NATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

# THE 1991 ELECTIONS IN ALBANIA



REPORT OF THE ELECTION OBSERVER DELEGATION

# MAP OF ALBANIA



# NRIIA ELECTION OBSERVER DELEGATION

# ALBANIAN PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

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# PREFACE

On March 31, 1991, the first multi-party elections for the People's Assembly of Albania were held. The elections were the initial step--but only the initial step--in the democratization of a nation trying to emerge from 47 years of isolation.

In the past year, the political situation in Albania has changed dramatically. From the refugee crisis in the summer of 1990 to the multi-party elections in March 1991, popular support for democratic change in the country surfaced. Nevertheless, the entrenched communists, running as the Party of Labor of Albania, won a majority of seats in the People's Assembly. Today, the future structure of Albania and the government's commitment to democratic reform are in question.

In January 1991, the Board of Directors of the National Republican Institute for International Affairs, responding to the important events evolving in the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, approved a program of pre-election assistance to the pro-democratic forces in the country. The program was never implemented, however, because the Albanian authorities refused the visa applications for Institute representatives.

The opposition parties, particularly the Democratic Party of Albania and the Republican Party of Albania, requested international election observers be present to objectively assess the election process and serve as a deterrent against potential fraud by the ruling party. In that light, the NRIIA President made the decision to send a small team to Tirana as soon as possible. The opposition applied pressure on the government to allow NRIIA professional staff to be present before, during, and after the voting. Institute representatives were permitted to enter Albania on 25 March 1991, only six days before the election. The team had two goals: to assess the preelection environment and to attempt to secure visas for additional observers.

The additional visas were granted, and, on the 28 March, the NRIIA delegation, led by Institute President Jack Buechner, assembled in Tirana for extensive briefings with government officials, opposition parties, and the Central Election Commission. On the day before the election, the delegation divided into four teams, deployed throughout the country, and held additional meetings with election authorities and political parties at the local level.

The polls opened at 6:00 am on Sunday, 31 March 1991. On election day, the NRIIA teams visited over 75 polling locations in 44 electoral zones and 14 departments, a feat not equalled by any other election observer groups regardless of their size.

The NRIIA Statement of Preliminary Findings set the tone for those individuals and organizations who questioned the election process in Albania. The international press and the opposition parties acknowledged that the Statement was the most accurate presented in Tirana.

The NRIIA wishes to acknowledge the contributions of the enthusiastic election observers who suspended their responsibilities in disparate professions to travel to Albania. Their insightful observations were the driving force behind the mission's success. Special mention should be made of the contributions of Mr. Osman Osmani. Without his knowledge of Albanian customs, language abilities, and contacts throughout the country, the mission would have lacked depth and a true understanding of Albania.

Janusz Bugajski, Associate Director of East European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Mary Catherine Andrews, Program Consultant at the NRIIA, were responsible for drafting and editing this report. Robert Henderson, Vice President of the NRIIA, also contributed to the report.

The mission would have never taken place were it not for the assistance of the prodemocratic forces, specifically Dr. Sali Berisha, President of the Democratic Party and Dr. Sabri Godo, President of the Republican Party. In the coming year, the NRIIA plans to implement a comprehensive program of assistance and support for the pro-democratic parties in Albania. Any support provided by the Institute could never repay these distinguished gentlemen or their colleagues for the graciousness they extended to the Institute.

The United States Department of State was dedicated to providing the Institute with timely and accurate information and assistance. John Fox, James Hooper, Roderick Mackler, Susan Sutton, and David Swartz assisted the Institute before and during the mission and in the preparation of this report.

Most importantly, a special thanks is in order for the people of Albania who were always hospitable and helpful. Furthermore, Brikena Balli, Ilirian Duka, and Dalina Kallulli, who served as interpreters for the delegation, provided a special understanding of Albanian life as well as precise translation services.

The Institute hopes that the following analysis and documentation provides a comprehensive examination of the first multi-party elections for the Albanian People's Assembly.

Jack Buechner, President

The National Republican Institute for International Affairs

#### April 1, 1991

#### NRIIA STATEMENT OF PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

# CONGRESS PALACE TIRANA, ALBANIA

Good Afternoon. My name is Jack Buechner and I am the President of the National Republican Institute for International Affairs. Today the NRIIA election observer delegation for the Albanian People's Assembly elections will share with you our preliminary findings.

I would like to begin by explaining that the NRIIA has observed elections throughout the Balkans, in Bulgaria, Romania, and, most recently, four republican elections in Yugoslavia. We are familiar with the complexities of transitional societies emerging from a totalitarian structure and developing democratic systems. This process is uneven, complicated, and in many respects, unique to the country in transition.

We would, however, have had more thorough advance preparation for this historic event had we not faced certain impediments to the mission. These took the form of limitations on the number of visas issued by the government, restrictions on the length of time before the election we were permitted to be in the country, and the availability of legal documentation, for example electoral laws, political party laws, and maps showing electoral zones divisions. We appreciate that this is a resource scarce environment and that there was little time to prepare many of the materials noted.

As you can see from the map, our four teams were deployed throughout the country. We observed voting and other election day activities in fourteen departments and forty-four electoral zones. We estimate that the NRIIA delegation observed voting for a significant portion of the Albanian population from Tropoja to Gjrokaster and from Durres to Korce. We saw voting in polling stations which varied in size from 692 in downtown Bajrim Curri to 117 in Gri.

We have taken these reports from across Albania and combined them to develop a national perspective.

#### **ELECTION PRINCIPLES**

A fair election is a process, not a single event. The process includes three stages: first, formulation of the rules governing the election; second, conduct of the campaign prior to the actual voting; and the election itself, or the voting, tabulation, and release of results.

Writing the election rules cannot be the sole province of only one of the contending parties. The risk is great, if not indeed certain, that the party writing the rules will shape them to deny opposing parties elemental fairness.

We believe that the monopoly over rule making exercised by the Albanian Labor Party in the March 31, 1991 election did deny elemental fairness to the opposition Albanian parties in at least three respects. These consequences were clearly evident on Sunday.

First, the opposition was denied adequate time to organize and prepare for the election. The Albanian election law was promulgated last year. The date of the election was first set for February 10, 1991, and moved to March 31st only because of pressure from the opposing parties. In meetings with the national and local branches of the opposition parties, the NRIIA delegation was able to confirm that the parties were severely hindered in their organizational efforts by the short campaign period. Candidates were hastily chosen, or in many cases not selected at all, and formulation of the party positions were hastily improvised. Communications between the parties and the Albanian people were often haphazard.

Second, the opposition parties were denied fair access to the media in all its formstelevision, radio, and newspapers. Communications is the life-blood of any electoral campaign. The Institute was informed of numerous barriers to opposition parties' access to the Albanian people, including the direct censorship of opposition party newspapers, with-holding of radio and television time from opposition candidates, and the manipulation of images and editing of TV and news coverage to favor candidates of the Albanian Labor Party.

The rules as formulated and implemented denied opposition party candidates adequate financial and natural resources to conduct their campaign, yet the Albanian Labor Party provided ample resources for their candidates. In the Institute's meetings and travels throughout Albania, we saw numerous examples of the detrimental results of the opposition parties' inadequate resource base. Vehicles and other forms of transportation were so tightly rationed that the opposition candidates experienced grave difficulties in carrying out the most elementary campaign duties. One candidate interviewed by our delegation was forced to walk to the 18 villages spread across his electoral zone. Similar hardships were encountered in the equipping and staffing of opposition party offices. Many branch offices we visited lacked the most basic office equipment, such as typewriters and copying machines as well as basic communications equipment.

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# ELECTION DAY PROCEDURES

On the basis of our observations, balloting on election day was conducted smoothly and efficiently in most of the polling locations. Election officials displayed a keen understanding of the election law and were able to maintain orderly voting procedures. The voters themselves showed a high degree of polling booth discipline as well as familiarity with balloting regulations. We believe that the very high voter turnout was more of an expression of the population's commitment to democratic change than a lingering effect of forty-five years of compulsory voting.

Despite these positive and encouraging elements, several aspects of the election process gave rise to concern, and some of these were more serious than others. Aside from smaller or periodic irregularities, for example, instances where polling precincts contained slightly more than six hundred registered voters or other small anomalies, two regular features of the election were more troublesome.

First, a distinct difference was noted between urban and rural composition of the election commissions. More party representatives were present on election commissions and as observers at polling locations in the urban areas than in the rural ones.

The second major concern involves the less tangible application of pressure against opposition activists particularly in the small towns and villages. These allegations were expressed to us by the Democratic Party leaders and in some instances seemed to be confirmed by our own observations. Opposition political party observers were more willing to express criticism about the process outside of the polling locations and away from other electoral commission members. In some cases, the opposition observers signaled to us that it was difficult to speak openly within the vicinity of the polling station.

We assume that fuller reports and more concrete evidence of pressure and intimidation will be made available in the post election assessments. In the most dramatic incident we discovered, in the town of Pac, department of Tropoja, our delegation was presented with evidence about a gunfire incident that occurred at about ten o'clock on the morning of the election. The incident transpired while voters were waiting to cast their ballots. This incident was uncharacteristic of the process as a whole, however, the fact that it occurred warrants reporting given its potential impact on the outcome of the election at that polling location.

#### **ELECTION PROCESSES**

Like fingerprints, no two elections are alike. But there are some elements that by their presence or their absence gives one side or another an advantage. A party in power for decades, whether it is in Chicago, Chile, or Albania, is especially advantaged. That advantage can be overcome or reduced by technology, timing, talent, and finances in some combination. Only in the area of talent, and then only in selected ares, was the opposition able to compete with the Labor Party.

Without well-known candidates a political party must project a message that entices the voters to select that party. The short length of time between enactment of the law allowing multi-party elections, the formulation of the opposition parties, and the election dates themselves, restricts the dissemination of that message. The time restriction becomes a prohibition when combined with a lack of technology and finances. The Labor Party, through the government, monopolized communications and transportation in all but a few of the urban areas. In these areas, the opposition forces were able to marshall their forces with maximum effect.

Without the technological infrastructure to deliver the message, finances become less important. However, even in the area of finances, the Labor Party appeared to hold a huge advantage because of its ability to work out of established party headquarters throughout the country.

The singular fact that Albania held its first multi-party national elections on March 31 is a significant tribute to the democratic forces and the people of Albania. Albania has a tremendous opportunity to join the family of democratic nations.

Political pluralism and democracy in Albania, as in the rest of Eastern Europe, is a necessary condition for the development of a viable and competitive economy, which will attract Western investment.

We must once again stress that a free and democratic Albania requires the building of legitimate and stable political institutions. Multi-party elections are not the only requirement. To that end, we hope to continue to work with Albania's democratic forces in the months and years ahead.



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#### Mr. Dio Guardi:

Much has been said about the great history and tradition of the Albanian people. We believe, however, that not enough can be said about their individual fortitude, spirit, and determination for not succumbing to past oppression and for allowing a complex and compressed election to proceed in a civilized way in difficult economic and social times.

The Albanian people have won our admiration for their perseverance and their willingness to participate peacefully in the electoral process under difficult conditions. Through those efforts, the Albanians have undertaken the first steps toward what we all hope will be a successful transition to democracy in their country.

The admirable comportment of the Albanian people during the election is due, in great part, to their strong spirit and traditional optimism. The significance of recent events to Albanians in their country and dispersed throughout the world was well captured by the great Albanian democratic leader and poet, Bishop Fan S. Nole, in a poem entitled, "By the Rivers:"

> "... Your strong will and manly fight, Make me brave and young and smart, Fill me up with strength and hope, By the rivers of unknown folk, Cheerful feelings follow sorrow, I will be home by tomorrow ..."

# CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND

Albania is distinguished by the geography of a mountainous country and the country's proximity to large and expansionist neighbors. Albania, situated on the Adriatic Coast, is bordered by Yugoslavia on two sides and Greece to the South. Albanian history is framed by the striving for self-determination and national identity under successive waves of conquerors. Only in the twentieth century have these aspirations to nationhood found sustained expression, and only under a xenophobic, isolated, and iron-fisted Stalinist rule has Albanian independence been secured.

Albania is the smallest country in Eastern Europe. According to the most recent national census, the country's population reached 3,201,000 in the 1980s, with an estimated 2% being ethnically non-Albanians. Official statistics disclose that approximately 60,000 ethnic Greeks live in Albania, primarily in the southern departments, as well as about 20,000 Slavs, who are mostly Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians. More Albanians live outside than inside the country, with an estimated worldwide population of seven million, including about two million in the Serbian autonomous region of Kosovo, Yugoslavia.

The Albanians have traditionally been divided into two major groups: the Tosks and the Gegs, characterized by different dialects and cultural backgrounds, which the Communist regime has tried to eradicate. The Gegs, inhabiting mountainous northern areas, were renowned for their strong nationalism and fighting prowess, and they dominated Albanian politics before the Communist takeover. The Tosks were located in southern Albania, where they experienced greater contact and influence from the outside world. The Communist movement emerged in the south, and the most prominent party and state leaders were Tosks.

The name Albania is derived from the word Albanoi, an ancient Illyrian tribe and a branch of the Indo-European ethno-linguistic family. In the 7th century B.C. Greek settlers arrived in the area and established a number of cities in coastal and riverain areas. In the 3rd century B.C. an expanding Illyrian kingdom came into conflict with the growing Roman Empire. By 167 B.C. Rome had conquered the Illyrian kingdom and the entire Balkan region, and ruled over these territories for about five centuries. After the Roman Empire disintegrated in the 4th century, Illyria was incorporated in the Byzantine Empire. The province was invaded by successive waves of Visigoths, Huns and Ostrogoths in the 5th and 6th centuries. In the 11th century Norman invaders occupied and controlled Illyrian territory. Serbian leaders also exercised control over the country into the 14th century.

After the defeat of Serbia by Ottoman Turkish forces in 1389 Albania came under Turkish domination. Albania's national hero, Gjergj Kastrioti-Skanderbeg was active between the 1440s and 1460s in leading Albanian resistance against the Turks. But the Albanian rebellion was eventually subdued and the country was fully incorporated in the Ottoman Empire by the 1480s.

An Albanian nationalist movement appeared in the late 1800s. In 1878 representatives from various parts of Albania met in the town of Prizren (now in Kosovo, Yugoslavia) and established the Albanian League, also known as the Prizren League. Its chief objective was to prevent the secession of Albanian-inhabited regions of Serbia and Montenegro and to obtain administrative autonomy from Turkey. But the League was crushed by the Turks in the 1880s and its leaders were imprisoned or executed.

In November 1912, after a series of revolts, and when other Balkan states declared war on Turkey, Albanian nationalists led by Ismail Qemali proclaimed the country's independence. But their goal of an Albania incorporating all Albanian-inhabited territories was not fulfilled, as Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece occupied large areas of the country. At the London Conference in December 1912, the Great Powers recognized Albanian independence, but the provinces of Kosovo and Cameria (in the south) were excluded from Albania.

During World War One, Albania was a battlefield for the main European protagonists. But despite the claims of neighbors, at the close of hostilities the Paris Peace Conference protected Albania from further partition. After a long domestic power struggle, Bishop Fan Noli established a relatively democratic government in May 1924. But Fan Noli was overthrown a few months later by Ahmet Zog who was appointed the country's president, and declared himself King Zog I in 1928. Because of the country's weakness, Zog entered into a political and military alliance with Fascist Italy, which resulted in increasing Italian interference in Albania's internal affairs and culminated in the country's conquest and annexation by Mussolini in April 1939.

Albania regained its independence in November 1944 after the collapse of Italian and German rule. The civil war between nationalists, royalists and Communists, who had established a party in November 1941, was won by the Communist-controlled Albanian National Liberation Army. Communist leader Enver Hoxha proclaimed the country as the People's Republic of Albania in January 1946 and imposed a Marxist-Leninist system modeled on Soviet Russia. It involved forced industrialization, massive police terror, and the imposition of one-party rule, initially with the help of Communist Yugoslavia.

Relations with Yugoslavia deteriorated in the late 1940s as a result of numerous political differences and Albania's fear of annexation by its larger Communist neighbor. Diplomatic ties between Belgrade and Tirana were severed in December 1948. The Soviet Union used this opportunity to establish closer ties with Albania against the rebellious Titoist regime in Yugoslavia. However, with the death of Stalin in 1953, and the installment of the more reformist Khrushchev government, relations between Moscow and Tirana began to deteriorate, and Albania formally detached itself from the Soviet bloc alliance system in 1961.

Throughout the 1960s, Albania sided with China in the Sino-Soviet dispute, as protection against Soviet and Yugoslav influence. Moscow reacted by withdrawing its economic aid and military assistance from the country. China provided some aid to Albania but the country's isolation from both West and East contributed to its economic backwardness and stagnation. Fearful of foreign influence and the dilution of its dogmatic Communist agenda, in the mid-1960s the Hoxha regime instigated a "Cultural and Ideological Revolution" to ensure that capitalism and revisionism would be thwarted.

Tirana's ties with China worsened after Mao's death in 1976 and the purging of Mao radical leftist associates. Hoxha accused the new Beijing leadership of reformist leanings and of abandoning the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. The regime reasserted its extreme isolationism and self-reliance, and added a clause in the constitution prohibiting Albania from "seeking foreign aid and credits or forming joint companies with foreigners." The country was also declared the first atheist state in the world, while Hoxha's security police (the <u>Sigurimi</u>) liquidated all manifestations of dissent and political opposition.

#### **Emergence of a Multi-Party System**

After Hoxha's death in 1985, the new leadership of Ramiz Alia, Enver Hoxha's handpicked successor, began to re-establish political and economic relations with several Western countries including Austria, West Germany, and Italy. It also introduced some domestic liberalization, particularly in religious and cultural life.

As democratic revolutions swept across Eastern Europe, the Alia government came under growing internal and external pressures to implement more far-reaching domestic reforms. Moreover, as the economy began to seriously deteriorate, the authorities increasingly looked toward Western assistance, and this necessitated political and economic steps to gain international credibility and legitimacy.

At the beginning of 1990, various limited reforms were introduced. In the economic realm, a measure of flexibility was initiated inside the command economy, with greater decentralization and decision-making responsibility for factory and farm managers. In addition, production incentives for workers were introduced and some private home ownership was developed. The government also signed agreements with a few Western businesses and began to import consumer goods to try and satisfy rising public demands.

Albania is facing an economic crisis, and the regime acknowledged that the centralized economic planning of the last 47 years did not provide adequate incentive for workers or adequate goods for consumers. Therefore, the Communist leaders realized the necessity of opening their economic markets to the West. In seeking to facilitate trade arrangements with Western nations, Albanian President Ramiz Alia spent most of the summer of 1990 attempting to join the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). However, he was only successful in gaining observer status in CSCE, as the organization awaits signs from the Albanian

government of a commitment to democratic reform, respect for human rights, and a dedication to the principles of a free market economy.

Meanwhile, the government also took steps to improve its atrocious human rights record. More Albanians were allowed to travel abroad and more foreign visitors, including journalists, were allowed to visit the country. Tirana also eased restrictions on religious worship and instruction, reinstated the Ministry of Justice, and liberalized its justice system by cutting the number of capital offenses. Internment without trial was also abolished, and the right of criminal defendants to legal counsel was established.

As the regime began to liberalize and open up the country to outside influence, increasing numbers of citizens clamored to leave Albania. In August 1990, several hundred citizens sought foreign asylum by storming Western embassies in Tirana. Albanian security services stemmed the flow of refugees with violence, and there were reports of several deaths. To prevent an uncontrolled exodus, the authorities declared the refugees criminals and prohibited further encroachments on the embassies. Amid mounting tensions, over 10,000 demonstrators gathered in Tirana to protest government policies and demand major political reforms.

The refugee crisis and growing public protests reflected and intensified power struggles within the ruling Albanian Labor Party, between reformist forces associated with Ramiz Alia and Stalinist factions linked with Enver Hoxha's widow, Nexhmje Hoxha. In a government shake-up, the Interior Minister was replaced along with four cabinet ministers responsible for the economy and the security forces. Informed observers assumed Alia's reformist faction had gained the upper hand by the close of 1990.

The refugee crisis continued and nearly 4,000 Albanians were evacuated from Western embassies, mostly to the Italian port of Brindisi. At the same time, student disquiet began to increase and several rallies and marches were staged in Tirana during the fall of 1990 which were violently dispersed by the police.

In the international arena, Tirana restored diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and began negotiations to re-establish ties with the United States. Alia attended the 45th anniversary of the United Nations and took preliminary steps to join other international institutions. [Diplomatic relations with the United States were re-established on 15 March 1991. See Appendix A.]

Against this backdrop, in November 1990, the Presidium of the People's Assembly scheduled **multi-candidate** elections and enacted Law 7423, or the "election law." The PLA and organizations affiliated with the Party would be eligible to field candidates to compete in a 10 February 1991 election. These organizations included:

The Democratic Front The Women's Union The Trade Unions

The National Committee of Veterans The Youth Union The League of Writers and Artists.

The election law stipulated, "any other political or social organization or association recognized by law" would also be allowed to run candidates. In November, the only political organization recognized by law were arms of the government; therefore, all candidates for the elections would be affiliated with the Party of Labor of Albania.

Broad-based support for a pluralistic system in Albania became evident on 11 December 1990, when students at Enver Hoxha (Tirana) University staged a protest for improved living conditions. The students were joined by workers and intellectuals, and the focus of the protest turned to calls for "Democracy" and multi-party elections. The protest served as visual proof to the government of citizens' hopes for economic freedom and a relief from political repression. By day's end, the 13th Plenum of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the People's Assembly issued a directive allowing opposition political parties to register for participation in the election. Immediately, the Democratic Party of Albania began the registration process.

On 19 December 1990, The Democratic Party was the first independent party to receive formal recognition from the Ministry of Justice, and its leadership, comprised of university professors, students, and intellectuals, began the process of forming a viable political institution. However, the Democrats met resistance from the government at all stages of their development.

A peaceful rally in Tirana, attended by thousands of supporters, inaugurated the creation of the Democratic Party. In the week before Christmas 1990, over 10,000 citizens staged the country's first legal opposition rally in Tirana.

The first priority of the Democratic Party's leadership was to postpone the elections until May 1991 to allow the pro-democratic forces time to organize and disseminate their messages to potential voters. Initially, the request was flatly denied by the government; however, after the opposition staged large rallies and threatened to boycott the election, the government postponed the elections until 31 March 1991. The decision was announced on 16 January 1991, after a five hour meeting between President Alia and Dr. Sali Berisha, President of the Democratic Party.

In addition, the Democratic Party called for the establishment of an opposition press, the release of all political prisoners, and revising of the November 1990 election law to include opposition party representatives on all election commissions. Eventually, the government conceded to most of the opposition demands.

Purges in the Labor Party were followed by the promotion of younger reformist officials. Alia pledged that the general elections would be free and democratic. Independent parties began to form in early 1991, including Republicans, Greens and Agrarians. In late December and early January 1991 the exodus of refugees surged. Thousands streamed across the Greek border unopposed by Albanian security forces. The Greek government appealed for the flood to stop, but despite Tirana's promises that refugees could return to Albania without recrimination, the majority refused to do so. Over 6,000 Albanian citizens, mostly ethnic Greeks, stayed in Greece. In a further show of liberalism, Alia pardoned over 200 political prisoners and began proceedings to release 200 others.

A moratorium was placed on strikes and other forms of industrial unrest, but in early February student protesters in Tirana demanded the resignation of the government and farreaching economic reforms. Police and refugees clashed in the port city of Durres and two people were killed as security forces tried to prevent citizens from illicitly boarding ferries to cross over to Italy in February.

In January 1991, the Democratic Party began publishing a newspaper entitled <u>Rilindja</u> <u>Demokratike</u> [Democratic Reawakening]. Shortly after, the Republican Party began publishing <u>Republika</u>. Each newspaper is published twice a week and financed through the sales of issues and, during the campaign period, through government funds allotted to the parties.

On 18 March 1991, President Alia claimed to have released "all" political prisoners--that is all prisoners the government admits to holding. The PLA used the release as supposed evidence of their commitment to human rights. In addressing another call of the opposition forces, the government made several alterations in the election law which included the addition of members representing opposition parties on the election commissions at all levels.

In early 1991, protests again escalated, and thousands of demonstrators toppled the Enver Hoxha statues in Tirana, Durres, and other cities. The protesters demanded an end to Communist rule and expressed frustration with the pace of political change. Student sit-in strikes continued through February but subsided when authorities closed Tirana University. Tensions remained high on the eve of the March elections, although there were great expectations of a democratic victory at the polls.

In a historic epoch rife with irony, the spectacle of the liberalization of Albanian politics by the leaders of the most orthodox Stalinist party in Europe has been extraordinary. These evidently "Europeanized" social democratic aspirants faced mounting challenges both within their party and from a heretofore unexpectedly strong democratic opposition.

# The Governmental Structure and Administration of the Elections

During almost five decades of totalitarian rule, the government of Albania and the Party of Labor had almost indistinguishable roles.

The Party dictated the government's policies in economic, political, and social life, and the Presidium of the People's Assembly rubber-stamped the decisions of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor. For example, the 13th Plenum Session of the Central Committee of the PLA under Alia's request issued the mandate for multi-party elections. The Presidium of the People's Assembly ratified the decision, and multi-party elections were scheduled. Throughout the years of communist rule, elections for representatives to the People's Assembly and for local offices were scheduled on a regular basis. Citizens 18 years of age and older were obliged by law to vote for the single candidate on the ballot.

The head of the Albanian government, most recently Ramiz Alia, served several roles--he was First Secretary of the Party of Labor and Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly. Alia's role as Chairman of the Presidium gave him the title of Head of State, or President.

Traditionally, Albania has been divided into 26 administrative departments, and the seats of these departments were in the major cities of the area. A loose correlation between departments and counties can be made, with each department governed by a "local power" authority. The departmental governments did not figure into the administrative scheme for the elections.

For the March elections, the country was divided into 250 zones (or districts), and voters in each zone directly elected one representative to the People's Assembly. For administering the elections, there were three election commissions. The Central Election Commission was responsible for clarifying the election law, implementing the law on the national level, adjudicating complaints from the opposing parties during the campaign and the elections, and registering deputies elected to the People's Assembly.

The zone election commissions and the election commission at the individual polling locations were responsible for the precise implementation of the election law. In addition, the zone election commissions registered and announced the candidates for deputy, counted the votes throughout the zone, issued certification of election to the winning deputies, adjudicated complaints from individual polling locations, and sent the final results from the zone to the Central Election Commission. There were, generally 12,000 to 13,000 inhabitants in each zone, or 7,000 to 8,000 eligible voters, although the final election results illustrated that the urban electoral zones were significantly larger than the rural zones. The discrepancy in the number of voters in an electoral zone raised the charge by the opposition of gerrymandering.

The election commissions at each of the 5,450 polling locations throughout the country were responsible for overseeing the implementation of the election law at that polling location, the counting and recording the votes, and delivering the results to the zone commissions. At each polling location, there were no fewer than 100 voters and no more than 600 voters on the registry. The NRIIA election observers discovered several exceptions to this rule, which will be discussed in the following chapter.

The total number of election day administrators, excluding the party "observers" or poll watchers, was 29,014. In other words, a significant portion of the two million eligible voters were involved in administering the elections.

The increased number of election commission members was an important concession to the opposing parties, although the decree did not specify that the additional election commissioners should be members of the opposition parties. There were Democratic and Republican party commissioners on the Central Election Commission and on the zone and polling location commissions at all of urban and many of the rural polling locations visited by the NRIIA teams on election day.

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# CHAPTER 2 THE PRE-ELECTION ENVIRONMENT

The period before an election, which determines the relative strengths of the competing parties, is framed by: the formulation and implementation of the rules governing the campaign and the administration of the election; and the conduct of the parties, including the utilization of resources during the campaign itself.

The pre-election environment in Albania was characterized by the monopoly over the campaign process exercised by the Party of Labor of Albania (PLA), the de facto government. Although the Albanian election law compares favorably with those of other Balkan nations, the fact remains that the legislation was enacted without the participation of an organized, informed, and autonomous opposition. The appearance of imbalance served to make the principle task of creating a representative structure more difficult. The campaign period was short, allowing the opposition insufficient time to organize and disseminate their message. Meanwhile, the PLA abused state resources, including the media, transportation, and state funds. Finally, there were numerous accusations of PLA intimidation of opposition party activists and candidates.

In evaluating the Albanian pre-election environment, it is important to keep in mind that the opposition parties were needed to stage protests, hunger strikes, and large rallies, as well as issue threats to boycott the election, in order to gain even the slightest concessions from the PLA.

# **The Political Parties**

Between the legalization of independent political parties and the postponing of the elections on 16 January, a total of five new parties were registered:

The Democratic Party of Albania The Republican Party of Albania The Ecology Party The Agrarian Party The Democratic Union of the Greek Minority, officially called Omonia.

The opposition parties and the ruling party endorsed similar platforms, espousing political, economic, and social reform. All parties claim to favor democracy, the desire to "join Europe," respect for human rights, transition to a market-based economy, respect for the worker, a representative government, and freedom of assembly and association. Furthermore, every

Albanian party desires reunification with the Serbian autonomous province of Kosovo, where over 90% of the population is ethnic Albanian. The differences between the parties were primarily in the implementation of these programs and in the degree of dedication to these ideals.

The Party of Labor understands that Albania must emerge from the isolation of the past principally for economic reasons. The desperate material condition of the country and its citizens dictates that the Labor Party allow a reform process to ensue in order to obtain international financial assistance. Furthermore, the PLA leadership realizes that there exists popular support for a pluralistic system in Albania, and, in order to assure the Party maintains some degree of power, the PLA must sustain a leadership role in political reform.

The Democratic Party wants Albania to receive economic assistance from the West. Party leaders want Albania to join the West, but understand the economy must be stabilized and steps toward a representative government must be made first. The most visible leader of the Democratic Party and renowned economist, Gramoz Pashko, outlined the party's economic program for the NRIIA delegation. The program includes "shock therapy" for the economy and the complete privatization of land. The Democrats see their primary goals as: first, having an influence within the legislature to the extent possible, and, second, gaining representation in the country on all levels, especially at the local level where elections will be held in the coming year. Once the "local power" of the communist party is dismantled, according to the Democratic Party leadership, their party can become a strong political force in Albania.

The Republican Party sees itself as the moderate political force, or as a step between the present communist regime and the Democratic Party. According to the Republicans, the people of Albania are not ready for the dramatic changes of the Democrat's platform. The Republican Party espouses a gradual transformation to a market-based economy and the slow privatization of property, because, they believe, the peasants and workers are fearful of owning their land, homes, or livestock, and being subjected to the risks of market competition. Such notions appear to be beyond the understanding of most Albanians. The Republicans are quick to maintain that because their leadership is comprised of intellectuals and workers who are not former PLA members, their party is more dedicated to democracy than the other independent parties.

The official Trade Union declared its independence from the Party of Labor on 24 December 1990 and claimed it would support higher wages and better working conditions for the employees of state-owned enterprises, as well as a shortening of the work week from six days to five. But on the same day as the Trade Union's declaration of independence, the organization issued a statement supporting the government's crackdown on rioters throughout the country.

Other PLA affiliated organizations, otherwise known as front organizations, also declared their independence from the Party. Nevertheless, candidates for the ruling party appeared on the ballot with endorsements from both the Party of Labor and one of the front organizations. For example, Rexhep Mejdani, the Chairman of the Central Election Commission, was a candidate for the PLA, the Youth Union and the Trade Union. The independent parties and international observers assumed that these front organizations remained arms of the Party of Labor, despite their declarations to the contrary.

During the last few years of totalitarian rule, the Omonia organization was established to serve as a voice for the ethnic Greek minority in Albania. Omonia was allowed to run candidates in areas with a large Greek minority. There exists a question as to the independence of Omoniasome maintain the organization is evolving as a viable sovereign party, while others believe the organization remains an arm of the PLA. Omonia enjoys almost exclusive support in regions with a significant Greek population, and, after the multi-party ballot, the elected Omonia deputies appeared to support the opposition initiatives in the People's Assembly.

The Ecology Party, as its name indicates, espouses a platform calling for environmental awareness and protection, as well as social consciousness. The Ecology Party's strength is in the industrial areas, especially Elbasan and Lushnje, where many of the major industries are located. The Ecology Party was the second opposition party to be registered, yet the Party did not play a major role in the election.

The Agrarian Party, with its headquarters in the agricultural center of Vlora, supports the interests of agricultural workers. Potentially, the Agrarians will enjoy support, because the major economic sector throughout the country is agriculture. The Party was formed in January 1991 and was only a minor player in the elections.

The Democratic Party of Albania, by far the most aggressive opposition party against the entrenched PLA, employed every possible means to assure their message was heard by potential voters. The sign of Democratic Party supporters throughout Albania was two fingers forming a "V," an international symbol of victory. As the NRIIA observers drove through the cities and the rural towns and villages before and after the election, peasants, small children, elderly women, and even members of the army flashed the "V" signs to the delegation. The "V" was the most effective way of illustrating support for democratic change, but in the rural areas it was not unusual to still see the weathered stern peasant male answering with the clinched-fist salute of communism.

## The Election Law

The election law, the same basic law enforced for the multi-party elections, was promulgated on November 13, 1990. [See Appendix B.] An amendment to the law, Decree 7457, was issued on 17 January 1991, and instructions to the voters and election commissions were issued on 7 January and 7 February 1991. [See Appendices C, D, and E.] The election law stated that all Albanian citizens of 18 years of age or older would be allowed to cast ballots for the election of deputies to the People's Assembly, so long as they had not been convicted of a penal act or were not declared mentally incompetent by a court. Unlike past elections, voting was not compulsory.

Registration lists were compiled by local authorities throughout the country. The registration lists were to be completed and made available for public inspection by 6 March according to the election law. However, the lists were not available in most parts of the country until less than a week prior to the election, leaving the opposition little time to verify the names on the voter registry. Compilation of the voter registry appeared to be accurate and few complaints about the registry were reported on election day.

On 7 January 1991, the Central Election Commission issued Instruction 1 entitled "On Drafting and Proclamation of Lists of Electors and Albanian Citizens Temporarily Abroad." This instruction stipulated that eligible voters working in diplomatic and consular offices, and trade representatives were allowed to cast ballots at the mission so long as there were five eligible voters. Also, students studying abroad in areas where diplomatic missions are located could vote at the missions. Similar regulations were in force for those on Albanian-flagged ships.

The NRIIA representatives discovered the votes from the foreign missions would be added to the votes in one of the Tirana zones. The opposing parties were concerned over the addition of the votes from abroad because, most of those casting ballots, would be ranking and privileged government officials, as evidenced by their tenure abroad. Furthermore, the votes would most likely be added to the zones where high-ranking government officials, such as President Ramiz Alia and Foreign Minister Muhamet Kapllani, were candidates, possibly swaying the outcome of the voting. Since most high-ranking government officials running in Tirana lost in the multiparty elections, the effect of the "abroad vote" did not seem to significantly change the outcome.

According to the 7 January instructions, Albanian citizens travelling abroad on business were granted permission to vote. The citizens were required to obtain a certificate allowing them to vote out of their district, and, on election day, the voter would present the certificate at the nearest Albanian diplomatic mission.

Certificates to vote at any polling locations in the country were available to Albanians who would, for legitimate reasons, be unable to cast ballots at their designated polling location on election day. Prior to election day, the potential voter would provide the zone election commission with the reason they would not be in their home area on election day. The commission, in turn, would provide a certificate to the potential voter. Up to 15 percent of the total number of registered voters in any location could vote by absentee certificate. For example, if there were 300 registered voters at a polling location, then that polling location could accept 45 addition voters from other parts of the country.

The NRIIA observers were concerned over voting by certificate because, theoretically, up to 15 percent of the population could be organized to vote in areas where the PLA required additional support. Special concerns were raised over the possibility of moving large military units to vote in areas needing PLA support. Furthermore, a clear method did not exist to assure that duplicate certificates were not issued to those seeking absentee votes. The certificates did not even appear to be uniform from region to region of the country. Finally, there were no stipulations requiring polling location election commissions to retain the used certificates.

Candidates for the office of deputy to the People's Assembly could be presented by a party or as "independent" candidates. In order to register a candidate, a party had to provide the first name, surname, father's name, and age of the candidate. An independent candidate had to obtain the signatures of 300 eligible voters, and provide the signatures along with the other information to the zone election commission in order to be registered. Candidates had to register 15 days prior to the election and could withdraw prior to the opening of the polls. A party could provide a replacement candidate until seven days prior to the election.

The election law stipulated that each political organization permitted to field candidates must publicly disclose their program. Party platforms could not contain, "fascist, racist, or terrorist ideologies and must not contain ideas borrowed from or inspired by traitor organizations created during the National Liberation War." However, it remained unclear how these terms were defined, as they may have in the past been manipulated by the Communist regime to exclude democratic political competition.

#### **Abuse of State Resources**

Albania, the poorest country in Europe, is a resource scarce environment. There are few supplies and little modern office equipment, making its extremely difficult for the opposition to produce posters, newspapers, and newsletters. Furthermore, the government of Albania monopolized the use of the limited number of vehicles and access to television and radio. These factors contributed to the inability of the opposition forces to transmit their programs to the voting public. In any campaign, the success of a given party is reliant upon that party's ability to disseminate a coherent message to the voting population. In Albania, the importance of disseminating a coherent message was increased, because there was little time to recruit and train charismatic or even known candidates. Therefore, voters had to rely on the platforms to determine the candidates they would support. The Party of Labor controlled every possible means by which opposition could distribute their message.

Most campaign paraphernalia for the opposition was produced in Western Europe by international supporters of the parties. The Democratic and Republican parties were able to obtain some office equipment from international sources, as well. Nevertheless, the Party of Labor operated out of established party offices throughout the country, equipped with typewriters, telephones, telefax machines, and modern copiers.

The opposition parties operated from office space provided to them by the government. These offices were often one-room locations on back streets. For example, the NRIIA team deployed to Korce, a medium-size town about 200 kilometers from Tirana, could not find the Democratic Party headquarters. Only after asking several pedestrians did the team discover the location was off a side street on the upper floor of a small building. When the team found the headquarters, it was a two-room office, and each room was barely large enough to accommodate a conference table. The only evident office equipment was a telefax machine that also served as the telephone. The NRIIA team met with the Republican Party leadership from Korce in a hotel, because no one, including the Democratic Party, knew where the headquarters were located. The Democratic Party called the local chairman of the Republican Party by telephone at his home to arrange the meeting.

The Party of Labor headquarters in Korce, on the other hand, were housed in a large building overlooking the city square. A doorman greeted the NRIIA team and lead them to the Chairman's office. The single office was larger than the two rooms of the Democratic Party headquarters combined and was equipped with a computer, two telephones, and a television.

Likewise, the national headquarters of the Democratic and Republican parties were housed in space provided by the government. The opposing parties barely had furniture for their offices and possessed meager equipment provided by foreign friends. The PLA headquarters were in the party office building, where one office was as large as the entire Republican Party premises.

The Democratic and Republican parties were allotted eight cars with government drivers, 1 million Leks (the local currency with an official exchange rate of ten Leks to one dollar), and a hard-currency loan of \$50,000. Meanwhile, the PLA had use of all government resources.

Transportation for opposition party candidates proved to be equally burdensome. Until early 1991, it was impossible to own a private automobile in Albania--not only was it illegal, but it was cost prohibitive. Therefore, the opposition had to rely on the government to provide automobiles for party use. Candidates in the small villages and secondary cities were required to find their own means of transportation for campaigning. The NRIIA delegation heard from one candidate in the Berat Department who was required to walk to the 18 villages spread across his zone to campaign because no other means of transportation was available to him.

All television and radio in Albania was operated by the government. The political parties, including the Party of Labor, were each assigned a one hour portion of time on the radio and television, and an additional 45 second spot on the Friday before the election. The independent parties told of the government censoring their media time, although no substantive evidence was obtained by NRIIA representatives.

Despite the allotment of pro bono media coverage to the opposition parties, there was inordinate news coverage of the ruling party. Rallies held by the Party of Labor were covered extensively on the nightly news, while speeches by opposition leaders were not mentioned or were shown without sound while a reporter summarized the speech. Reports indicate that 75 percent of the Albanian population has daily access to television, and, if the opposition parties had received equal electronic media access, more voters would have been able to make informed choices for support based on the parties' messages.

The opposition parties were allowed some freedom in producing written materials. Both the Democratic and Republican parties printed newspapers twice weekly, and the government seemed to allow the parties to publish uncensored articles. Although the government permitted

the establishment of opposition newspapers, they controlled the availability of newsprint and printing facilities, as well as the distribution of the papers.

Furthermore, each opposition paper could only be produced twice weekly (a total of four opposition papers each week), despite their popularity, because the government strictly regulated the parties' access to printing facilities and newsprint. Once the papers were produced, the government controlled their distribution. For example, Democratic Party leaders in Berat claimed that numerous copies of their party paper never reached the outlying regions of the Department because the party had to rely on delivery by government managed sources. Similar reports were heard from the opposition parties in Tropoja and Gjirokaster.

In an effort to further disseminate the party message, the Democratic Party in Berat produced three newsletters. The first never reached the voters because the government prohibited its publication. The second and third editions were handwritten and produced on a mimeograph machine, much like an "underground" publication, because the party leaders knew government facilities were unavailable to them and were fearful of government reprisal for producing such a document. In fact, one Democratic Party activist was arrested for distributing the "underground" party newspaper.

Although some resources were available to the opposition in conducting the campaign, the government inhibited every possible means for the opposing parties to distribute their programs. The importance of material to run a proper campaign is an important overall component of a party's success, and evidence indicated that the opposition was denied this opportunity.

#### **Allegations of Intimidation**

In Albania, the opposition parties had motivated and intelligent activists disseminating the opposition messages. Meanwhile, the Party of Labor had an established network of apparatchiks throughout the country who were determined to sustain their jobs and livelihood. From agricultural cooperative directors to shop managers, these PLA activists told potential voters that their jobs, homes, and futures were at stake if the opposition won the election. Instilling fear about the future in the electorate was only one ploy applied by the ruling party. One allegation was that opposition activists were arrested for little or no reason while campaigning and distributing opposition newsletters.

In evaluating the intimidation factor, the high profile events, such as the downing of Stalin and Hoxha statues, were important to the morale of the electorate. The government's response to these actions, such as sending tanks into the main square in Tirana during anti-Hoxha protests, sent the message to potential voters that the government was in control of the political reform and could stop the reform process at any time. The NRIIA election observers believed the implicit intimidation caused by heavy-handed government action prior to the election contributed to the PLA victory.

Ultimately, 45 years of totalitarian police state rule does not disappear from the minds of individuals citizens because someone says their election is free and open.

### Conclusions

Despite truly adverse campaign conditions, the threats of intimidation and political retribution did not hinder candidates from participating in the election. There was a total of 1,074 candidates registered for the election, including:

The Democratic Party--250 candidates The Party of Labor--243 candidates The Republican Party--165 candidates The Democratic Front--122 candidates The Womens Union--94 candidates The Youth Union--94 candidates The Agrarian Party--37 candidates The National Committee of Veterans--7 candidates Independent candidates--17 candidates.

The NRIIA observer delegation was impressed with the perseverance of the Albanian opposition parties and their candidates in the face of the serious inequities in the pre-election process.

# CHAPTER 3 ELECTION DAY PROCEDURES

The NRIIA election observer delegation divided into four teams on the day before the elections. Each team was deployed in a different part of the country in order to cover a broad cross-section of the voting areas, and to reach accurate representative samples of the Albanian electorate in both urban and rural areas. [See Appendix F.] Each team met with local party leaders, including "local power" PLA leaders, officials of zone election commissions (komisioni i zonave te zqiedhjeve), and precinct or local election commissions (komisioni i gendres se votimit). The pre-election discussions helped to familiarize our delegates with the local situation and to sensitize them to the potential election day problems.

## **General Voting Procedures**

According to observations conducted by all four teams, the balloting process on election day appeared to run smoothly and efficiently at the majority of polling locations. The polling sites were easily identifiable and seemed to be conveniently located for most local residents.

Article 10 of the election law stipulated that each polling station was supposed to accommodate under 600 voters in order to facilitate the processing of voters. A few instances were recorded where the number of registered voters at some precincts exceeded 600. Local election officials were aware of this anomaly, but explained that they had decided to expand the list rather than open up a new polling station for a mere handful of voters.

The election law, Article 46, stipulated that citizens could cast ballots on election day between the hours of 6:00 am and 8:00 pm. One case was brought to the attention of the NRIIA delegation by an opposition activist in Kucova (Berat department) where a polling station was allegedly opened fifty minutes before the designated time of 6 am. In another instance, a polling station was opened late because the local election commission chairman had apparently overslept. The frequency of such occurrences could not be ascertained, or the effect such instances had on the voting process or the election results.

Members of local election commissions displayed a good knowledge of the electoral law and answered all inquiries competently. NRIIA observers were informed that all election materials had arrived on time in the majority of polling stations, including ballot boxes (<u>kuti e</u> <u>votimit</u>), ballot papers (<u>fete votimi</u>), and other documents. Article 47 of the election law mandated that all ballot boxes must be sealed prior to the commencing of voting. In a few polling stations, NRIIA teams noted that ballot boxes were not properly sealed or lacked seals altogether. The election law directed the commissions at polling locations to use three ballot boxes--the main box for voters who cast ballots at the polling location; a second box, or sick box, for those who were incapacitated and had to vote in their homes; and a third box for use during the counting of ballots. [See Chapter 7 of the election law.] In most precincts, all three polling boxes were present, while the sick boxes were despatched at different times in each precinct to collect the ballots of incapacitated voters.

Voters displayed a high degree of voting discipline at the polling sites. Little or no overcrowding was noticed, and the processing of voters by election officials appeared to proceed normally. There were no stipulations in the election law requiring voters to show official identification prior to obtaining ballots; however, in a number of polling locations visited by NRIIA team, election officials were requiring proof of identification from potential voters.

In general, each location had two polling booths (<u>dhoma e fshehte</u>). Article 49 of the election law stated, "In each voting centre [polling location] rooms or cubicles are provided for the electors to vote in secrecy." In many voting stations, secrecy seemed to be effectively assured by surrounding screens; in others, voters actually cast their ballots in a separate room or closet equipped with a small table. Further stipulations of the election law, specifically Article 52, allowed illiterate voters to summon the assistance of another eligible voter to cast their ballot. Only a few instances were noted where assistance in voting was required. Illiteracy did not seem to figure as an important factor in the elections, and only a few cases were noted in some precincts where voters needed help to interpret their ballot slips.

Like all Western election observers, the NRIIA delegation was impressed by the high voter turnout, and indeed in some locations the majority of registered voters had cast their ballots by mid-day. The small precincts enabled a faster processing of voters. Several local election officials claimed that the turnout would be high because voting was compulsory according to the electoral law, despite Article 1 of the election law assuring free right of expression for voters. In addition, the Chairman of the Central Election Commission, Rexhep Mejdani, told the NRIIA observer delegation that voting was not mandatory, but the message may not have reached all the voters or the local election commissions. The high voter turnout may best be considered, as one Democratic poll watcher said, "The Albanian people have been trained to vote--the test of democracy is when they are able to vote without fear!"

Chapter 8 of the election law and the subsequent instructions issued by the Central Election Commission on 7 February 1991 provided provisions for the counting and tabulation of the ballots. At the end of the polling, vote counting procedures (<u>numerimi i votave</u>) appeared to be in compliance with the legal mandates. Tally sheets (<u>protokoll</u>) of the votes were duly recorded by election commission chairmen in full view of other commission members and political party observers, and the results duly relayed to the zone election commissions.



#### The Registration Lists

Chapter 2 of the election law, "The Lists of Electors," outlined the procedures for compilation, verification, and distribution of the registration lists (regjistrimi i votave). A number instances of noncompliance with the provisions of Chapter 2 of the electoral law were ascertained by the NRIIA delegation. These instances were found with particular frequency in the rural districts.

Opposition party representatives complained to observers that the lists were not readily available to the electorate or even to local party leaders and opposition party members of the precinct electoral commissions. By contrast, Labor Party leaders and election officials asserted that the lists were dispatched and displayed at all voting locations several days before the balloting. There was little opportunity to check the accuracy of either claim. Either way, the impression remained that too little time was allowed between the posting of registration lists and election day itself. This may have made it difficult for unregistered citizens to place their names on the lists.

The election law, Article 53, stipulated that ballots be prepared according to the model provided by the Presidium of the People's Assembly. In many polling sites, the registration lists and the individual ballots were handwritten not typed. When asked, officials confirmed that the writing had been extremely time consuming and was in many cases not completed until the day before the elections. The NRIIA delegation noted the non-traditional means of producing election day materials as another indication of the resource scarce environment. Some election officials indicated to the NRIIA teams that the resources to mimeograph, photocopy, or professionally print the ballots were not available in the area.

The accuracy of the registration lists remained unclear to the delegation, as well as the basis for compilation of the names. Unfortunately, no independent population surveys were available in the country, and the opposition parties had neither the time nor the means to conduct their own assessments of the number of eligible voters in any election zone.

Military personnel residing on installations were required to vote on the base, and all other members of the army were to be registered on the lists in their home zone. If military units had between 20 and 600 potential voters, then a separate polling location could be established on the base, and the results would be counted in the zone in which the base was located. Articles 5 and 12 of the election law outlined the procedures for military voting.

The NRIIA delegation had some concerns over the military voting procedures because of the implicit intimidation questions raised over a large number of uniformed military personnel at polling locations. Although allegations were heard from local opposition leaders that multiple ballots could be cast by soldiers under the control of officers supporting the Labor Party, little or no evidence could be found to confirm such claims. On election day itself, no major problems were observed with the registration lists. Voters were systematically checked off the lists after receiving ballots. According to election officials and political party observers, no complaints were submitted by voters and there were no evident instances of exclusion from the registration lists. An NRIIA team visiting Elbasan spoke with one potential voter who claimed he was excluded from the registration list because of his affiliation with the Democratic Party. When questioned further, the individual admitted that he was recently arrested while trying to cross the boarder into Yugoslavia, which could account for his exclusion from the lists.

# **Certificate Voting**

Article 5 of the electoral law made provisions for transfer or certificate voting, whereby up to one-fifteenth of registered voters in any precinct could vote in precincts where they were not permanently residents. Conversely, any precinct could accept up to one-fifteenth of nonresident voters at their polling site.

From all observations, it appeared that the transfer procedures were not abused by either election officials or voters. In polling stations visited by the NRIIA delegation, the certificate votes did not exceed the one-fifteenth ceiling, and the election officials were collecting certificates from voters. The transfers evidently did not significantly effect the voting process or the election results. The use of certificates by soldiers in the Tirana districts where top PLA officials were running did appear disproportionate to the neighboring zones. However, they did enable citizens to automatically register their vote in any part of the country by simply presenting an identity document together with the vote transfer slip issued in their home constituency.

#### **Composition of Election Commissions**

Differences were noted in the composition of local election commissions, especially with regard to the presence of opposition party representatives. The election law and the subsequent amendment, decree 7457, did not stipulate that representatives of the opposition would be representatives on the election commissions. In rural areas in particular, Labor Party officials or members of front organizations linked with the ruling party, dominated on the commissions. In pre-election interviews, local Democratic Party leaders had expressed concerns that their first-choice delegates were deliberately excluded from the committees. These claims could not be confirmed, although cases were noted where Democratic Party representatives had apparently pulled out of the commissions for "personal reasons" several days before the elections. Democrat leaders also felt that younger opposition activists in rural zones would be less experienced and more susceptible to manipulation or intimidation by Labor Party officials.

It must also be pointed out that the resource constraints of the newly formed opposition parties contributed to limiting their reach into the rural zones. It also limited the number of representatives they had available to participate in local election bodies in many village areas.

In several of the polling sites visited there were either no Democrats or Republicans present, or they were outnumbered by older Labor Party officials and self-declared unaffiliated individuals. Opposition leaders informed the NRIIA teams that these "independents" were primarily Communist supporters who disguised their prior affiliation in order to present an appearance of impartiality. Although these accusations could not be confirmed, they raised some doubts about the objectivity of certain local election commissions.

### **Role of Observers**

The identity and position of election observers from the political parties in rural zones proved similar to that of the election commission officials. Fewer opposition representatives were present in outlying areas, and in some instances officials informed foreign observers that several hours after the poll was opened that no opposition party observers had as yet visited their voting stations. Once again, logistical difficulties and staff shortages may have hindered the Democrats and Republicans from covering every polling site, but the possibility of potential observers being turned away by local officials cannot be completely discounted. Indeed, some local Democrat leaders had signalled that this could be a problem on election day.

Observers present at the precincts tended to indicate that there were no irregularities with voting procedures, but few volunteered any further information inside the polling stations.

When asked, election commission officials confirmed that election observers from all parties could be present during the vote counting and tallying, and during the transportation of tally sheets to the zonal electoral commissions. Again, the shortage of opposition observers also affected this stage of the election process, in that the transportation of properly recorded results was principally guaranteed by representatives of the ruling Labor Party and its local supporters.

### **Election Day Intimidation**

NRIIA observers were attuned to the possibility of voter intimidation, especially in rural areas where Labor Party representatives continued to dominate the local political and economic structures. In addition, opposition party leaders had indicated that much of the peasantry had gained little exposure to democratic procedures or to the platforms of newly created political groups. Fearful of change, or of being perceived to be deviating from traditional obedience to the local authorities, peasants may have been more susceptible to potential intimidation than city residents.

It was not possible for international observers to investigate or verify any allegations of comprehensive voter intimidation. It was the responsibility of the opposition parties to

thoroughly document such assertions, and to present their findings to the appropriate national and international bodies.

Nevertheless, on election day itself, NRIIA observation teams did witness individual cases of what appeared to be the attempted intimidation of voters and political party election observers. In the most dramatic incident in the town of Pac, in the department of Tropoja, an NRIIA team was presented with evidence about a gunfire incident on the morning of the election. It occurred outside the polling station while voters were waiting in line. Election commission officials confirmed that a pro-Labor soldier had fired shots near the site, although the impact of the incident on the turnout did not appear to be significant.

In Kucova, Berat department, NRIIA delegates were informed about knife threats against Democratic Party observers at the entrance to a polling station, but could neither confirm nor disprove the incident.

More direct evidence of intimidation was obtained in several precincts in the city of Gjirokaster (Gjirokaster department). At one polling station, a Democratic Party election observer whispered to NRIIA observers that there were indeed problems with the election process, even though a few minutes earlier he had nodded in agreement with election commission members that everything was in order. At another nearby polling site, a Democratic Party election observer proved much more willing to express criticism about election procedures out of earshot of electoral commission members. He was visibly worried about speaking openly with us within the vicinity of the polling station.

In order to elicit independent information, some of our delegates sought to speak privately to election observers from different parties. This seemed to cause some concern among members of the election commissions. In one instance, the commission chairman became extremely agitated when our delegates began to converse in English with a local election observer and he could not understand what was being said.

These incidents do not in themselves prove that intimidation of voters or pressure on observers was widespread. Nonetheless, they certainly reveal the existence of tension and mistrust in the rural areas, where rumors were rampant of doctored ballots and other election day anomalies. They also underscore the potential for unfair manipulation by local Labor Party officials who continue to control the chief political, economic, and security instruments in the countryside.

#### Gerrymandering

Another major concern of the NRIIA delegation was the question of the potential gerrymandering of the electoral zones in favor of rural precincts where the Labor Party held an overwhelming advantage. Unfortunately, officials were unable to supply observers with detailed

maps indicating the size and shape of Albania's 250 voting zones. This made it difficult to assess the significance of any boundary alterations prior to the elections.

Some local Democratic Party representatives expressed reservations about the size and number of voting zones, particularly over the fact that the ruling Party had determined the electoral divisions without any consultation with the opposition. Unfortunately, no independent population surveys of the voting constituencies were available in order to conduct an impartial assessment and comparison. It therefore remains important for the opposition parties to conduct independent investigations and to systematically document the size and shape of the electoral zones. Only then can a full analysis be undertaken of any deliberate gerrymandering by the ruling Labor party.

# CHAPTER 4 THE POST-ELECTION ENVIRONMENT

On 31 March 1991, the Party of Labor of Albania was successful in maintaining control of the People's Assembly. The election results illustrated the distinct dichotomy between the urban and rural areas of the country.

The Democratic Party, although an important voice in the country, was not as strong as their leaders anticipated or as popular support seemed to indicate. The People's Assembly is now comprised of representatives of four political parties:

- 169 Party of Labor
- 75 Democratic Party
- 5 Omonia (Greek Party)
- 1 Committee of Veterans.

There are several reasons why the opposition was not as successful as their leaders had predicted. Primarily, the short campaign period did not allow the opposition time to establish a nation-wide network of high-profile, qualified candidates. As a result, the independent parties concentrated on winning seats for their most visible and capable candidates. The Democrats were especially successful in the cities.

Furthermore, the short campaign period hindered the ability of the opposition to undermine the PLA-controlled infrastructure. The lack of opposition resources and pronounced Labor Party control over the media exacerbated the problem.

The NRIIA delegation was particularly concerned about accusations of PLA intimidation of candidates, opposition activists, and potential voters, as well as the possibility of post-election retribution for those supporting the opposition. Evidence to substantiate some of the opposition claims was provided to Institute representatives after the voting.

#### The Results

The election law stipulated that those candidates who won a majority of the votes (50 percent plus one vote) on 31 March were elected to the People's Assembly. If two candidates obtained over 25 percent of the vote, but less than 50 percent, they would enter a second-round run-off on 7 April. If only one candidate or no candidates received 25 percent of the vote, the

parties would nominate additional candidates to stand for election on 14 April. The candidate who received more than 25 percent of the vote would remain on the ballot with a new challenger.

At least two candidates had to appear on the ballot for any given election. In Zone 166 (Pogradec), the Democratic and Republican Party challengers withdrew from the election on 29 March, and accused the PLA of intimidation. Since originally there were only three candidates on the ballot, the election was rescheduled for 14 April.

In urban Albania, especially the capital city of Tirana, the Democratic Party won in a landslide. Numerous communist party leaders lost in direct elections. For example, the Head of State, Ramiz Alia, lost to a Democratic Party unknown. The President only won 32 percent of the vote. Likewise, the reform-minded Foreign Minister, Muhamet Kapllani, won only 33 percent of the vote, and the Chairman of the Central Election Commission won only 32 percent of the vote.

In rural Albania, the opposition was largely unsuccessful. A high ranking official in the Democratic Party, Eduard Selami lost to a PLA candidate in Zone 108, consisting of a number of small villages in the Korce Department. Selami won 46.8 percent of the vote against his PLA rival Vasfi Sherifi who won 52 percent of the vote. Opposition party candidates lost in the rural zones of the Berat, Shkoder, and Elbasan departments, while a number of opposition candidates in the larger cities in these departments were in second round run-off elections.

The election law stipulates that candidates could challenge in any constituency, as long as the candidate does not appear on ballots in more than one zone. The strategy of the Democratic Party was to field their strongest candidates and most important leaders in "safe" zones, or areas of great opposition support. Therefore, Dr. Sali Berisha, President of the Democratic Party and a Tirana resident, appeared on the ballot in Zone 34 (Kavaje), an opposition stronghold where he won 88 percent of the vote. Another high ranking Democratic Party official, Gramoz Pashko, ran in Zone 237 (the town of Vlora) and garnered 64 percent of the vote.

After the first round, 162 PLA candidates, 65 Democratic Party candidates, one Veteran's Committee candidate, and three Omonia candidates won seats in the People's Assembly. In addition, there were 14 second round run-offs scheduled for 7 April and two second round elections with new challenger(s) scheduled for 14 April. [See Appendix G.]

The Republican Party, potentially an important player in the elections, did not win a single seat in the legislature. Although the Republicans did not enjoy the high profile of the Democratic Party, their platform was geared to attract moderate Albanians desiring a slow emergence from isolation and centralized planning. On election eve, the Republican Party made a strategic mistake which alienated a large portion of their potential supporters. The Republican Party President Sabri Godo, in what appeared to be a unilateral decision, implicitly endorsed certain PLA candidates on national television and radio by suggesting that Albanians should
support reform-minded Communists. These candidates, claimed Dr. Godo, allowed the country to begin emerging from isolation and were most capable of leading the country.

Many international observers claimed that the Republican endorsement of high level PLA candidates illustrated the Republicans were actually a Communist-controlled front party. NRIIA delegates believe that Dr. Godo's statement was a genuine effort to support the democratic process and was intended to thank those officials who had allowed the reform process to begin.

The result of Dr. Godo's speech impacted on Republican Party candidates nation-wide. Not a single Republican candidate garnered enough support to stand in second round elections. In the days following the 31 March elections, the Republican Party beseeched their supporters to vote for the Democratic Party candidates in the second round elections, a move that pleased the Democrats and caused them to believe in the legitimacy of the Republican Party.

On 2 April, a dramatic event rocked the Albanian political landscape. When the election results from several Shkoder zones were announced, the Democratic Party had not achieved the victory party leaders anticipated. Democratic supporters began to protest outside the city's PLA headquarters, about 100 kilometers from Tirana. When the president of the local Democratic Party tried to calm the crowd, shooting erupted from the PLA headquarters. The president and three other Democratic Party activists were shot. The president and two activists died immediately, and the other activist died several days later.

The shootings served as an example of the high level of tension in the aftermath of the first multi-party elections, and exemplified the potential violence in the country. Because the opposition did not secure their projected electoral success, opposition party activists were discouraged and quick to assume the PLA had stolen the election. There were riot police on the streets of Tirana and excessive security forces controlling the crowds outside the Tirana headquarters of the Democratic Party.

Nevertheless, the tensions aggravated by the Shkoder shootings revealed to the general population the potential for PLA inspired violence and retribution throughout the country.

# **Political Retribution**

In the days following the first round elections, there were several reported cases of political retribution against Democratic Party activists. On 4 April, NRIIA representatives were told of two substantiated cases of retribution in the Berat Department. In the village of Vodetes, a women who worked for an agricultural cooperative was expelled from her job and subsequently fired by the local PLA secretary for supporting the Democratic Party. In another instance of political retribution, the director of a local museum was dismissed from his job by PLA authorities.

The national leadership of the Democratic Party told NRIIA representatives of additional instances of retribution against their party supporters throughout the country. Any kind

retribution is contrary to the spirit of democracy, and, although a number of the cases remain unsubstantiated, the reported allegations raise further concerns about the good will of the PLA in the election process.

Several cases of peasants being given deeds to plots of land and livestock by the government in the period immediately prior to the election, and having the gifts taken back after the election, were also reported. Although not specifically an example of political retribution, the events call into question the methods used by the Labor Party for securing votes in rural Albania.

# **Complaints on Election Procedures**

Albania's election law provided several provisions for the adjudication of complaints submitted by the parties on election day procedures. The zone election commission have initial jurisdiction over resolving the issues; the Central Election Commission serves as a further arbitrator of the complaints; and the ultimate authority is the Supreme Court of Albania.

On 2 April, the Republican and Democratic party leaders outlined for NRIIA representatives the nature of their election day complaints, and their plans for their parties. The Republicans issued a complaint because some of their poll watchers were not allowed to observe the voting by some PLA election commission members, especially in the Librazd Department. The Republican Initiating Commission told the NRIIA that they were hindered in their ability to produce the party newspaper, because, in the period prior to the election, there was a sudden shortage of newsprint.

The Republicans believe that the electorate did not understand the important place of their centrist party in the Albanian political landscape. According to Republican officials, voters wanted a drastic change in the country and were not ready for their complex platform. Nevertheless, the Republicans claim to have learned from their mistakes and will direct future campaigns at those sectors of the population, namely agricultural workers, where their officials believe they can receive the most support.

Democratic Party officials in Tirana and Berat explained their party's complaints with election day procedures to NRIIA representatives. The nature of the Democrats' complaints involved procedural irregularities. Specifically, several polling locations opened prior to 6:00 am, contrary to election law stipulations. In other instances, election commission members evidently assisted illiterate voters in casting ballots, and cases existed where armed police officers and army personnel greeted voters at polling locations.

Furthermore, the Democrats questioned the drawing of zonal borders by the Central Election Commission and claimed there was a disparity between the number of voters in the electoral zones. The impact of gerrymandering on an electoral outcome can be substantial; however, the opposition was unable to provide NRIIA representatives with evidence to support

their complaints. According to official election results, there was some disparity in the number of voters in each constituency. Unfortunately, no figures were made available on the number of residents in each constituency.

The Democratic Party was pleased that their party would be represented in the People's Assembly, and believed that the quality of their representatives would assure the party had an important voice in the government. The Democrats' emphasis will now shift toward making significant strides in the rural areas prior to future local elections. Then, according to the Democratic leadership, the communist infrastructure will begin to be dismantled.

In a post-election meeting with NRIIA representatives, Labor Party campaign officials explained that they were pleased with the election results. According to the PLA, the world could now see that Albania is a democracy. Officials believed that the election results illustrated the degree of popular support for their policies. The PLA did not submit any complaints with election day procedures.

The PLA campaign officials outlined the party's plans for economic revitalization of Albania. This included an emphasis on international trade, tourism, and the modernization of natural resource extraction facilities. Because the Albanian population has become more educated and sophisticated, the PLA realizes the need for greater material incentives and hopes to motivate workers by providing more consumer goods.

# Conclusions

The Chairman of the Central Election Commission told the NRIIA delegation that the nation-wide election results would be made public within 48 hours of the polls closing. Although the election results were disclosed verbally to NRIIA representatives, official written results were not provided to the Institute prior to their departure from Albania.

When the results were requested, several excuses for not furnishing the information were given. Some maintained that, because the information was classified "top secret," the information could not be distributed. Others maintained that such information could only be obtained from the Chairman of the Central Election Commission, who, after the results were announced, was unavailable to meet with Institute representatives. Ultimately, the NRIIA was able to obtain complete election results on 17 April through the U.S. Department of State.

The election observer delegation, sponsored by the National Republican Institute for International Affairs, for the Albanian People's Assembly elections on 31 March 1991 concluded that the campaign environment could not be characterized as either free or fair. The Party of Labor, after 47 years in power, made little effort to provide an even playing field. Furthermore, the PLA manipulated the scarce resources, particularly the distribution of funds to run campaigns and media access for the opposition, so that the opposing parties had virtually no ability to disseminate party programs.





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Despite the uneven campaign environment, the Democratic Party made important strides by securing representation in the People's Assembly. Because the Democrats have elected deputies serving in the People's Assembly, their party will continue to receive some government funding in the period prior to future elections. The other opposition parties will not receive governmental allotments of financial assistance, and this calls into question whether they can maintain or increase the support they obtained prior to the March elections.

All indications are that the Republican Party newspaper continues to enjoy great popularity. The Republicans are operating from funds they receive by selling issues of the paper. Hopefully, <u>Republika</u> will continue to provide funds for the Republican Party to operate and become a viable pro-democratic political force.

The Albanian elections were an important first-step in the democratization of a country facing serious economic and social hardships. If the popular support for democratic change continues, the opposition will soon become a ruling force in the Republic of Albania, and the country will complete its transition from a totalitarian one-party state to a pluralistic democracy.

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# APPENDIX A

# MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ALBANIA MARCH 15, 1991

JOINT COMMUNIQUE--The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, following consultations between their duly authorized representatives, and having confirmed their commitment to the principles of equality, mutual respect, and mutual benefit, have decided to re-establish diplomatic relations with effect from March 15, 1991, and subsequently to exchange diplomatic missions at the level of Ambassador.

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, as a result of discussions of their representatives and considering that the Governments have re-established diplomatic relations effective this date, have agreed as follows:

#### ARTICLE 1

1. The Government shall conduct their diplomatic relations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco on June 26, 1945, and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, signed at Vienna on April 18, 1961, to which both Governments are parties. The Governments shall exchange diplomatic representatives with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, as soon as the necessary administrative and legal arrangements in the sending State so permit.

2. The two Governments shall provide all necessary assistance for the early establishment, and performance of the functions, including consular functions, of diplomatic missions in their respective capitals, in accordance with international law and practice. Such assistance shall include, inter alia, consent to the use of wireless transmitters including the use of satellite links, by the respective Embassies for purposes of official communication, subject to compliance with the laws and regulations of the receiving State. Such laws and regulations shall, however, be applied so as to give full effect to the consent hereby recorded.

3. The Governments affirm their intent to respect the fundamental principles on which diplomatic intercourse is based, including inter alia, the principle of inviolability of the premises of the diplomatic mission.

4. The two Governments shall extend the privileges and immunities of diplomatic agents, as defined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic relations, to those members of their respective administrative and technical staffs of the diplomatic missions accredited to Washington and Tirana, as well as their families. The stated privileges and immunities will not be accorded to persons who are nationals or permanent residents of the receiving State.

5. The two Governments intend to hold discussions on the conduct of consular relations at the earliest practicable time. Until such time, the two Governments agree to the following interim practical arrangement:

If a citizen of the sending country is arrested or detained in any manner, the authorities of the receiving country shall, within 72 hours, notify the designated representative of the sending country of the arrest or detention of the person and permit within 24 hours of such notification access by a representative of the sending country to the citizen who is under arrest or detained in custody.

# ARTICLE II

The two Governments intend to promote relations in economic, cultural and other fields.

#### ARTICLE III

The Treaty of Naturalization signed at Tirana on April 5, 1932, shall terminate upon the entry into force of this Memorandum of Understanding. In this connection, the Government of the United States of America notes that the statement made in paragraph 2 of the diplomatic note delivered on June 23, 1922, by the American commissioner in Tirana to the President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Albania concerning the "interpretation and application of laws affecting naturalization in the United States" has for a number of years ceased to be an accurate representation of United States law.

# ARTICLE IV

Following the re-establishment of relations, the two Governments, upon the request of either side, shall enter into negotiations for the prompt settlement of claims and other financial and property matters that remain unresolved between them, each Government being entitled to raise during such negotiations the matters it wishes to be addressed.

# ARTICLE V

This Memorandum of Understanding shall enter into force upon signature.

Done at Washington, in duplicate, in the English and Albanian languages, this 15th day of March, 1991.

 FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
 FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

 THE UNITED STATES
 PEOPLE'S SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

 Raymond Seitz
 OF ALBANIA

 Muhamet Kapllani
 Muhamet Kapllani

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# **APPENDIX B**

# THE LAW ON THE ELECTIONS TO THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY\*

On the basis of Article 67 of the Constitution

# THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY OF THE PEOPLE'S SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA

# DECIDED: CHAPTER ONE GENERAL DISPOSITIONS

#### Article 1

The elections for deputies to the People's Assembly are conducted with general suffrage, by direct, equal and secret vote on the basis of the free will of electors.

Any pressure of other form of compulsion which hinders the free expression of the will of citizens during their exercise of the right to vote is punishable according to dispositions of the laws in force.

#### Article 2

All Albanian citizens who on election day have reached 18 years of age have the right to take part in the elections and to elect deputies to the People's Assembly.

Only those citizens who have been deprived of this right by decision of the court because they have committed a penal act, those declared mentally incompetent by the court, those who are serving prison sentences, as well as those arrested by decision of the court, or with the approval of the state attorney, are excluded from the right to vote.

# CHAPTER TWO THE LIST OF ELECTORS

#### Article 3

The elections are conducted on the basis of lists of electors.

All the citizens who enjoy the right to vote and are resident (permanently or temporarily in the territory of the people's council at the time when the lists are compiled, are registered in the lists of electors.

Each citizen is registered in only one list of electors.

<sup>\*</sup> Translation provided by the Presidium of the People's Assembly.

## Article 4

The lists of electors are compiled for each voting centre according to the form decided. In towns they are compiled by the executive committees of people's councils of towns or by people's councils of towns when they had no executive committees; in the cities which have been divided into precincts by the people's councils of precincts and in villages by the people's councils of villages.

The lists of electors are published by the executive committee or by the people's councils which have compiled them, not less than 25 days before election day.

#### Article 5

The lists for the electors who are serving and residing in the military units and detachments are compiled and published by their commands. All other serving members of the armed forces are registered in the lists of electors of their place of residence compiled by the respective executive committees or people's councils.

#### Article 6

When for various reasons an elector leaves his place of residence after the publication of the list of electors and before election day, on his request, the executive committee or people's council which published the list issues a certificate of his right to vote and on the list of electors records the word "departed".

The elector is registered in the list of electors of his new place of residence (permanent or temporary) on the presentation of his certificate of the right to vote together with his identification papers or some other document which replaces it.

Not more than one fifteenth of the registered electors can vote on the basis of certificates of the right to vote in any one voting centre.

The lists of electors for Albanian citizens who have gone abroad temporarily are compiled in the way determined by the central electoral commission.

#### Article 7

The organ which has published the lists of electors, by decision, can make alterations to these lists even on election day, but in all cases before the commencement of voting, when a citizen has died, has been registered twice, does not appear on the register, does not enjoy the right to vote, or is outside the territory of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania.

#### Article 8

Every citizen has the right to make requests for the correction of errors or omissions in the lists of electors such as the absence of registration, removal from the list, alterations on his name or surname, the registration of persons who have lost the right to vote etc. The request is made to the organ which has published the list, which is obliged to examine the request within two days and to give the respective decision.

An appeal against the decision may be made to the district court, which, within three days, in the presence of the complainant, and the representative of the organ which has published

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the list, considers the appeal at a court session with open doors and takes the respective decision. The decision of the court is final.

# CHAPTER THREE THE ELECTORAL ZONES AND THE VOTING CENTRES

#### Article 9

For the elections to the People's Assemble 250 electoral zones with an approximately equal number of residents are created.

The electoral zones are determined and published by the Presidium of the People's Assembly not later than 40 days before election day.

#### Article 10

The territory of each town, city precinct and village is divided into voting centres.

For each 100 to 600 electors one voting centre is set up.

When a work centre is more than 3 km from the closest voting centre a separate voting centre is set up there provided that it has no less than 50 electors.

#### Article 11

The voting centres are allocated by decision not later than 20 days before election day. In towns they are allocated by the executive committees of people's councils of towns or by the people's councils of towns where there are no executive committees, in the towns which have been divided into precincts by the people's councils of the precincts and in villages by the people's councils of village.

#### Article 12

In the military units and detachments a separate voting centre is set up for each 20 to 600 electors. These voting centres are included in the electoral zone in the territory of which the military unit or detachment is located.

The voting centres in the military units and detachments are allocated by decision of executive committees of people's councils or of people's councils when there is no executive committee in the territory of which a military unit or detachment is located. They are made known to electors and their candidates.

## Article 13

In the diplomatic representations outside the state which have not less than five electors special voting centres are set up, which are included in one of the electoral zones of the city of Tirana.

In the ships which are on voyages on election day special voting centres are set up provided they have no less than five electors. These voting centres are included in one of the electoral zones of the place where the ship is registered.

#### Article 14

In hospitals, maternity homes and other similar institutions voting centres are set up provided they have more than 15 electors.

In institutions which have many wards a separate voting centre can be set up in each ward provided it has more than 15 electors.

# CHAPTER FOUR THE ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS

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#### Article 15

To conduct elections to the People's Assembly the following commissions are set up: the central electoral commission, the electors commissions of the zones and the commissions of voting centres.

The electoral commissions are comprised of representatives of political and social organizations, representatives of various associations and outstanding personalities of various fields.

The vice chairman or secretary of the central electoral commission as well as the chairman or secretaries of electoral commissions of zones must be jurists.

#### Article 16

The central electoral commission is comprised of the chairman, vice-chairman, secretary and 10 members. The commission is approved by the Presidium of the People's Assembly not later than 40 days before the elections.

The Central electoral commission performs the following tasks:

(a) it supervises the precise implementation of the law on elections to the People's Assembly during the holding of elections throughout the whole territory of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania;

(b) it registers the deputies elected to the People's Assembly;

(c) it considers complaints against irregular actions of electoral commission of zones and gives decisions which are final;

(d) it hands the acts of elections to the commission of mandates of the People's Assembly.

#### Article 17

In each electoral zone the electoral commission of the zone is set up comprised of a chairman, a secretary and three members. The commission is approved by decision of the executive committee of the people's council of the district not later than 25 days before election day.

The electoral commissions of the zones perform the following tasks:

a) it supervises the precise implementation of the law on elections of the People's Assembly during the holding of elections throughout the whole territory of the zone;



b) registers and announces the candidates for deputies nominated according to this law;

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c) counts the votes on the basis of the certified records of voting centres and declares the results of elections in the zone;

d) considers complaints against irregular actions of commissions of voting centres;

e) issues to the deputy the certificate confirming his election;

f) sends the acts of elections to the central electoral commission.

# Article 18

For each voting centre the commission of the voting centre is set up, comprised of a chairman, a secretary and three members. The commission is approved by decision not later than 25 days before election day. In towns the commissions are approved by the executive committees of people's councils of towns or by the people's councils of towns where there are no executive committees; in the cities which have been divided into precincts by the people's councils of the precincts, and in villages by the people's councils of the village.

The commission of the voting centre performs the following tasks:

a) it runs and controls the activity for the implementation of the law on elections in the voting centre;

b) it counts the votes cast for each candidate for deputy;

c) it records in certified documents all the complaints, requests, criticisms and proposals of electors or candidates, considers them and takes the respective decision;

d) it hands to the electoral commission of the zone the certified record of the voting;

e) it sends the acts of elections to the executive committee of the people's council of the district or the town for safekeeping.

#### Article 19

The candidate for deputy cannot be a member of the electoral commission of the zone or of the commissions of voting centres of the zone in which he has been nominated.

#### Article 20

The members of electoral commissions of zones of voting centres can be released from their duties in these commissions by the organ which approved the composition of the commission, on the request of the members themselves or on proposal of organizations or associations.

#### Article 21

The directors of enterprises, institutions and social or economic organizations are obliged to grant paid leave from work to the chairman and secretaries of electoral commissions of zones for three days before and two days after the voting as well as to the chairman and secretaries of voting centres for three days before and two days after the voting.

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# CHAPTER FIVE THE PRESENTATION OF CANDIDATES

#### Article 22

For each electoral zone the deputies to the People's Assembly not less than two candidates are presented.

A person can be a candidate for deputy in only one electoral zone.

To be presented for a candidate for a deputy the Albanian citizen must be a permanent resident in the territory of the PSRA.

#### Article 23

The following political and social organizations have the right to nominate candidates for deputies to the People's Assembly: the Party of Labour of Albania, the Democratic Front, the Trade Union, the Women's Union, the Youth Union, the National Committee of Veteran the League of Writers and Artists, as well as any other political or social organization or association recognized by law.

#### Article 24

Each organization or association has the right to nominate not more than on candidate for each electoral zone.

The organizations and associations can also present the same candidate jointly.

#### Article 25

Every citizen has the right to present his candidature to be elected a deputy to the People's Assembly after he has secured the endorsement of not less than 300 electors of the electoral zone.

#### Article 26

Following the tradition of the line of the masses, for the candidates proposed by the organizations and associations before they are formally nominated, the opinion of the people is sought in open meetings which are organized for this purpose in the respective zone.

At these meetings the electors have the right to propose to the respective organizations or associations the withdrawal of any candidate about whom they have criticisms.

The electors who take part in the meetings for the preliminary discussion of candidatures have the right to propose candidates for deputies to the People's Assembly directly from these meetings.

The proposals for the withdrawal or nomination of a candidate for deputy are endorsed by the majority of participants in the meeting of electors by open vote.

#### Article 27

After they have received the criticisms or proposals in preliminary meetings of electors, the central organs of the organizations or associations, individually or jointly, compile the final list of candidates for deputies who have been nominated in the respective districts.

When the list is a joint one, it is published by the Democratic Front describing the proposing organization or association to which the candidate presented belongs.

#### Article 28

The candidates for deputies to the People's Assembly must be registered with the electoral commission of the zone not later than 15 days before election day. In order to make the registration, the following documents must be presented:

a) the application in writing by the respective organization or association

in which the registration of the candidate nominated for deputy is requested. The application must contain the name, surname, father's name and age of the candidate.

When the nomination is made by the candidate himself, the application is presented with the respective signatures of electors. The commission has the right to carry out a verification of the signatures of electors.

b) The declaration of the candidate that he accepts his nomination in that electoral zone.

### Article 29

When the conditions of this law have been fulfilled, the electoral commissions of zones are obliged to register all the candidates for deputies to the People's Assembly and to proclaim them not later than 15 days before election day, while also recording the name of organization or association which has nominated them.

#### Article 30

For each candidate for deputy the electoral commission of the zone keeps a registration document of the approved form. A copy of this document is sent immediately to the central electoral commission together with the declaration of the candidate that he accepts nomination in that zone.

#### Article 31

Against the decision of the electoral commission of the zone which refuses to register or has deregistered a candidate for deputy to the People's Assembly, a complaint can be laid within two days at the Central Electoral Commission.

#### Article 32

A complaint against the decision of the Central Electoral Commission can be laid to the Supreme Court. The latter, after summoning the candidate and the representative of the respective commission of the zone, considers the complaint and within three days gives its decision which is final and which it declares immediately.

#### Article 33

When a candidate to the People's Assembly is withdrawn by the proposer or withdraws his nomination himself or dies after he has been registered by the electoral commission, the



respective organization or association can register another candidate, but not later than 7 days before election day.

# Article 34

When a candidate for deputy is withdrawn by the proposer, withdraws his own nomination or commits an obvious grave crime during the period of 7 days before the election and when in that zone no more than two candidates have been nominated, the organ which has done the registration removes the name of the candidate from the list published or from the ballot paper and the elections for that zone are on another day not more than two weeks later than the day of the general elections.

# CHAPTER SIX THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CANDIDATES DURING THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN

# Article 35

The organizations or associations which have nominated candidates as well as any independent candidates must publicly present their respective program in writing or orally.

The programs presented must not contain ideas which are fascist, racist or terrorist or ideas inspired by or borrowed from the traitor organizations created during the National Liberation War.

#### Article 36

Every organization, association or individual has equal rights to conduct propaganda in favour of the candidate nominated, in meetings in the press, on the radio and television and in other ways.

#### Article 37

A candidate for deputy is prohibited from using the means of information of foreign countries for propaganda during the electoral campaign.

#### Article 38

The institutions, enterprises and organizations are obliged to help and to create the necessary conditions for the normal conduct of propaganda for the meetings of all candidates with the electors as well as to place at their disposal the materials necessary for knowledge of the situation.

## Article 39

During the electoral campaign no kind of propaganda is permitted from the organs of the state and the state administration on behalf of the candidates nominated for deputies to the People's Assembly.

#### Article 40

The state provides the necessary assistance to candidates and organizations which do not have the material means or sufficient financial income to cope with the electoral campaign.

The sources of financing the electoral campaign are controlled by the state.

#### Article 41

The candidate for deputy is prohibited from accepting aid, gifts or financial means for the electoral campaign from foreign states or physical or juridical persons, from buying votes from the electors or from spreading false information about the other candidates.

#### Article 42

For violation of the regulations envisaged by Articles 35, 37 and 39 of this law, the candidate for deputy is removed from the list of candidates by the commission which has registered him and when the violation constitutes a penal act, he is answerable according to dispositions envisaged in the Penal Code.

#### Article 43

While candidates for deputy tot eh People's Assembly are performing their duties as candidates during the electoral campaign their jobs are kept open for them and they receive their full pay.

#### Article 44

The candidates for deputy to the People's Assembly cannot be subject to penal prosecution, arrested or held without the approval of the Presidium of the People's Assembly, except in cases when they commit an obvious and grave crime.

## CHAPTER SEVEN VOTING

#### Article 45

The elections to the People's Assembly are held on a holiday throughout the whole People's Socialist Republic of Albania.

The date of elections is set by the Presidium of the People's Assembly not later than two months before election day.

#### Article 46

The voting is done on the day set for the elections from 6.00 to 20.00 hours.

#### Article 47

Before 6.00 hours on election day the chairman of the commission of the voting centre, in the presence of members of this commission checks the ballot boxes and the list of electors and after he finds them in order, closes and seals the ballot boxes and invites the electors to commence voting. The chairman of the commission of the voting centre is responsible for the maintenance of order and tranquility in the voting centre. His orders are obligatory for all.

# Article 48

Throughout voting day no propaganda for the candidates is permitted.

# Article 49

In each voting centre, rooms or cubicles are provided for the electors to vote in secrecy. The presence in those places of any other person including the members of the commission of the voting centre is prohibited.

#### Article 50

Each elector votes in person by presenting himself at the voting centre and obligatorily entering the room or cubicle of secrecy.

The elector has the right to vote for the candidate he chooses. The vote is cast by placing the ballot paper in the ballot box.

#### Article 51

The elector who is unable to present himself in person at the voting centre because he is ill or for any other cause has the right to demand that the commission of the voting centre send him, through a member of the commission, the second ballot box which is in each voting centre in order that he may vote.

#### Article 52

The elector who cannot read or write or has some physical disability has the right to summon any other elector into the room or cubicle of secrecy.

## Article 53

The ballot papers are printed according to the model laid down by the Presidium of the People's Assembly.

The ballot papers can also be printed in the language of national minorities.

# Article 54

The persons who present themselves to vote with a certificate of the right to vote issued according to this law are registered at the end of the list of electors by the commission of the voting centre.

# CHAPTER EIGHT VERIFICATION OF THE RESULTS OF ELECTIONS

#### Article 55

At 20.00 hours on election day the chairman of the commission of the voting centre declares the voting closed and the commission records the number of ballot papers which are unused. Following this action the ballot box is opened.

#### Article 56

During the counting of votes by the commission of the voting centre and by the commission of the electoral zone, the representatives of social organizations and associations, specially authorized for this purpose by their organs, as well as the representatives of independent candidates, the press, the radio and television services and the news agencies have the right to be present.

#### Article 57

The commission of the voting centre compares the number of ballot papers placed in the ballot box with the number of electors who have received ballot papers on the basis of the list of electors and count the votes for each candidate. The results are recorded in the certified document of the voting.

The chairman of the commission of the voting centre in the presence of all members of the commission, declares the results of the voting for each candidate.

#### Article 58

The ballot papers are invalid:

a) when the ballot paper is not of the given model;

b) when the names of more than one candidate have been left on the ballot paper;

c) when the names of all candidates have been crossed out and the name of no other person has been written in;

d) when the names of all candidates have been crossed out and in place of them another has been written in but without recording his father's name;

e) when the names of the candidates have been crossed out and in place of them the name of another person has been written in who does not have the right to vote, is under age, dead, etc.;

f) when the ballot paper is so defaced that it cannot be understood what action has been done on it.

# Article 59

The commission of the voting centre keeps a record of the voting according to the form laid down, which after it is signed by the chairman and secretary of the commission, is sent immediately to the electoral commission of the zone. The commission of the voting centre of the village sends the other acts of elections for safekeeping to the executive committee of the people's council of the district, while the commission of the voting centre of the precinct sends them for safekeeping to the people's council of the district, while the commission of the voting centre of the precinct sends them for safekeeping to the people's council of the city or its executive committee or to the executive committee of the people's council of the region.

#### Article 60

The electoral commission of the zone counts the votes on the basis of certified records of the voting sent by the commissions of voting centres and verifies the number of votes cast for each candidate for deputy.

## Article 61

The electoral commission of the zone keeps a record in two copies which is signed by the chairman or secretary of the committee. One copy of the signed record is sent immediately to the central electoral commission. The second copy of the record and the other acts of elections are sent for safekeeping to the executive committee of the people's council of the district or city.

# Article 62

After the counting of votes has ended and the record has been signed, the chairman of the electoral commission of the zone, at the meeting of the commission declares the results of the elections.

#### Article 63

The chairman of the electoral commission of the zone issues to the elected candidate a certificate of his election as a deputy to the People's Assembly.

#### Article 64

The candidate who in the first round has won more than half the total valid votes (the absolute majority) in the electoral zones is elected a deputy to the People's Assembly.

#### Article 65

When two or more candidates have been nominated in the electoral zone and none of them has received the absolute majority of votes in the first round, the electoral commission notes this on the certified records and at the same time orders the holding of a second round of voting not later than one week after the first round.

#### Article 66

When more than two candidates have been placed on the list, in the second round the voting will be for the two candidates who have received most votes, while when only two candidates have been placed on the list, both go on to the second round. In both instances, in order to go on to the second round, the candidate is required to have received more than 25

43

percent of the ballot votes cast in the ballot box. After the second round of voting the candidate who has received more valid votes than the other candidate (the relative majority) is elected.

The candidates are registered within four days of the conclusion of the first round of voting.

#### Article 67

Other elections with new candidates are held:

1. when in the first round of voting none of the candidates represented has gained more than 25 percent of the valid votes;

2. when in the first round of voting only one of the candidates presented has gained more than 25 percent of the valid votes. This candidate is retained in the new election, too.

The elections with new candidates are held not later than two weeks after the conclusion of the first round of voting.

#### Article 68

If the number of votes cast in an electoral zone is less than half the number of the electors who have the right to vote in that zone, the electoral commission of this zone marks this on its certified record and orders the reholding of elections no later than two weeks after the first voting.

The new elections are held on the basis of the list of electors compiled for the first election and in conformity with the dispositions of this law.

# Article 69

An appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Central Electoral Commission on the results of elections can be lodged by the interested candidate. The Supreme Court considers the appeal and within three days gives its decision which is final. The decision is made known to the commission of mandates of the People's Assembly.

#### Article 70

If a place for a deputy to the People's Assembly remains vacant, the Presidium of the People's Assembly, within three months calls elections for a new deputy in the respective electoral zone.

# CHAPTER NINE FINAL DISPOSITIONS

# Article 71

Law no. 4121, date 17.3.1966 "On the elections to the People's Assembly" is annulled.

# Article 72

This law comes into force immediately.

Tirana, 13.11.1990 No. of the law: 7423

Secretary of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania

Sihat Tozaj

Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania

Ramiz Alia

Section 2019

# APPENDIX C

# Decree\*

# ON SOME CHANGES TO THE LAW NO. 7423, DATED NOV. 13, 1990 "ON ELECTIONS TO THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY"

In accordance with Article 78 of the Constitution:

# PRESIDIUM OF THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY OF THE PEOPLE'S SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA

# DECIDED:

#### Article 1

The following changes must be made to law no. 7423, dated Nov. 13, 1990 "On elections to the People's Assembly":

In Article 16 the number of the members of the Central Election Commission is increased to 10 up to 14.

In Article 17 the number of the members of the election commission of the precinct is increased to 3 up to 7.

In Article 18 the number of the members of the commission of the voting centre is increased to 3 up to 5.

#### Article 2

This decree comes immediately into force.

Tirana, Jan. 17, 1991 No. of decree: 7457

# FOR THE PRESIDIUM OF THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY OF THE PEOPLE'S SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA

SECRETARY Sihat Tozaj PRESIDENT Ramiz Alia

\* Translation provided by the Central Election Commission.

# **APPENDIX D**

# PEOPLE'S SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION

# INSTRUCTION\* No. 1. January 7, 1991

# ON DRAFTING AND PROCLAMATION OF LISTS OF ELECTORS OF ALBANIAN CITIZENS TEMPORARILY ABROAD

On the basis of the dispositions of the last paragraph of Article 6 of Law no. 7423, dated Nov. 13, 1990 "On elections to the People's Assembly",

we instruct:

1. The elector lists of Albanian citizens who are temporarily abroad are drafted and proclaimed by the secretaries of our representations abroad, within the term envisaged in Article 4 of the election law.

2. The staff of our diplomatic, consular and trade representations as well as students and post-graduate students working or studying in the cities where our representations are accredited, are registered in the elector lists of our embassies.

3. Albanian citizens who travel abroad on business after the proclamation of the list of electors in their place of residence can register in these lists and vote in our representations abroad. They must present their "voting certificate" issued by the competent organ on the basis of the provisions of the election law.

4. Our representations abroad inform the election commission of the precinct to which our diplomatic representations are attached of the results of the poll, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, within 12 hours after the end of the elections. The election documents are sent to the respective organs of power of the precinct through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

5. This instruction comes immediately into force.

# FOR THE CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION OF THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY

Chairman Rexhep Mejdani

<sup>\*</sup> Translation provided by the Central Election Commission.

### APPENDIX E

# INSTRUCTIONS\* On filling voting papers and their assessment by the commissions of voting centers for the elections to the People's Assembly

As it is known, on the basis of the provisions of Article 22 of the law "On elections to the People's Assembly," no less than two candidates for deputies are put forward and registered in each precinct. Article 23 of this law defines the electoral subjects which have the right to nominate candidates, and which are several in number including the parties which have been recently created after the approval of the law.

We give the following instructions with the aim of creating a unified system of regulations for all precincts and voting centres on filling voting papers and their assessment at the end of the election:

# I. On listing the candidates in the voting paper

The names of candidates in the voting papers must be listed according to the alphabetical order, irrespective of the electoral subject which has nominated them.

The voting paper must be filled in good handwriting, clearly and without mistakes, including the name, father's name and surname of the candidates. They must be filled with a pen, ball-point or typewriter. We think that the space of the voting paper where the name of the subject nominating the candidate must be written must be filled as follows under the collective names: Party of Labour, Democratic Party, Republican Party, Ecological Party, Democratic Front, Trade Unions, Labour Youth Union, Women's Union, Committee of Veterans, independent candidates, etc.

In cases when several candidates are listed in a voting paper, it must be made clear to each elector that he will leave the name of only one candidate and cross out all the others.

# II. The procedure of voting paper assessment by the voting centre commission

At 20:00 hours of the election day the head of the voting centre commission declares the polling closed and starts the counting of votes to see the final result.

- He instructs that all unused voting papers are counted, packed and sealed. The number of unused papers is registered in special minutes.

<sup>\*</sup> Translation provided by the Central Election Commission.

- He writes in the minutes the number of electors registered in the respective voting centre as well as the number of electors who have cast their vote in conformity with the list of electors, including those with a voting certificate. Afterwards, the head of the commission orders the opening of the polling box (including the moving box).

Besides the usual polling boxes, including the moving box, each voting centre, <u>must</u> necessarily have a controlled special empty (uncovered) box ready for use, where the voting papers which have been controlled and assessed by the commission of the voting centre will be placed.

This box is controlled by the head of the commission of the voting centre in the presence of the other members of the commission and the other authorized persons, and is moved to a special place.

It is only after all these preparatory actions, that the head of the commission of the voting centre orders the opening of the polling boxes.

- Voting papers are counted by taking them out of the boxes one by one.

The head of the commission takes the first voting paper, reads it aloud, passes it to all members of the commission and shows it to all those present, the commission assesses it and registers it in the first minutes, keeping notes on each candidate and on all invalid voting papers.

Having assessed all voting papers one by one, the commission writes down in the minutes: the total number of voting papers, compares it with the number of electors who have cast their votes in conformity with the list of electors, the number of invalid voting papers and the number of votes for each candidate. Afterwards, the head of the commission of the voting centre informs all those present on the final result of the poll in the respective voting centre.

Having accomplished this procedure, the minutes signed by the head and the secretary of the commission are immediately sent to the precinct election commission, while the other documents of the election are sent to be preserved to the state organs defined in article 59 of the law on elections to the People's Assembly. The minutes can be signed also by the members of the commission of the voting centre if they demand this. If a member of the commission of the voting centre has a contradiction with the others, this must be written down in the minutes.

# III. Rules of voting in military units with a small effective

The commission instructs the organs of state power at the base that no special voting centres are set up for military units with a small effective near inhabited centres. The military must vote in the voting centres of the village or city quarter, while effective cadres, as always, vote with their families. In the case when special voting centres are set up in military unites, on the basis of Article 56 of the law "On elections to the People's Assembly", all conditions must be created for specially authorized representatives of political and social organizations, as well as independent candidates, representatives of the press, radio-television and new agencies to be present during the voting and the counting of votes in voting centres.

# CENTRAL COMMISSION OF ELECTIONS TO THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY

Tirana, February 7, 1991

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#### **APPENDIX F**

# NRIIA ELECTION DAY COVERAGE

6 t y

TEAM 1: TIRANA Jack Buechner, Delegation Leader Joseph DioGuardi, Co-Leader

Election Zones: 113, 203, 207, 208, 210, 216, 217, 218, 220, 221, 222, 224, and 225 <u>Total Polling Locations:</u> 16 <u>Total Departments:</u> 1

# TEAM 2: KUKES

Robert Henderson Osman Osmani

<u>Election Zones:</u> 120, 123, 126, 127, 167, 169, 234, and 235 <u>Total Polling Locations:</u> 14 <u>Total Departments:</u> 3

## TEAM 3: GJIROKASTER AND BERAT

Janusz Bugajski John Costonis

<u>Election Zones:</u> 1, 2, 4, 5, 28, 75, 87, 88, 201 <u>Total Polling Locations:</u> 20 <u>Total Departments:</u> 4

TEAM 4: KORCE AND ELBASAN Mary Catherine Andrews Mark Bloomfield

Election Zones: 46, 48, 95, 99, 100, 103, 104, 134, 135, 137, 162, 163, and 206 Total Polling Locations: 25 Total Departments: 5

# **APPENDIX G**

# DEPUTIES TO THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY People's Socialist Republic of Albania

ZON	NAME <u>E OF DEPUTY</u>	PARTY <u>AFFILIATION</u>	NUMBER OF VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Berat	Department			
1	Avdi Baleta	Democratic Party*		
2	Pavllo Bojaxhiu	PLA	4196	51.30%
3	Perparim Ruzi	PLA	4706	56.40
4	Gezim Gurazi	PLA	7129	79.30
		Democratic Front		
5	Kristaq Odricani	PLA	5937	77.80
6	Fatos Zotkaj	PLA	6442	88.90
7	Dhimo Dundo	PLA	6281	82.40
8	Asqeri Shehu	PLA	5993	81.70
9	Flamur Abedini	PLA	4437	89.20
10	Tomor Begollari	PLA	3809	85.40
11	Fadil Nasudi	PLA	6367	91.30
~??~`		Youth Union		
12	Xhemal Dauti	PLA	6489	86.70
		Trade Union		
13	Nadire Prifti	PLA	5890	79.00
		Women's Union		
		Democratic Front		
14	Abdyl Pilafi	PLA	4809	90.80
<b>D</b> ''				
	Department			( <b>*</b> 00
15	Fehmi Abdiu	PLA	4934	62.90
16	Ali Kaza	PLA	4463	68.50
17	Xhemal Gazidede	PLA	4335	65.30
18	Huzri Hoxha	PLA	4656	62.60
19	Vehap Daku	PLA	3730	71.00
20	Osman Murati	PLA	4135	67.80
21	Fisnik Hyka	PLA	4712	72.70
22	Xhelil Gjoni	PLA	4121	57.90
23	Haxhi Lleshi	Veterans' Committee	5086	75.90
24	Bujar Pata	PLA	5734	68.10
25	Ahmet Kamberi	PLA	3270	67.30
26	Arif Hasani	PLA	4258	63.40

NAMEPARTYNUMBER OFPERCENTAGEZONE OF DEPUTYAFFILIATIONVOTESOFTOTALDurres DepartmentOFOFTOTALOFTOTAL				
27	Bardhyl Balteza	Democratic Party	5597	(7 700
28	Spiro Doraci	Democratic Party	4589	67.70%
29	Vangjel Stamo	Democratic Party	5781	69.00 72.00
30	Bashkim Kopliku	Democratic Party	6343	73.00 69.40
31	Emin Musliu	Democratic Party	6520	
32	Bardhyl Reso	Democratic Party		72.10
33	Naim Kariqi	Democratic Party	6968 6963	71.70
34	Sali Berisha	Democratic Party		88.60
35	Ismet Ferizaj	Democratic Party*	7076	88.90
36	Fiqret Hallulli	PLA	2201	56 50
30 37	Fatmir Mingoli	PLA PLA	3281	56.50
38	Agron Fishta	PLA PLA	3927	52.90
30 39	Ibrahim Kalemi		3781	51.90
39 40		PLA	3639	52.80
	Pellumb Dema	PLA	5389	66.80
41 42	Sulejman Disha	PLA	4077	53.30
	Dhimiter Miho	Democratic Party*		<i></i>
43	Skender Dika	Democratic Party	4104	61.70
44	Petrit Llaftiu	Democratic Party	6262	79.90
45	Lindita Prifti	Democratic Party	4595	57.40
<u>Elbas</u>	an Department			
46	Argjir Panariti	Democratic Party	4649	58.50
47	Neritan Ceka	Democratic Party	5326	61.60
48	Fatmir Manushi	Democratic Party	4186	53.30
49	Arben Demeti	Democratic Party	4800	57.50
50	Qazim Radoniqi	Democratic Party	4799	65.50
51	Daniel Karanxha	Democratic Party	4577	57.30
52	Muharrem Kanjolli	PLA	4505	64.90
53	Baki Shehi	PLA	5193	81.30
54	Hysen Meta	PLA	4850	68.20
55	Skender Dubali	PLA	4024	57.40
56	Haki Hysa	PLA	4531	80.20
	•	Trade Union		
57	Ndricim Hysa	PLA	5288	80.30
58	Sulejman Pepa	PLA	5407	85.70
59	Ismail Cerri	PLA	4943	82.90
60	Moisi Lushi	PLA	5077	74.90
61	Xhemal Qerimani	PLA	5066	63.00
62	Murat Jance	PLA	5428	80.50
63	Ligor Balla	PLA	6253	83.40
64	Bajram Kurti	PLA	4747	73.60
	•			, 5.00

	NAME E OF DEPUTY Department	PARTY <u>AFFILIATION</u>	NUMBER OF <u>VOTES</u>	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
65	Ylli Bufi	PLA	3687	52.60%
66	Drini Mezini	PLA	6102	52.70
67	Kristaq Thanasi	PLA	4890	51.50
68	Xhorxhi Marku	PLA	4030	54.50
69	Anastas Pone	PLA	5499	69.60
70	Ilir Dushi	PLA	4312	55.00
71	Dhimiter Dhamo	PLA	5407	62.50
72	Shyqyri Rexhepi	PLA	3709	69.90
		Democratic Front	5705	07.70
73	Napolon Mertiraj	PLA	4646	76.00
		Democratic Front	1010	70.00
74	Engjell Beshaj	PLA	5703	68.90
75	Pellumb Shpata	PLA	5332	73.70
76	Xhevair Tahiraj	PLA	5929	78.90
77	Bardhyl Faskaj	PLA	7183	82.30
78	Faik Memushi	PLA	3332	52.60
79	Spiro Lule	PLA	5791	76.10
80	Bilbil Jaupi	PLA	5500	80.70
81	Kastriot Islami	PLA	6061	80.30
• •		Democratic Front	0001	00.50
82	Xhevair Brequ	PLA	3856	77.00
83	Ali Lamaj	PLA	5825	88.60
	5			00100
Gram	sh Department			
84	Hysen Godole	PLA	9259	92.50
85	Ajet Baci	PLA	6317	92.60
86	Mecan Hoxha	PLA	6339	93.20
		Democratic Front		
<u>Gjirol</u>	kaster Department			
87	Elvira Shapllo	PLA	4400	70.20
88	Adil Carcani	PLA	6436	59.60
		Democratic Front		
89	Flamur Cani	PLA	3475	73.00
90	Foto Fuqi	PLA*		
91	Jani Jani	Omonia	2700	68.00
92	Panajot Barka	Omonia	3403	57.80
	•			
Kolor		D7 4		
93	Shkelqim Cani	PLA	6351	76.60
94	Sotir Kokeri	PLA	6529	76.90

	NAME <u>NE OF DEPUTY</u>	PARTY <u>AFFILIATION</u>	NUMBER OF <u>VOTES</u>	PERCENTAGE OF_TOTAL
	ce Department			
95	Petrika Minga	Democratic Party	5191	73.75%
96	Natasha Lako	Democratic Party	5060	68.69
97	Stavri Frasheri	Democratic Party	6106	67.20
98	Petraq Kolevica	Democratic Party	6242	67.70
99	Ilir Manushi	Democratic Party	6707	67.40
100	Theodhorq Bello	PLA	5562	56.58
101	Stavri Kallco	PLA	4423	56.60
102	Mylazim Matraku	PLA	3520	76.10
103	Ahmet Hoxhallari	PLA	5487	77.73
104	Lutfi Dautllari	PLA	3942	67.60
105	Bujar Kolaneci	PLA	6321	69.32
106	Pellumb Seferkolli	PLA	5013	58.04
107	Mitro Nedelko	PLA	4571	58.60
108	Vasfi Sherifi	PLA	3279	52.40
109	Dritero Agolli	PLA	4918	51.78
110	Gjergji Krastafilak	PLA	4462	54.40
111	Meleq Gupi	PLA	4091	57.71
	a Department			
112	Sadedin Balla	Democratic Party	5671	62.50
113	Sulejman Disha	PLA	5393	59.40
114	Fadil Daci	PLA	5510	75.70
	Gezim Haxhiu	PLA	4217	59.10
116	Hajdar Sinani	PLA	3591	51.60
117	Agim Mero	Democratic Party	5682	53.90
118	Alfred Serreqi	Democratic Party*		
119	Mark Nokaj	Democratic Party	3778	51.70
	es Department			
120	Islam Gjana	PLA	6073	73.40
121	Qazim Laci	PLA	5727	81.60
122	Muharrem Mezini	PLA	4487	70.00
123	Qemal Elezi	PLA	5897	78.50
124	Feim Tota	PLA	3251	64.20
125	Namik Dokle	PLA	4626	66.00
126	Petrit Musa	PLA	4511	81.20
127	Pexhep Ballmi	PLA	4203	70.20
	e Department			
128	Agron Dibra	PLA	4370	54.40
129	Esat Myftari	Democratic Party*		

ZON	NAME <u>E OF DEPUTY</u>	PARTY <u>AFFILIATION</u>	NUMBER OF VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
130	Prec Zogaj	Democratic Party	5319	60.90%
131	Gjyl Brahimi	PLA*		00000
132	Zef Nikolla	PLA	4342	61.50
	shd Department			
133	Zenel Hysa	PLA	5398	83.20
134	Refik Disha	PLA	7232	85.95
135	Qemal Alla	PLA	6677	84.70
136	Sami Kushta	PLA	6434	84.90
137	Hamit Cota	PLA	6576	80.40
Lushr	ie Department			
138	Bardhyl Caco	Democratic Party*		
139	Kujtim Gina	Democratic Party*		
140	Muharrem Dalipi	PLA	4018	58.64
141	Xhemal Nezha	PLA	4283	71.29
142	7 Giomar 1 (02/14	PLA**	4205	/1.29
143	Dhimiter Cili	PLA	4797	74.70
144	Alim Cela	PLA	4957	76.60
145	Themie Thomai	PLA	4607	66.78
146		PLA	4373	69.06 ×
147	Vangjel Kokoneshi	PLA	4378	65.90
1.17	vanger ikokonesin	Democratic Front	1570	05.90
148	Skender Muco	PLA	3567	54.51
110	Shender Made		5501	54.51
Mati	<u>Department</u>		<i>i</i>	
149	Hajredin Tahiri	PLA	5844	72.60
150	Mehill Kaca	PLA	4873	77.60
151	Petrit Cuka	PLA	4692	66.20
152	Hashim Zoqu	PLA	4967	69.50
153	Qemal Disha	PLA	5326	78.10
154	Tahir Osmani	PLA	4779	75.20
<u>Mirdi</u>	ta Department			
155	Marie Biba	PLA	4584	70.20
		Women's Union		
156	Viktor Doda	PLA	5326	69.20
157	Ndue Totri	PLA	4903	73.80
		Democratic Front		
158	Ndue Kaza	PLA	4471	69.20

Perm	NAME <u>E OF DEPUTY</u> eti Department	PARTY <u>AFFILIATION</u>	NUMBER OF <u>VOTES</u>	PERCENTAGE <u>OF TOTAL</u>
159	Bashkim Xhakollari	PLA	6016	88.20%
160	Halil Hyseni	PLA	6122	83.50
161	Arqile Nagellari	PLA	7050	76.20
		Trade Union		
	dec Department			
162	Thoma Angjellari	PLA	7354	60.31
163	Dhimiter Bardhi	PLA	6434	63.90
164	Feim Bardhi	PLA	5942	75.80
165	Banush Gozhdari	PLA	3631	82.50
166	Belul Lufo	PLA**		02100
<u>Puke</u>	Department			
167	Arif Gerxhari	PLA	5082	71.10
168	Nikoll Ndoj	PLA	4833	70.80
169	Pjeter Dema	PLA	4607	73.40
170	Fran Pjetri	PLA	3581	73.40
		Trade Union		75.40
Saran	de Department			
171	Kosta Kallojeri	PLA	6468	67.87
	•	Democratic Front	0.00	07.07
172	Kico Mustaqi	PLA	5515	65.20
173	Nexhmi Hoxha	PLA	5568	71.30
		Democratic Front	2000	71.50
174	Andrea Zarballa	Omonia*		
175	Sofo Thoma	PLA	4267	58.56
176	Tomo Mico	Omonia*	1207	56.50
177	Jani Gjzeli	Omonia	3236	51.20
Skrapa	ari Department			
178	Ajli Alushani	PLA	5657	00.00
		Democratic Front	5057	88.00
179	Sazan Satka	PLA	6251	90.00
180	Gezim Cane	PLA	5963	86.30
181	Enver Naska	PLA	6139	94.10
	er Department			
182	Mehdi Shabani	Democratic Party	5241	70.20
183	Blerim Cela	Democratic Party	5276	69.90
184	Mendu Derquti	Democratic Party	5750	70.60

NAME PARTY NUMBER OF PERCENTAG				
	<u>E OF DEPUTY</u>	<b>AFFILIATION</b>	<u>VOTES</u>	<u>OF TOTAL</u>
185	Bujar Golemi	Democratic Party	6314	75.90%
186	Azem Hajdari	Democratic Party	5935	75.60
187	Ali Spahija	Democratic Party	5046	74.80
188	Pjeter Pepa	Democratic Party	5034	64.90
189	Dede Kacaj	Democratic Party	4829	57.70
190	Shaqir Vukaj	PLA	3742	60.10
191	Cun Culaj	PLA	4098	56.80
192	Myftar Mataj	PLA	4187	55.10
193	Behadir Bakalli	Democratic Party*		
194	Kole Tonaj	Democratic Party	3163	52.70
195	Agustin Shqalsi	Democratic Party	5127	65.90
196	Pjeter Arbnori	Democratic Party	3890	57.80
197	Vehbi Gruda	Democratic Party*		
198	Gezim Luli	Democratic Party	4468	57.50
199	Tonin Alimhilli	Democratic Party	4406	56.60
200	Francesk Moisi	Democratic Party	4886	66.90
		•		
	ena Department			
201	Gramoz Ruci	PLA	5193	74.30
202	Medin Duro	PLA	4802	81.50
203	Faik Cinaj	PLA	6625	78.30
204	Xhevat Sinoruka	PLA	4448	74.40
Tirana	Department			
$\frac{11100}{205}$	Tritan Shehu	Democratic Party	4934	67.10
205	Ylli Vejsiu	Democratic Party	5331	67.10
200	Rushen Golemi	2		65.50
207	Napoleon Roshi	Democratic Party Democratic Party	5690 5824	59.60
208	Arben Imami	Democratic Party	5824	65.10
209	Mitro Cela	5	4896	65.10
210	Besnik Mustafai	Democratic Party	5920	63.00
211		Democratic Party	4420	65.00
212	Ridvan Peshkepia Fatos Nano	Democratic Party PLA*	5566	58.90
213			510 <b>7</b>	<i></i>
	Albert Karriqi	Democratic Party	5187	64.10
215	Teodor Keko	Democratic Party	6509	65.10
216	Tomor Malasi	Democratic Party	6889	62.00
217	Genc Ruli	Democratic Party	5028	68.30
218	Franko Kroqi	Democratic Party	5502	62.50
219	Dhimiter Anagnosti	Democratic Party	7437	70.10
220	Gjinovefa Ndrenika	Democratic Party	5757	62.50
221	Maksim Konomi	Democratic Party	6473	65.00
222	Aleksander Meski	Democratic Party	6957	62.50

<u>ZON</u>	NAME <u>E OF DEPUTY</u>	PARTY AFFILIATION	NUMBER OF VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
223	Zyber Sinani	PLA*		<u></u>
224	Emanuel Heba	Democratic Party	3918	52.90%
225	Banush Xhabrahimi	PLA*		
226	Rexhep Uka	Democratic Party	4140	54.90
227	Lufter Xhuveli	PLA	5384	63.30
228	Mehmet Loci	PLA	4385	59.40
229	Leontiev Cuci	PLA	3180	81.40
230	Ismail Lleshi	PLA	4359	86.20
231	Shane Korbeci	PLA	5193	73.90
232	Pellumb Rama	PLA	4345	66.40
233	Lumturi Rexha	PLA	4859	67.10
		Women's Union		
Trone	oja Department			
234	Halil Elezi	PLA	7237	73.10
235	Lush Perpali	PLA	5633	71.30
236	Ali Gosturani	PLA	5641	67.80
Vlora	Department			
237	Gramoz Pashko	Democratic Party	4513	62 70
238	Roland Tafili	Democratic Party	5153	63.70
239	Kosta Koci	Democratic Party	5592	56.30 55.80
240	Abedin Elmazi	Democratic Party	5213	
241	Gafur Shametaj	Democratic Party	5609	58.40 62.90
242	Petraq Nasi	PLA	4314	
212	r ou uq 19031	Trade Union	4314	62.10
243	Gagace Bregaj	PLA	4095	60.10
244	Kostandin Hoxha	PLA	3032	62.90
245	Sabit Brokaj	PLA	4406	66.90
246	Pellumb Kapo	PLA	5193	75.90
247	Filip Taco	Democratic Party	3916	59.00
248	Llazar Gjindali	PLA	4970	62,50
249	Halil Hasko	PLA	4255	60.60
250	Petraq Curri	Democratic Party*		20100

\* Won on 7 April 1991 in the second round. \*\* Won on 14 April 1991 in special election.

# **APPENDIX H**

# U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STATEMENT ON ALBANIAN ELECTIONS

# 3 April 1991

MS. TUTWILER: Yesterday I told you all what we knew at the time about the elections in Albania that had been held. We have more information today, and I'd like to share that with you.

The Albanian Central Election Commission has officially announced that the Albanian Workers Party won 162 seats of the 250-seat Parliament; the Democratic Party, 65; the Greek Party, 3; the Veterans Committee, 1. Seventeen candidates face runoff elections this Sunday and one seat will be recontested April 14.

Concerning our overall reaction on these elections, the March 31 elections were the first step on the long road to democracy in Albania. The democratic opposition, which did not exist four months ago, now has over a quarter of the seats in Parliament and is pressing for political freedom and economic reform in a society with little recent experience in the democratic process. A partial foundation has been laid for political pluralism and democracy.

Based on reports from U.S. observers and other international election monitors, it appears that the electoral process fell short in several key areas of CSCE standards for free and fair elections. During the campaign, the opposition parties were allowed only limited access to the government-controlled media, although they were allotted some time for televised political broadcasts and were able to publish newspapers that received partial dissemination.

Official parties enjoyed overwhelming use of state resources while opposition parties had limited access to these resources. There are also credible reports of widespread intimidation against opposition party candidates and activists during the campaign and on election day. It is questionable why the authorities delayed issuing official election results for over two days, and that the list of winning and losing candidates contained no vote count.

We call upon authorities to investigate fully and openly all charges of electoral abuses and to propose appropriate measures to redress legitimate grievances.

Now it is up to all elements of Albanian society to help the newly created multiparty system function in an effective manner. In particular, the majority party must fully respect the rights of the minority parties as stipulated by CSCE. The United States firmly supports the principles of democracy in Albania and those who are working to establish freedom and human rights.

#### APPENDIX I

# NRIIA DELEGATION SCHEDULE FOR ELECTION OBSERVATION IN ALBANIA

# MONDAY,

# 25 MARCH 1991

4:00 pm	NRIIA Representatives Arrive Tirana
	Robert Henderson and Mary Catherine Andrews of NRIIA
	Joseph DioGuardi and Osman Osmani

8:00 pm Dinner with the Republican Party of Albania Dr. Sabri Godo, President

# TUESDAY,

# 26 MARCH 1991

- 9:00 am Meeting with the Minister of Justice Dashamir Kare
- 10:30 am Meeting with the Central Election Commission Rexhep Mejdani, Chairman
- 12:00 pm Meeting with the Democratic Party Steering Committee Eduard Selami, Amben Immani, Aleksander Meski
- 6:00 pm Attend Press Conference By Rexhep Mejdani of the Central Election Commission

# WEDNESDAY,

# 27 MARCH 1991

- 9:00 am Meeting with the Party of Labor of Albania Dr. Spiro Dede
- 10:00 am Meeting with the Foreign Ministry Muhamet Kapllani, the Foreign Minister
- AFTERNOON Meetings in Berat Department with the Democratic Party and Republican Party Presidents and Activists

# THURSDAY, 28 MARCH 1991

4:00 pm	Delegation Arrive
	Jack Buechner, Mark Bloomfield, Janusz Bugajski, and
	John Costonis

7:30 pm Dinner with U.S. Department of State Tirana-based Site Team

# FRIDAY,

29 MARCH 1991

9:00 am	Meeting with Central Election Commission Rexhep Mejdani, Chairman
10:30 am	Meeting with the Democratic Party

- Dr. Sali Berisha, President, and Gramoz Pashko, Eduard Selami
- 2:30 pm Meeting with the Republican Party Dr. Sabri Godo, President
- 4:00 pm Meeting with the Labor Party Spiro Dede

Meeting with Cameria Association NRIIA Delegate Janusz Bugajski

# SATURDAY,

# 30 MARCH 1991

8:00 am	Kukes Deployment
	Depart Tirana

- 9:30 am NRIIA Press Conference Presentation of Letter to the Albanian People from former U.S. President Ronald Reagan
- 10:00 am Korce and Gjirokaster Deployments Depart Tirana
- AFTERNOON All Deployments Meet with: Democratic Party Activists Republican Party Activists Labor Party Activist Zone Election Commissions

8:00 pm	Tirana Deployment Dinner with Foreign Journalists
SUNDAY,	
31 MARCH	
6:00 am	All Deployments Arrive For Poll Openings
DAY	Observe Voting Throughout Albania
	Gjirokaster Deployment
	Meeting with Omonia Organization
10:00 pm	Delegation Reassembles in Tirana Debrief
	Begin Statement Drafting
MONDAY,	
1 APRIL 19	91
MORNING	-
	Visits to the Central Election Commission
1:30 pm	Presentation of NRIIA
p	Statement of Preliminary Findings
3:00 pm	Delegation Depart Tirana
I	Jack Buechner, Mark Bloomfield, John Costonis
TUESDAY, 2 APRIL 19	91
11:30 am	Follow-Up Meeting with Republican Party
11.50 um	Dr. Sabri Godo, President
3:30 pm	Follow-Up Meeting with Democratic Party
2.20 pm	Dr. Sali Berisha, President
	Eduard Selami and Genc Pollo
5:00 pm	Follow-Up with Central Election Commission
8:00 pm	Follow-Up Meeting with Labor Party
0.00 pm	Spiro Dede and Other PLA Officials

# WEDNESDAY, 3 APRIL 1991

8:00 AM	Delegate Janusz Bugajski Depart Tirana	
9:00 am	Additional Meetings with Labor Party Officials	
10:30 am	Additional Meetings with Democratic Party Officials	
12:00 pm	Additional Meetings with Central Election Commission	
AFTERNOON	Follow-Up Meetings in Berat: Democratic Party Republican Party Labor Party	
THURSDAY, 4 APRIL 1991 9:00 am Courtesy Call at Republican Party Headquarters		

10:00 am	Courtesy Call at Democratic Party Headquarters
12:00 pm	Follow-Up with Central Election Commission
3:00 pm	NRIIA Representatives Depart Albania Robert Henderson and Mary Catherine Andrews

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The National Republican Institute for International Affairs (NRIIA) is a not-for-profit institution which fosters the process of democratic self-rule, through cooperative programs with political parties and other non-governmental organizations overseas. The NRIIA is committed to the belief that free, competitive, and sound political parties are cornerstone institutions within any democratic society.

The NRIIA has sponsored election observer delegations in Bulgaria, Chile, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, the Philippines, Romania, and five republics of Yugoslavia.