	0.9%	0
Socialist Party of Timor (PST)	4,891	0.9%	0

Social Democratic Party (PSD)	4,688	0.8%	0
Republican Party (PR)	3,951	0.7%	0
National Development Party (PDN)	3,846	0.7%	0
Timorese Social Democratic Central Action (CASDT)	2,330	0.4%	0
People's Development Party (PDP)	2,079	0.4%	0
Christian Democratic Party (PDC)	1,764	0.3%	0
Freedom Movement of the Maubere People (MLPM)	1,332	0.2%	0
National Unity of Timorese Resistance (UNDERTIM)	1,216	0.2%	0
Timorese Democratic Party (PTD)	669	0.1%	0
Total	568,070	100%	65

No party received an outright majority in the elections. As the most voted party with 29.7 percent of the vote, FRETILIN was invited by President Francisco Guterres “Lú-Olo” to form the VII Constitutional Government of Timor-Leste. Following extended negotiations, FRETILIN and PD formed a minority government holding 30 out of the total 65 seats in parliament. CNRT, PLP and KHUNTO opted to remain in parliamentary opposition and solidified their coalition in an “Alliance of Parliamentary Majority” (AMP) agreement. At the time of writing, it remains to be seen whether the government will be stable enough to prevent the need for early elections or a re-constitution of the National Parliament by giving the second most voted party, CNRT, the opportunity to form a government.

Among the Members of Parliament in the VII Constitutional Government of Timor-Leste, there are 26 new MPs representing 40 percent of the 65 seats. 27 female MPs were also elected to Parliament, increasing the percentage of female MPs from 38 to 42 percent – the highest representation level in the Asia-Pacific region.

APPENDIX A

IRI Preliminary Statement
July 22, 2017

Timor-Leste’s Parliamentary Elections: Voters Demonstrate Commitment to Democracy; Election Day Logistics Need Improvement

Dili, Timor-Leste — In its preliminary statement released today, the International Republican Institute (IRI) concluded that Timor-Leste’s July 22 parliamentary elections were “credible and met international standards for free and fair elections.”

The citizens of Timor-Leste went to the polls to vote in the country’s third parliamentary elections since the restoration of independence in 2002. While there were limited flaws in election procedure, IRI’s Election Observation Mission observed a transparent voting process, with Timorese citizens demonstrating their commitment to the democratic process.

“The Timorese people should be proud of the progress they have made in their democracy since their last parliamentary election,” said Randy Scheunemann, the co-leader of IRI’s delegation and a member of IRI’s Board of Directors, “This relatively young country has continually demonstrated that democracy is not just about elections, but about putting in place the institutions that ensure those elections are held freely and fairly.”

“We were impressed by the clear commitment of the citizens of Timor-Leste to peaceful, democratic elections. Additionally, we would like to applaud the technical conduct and professionalism of the polling agents,” said Bruce Edwards, International Secretary of the Liberal Party of Australia and co-leader of IRI’s delegation.

Deployment of Short and Long-Term Observers

A delegation of 20 accredited observers—including IRI staff and external foreign policy experts—observed electoral activities and polling in all 13 districts of Timor-Leste on Election Day, visiting approximately 120 polling stations. This mission was part of an international effort to ensure the election was free, fair and peaceful, and participated in monitoring activities at the behest of the Timorese government.

The delegation consisted of 20 short-term observers, deployed throughout the country on Election Day; and two long-term observers, deployed on June 21, 2017, who observed preparations for the election. From June 21 to July 15, long-term observers attended more than 110 meetings and events with election-related stakeholders throughout the country, which they documented as the basis for IRI’s report on Timor-Leste’s pre-election environment.

IRI’s international delegation of short-term observers was co-led by Randy Scheunemann, a foreign policy expert and IRI Board Member; Bruce Edwards, International Secretary of the

Liberal Party of Australia; and Thomas Garrett, IRI Vice President of Programs. The delegation also included Curtis Chin, former U.S. Ambassador to the Asian Development Bank, as well as an array of experts in politics and foreign policy.

IRI Commends Free and Fair Process

Overall, IRI's short-term observers witnessed a peaceful, free and fair election process, and noted the close cooperation between electoral authorities, political parties and civil society organizations. This outcome is consistent with the conclusion of IRI's long-term observers in their pre-election assessment, which anticipated a calm, free and fair process.

This peaceful election was another important step towards allaying popular fears surrounding the possibility of election-related violence: according to a recent IRI nationwide poll, 53 percent of Timorese citizens feared the possibility of electoral violence, despite the fact that 96 percent had not observed violent incidents during the recent presidential election in March 2017.

The opening of polling stations was smoothly administered in most cases. Voter turnout was strongest in the morning, with numbers decreasing in the afternoon before the polls closed at 3 p.m. The vote counting process was orderly and mostly well-administered. Delegates noted that election officials appeared to be committed to ensuring the process was conducted smoothly, transparently and without error.

Across the country, IRI teams witnessed Timorese citizens helping each other at polling stations: for example, routinely allowing the elderly, women with children and people with disabilities to move immediately to the front of the lines. Election workers appeared to be well-trained, organized and seemed to understand and respect electoral procedures.

Presence of Independent and Party-Affiliated Election Monitors; Respect for Regulations Governing Elections

IRI observers noted the presence of political party polling agents and domestic observers, which contributed to the transparency, inclusivity and credibility of the overall process. Political parties had party agent observers present at a vast majority of polling stations visited by IRI.

Political parties appeared to adhere to the 48-hour campaign blackout law prior to the election. Additionally, IRI observers noted that a majority of the polling stations visited did not have electoral propaganda inside the polling station or within 25 meters of the polling area.

The Role of Women as Polling Agents

IRI observed women playing a positive role in the administration of the election at the polling station-level, with a significant proportion serving as election officials at the polling stations

visited by delegates. IRI commends the Technical Secretariat for the Electoral Administration for its proactive recruitment and training of women to serve in these roles.

Minor Procedural Imperfections

Although IRI observers characterized the election as proceeding in a calm, well-ordered fashion, delegates noted a few instances of procedural imperfections. A number of polling sites did not verify whether voters' fingers were already inked before providing them with ballots. Additionally, IRI delegates also observed cases of election officials not properly inking voters' fingers. A few observers witnessed a ballot paper controller pre-signing and stamping ballots prior to issuing them.

Finally, having observed vote counting processes in 13 polling stations, delegates noted a few instances in which the number of ballots tallied did not equal the number of ballots cast. This problem prolonged the ballot counting process and could have been avoided by providing clear and simplified instructions regarding the ballot counting process to the polling agents.

APPENDIX B

IRI International Election Observers

IRI Short-Term International Election Observers:

1. Randy Scheunemann, Delegation Co-Leader; foreign policy expert; Member, IRI Board of Directors
2. Bruce Edwards, Delegation Co-Leader; International Secretary of the Liberal Party of Australia
3. Curtis Chin, Former U.S. Ambassador to the Asian Development Bank; Asia Fellow, the Milken Institute
4. Christopher Fussner, Owner and Founder, TransTechnology; Member, IRI Board of Directors
5. Georgina Downer, Adjunct Fellow at the Institute of Public Affairs; Member, Victoria Liberal Party Administrative Committee
6. Gail Gitcho, Communications Strategist and Partner, McKay-Gitcho Strategies
7. Sue Ingram, expert in public policy and Timor-Leste; former Australian government official
8. Trent Hasson, Advisor, Australian Government
9. Robyn Nolan, Former President of the Federal Women's Committee of the Liberal Party of Australia

IRI Staff


10. Thomas Garrett, Delegation Co-Leader; Vice President for Programs
11. Derek Luyten, Regional Director, Asia
12. Morgan Martinez, Deputy Director for External Affairs
13. Jessica Keegan, Director of Political Development, Mongolia and Cambodia
14. Dimitar Stojkov, Resident Program Director, Timor-Leste
15. Natalie Trisilla, Senior Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist
16. Parker Novak, Program Officer, Timor-Leste and Indonesia
17. Chelsea Catsam, Senior Program Associate, Timor-Leste and Vietnam
18. Cyntia da Silva, Assistant Program Officer, Timor-Leste

IRI Long-Term Election Observers

19. Ken Palmer, Long-Term Election Observer, Western Municipalities
20. Jörg Meier, Long-Term Election Observer, Eastern Municipalities

APPENDIX C

Map of Polling Centers Visited by IRI's Short-Term Election Observers



Municipality

-  Baucau
-  Dili
-  Aileu
-  Bobonaro
-  Cova Lima
-  Liquiça
-  Manatuto
-  Viqueque
-  Ainaro
-  Ermera
-  Manufahi
-  Lautem
-  Oecusse

Deployment of IRI's Long-Term Election Observers



1. Western Municipalities – Ken Palmer

- Dili
- Aileu
- Ainaro
- Cova Lima
- Bobonaro
- Liquiça
- Oecusse

2. Eastern Municipalities – Jörg Meier

- Manatuto
- Manufahi
- Viqueque
- Baucau
- Lautem

APPENDIX D

List of Campaign Events Attended by IRI Long-Term Observers

Party	Date	Type of Event	Municipality	Attendees
FRETILIN	June 21	Dialogue	Dili	1,000
PDC	June 22	Mini-Campaign/Door-to Door	Manatuto	N/A
KHUNTO	June 22	Rally	Ermera	400
KHUNTO	June 23	Rally	Manatuto	500-600
KHUNTO	June 25	Rally & Mini-Campaign	Baucau	1,000
UNDERTIM	June 25	Rally	Liquiça	50
CNRT	June 26	Rally	Ermera	3,000
PUDD	June 27	Rally	Viqueque	400-450
PD	June 27	Rally	Aileu	300
APMT	June 28	Rally	Aileu	N/A
PSD	June 28	Rally	Ainaro	500
PSD	June 29	Rally & Mini-Campaign	Manufahi	100
PD	June 29	Rally	Ainaro	500
FRETILIN	June 29	Rally	Ainaro	1,000
CNRT	June 30	Rally	Aileu	2,500-3,000
PD	June 30	Rally	Ainaro	N/A
FM	July 1	Rally	Cova Lima	200
FRETILIN	July 3	Rally	Aileu	2,000
KHUNTO	July 4	Rally	Dili	1,500
PSD	July 4	Rally	Lautem	200
CNRT	July 5	Rally	Lautem	2,000
CNRT	July 6	Rally	Viqueque	700-800
CNRT	July 7	Rally	Viqueque	1,500-1,600
PEP	July 7	Rally	Viqueque	N/A
PLP	July 7	Rally	Bobonaro	1,000
PD	July 8	Rally	Liquiça	1,000
FRETILIN	July 8	Mini-Campaign	Liquiça	150-200
UDT	July 8	Dialogue	Baucau	130
FRETILIN	July 10	Dialogue	Baucau	600
FRETILIN	July 11	Rally	Baucau	5,000-6,000
FM	July 12	Rally	Baucau	450
PLP	July 13	Rally	Baucau	1,000
FRETILIN	July 15	Rally	Oecusse	6,500
PD	July 15	Rally	Oecusse	700

APPENDIX E

List of Polling Stations Observed by IRI on Election Day

Aileu

Administrative Post	Suco	Name	Number
Aileu	Aissirimou	Sede Suco Aissirimou	00001/0002
Aileu	Bandudato	Sede Suco Bandudato	00004/0001
Aileu Vila	Fahiria	Sede Suco Fahiria	00007/0001
Aileu	Saboria	Sede Suco Saboria	00014/0001
Aileu	Seloi Malere	EP No 1 Aileu Villa	00018/0001
Aileu	Seloi Malere	EP No 1 Aileu Villa	00018/0002
Aileu	Seloi Malere	ES Publico No 1 Aileu	00019/0001
Laulara	Cotolau	EPS Madabeno	00026/0001
Laulara	Talitoi	Sede Aldeia Fatuk Hun / Sede Aldeia Talitu	00030/0001

Ainaro

Administrative Post	Suco	Name	Number
Ainaro	Ainaro	Sede Joventude Ainaro	00056/0001
Ainaro	Ainaro	EBF Seulau	00057/0001
Ainaro	Cassa	EF Casa	00059/0001
Ainaro	Cassa	EF Casa	00059/0002
Hatu-Builico	Nunumoge	Sede Juventude Nunumoge	00073/0001
Hato-Udo	Leolitha	EP Luru	00083/0001
Hato-Udo	Leolitha	EP Luru	00083/0002

Baucau

Administrative Post	Suco	Name	Number
Baucau	Bahu	EPO Sao Domingos Savio	00120/0001

Baucau	Buruma	EB No 4 Buruma	00126/0001
Baucau	Caibada	EEB No 8 Caibada Makasae	00129/0001
Baucau	Gariuai	Sede Suco Gariuai	00131/0001
Baucau	Samalari	EPC No 4 Samalari	00134/0001
Baucau	Tirilolo	EPS No 03 Vila Nova	00137/0001
Baucau	Uailili	EP Uailili	00141/0001
Laga	Soba	EPP Soba	00152/0001
Laga	Soba	Sede Suco Soba	00153/0001
Quelicaí	Uaitame	EP Uaiaca	00177/0001

Bobonaro

Administrative Post	Suco	Name	Number
Balibo	Balibo Villa	Sede Suco Balibo Villa	00208/0001
Balibo	Balibo Villa	Sede Suco Balibo Villa	00208/0002
Balibo	Balibo Villa	EP Builecum	00209/0001
Balibo	Batugade	Sede Suco Batugade	00210/0001
Maliana	Holsa	Sedo Suco Holsa	00263/0001
Maliana	Holsa	Sedo Suco Holsa	00263/0002
Maliana	Lahomea	EP Lahomea	00266/0001
Maliana	Lahomea	Gimnasio Municipiu	00267/0002
Maliana	Odomau	EP Odomau	00268/0001
Maliana	Raifun	EP Raifun Villa	00270/0001
Maliana	Raifun	EP Raifun Villa	00270/0002
Maliana	Ritabou	EP Ritabou	00272/0002

Cova Lima

Administrative Post	Suco	Name	Number
Maucatar	Belecasae	EBF Dais	00300/0001
Suai	Beco	EBC Beco	00306/0002
Suai	Camenaca	EBF Sanfuck	00308/0001
Suai	Camenaeva	EBF C Ailoc Laran	00309/0001
Suai	Debos	EBF C Ave Maria	00310/0001
Zumalai	Tashilin	Sede Suco Tashilin	00337/0001

Zumalai	Zulo	Sede Suco Zulo	00339/0001
Zumalai	Zulo	Sentru Komunitade Zulo	00340/0001

Dili

Administrative Post	Suco	Name	Number
Cristo Rei	Becora	EO Hati Kudus	00352/0001
Cristo Rei	Becora	EO Hati Kudus	00352/0002
Cristo Rei	Bidau Santaixa	EP No 2 Bidau Masaur	00357/0004
Cristo Rei	Camea	EP Aidac Bihare	00360/0002
Cristo Rei	Hera	EBC Acanuno	00367/0001
Cristo Rei	Hera	EBC Acanuno	00367/0002
Cristo Rei	Hera	EP No 4 Hera	00368/0001
Nain Feto	Acadiru Hun	EBC Bidau Akaderu Hun	00401/0001
Nain Feto	Bidau Lecidere	Bidau-Lecidere	00403/0001
Nain Feto	Gricenfor	See Suco Gricenfor	00404/0001
Nain Feto	Santa Cruz	EPC Nu'u Laran	00409/0003
Vera Cruz	Motael	EB No 1 Farol	00421/0001

Ermera

Administrative Post	Suco	Name	Number
Ermera	Lequimea	EP Hatuleta	00446/0001
Ermera	Lequimea	EP Hatuleta	00446/0002
Ermera	Raimerhei	Escola Infantil Nalmorema Gleno	00455/0001
Ermera	Talimoro	ES Nino Conisantana	00460/0001
Ermera	Talimoro	ES Nino Conisantana	00460/0002
Railaco	Fatuquero	EP Fatuquero	00499/0002
Railaco	Liho	EP Railaco Vila	00500/0001
Railaco	Tokoluli	EP Tokoluli	00507/0001

Lautem

Administrative Post	Suco	Name	Number
Lautem	Com	Sede Soco Com	00518/0001
Lautem	Maina 1	Sede Suco Maina 1	00526/0001
Lospalos	Fuiloro	ES Nino Conisantana	00542/0001
Lospalos	Fuiloro	ES Nino Conisantana	00542/0002
Lospalos	Fuiloro	EEB Paioto	00543/0001
Lospalos	Home	EP Home	00544/0001
Lospalos	Home	EP Home	00544/0002

Liquiça

Administrative Post	Suco	Name	Number
Bazartete	Lauhata	Sede Suco Lauhata	00574/0001
Bazartete	Tibar	Sede Suco Tibar	00585/0001
Bazartete	Ulmera	EB Ulmera	00588/0001
Maubara	Guguleur	EB Pahui Robo	00607/0001
Maubara	Vatuvou	EB Tobau	00614/0001
Maubara	Vatuvou	EB Tatamolobu	00615/0001
Maubara	Vatuvou	EB Ediri	00616/0002
Maubara	Vaiquinia	EB Vaviquinia	00620/0001

Manatuto

Administrative Post	Suco	Name	Number
Laclo	Uma Kaduak	EP BE Hedan	00636/0001
Laclo	Uma Kaduak	EP Ilimanu	00638/0001
Manatuto Vila	Ailili	Sede Suco Ailili	00657/0001
Manatuto Vila	Aiteas	EP Aiteas	00658/0001
Manatuto Vila	Aiteas	EP Aiteas	00658/0002
Manatuto Vila	Aiteas	Sede Aldeia Kamp Baru	00660/0001
Manatuto Vila	Ma'abat	Sede Suco Ma'abat	00665/0001
Manatuto Vila	Sau	EP Sau	00666/0001
Manatuto Vila	Sau	EP Sau	00666/0002
Manatuto Vila	Sau	E Infantil Obrato	00667/0001

Manufahi

Administrative Post	Suco	Name	Number
Same	Babulu	EP Turon	00700/0001
Same	Babulu	EP Ailok Laran	00701/0001
Same	Holarua	EBC Fatuco	00714/0001
Same	Holarua	EBC Fatuco	00714/0002
Same	Holarua	EBC Fatuco	00714/0003
Same	Holarua	EBC Fatuco	00714/0004
Same	Letefoho	EB Ailuli	00723/0001
Same	Tutuluro	EP Acadiru Tetuk	00725/0001
Same	Tutuluro	EP Bubulau	00726/0001

Oecusse

Administrative Post	Suco	Name	Number
Pante Macáassar	Costa	EP Mahata	00755/0002
Pante Macáassar	Costa	EP Mahata	00755/0003
Pante Macáassar	Costa	EBC Santo Antanio Numbei	00756/0001
Pante Macáassar	Costa	EBC Santo Antanio Numbei	00756/0002
Pante Macáassar	Costa	EP Masin	00758/0002
Pante Macáassar	Costa	EP Masin	00758/0003
Pante Macáassar	Lifau	EP Tulaika	00764/0001
Pante Macáassar	Lifau	EP Tulaika	00764/0002
Pante Macáassar	Nipane	EP Sakata	00767/0001

Viqueque

Administrative Post	Suco	Name	Number
Ossu	Loi-Huko	Sede Suco Loihuno	00785/0001
Viqueque	Bahalarauain	EBC 08 Agosto Kaiju Laran	00821/0001
Viqueque	Bibileo	EBF Craras	00822/0001
Viqueque	Caraubalu	EBC 01 Beloi	00824/0001
Viqueque	Caraubalu	EBC 02 Cabira Oan	00825/0001
Viqueque	Uma Qui'ic	ESC Calisa	00832/0001

Viqueque	Uma Uain Craic	Sede Aldeia Naeboruk	00834/0001
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APPENDIX F

Ballot for the 2017 Parliamentary Elections

Eleisaun Parlamentu Nasional 2017 Eleição para o Parlamento Nacional 2017 Metiñ di-tu, u ddiñ iha tabin sda ne'ebé iha-bor-hor-hor. Assinale ou perfura no quadrado destinado no qual pretende votar.			
1	Bloku Unidade Popular		
2	Partido Associação Popular Monarcaia Timorense		
3	Partidu Kmanek Haburas Unidade Nacional Timor Oan		
4	Partido Esperança da Pátria		
5	Partido Socialista de Timor		
6	Partido Dezemvolvimento Popular		
7	Congresso Nacional de Reconstrução por Leste		
8	Partidu Republikanu		
9	União Democrática Timorense		
10	Partido Democracia Cristã		
11	Partido de Movimento da Libertação do Povo Macassar		
12	Partido da Libertação Popular		
13	Partido Democrático		
14	Unidade Nacional Democrática da Resistência Timorense		
15	Partidu Unidade Dezemvolvimentu		
16	Partido Timorense Democrático		
17	Partidu Frente-Mudança		
18	Partido Social Democrata		
19	Partido Centro Ação Social Democrata Timorense		
20	Partido do Desenvolvimento Nacional		
21	Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente		

APPENDIX G

List of Acronyms

AMP	Alliance of Parliamentary Majority
ANFREL	Asian Network for Free Elections
APMT	Timorese People's Monarchy Association
ASDT	Timorese Social Democratic Association
ASEAN	Association for Southeast Asian Nations
BOP	Public Order Battalion
BUP	Bloku Unidade Popular
CASDT	Timorese Social Democratic Central Action
CNE	National Election Commission
CNRT	National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction
CSO	Civil Society Organization
EMB	Election Management Body
EU	European Union
F-FDTL	Falintil-Federal Defense Forces of Timor-Leste
FRETILIN	Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
FM	Frenti-Mudança
GMN	National Media Group
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IRI	International Republican Institute
KAK	Anti-Corruption Commission
KHUNTO	<i>Kmanek Haburas Unidade Nasional Timor Oan</i>
LTO	Long-Term Observer
MLPM	Freedom Movement of the Maubere People
MP	Member of Parliament
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OIPAS	<i>Observatorio da Igreja Para Os Assuntos Sociais</i>
PD	Democratic Party
PDC	Christian Democratic Party
PDN	National Development Party
PDHJ	Human Rights Ombudsman
PDP	People's Development Party
PDRT	Partido Democratica Republica de Timor
PEP	Hope of the Fatherland Party
PLP	Popular Liberation Party
PLPA	Partido Liberta Povo Ailaba
PMD	Partido Milenium Democratico
PNTL	National Police of Timor-Leste
PPT	Timorese Popular Party
PR	Republican Party
PSA	Public Service Annoucement

PSD	Social Democratic Party
PST	Socialist Party of Timor
PTD	Timorese Democratic Party
PUDD	United Party for Development and Democracy
PWD	Persons With Disabilities
RHTO	Ra'es Hadomi Timor Oan
RTTL	Radio Television Timor-Leste
RTV	Radio Television Maubere
STAE	Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration
TMR	Taur Matan Ruak (José Maria Vasconcelos)
UDT	Timorese Democratic Union
UN	United Nations
UNDERTIM	National Unity of Timorese Resistance
UNITAL	Universidade Oriental Timor Lorosa'e
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
ZEESM	Zone for Social Market Economy (located in the Oecusse municipality)



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