

**MEXICO
PRE-ELECTION ASSESSMENT MISSION
REPORT #1**

February 28-March 1, 2000

Issued May 8, 2000

I. INTRODUCTION

On July 2, 2000, Mexican voters will go to the polls to elect Mexico's president and that country's 58th Federal Congress—all 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and all 128 seats in the Senate. In addition to the federal elections, citizens in the states of Morelos and Guanajuato will cast votes to elect their governor. Citizens in nine states—Campeche, Colima, Guanajuato, Mexico State, Morelos, Nuevo Leon, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi, and Sonora—will cast votes in contests for state congresses, and municipal councils. Finally, in Mexico City, voters will elect the mayor (*jefe de gobierno*), the legislative assembly and—for the first time—all 16 city delegates. The election of Mexico City's delegates is yet another breakthrough toward providing representative, accountable government. The delegates formerly were appointed by the mayor.

These upcoming elections come at a decisive juncture in the country's transition to democracy, for the following reasons:

Recent polls indicate that this upcoming contest is the most highly contested presidential election in the 71 years that the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) has been in power.

For the first time, both major opposition political parties—the National Action Party (PAN) and the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD)—have formed separate alliances to enhance their respective electoral competitiveness. Although there are a total of 11 political parties registered with IFE to compete in the upcoming elections, the strategic alliances have reduced the actual number of presidential candidates to six.

They will be the first presidential elections to be administered under the electoral reforms of 1996. These reforms have leveled the electoral playing field by a significant degree, providing opposition parties with far more money and media access than before.

July's election will be the first presidential election to be administered by an autonomous Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). The electoral reforms of 1996 transformed that institution into an autonomous body, which is widely regarded as impartial.

With a grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development, IRI is conducting a series of pre-election assessment missions throughout Mexico. Each of the missions will produce a report.

This report is based on information gathered during the first pre-election assessment mission during the week of February 28-March 1, 2000. The assessment team consisted of Michael Zarin, IRI Regional Program Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, Washington; and Armand Peschard-Sverdrup, Director of the Mexico Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington.

The assessment team met with representatives of the three principal political parties; the President and various members of IFE's General Council; the President and all six magistrates of the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TRIFE); representatives from non-governmental organizations; media; and private citizens.¹

II. THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

IFE is responsible for administering the federal elections—the election of the president and the Federal Congress. The State Electoral Institutes in the nine states holding state-level elections in July are responsible for administering their respective elections. Although IFE administered the then unprecedented 1997 Mexico City mayoral election, it did so because Mexico City had not yet set up an Electoral Institute. Since then, Mexico City has established an Electoral Institute (*Instituto Electoral del Distrito Federal*), and it now has the responsibility for administering elections in Mexico City.

While IFE has undergone significant reforms and earned the respect of most political actors in Mexico, the same, unfortunately, cannot be said of all State Electoral Institutes. IFE officials are concerned that the questionable impartiality of some State Electoral Institutes will tarnish the image of IFE, even though they are separate entities.

During this first mission, the IRI team focused only on the Federal Electoral Institute. Future assessment teams will travel to other states to assess the preparedness of other Electoral Institutes.

Electoral Reforms of 1996

Mexico has taken great strides in recent years toward building confidence in the administration of federal-level elections. The electoral reforms of 1996, in particular, are largely responsible for the substantial progress in the autonomy of IFE and the Federal Electoral Tribunal

¹The authors are indebted to all those in Mexico who gave generously of their time to meet with us and discuss the elections.

(TRIFE), campaign finance, and access to the media. Although the scope of this first assessment mission was to focus on the July 2000 elections, IRI strongly recommends a review of the 1996 electoral reforms, which remain highly relevant. For a detailed description of the 1996 electoral reforms, readers may refer to the IRI's 1997 IRI pre-election report, available on the Institute's web site, www.iri.org.²

Election Administration

There is overwhelming confidence throughout Mexican society in IFE's ability to properly administer the upcoming federal elections. In a meeting with the assessment team, IFE president Jose Woldenberg affirmed the readiness of the voter registry, the organizational and logistical aspects of administering the election, the ballots, and the ability to compute the vote.³

Voter Registry

IFE anticipates the voter registry will comprise approximately 60 million voters by the March 31 registration deadline—six million of them estimated to be first time voters.⁴ IFE, along with all of Mexico's political parties, agree that the integrity of the voter registry is no longer a concern. IFE has in place ongoing programs for continually updating the voter registry and maintaining it as current as possible. Although political parties can continuously review the voter registry, IFE will present them with the final registry and give them until April 14, 2000 to raise any concerns. As an added measure, IFE will be selecting an independent committee, comprising five distinguished academics, to certify the integrity of the voter registry. Even though there is no official deadline for the IFE to approve the voter registry, it is likely to be approved by early May.

Polling Stations

On July 2, Mexicans will vote in an estimated 115,000 polling stations (*casillas*)—approximately 77,500 located in urban areas and 37,500 in rural areas. Some of the members of IFE's General Council expressed concern over their ability to select and adequately train polling station officials in time for the elections. Each polling station is presided over by seven individuals—a president, a secretary, two examiners (*escrutinadores*), and three substitutes (*suplentes*)—which means that to staff the 115,000 polling stations, IFE will need to select and train 805,000 individuals. Because the participation of the selected individuals is discretionary, IFE must overcompensate by drawing approximately five-and-a-half million Mexicans through a lottery system to obtain the 805,000 individuals needed. IFE informed the assessment team that the polling station lottery had been conducted on March 7, 2000.

² John Murphy and Armand Peschard-Sverdrup, *Mexico Pre-Election Assessment Mission Report*, Washington, D.C. International Republican Institute, 1997.

³ The assessment team would also like to thank Carlos M. Navarro Fierro, Director of Electoral Studies of IFE's International Section, for his substantive support.

⁴ Although the voter registry was closed on February 29, names could still be added to the voter registry until March 31, 2000, which is the deadline that citizens have to pick up their voter credentials.

IFE is relying on 18,000 people to train the polling station representatives by the April 30 deadline. The training of polling station representatives is vitally important because they represent the first line of election administration and are also responsible for conducting the first ballot count.

While polling station officials are not financially compensated for their time, IFE decided that for the 1997 mid-term elections, it would provide them with two box-meals each on election day. Polling station officials open the polls at 8 a.m., close them at 6 p.m., and then work until around 8 p.m. tabulating the votes. Juan Molinar, member of IFE General Council, conceded that this presented IFE with a logistical problem, which resulted in the IFE's deciding that for the 2000 elections it instead would provide polling station officials with a stipend of 150 pesos each as a meal allowance.

Ballot Safeguards

Since the 1997 mid-term elections, IFE has introduced additional ballot safeguards including a total of seven distinct safeguards aimed at preventing the counterfeiting of ballots. The known safeguards include: various watermarks, visible and invisible fibers, microprinting, and inverted printing. While these safeguards are known to the public, there is one safeguard that only one anonymous IFE official is privy to. As an added precaution, IFE has also requested the Mexican military to guard the printing facilities where the ballots are being printed.

IFE officials informed the assessment team that they have made additional improvements to the quality of the indelible ink since the 1997 elections. IFE is confident that the ink that is used to mark each voter's finger after he or she votes is more difficult to wash off than it was in 1997.

Election Observation

IFE's General Council has agreed to allow national observers and international visitors for the upcoming elections. The national observers have until May 31 to get accredited. The Ministry of the Interior (*Secretaría de Gobernación*) has provided IFE with a fund of 40 million pesos (an estimated US\$4 million), for the national observer program. The fund is to be administered jointly by IFE and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The 40 million pesos is a significant increase from the 12 million pesos that the Ministry of the Interior provided IFE for the national observers program in the 1997 mid-term elections. International visitors have until June 21 to get accredited.

Resolving Electoral Disputes

The Federal Electoral Tribunal and the 32 State Electoral Tribunals—one per each of Mexico's 31 states, plus Mexico City—are the institutions that have been mandated to resolve electoral disputes in Mexico.

These institutions are likely to play a vitally important role once the last ballot is cast in the July 2000 elections. The elections are shaping up to be the most closely contested election in Mexico's contemporary history. Narrow margin victories could lead to heated disputes over the integrity of the electoral outcomes—be it in the presidential, congressional, gubernatorial, and/or

municipal contests. The respective institutions will be called upon to adjudicate any disputes, and each verdict will unquestionably be carefully scrutinized.

The assessment team is grateful for the opportunity to have met with the president and all six magistrates of the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TRIFE)—the supreme authority responsible for adjudicating federal electoral disputes.⁵ TRIFE officials acknowledged that the process for resolving electoral disputes in Mexico has undergone a slow and measured evolution since the early 1800s. Yet, they also noted that the most far-reaching changes have taken place in the past 10 years.⁶

Since the early-1800s and throughout most of the 1900s, Mexico's rubber-stamp Congress was principally responsible for resolving electoral disputes through a self-validating process (*autocalificación electoral*). This process consisted of the Electoral College of the Chamber of Deputies possessing the authority to validate the election of the country's president and the federal deputies, and the Senate's Electoral College possessing the authority to validate the election of federal senators. It was not until the 1940s that opposition parties began to voice their displeasure over the partisanship of the electoral dispute resolution process and demand that impartial parties assume these responsibilities. Opposition outcry resulted in the founding of the Federal Commission for Electoral Vigilance (*Comisión Federal de Vigilancia Electoral*) in 1946. This commission, however, was set up under the Ministry of the Interior, thus failing to diminish concerns over the lack of impartiality.

While the constitutional reforms of 1977 continued to give the federal congress supreme authority over electoral disputes, they did grant the Supreme Court the capacity to perform a judicial review as a recourse in electoral dispute resolution (*Recurso de Reclamación*). Although the Supreme Court was limited to rendering non-binding legal opinions, these reforms did open the door for the judiciary to assume a greater role in the future. Nine years later, the constitutional reforms of 1986 resulted in the creation of the Tribunal for Electoral Contentiousness (*Tribunal de lo Contencioso Electoral*). However, as had been the case with the 1977 reforms, the federal congress continued to be the supreme authority, with the Tribunal limited to issuing only non-binding legal opinions. In spite of the shortcomings, the creation of the Tribunal for Electoral Contentiousness did signal a staying of the course toward more judicial recourse in electoral dispute resolution.

It was not until the dramatic crisis of the 1988 presidential election—when the Federal Electoral Commission's computer system crashed under curious circumstance while tabulating the vote—that political pressure climaxed, forcing the creation of IFE and TRIFE in 1990. While the reforms stipulated that it was mandatory for TRIFE to deliver resolutions, the resolutions could still be modified or revoked by the Electoral Colleges. In essence, this sustained the supremacy of the Electoral Colleges, in that their resolutions were definitive and beyond appeal. Given that TRIFE magistrates were to be nominated by the President of Mexico and confirmed by the Chamber of

⁵ Under the 1996 reforms, TRIFE can also adjudicate state-and-municipal level electoral disputes, but only as an appeal from the ruling of the corresponding State Electoral Tribunal.

⁶ The information provided in this section was obtained during the assessment team's meeting with TRIFE and complemented with a publication written by Dr. Flavio Galván Rivera, TRIFE's Secretary General of Agreements. Flavio Galván Rivera, *Derecho Procesal Electoral Mexicano*, McGraw-Hill, Mexico City, Mexico, 1997.

Deputies—which at the time continued to be under PRI majority—was viewed as lacking autonomy.

The constitutional reforms of 1993 instituted a judicial process for validating election results, a responsibility that previously lay with the Chamber of Deputies. Although these transformed TRIFE into the supreme authority with electoral jurisdiction, TRIFE was mandated only to validate the election of deputies and senators. The Electoral College of the Chamber of Deputies would sustain the authority to validate the presidential election.

The boldest wide-sweeping reforms were undertaken during the Zedillo administration. In the continuum toward having electoral dispute resolution become a judicial process, TRIFE was shifted in 1996 to fall under the organizational structure of the judicial branch. The Electoral Colleges were disbanded, and TRIFE was given the authority to validate the presidential election, and IFE was given the authority to validate the election of federal deputies and senators. In an attempt to further instill the division of powers, the Supreme Court was made responsible for nominating the magistrates of the Tribunal, which then required a two-thirds Senate vote for their confirmation.

This synopsis of the historical evolution of electoral dispute resolution is invaluable in providing a broader context. TRIFE officials believe that the 1996 reforms give their institution an unprecedented level of impartiality. Some of the people with whom the assessment team met, however, are not as quick to come to the same conclusion. The slow and measured evolution of electoral dispute resolution over a 165-year period has contributed to an inherent Mexican cynicism over the autonomy and impartiality of electoral dispute resolution. In order to overcome such cynicism, TRIFE will have to prove its autonomy by the manner in which it adjudicates disputes. This will become increasingly difficult as Mexico embarks on a more closely contested political landscape.

Election Environment

The electoral reforms that have been implemented have succeeded in diminishing concerns over IFE's administration of federal elections. Current concerns consist of vote buying; the use of public funds for electoral purposes; and quantitative and qualitative access to the media.

Vote Buying

Members of IFE General Council, as well as a non-governmental organizations, identified vote buying or coercion (*compra y coacción de voto*) as currently the most overt way of improperly swaying electoral outcomes. IFE President, Jose Woldenberg, acknowledges that as long as there are dramatic economic disparities in Mexico, there will be fertile grounds for efforts to buy or coerce voters' support. Rural areas are more susceptible to these practices due to their more depressed socio-economic standards and generally lower levels of access to information regarding citizens' rights and protections. Woldenberg concedes that it is unknown how significant an impact vote buying will have on the electoral outcomes. Yet, he assumes that if voter turnout in July nears 40 million, it would be difficult to buy even 1 percent of the vote—which would be 400,000 of the votes cast.

IFE has attempted to counter vote buying through radio and television public awareness campaigns that condemn this practice. The advertisements inform citizens of their right to freely cast their votes, that their vote is genuinely secret, and that vote buying is illegal.

Mexico's Federal Penal Code stipulates that the buying and coercion of the vote is illegal. Such violations, however, fall under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Attorney General, as opposed to the more highly regarded IFE or TRIFE. Within the Office of the Attorney General, it is the Specialized Office for Electoral Crimes (*Fiscalia Especial para Delitos Electorales – FEPADE*)—headed by Dr. Javier Patiño Camarena—that investigates allegations of buying and coercing of the vote. Many of the people interviewed during the first assessment mission expressed uncertainty over the FEPADE's capacity and impartiality. On March 23—soon after the first assessment mission—IFE and the Office of the Attorney General (PGR) signed an agreement of collaboration and support for the prevention and awareness of electoral crimes. Subsequent assessment teams will follow up by requesting a meeting with Dr. Patiño to learn more about FEPADE and the details of this latest agreement.

Use of Public Funds for Partisan Purposes

Many people interviewed during the mission thought that vote buying and the use of public funds for partisan purposes are overlapping issues. Representatives of the PAN pointed to the July 4, 1999 Mexico State gubernatorial election as the most recent example of this duality. In that election, it is widely believed that the PRI resorted to vote buying and the use of public funds to ensure victory by its gubernatorial candidate. In response to increasing concerns over use of public funds for electoral purposes, there have been a series of significant advancements at the NGO and governmental level.

At the NGO level, local organizations FUNDAR and the Civic Alliance have initiated a joint pilot project aimed at monitoring social expenditures to ensure that they are not used for partisan purposes. Their methodology is to review and analyze expenditures over time—particularly in the less-than-transparent social support programs—to determine whether disbursement patterns change prior to the election. FUNDAR identified social infrastructure funds (*Fondos de Aportaciones para Infraestructura Social*), which are disbursed directly to the municipalities, as areas of concern. They also expressed concern over the disbursement of monies under the federal government's poverty alleviation program—*PROGRESA*—to state governments or state-based *PROGRESA* offices. FUNDAR and Civic Alliance hope that their due diligence will further enable them to advocate improved transparency. According to FUNDAR officials, their work thus far has found that most governments—regardless of party affiliation—resort to some form of pork-barrel tactics of this nature.

At the governmental level, the Chamber of Deputies created a Congressional Oversight Committee on December 9, 1999, to ensure that public (federal) funds are not disbursed for partisan purposes during the 2000 elections.⁷ According to Committee Chairman, PAN Deputy Eloida Gutierrez Estrada, and PRD Ranking Member Deputy Armando Aguirre, the Committee's principal

⁷ *Comisión Especial Encargada de Vigilar que no se Desvien Recursos Federales en el Proceso Electoral del Año 2000.*

responsibility is to inform civil servants and the citizenry at large that it is illegal to disburse public funds for partisan purposes, and that offenders are subject to legal sanctions. The committee hopes to open 32 field offices—one in each state and Mexico City—to make it easier for citizens to file complaints and expose such violations, as opposed to requiring them to travel to Mexico City to lodge complaints.

The PAN and PRD members of the committee expressed concern over the possible misuse of social/poverty alleviation programs such as *PROGRESA*, which targets 2,600,000 families; *PROCAMPO*, which benefits two million farmers; and a variety of temporary employment programs.

The assessment team applauds the unprecedented initiation of the oversight committee, yet it also recognizes that election day is only months away, and that this short time period could prevent the committee from truly being effective. Compounding the already short time period, as of this first assessment mission, the committee had yet to receive funding from the approved five million peso budget, allegedly due to PRI-inspired dilatory tactics. These delays resulted in the committee's not yet having signed necessary agreements with the executive branch; reaching cooperative accords with the IFE; meeting with the Supreme Court to ensure cooperation from the judiciary; hiring and training the 93 individuals the committee estimates it would need to staff all 32 offices; clearly defining the procedures for the 32 field offices; and opening the field offices to the public.

The committee members from the opposition PAN and PRD blamed the PRI faction in the Chamber of Deputies, as well as the PRI Executive, for foot-dragging and hence delaying the setting up of the committee to carry out its mandate. In fairness, however, it appears that the opposition members of the committee also shoulder some responsibility for failing to act more swiftly and assertively.

While the effectiveness of this committee undoubtedly will be limited going into the July 2000 elections, its underlying importance rests on its potential—the fact that it may prove to be the beginning of future congressional oversight of the use of public funds. The opposition members of the committee, however, fear that the committee runs the risk of being disbanded if the majority in the Chamber of Deputies changes hands, (i.e. if the PRI regains control).

Access to the Media

There are three different forms in which political parties can have access to the media.

1) Official air-time (*tiempos oficiales*) mandated by the Federal Electoral Code (COFIPE)

This form of access to the media consists of 15 minutes of free airtime per party per month indefinitely even during non-election periods.

This is complemented during election periods by additional airtime that IFE purchases (as per the COFIPE) and distributes free-of charge to the political parties. IFE distributes this additional free airtime to the political parties through the 70/30 formula—70 percent based on the previous federal election results and 30 percent equally among all political parties;

- 2) Paid-for political advertisements or “spots”;
- 3) Daily news coverage.

In the past six years, there has been enormous progress in terms of political parties having access to the media. Aside from the fact that COFIPE mandated airtime has helped level the playing field, the additional financial resources that all political parties now receive—as a result of the 1996 electoral reforms—have enabled the parties themselves to purchase additional airtime.

According to Alonso Lujambio, member of IFE General Council, the improved *paid-for* access to the media by political parties is evidenced by the increases in spending over the past six years for television and radio airtime. In the 1994 presidential election, political parties allocated an estimated 25 percent of their expenditures toward media; that amount rose to an estimated 55 percent for the 1997 mid-term elections. IFE estimates the amount will increase to 65-70 percent for the July 2000 elections.

One of the benefits of allocating expenditures for media access is that this makes it possible for IFE to better monitor and quantify expenditures. Not all expenditures are as transparent and quantifiable.

Some members of opposition political parties contend that it is no longer quantity but quality of coverage that has become an issue. To address this concern regarding the quality of media coverage, non-governmental organizations such as the *Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos* and Mexico’s major newspaper, *Reforma*, are monitoring press coverage to detect and report on imbalanced news coverage.⁸

IFE has voiced concerns over the time-slots that television and radio stations are designating for the COFIPE mandated airtime. IFE has asked the *Dirección General de Radio, Televisión y Cinematografía*, under the Ministry of the Interior, for help so that television and radio station owners (*concessionarios*) can be made to be more responsive to the specific time-slots that are being requested by IFE. The owners counter that prime-time slots are the most expensive and thus the most lucrative, and that assigning those time-slots to non-paid advertisements would adversely affect their bottom line.

Campaign Finance

The 1996 electoral reforms introduced public funding for election campaigns. Like the television and radio time provided to the parties, 30 percent of these funds is distributed equally among the parties represented in Congress, and 70 percent is distributed according to the share of the vote each party won in the previous federal election. As a result, public funding for electoral campaigns has provided the opposition parties with more cash than they have ever had before.

⁸ In the case of *Reforma*, it only monitors television coverage.

The 1996 reforms also established a complex system of spending limits to constrain the use of private funds. Parties are required to provide detailed reports on their spending, and there are clearly defined penalties – parties may be fined or even stripped of their registration – if they cannot provide adequate documentation or if they exceed the spending limits. The difficulty arises from the fact that a party will only be penalized for exceeding spending limits if it delivers a report to the IFE indicating it has done so. There are no independent audits of party spending.

Another loophole in the campaign finance law concerns public collections (*colecta pública*), which ostensibly permits parties to raise funds through ad-hoc public collections. Parties need not specify the donor's name nor the quantity he or she gave when reporting funding under this heading. How forthcoming the parties will be in these reports probably will be difficult to determine.

III. THE POLITICAL SITUATION

In examining electoral outcomes over the last 39 years, for presidential as well as legislative elections, it is clear that the PRI has experienced a gradual decline in voter support (see Appendix B). To a significant degree, the reforms that have led to Mexico's steady democratization have been driven by popular demand and implemented by the PRI, largely at its own expense.

The July 2000 elections come at a decisive juncture politically, in light of the many electoral advances that Mexico has already achieved since 1994.

1994 The first nationally televised debate among the major presidential candidates took place during the 1994 presidential election.

1997 During the 1997 mid-term elections, the PRI lost its 68-year majority in the Chamber of Deputies, resulting in divided government.

Also in 1997, Mexico City held elections for the first time to elect not only the mayor (who had traditionally been appointed by the president), but also all 66 seats in the city legislature (*Asamblea*).

Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas, the PRD's candidate, won decisively, giving Mexico's political opposition yet another victory.

1998 The PRI held its first open primary in the state of Chihuahua to select the party's gubernatorial candidate, and simultaneously sent a message to the rest of the country that the PRI was not averse to greater internal democratic openness.

1999 The PRI became the first party to hold an open primary to select the party's candidates for president and mayor of Mexico City.

2000 Mexico's political landscape at the state-level has become increasingly pluralistic. Of Mexico's 32 states (including Mexico City), opposition governors govern 11. Four of these represent the recent trend toward opposition coalitions.⁹

Of Mexico's 2,400 municipalities, 583 currently are governed by opposition governors—encompassing 46 percent of the population.

For the very first time, all 16 delegates for Mexico City will be elected in the July elections.

IV. LOOKING AHEAD

IRI will conduct additional pre-electoral missions to Mexico. The future missions will be assigned to various states throughout Mexico, distributed among urban and rural areas and to states governed by each of the three major parties.

⁹Aguascalientes (PAN); Baja California Sur (Coalition); Baja California Norte (PAN); Nuevo Leon (PAN); Zacatecas (Coalition); Nayarit (Coalition); Jalisco (PAN); Guanajuato (PAN); Mexico City (PRD); Tlaxcala (Coalition); Queretaro (PAN)

APPENDIX A

Candidates for the 2000 Presidential Elections

Political Forces	Presidential Candidates
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)	Francisco Labastida Ochoa
Alliance for Change National Action Party (PAN) Mexico's Green Party (PVEM)	Vicente Fox Quesada
Alliance for Mexico Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) Labor Party (PT) Social Alliance party (PAS) Convergence for Democracy (CD) Nationalist Society Party (PSN)	Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas
Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM)	Porfirio Muñoz Ledo
Democratic Center Party (PCD)	Manuel Camacho Solís
Social Democracy (DS)	Gilberto Rincón Gallardo

Candidates for the 2000 Mexico City Election

Political Forces	Candidates
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)	Jesús Silva Herzog Flores
Alliance for Change National Action Party (PAN) Mexico's Green Party (PVEM)	Santiago Creel Miranda
Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD)	Andrés Manuel López Obrador
Democratic Center Party (PCD)	Marcelo Ebrard Casaubón
Labor Party (PT)	
Social Alliance party (PAS)	
Convergence for Democracy (CD)	
Nationalist Society Party (PSN)	
Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM)	
Social Democracy (DS)	

APPENDIX B

Mexican Presidential Elections (1964 – 1994) National Percentages of Vote by Party for President

	PAN	PRI	PRD	PVEM	PT	PC	PDM	PPS	PARM	PSUM	PST	PRT	PMT	PFCN
1964	11.5	86.3	---	---	---	---	---	1.4	0.7	---	---	---	---	---
1970	13.9	80.1	---	---	---	---	---	1.4	0.8	---	---	---	---	---
1976	8.5	80.1	---	---	---	---	---	3.0	2.5	---	---	---	---	---
1982	17.5	69.3	---	---	---	---	2.2	1.9	1.4	4.4	1.8	1.3	---	---
1988	17.1	50.4	---	---	---	---	0.4	9.2	6.1	---	---	0.2	---	9.4
1994	26.7	50.2	17.1	1.0	2.8	---	0.3	0.5	0.4	---	---	---	---	0.9

Source: Bailey, John. *"The 1994 Mexican Presidential Election Post-Election Report"*. CSIS Western Hemisphere Election Study Series. October 8, 1994

Mexican Midterm Elections (1961-1997) National Percentages of Vote by Party for the Chamber of Deputies (Single-Member Districts)

	PAN	PRI	PRD	PVEM	PT	PC	PDM	PPS	PARM	PSUM	PST	PRT	PMT	V o t e r Turnout
1961	7.6	90.2						1.0	.5					68.3
1967	12.4	83.3						2.8	1.3					62.3
1973	14.7	69.7						3.6	1.9					60.3
1979	10.8	69.7					2.1	2.6	1.8	4.9	2.7			49.3
1985	15.5	65.0					2.7	2.0	1.7	3.2	2.5	1.3	1.5	50.5
1991	17.7	61.4	8.3				1.1	1.8	2.1			0.6		65.4
1997	26.6	39.1	25.7	3.8	2.6	1.1	0.7	0.3						57.6

Sources: Armand B. Peschard-Sverdrup, *"The 1997 Mexican Mid-Term Elections: Post Election Report"*, CSIS Western Hemisphere Election Study Series. August 30, 1997

Note: The PARM, PSUM, PST, PRT, and PMT did not participate in the 1997 midterm elections.