I R I

Advancing Democracy Worldwide

Republic of Croatia
Parliamentary Election
January 3, 2000

Election Observation Mission
Report and Recommendations

International Republican Institute
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I. Executive Summary

IRI received funding from the US Agency for International Development to conduct an international election observation for the January 3, 2000 Croatia parliamentary (Sabor) elections. IRI's 25-member delegation included representatives from the United States, Great Britain, Poland, Ukraine and Slovakia. A full list of delegates is attached (Appendix I). The delegates were credentialed through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, but operated independently during the elections and issued their own post-election statement on January 4, 2000.

IRI observers arrived in Zagreb, Croatia on December 31, 1999. Following a day of briefings in Zagreb on January 1, 2000 with political parties, election officials, journalists, NGOs and representatives from the American Embassy and USAID, the teams were deployed to ten electoral units across Croatia. On January 2, delegates met with local party officials, election administrators, media representatives and representatives from the Croatian domestic election monitoring organization, GONG. On election day, January 3, delegates traveled throughout the electoral units to which they had been assigned and observed the opening of polling stations, voting procedures, and ballot tabulation and reporting processes. In all, IRI observers visited approximately 150 polling stations on election day. The day following the elections, the delegates returned to Zagreb for debriefing and issued a preliminary statement to the news media (Appendix II).

Although IRI observers noted problems in the period preceding the election and on election day itself, they were able to conclude unanimously that the election process was basically sound. They found no evidence of either widespread or systematic irregularity in the balloting process in the 10 electoral units within Croatia. (IRI observers did not monitor balloting or ballot tabulation in Bosnia-Herzegovina on January 2nd and 3rd, where more serious problems and irregularities were reported.) Based upon their observations, and their many interviews with representatives of parties, civic organizations, election administrators and the media, IRI observers concluded that the results of the balloting were a credible and accurate reflection of the will of the citizens of Croatia on election day.

II. Election Framework

Representation in Parliament

On January 3, 2000, the citizens of Croatia went to the polls to elect new members to the House of Representatives, which is the lower house in Croatia's parliament or *Sabor*. Since Croatia's first multi-party elections in 1990, it was the ninth time that Croatians voted in nationwide elections. The mandate of the outgoing parliament expired on November 27, 1999. Croatian law requires that elections be held not later than 60 days after the expiration of the mandate or the dissolution of the Sabor. Therefore, the elections were required to be held by January 27, 2000.

A distinctive provision in the Croatian Constitution (article 71) states that the House of Representatives shall have "no less than 100 and no more than 160 deputies, elected on the basis of direct universal and equal suffrage by secret ballot." This provision allows the number of representatives to vary with each new electoral law revision.

Following 1995 parliamentary elections, for example, there were 127 seats in the House of Representatives. Representatives for 80 of these seats were chosen on the basis of a nationwide, proportional ballot while an additional 28 seats were filled on the basis of a majority vote in electoral districts established for the elections. Seven seats were reserved for Croatia's national minorities, while the remaining 12 seats were chosen on the basis of a proportional vote of Croatian citizens residing outside of Croatia borders - most of them in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The law's provisions for diaspora voting were among its most controversial as they provided Bosnian Croats, in particular, with highly disproportional representation in the parliament.

Electoral law revisions for the 2000 elections, adopted barely two months prior to the election, redrew the electoral map of Croatia, establishing 12 constituency districts. Ten territorial districts were established, each electing 14 members. In addition to these 140 seats, the election law provided for an 11th constituency unit reserved for Croatian citizens without permanent residence in Croatia. A separate constituency for national minorities reserved five additional seats for officially recognized ethnic minority groups.

While the new election law did not abolish the controversial provision for diaspora representation, it did provide a new method for calculating results that made the number of diaspora seats a function of turnout in the 10 districts, virtually assuring that diaspora representation in the new parliament would diminish. The diaspora seats were considered an 11th constituency district that could, however, theoretically elect up to 14 members to the House of Representatives. Therefore, the new House of Representatives could have had a maximum of 159 members.

In fact, 151 members were elected to the new parliament: 140 from the 10 electoral units in Croatia; five representatives of the countries' officially recognized ethnic minority groups; and 6 members representing ethnic Croats living in Bosnia and elsewhere.

Selection of the Election Date

Croatia's January 3 parliamentary elections were announced against the backdrop of former President Franjo Tudjman's deepening health crisis, and the election date was the subject of great uncertainty and controversy.

Before his hospitalisation in November, President Tudjman had unofficially announced that the election would be held on December 22. His illness prevented him from making the date official.

Parliament was unwilling to use constitutional provisions to declare the President permanently incapacitated, which would have empowered the Speaker of Parliament to make the December 22 date official. Instead, the impasse froze the government and resulted in a missed deadline for making the December 22 election date official. The gridlock was broken when parliament, led by Mr. Tudjman's party, amended the Constitution to allow for a declaration of temporary incapacitation. Utilizing this newly enacted provision of constitutional law, Parliamentary Speaker Vlatko Pavleti assumed presidential powers in early December and announced the election for January 3, 2000. While conforming with Croatia's legal requirement that elections be called with no less than 30 days notice, the time for campaigning, given the ensuing Christmas and New Year's holidays, would be exceedingly short.

A Shortened Official Campaign Period

Barely a week after the new election date was announced, on December 10, President Tudjman died. Tudjman's death and the state funeral and mourning that followed, further truncated the already brief official campaign period. Moreover, the process of forming electoral commissions and naming candidates consumed much of the early part of the campaign. On December 12, the State Election Commission (SEC) announced that it had received a total of 278 candidate lists from 54 parties for the January parliamentary elections. In addition, 30 people had declared their candidacy for the five seats reserved for ethnic minorities. In total, 4,100 individuals applied to the commission to be candidates in the election. The State Election Commission had to check all candidacies by midnight December 13 and establish whether they were valid. According to the election law, "election campaigning starts on the day of the publication of the collective lists of the constituencies... and ends 24 hours before election day." This provision meant that campaigning started on December 14, one day after President Tudjman's state funeral, and only 19 days before the election. Because of the Christmas and New Year holidays, the campaign was in reality barely two weeks.

Eligibility to Vote/Voter Registration

All Croatian citizens over the age of 18 were eligible to vote in the elections. Croatia has no requirement that citizens register to vote. Upon their 18th birthday their names are supposed to be automatically added to voter registration lists in the electoral district where they reside. Two weeks prior to the election, all eligible voters are to receive notification by mail of the election date and where they are to vote.

In addition to allowing for the "diaspora" vote (see below), Croatia's revised election law adopted on October 29, 1999 allows for members of Croatia's armed services and merchant marine, as well as private citizens travelling abroad to vote in the elections at officially designated locations. In addition, voters "serving prison terms," were allowed to vote in polling places at prison sites. The election law made no provision for either the public posting or revision of voter registration lists prior to election day.

The law also provided for approximately 16,000 "expelled" and "displaced" persons to vote at special polling stations. "Expellees," comprising approximately 14,500 of these 16,000 people, are predominantly ethnic Croats forced from their homes during Croatia's war with Serbia. Approximately 300 polling stations were established for "expellees" from Vukovar-Srijem County and 10 polling stations for those from Osijek-

Baranja. Approximately 1,400 voters, predominantly ethnic Serbs, are designated as "displaced persons." Two voting stations were established for these voters.

III. Election Administration

The election was administered by four-tiered administrative structure. The structure was comprised of the State Election Commission (SEC); 11 Constituency Election Commissions (CECs); 543 Municipal Election Commissions (MECs) or City Election Commissions (CiECs), and over 6,500 polling station Voting Committees (VCs).

Election commissions at the state (national), constituency, and municipal levels were all composed of a core group of members - all of whom had to be judges or lawyers - appointed directly or indirectly by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia. Commissions at all three of these levels were augmented by between four and six additional members designated in equal proportion by the majority political party (HDZ) and the combined opposition. Polling Station Precinct Election Commissions (individual polling stations) were composed of nine members – a non-partisan President and eight members designated in equal proportion by the majority party and the combined opposition. In the territory of Croatia, there were approximately 6,500 individual polling stations, each of which was required to open at 7:00 a.m. and close at 7:00 p.m.

As both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court were composed almost completely of members appointed by and loyal to the government, inclusion of the opposition representatives on the State Election Commission (SEC), Constituency Election Commission (CEC), and Municipal and City Election Commissions (MECs and CiECs) was especially important, as was representation of both opposition and government party designees on all voting station committees. Provisions in the new election law providing for opposition party representation at all levels of the election administration structure was among its most important improvements over the 1995 election law.

Party Lists / Independent Candidates / Access to Voter Registration Lists

All registered political parties had the right to propose party lists for each of the 10 electoral units. Lists had to be presented to the SEC no more than 14 days after the election was officially announced. The deadline for submission of lists was December 11, 1999. Each list had to contain no more than 14 names, and any two or more parties had the right to propose joint, or coalition, lists. The names of individual candidates could appear only on one party or coalition list, and only in one electoral unit. The person whose name heads the list did not have to be a candidate on the list. In order to be seated in parliament, any political party (or coalition) that won seats in a constituency district also had to win a minimum five percent of the national vote total.

Individual voters could also propose their own, independent candidate lists to the NEC. To be valid, these lists had to be accompanied by 500 validated signatures. A total of 282 party and independent candidate lists were accepted by the SEC for election to Constituency Units 1-11, including 21 for Constituency Unit #11. Thirty candidates registered for election to the five seats allocated to the national minorities in Constituency Unit #12.

One of the most contentious issues in this election, as in previous elections, involved the voter registration lists. The Law on Election Registers, adopted in 1992, was not amended for the 2000 election. It provides for these lists to be updated on a regular basis and to be open for inspection by individual voters. Despite this allowance for transparency, the OSCE reported complaints on the part of opposition parties of inaccuracy of the lists and of an extremely limited amount of time to inspect and update the lists. Instances of deceased persons remaining on voter lists in part corroborated these complaints, as did the fact that many county administrators were not able to finalize their voter lists in time to meet the legal deadline.

3,827,000 voters were registered to vote in the 10 in-country Constituency Units.

Minority Representation in Parliament

In addition to the 140 members elected based on party and independent lists from the 10 electoral units, the election law guaranteed five seats in parliament to representatives of Croatia's indigenous ethnic minorities. Members of Croatia's Hungarian, Italian, and Serb minorities each elected one parliamentarian – a reduction for the Serb minority, which had been guaranteed three seats in the previous Sabor. Members of the Czech and Slovak minority together elected one parliamentarian, and members of the Austrian, German, Ruthenian, Ukrainian, and Jewish ethnic minority together elected one parliamentarian.

Representation of Croat Diaspora in Parliament

The revised election law, like its predecessor, provided that the Croat diaspora could also elect a list of candidates. The diaspora constituted an 11th electoral district. By far the greatest concentration of diaspora voters resides in the Croat-dominated portions of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The diaspora slate was the subject of great controversy both internationally and within Croatia. Within the international community, it was viewed as undermining Bosnia's fledgling democracy by fostering the "greater Croatia" sentiment that remained strong among Bosnian Croats and ultra-nationalists in Croatia itself. The diaspora slate was contentious in Croatia for these same reasons, but also because it provided the HDZ with a built-in electoral advantage. Twelve MPs – nearly 10 percent of the entire body and all members of HDZ – represented the diaspora in the last parliament. Members of the diaspora, in this case, were significantly over-represented in the Sabor relative to Croatian voters residing in Croatia itself.

In a compromise worked out with the opposition, the governing HDZ agreed to a new formula for allocating diaspora seats in the January 3, 2000 election. While the law allowed each party to propose a normal list of 14 candidates to be included on the diaspora ballot, a formula was set out in the election law to insure against over-representation. The number of MPs selected from the diaspora slate was linked to the number of votes, on average, that it took to elect each of the 140 MPs from the 10 election units in Croatia itself. In other words, if the 140 MPs elected from Croatia proper were elected on the basis of 1.4 million votes cast (an average of 10,000 votes per MP), and 80,000 diaspora Croats cast ballots on election day, eight rather than 14 MPs would be selected to represent the diaspora community. Six candidates were eventually elected from the diaspora ballot.

Filing and Adjudication of Complaints

A two-tiered system for resolving election disputes was established, designating the SEC and Constitutional Court to handle election-related complaints. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia was the final arbiter of complaints and allegations. However, objections related to the offering of candidates, the registration of candidate lists, or the campaign itself had to first be brought to the State Election Commission, no later than 48 hours after the alleged infraction occurred. The SEC was required to make its ruling within 48 hours. In the case of an unfavorable ruling, the complainant had 48 hours to appeal the decision to the Constitutional Court, which had 48 hours to render a final decision.

If the SEC ruled in favor of the complainant, and further determined that the improper actions effected or might have affected the results of the election, the body could rule the action null and void. If there was no way of repeating the actions declared null and void prior to election day, and if the Commission determined that the action impacted on the outcome of the election, the Commission had the authority to declare the election null and void and set a new election date.

Election Ethics Commission

The election law also provided for establishment of an Ethics Commission. The Ethics Commission was presided over by the President of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, and was composed of distinguished public figures proposed by the political parties and appointed by the Constitutional Court. As required by law, the Commission published an election Ethical Code prior to the official beginning of the election campaign, calling upon all participants in the election to exercise "fairness, tolerance, and truthfulness."

The Ethics Commission was professional in its conduct during the campaign period and issued balanced warnings and announcements without regard for party considerations. Seven announcements and four warnings were issued during the campaign period with regard to parties' campaign behavior and media content. The Ethics Commission's rulings, however, had no force of law, and therefore had no real impact on the conduct of the campaign.

Campaign Financing

The election law provided for public funding for parties' campaigns, using a formula that heavily favored the ruling party. Of the total available public funding, 20% would be distributed evenly among competing parties and 80% according to the parties' seats in the current parliament. With 75 seats in parliament, the HDZ received 59% of this funding, giving it considerable advantage over the opposition.

The election law made limited provision for transparency: prior to the election, parties were required to disclose intended expenditures and their sources. The law fell short of offering true transparency, however, as parties were not required to disclose their financial records following the election.

Access to Media

The law made it incumbent upon parliament to enact regulations on how Croatian state TV and radio would cover the election campaign, and on how state TV and radio would make advertising time available to parties. On November 5, 1999, the Sabor adopted the "Regulations on the Conduct of Croatian Radio-Television During Election Campaign," which stated that the state-owned broadcast services would "ensure compliance with and respect for professional independence of its journalists, journalist code of conduct, and widely accepted rules and principles of democracy." These new rules went on to state that no political party or candidate could have privileged treatment; the regular activities of state officials may not be used for promotion of their political party; and that the State Election Commission could adjudicate objections to media coverage.

In addition, the law had many other provisions designed to provide equal access and unbiased coverage for all parties and candidates running in the election. The new regulations required the state-owned television channel (HTV) to broadcast coverage of campaign activities in programs following the "main news programs." These were ten-minute broadcasts in which up to five parties each had two-minute slots.

The law also called for "specially designed programs" to allow parties and candidates to introduce themselves to voters and explain their political platforms. All candidates were given an opportunity to answer the same questions, and the sequence of appearances was decided by lottery. There was an additional five-minute program in which parties and candidates had an opportunity to present themselves without the presence of journalists. Parties running in coalition with other parties could not make individual presentations, but were required to share time with their coalition partners.

Parties and campaigns had the right to purchase up to 30 minutes of additional paid advertising time, at a uniform discounted rate, in a maximum of two-minute blocks. However, HTV had the right to refuse to run a paid advertisement if it "has not been requested or submitted 24 hours prior to scheduled air time or if its content... breaches the Constitution and legal order."

Recognition of Domestic Election Observers

For the first time, the new election law provided for the accreditation of domestic election observers by the SEC. In previous elections, observers were present but were forced to stand outside of voting places. There were approximately 9,000 polling places in Croatia, and it is estimated that the domestic monitoring organization GONG deployed observers to over half of these sites. By comparison, the OSCE team, including IRI-designated observers, was composed of over 350 observers. Along with the new law's provisions allowing political parties to have representation on election commissions at all levels, the provision on accreditation of domestic monitors represented an important step forward and made an important contribution to the success of the election.

IV. Findings of IRI Election Observers

IRI's preliminary statement is attached as Appendix II. As noted, the delegates concluded that the election process was basically sound and accurately reflected the will of the electorate. IRI observers found no evidence of either widespread or systematic irregularity in the balloting process. The OSCE delegation, as

well as the domestic monitoring organization, GONG, reached similar conclusions. IRI's delegates coordinated their activities and coverage, to the maximum extent possible, with OSCE short-term observers.

IRI's delegates were deployed principally to the following cities in Croatia: Bjelovar, Dubrovnik, Karlovac, Osijek, Rijeka, Sibenik, Sisak, Split, Varazdin, Vukovar, Zadar, and Zagreb. Because of the geographical configuration of Electoral Unit #10, which included both areas of Split and Dubrovnik, two teams were deployed to this area.

IRI's monitors visited both rural and urban sites, as well as military installations and prisons. Delegates reported back to IRI on Sunday evening following meetings with local party leaders, election officials, and NGOs. Delegates also reported to IRI's Zagreb office several times on election day – Monday, January 3. Final delegation reports were phoned in after ballot tabulation late Monday night or early on Tuesday morning, January 4. IRI then debriefed all delegates in Zagreb on Tuesday afternoon before issuing its preliminary statement at an afternoon news briefing at the Sheraton Hotel in Zagreb.

A. The Pre-Election Environment

Each team was provided with information about the local ruling party, opposition parties, GONG, and local media. Teams then met with as many of these groups as possible prior to election day. Because of the unusual timing of the elections, it was difficult for many teams to arrange meetings. In some cases, meetings had to be held in the homes of party officials.

The political party representatives, election administrators, and NGO representatives with which IRI observers met in Zagreb, and in the 10 electoral units to which IRI observers were deployed, did not report widespread or systematic obstacles to the conduct of campaigns by individual parties or coalitions, the filing and registration of candidate lists, or the formation of local and regional election administration structures. Municipal and City Election Commission representatives with whom IRI observers were able to meet on January 2 expressed confidence in their preparations and readiness, a sentiment that political party representatives shared. Representatives of opposition political parties and coalitions with which IRI met in Zagreb and in the regions also expressed a generally high level of confidence in the preparedness of national, regional and local election administrative structures and their capacity to insure the integrity of the process.

The most frequently heard complaints focused on three issues: media, voter registration lists, and the timing of the election.

Media

Most opposition representatives criticized the pre-election media environment, noting the considerable advantage the ruling HDZ enjoyed in gaining access to media coverage. It was clear that despite the election law's formal requirements, HDZ had a substantial media advantage because of its influence over the editorial policies of the HTV. In its regular national news broadcasts, HTV provided HDZ with substantial and highly favourable coverage. Coverage of the opposition was far less substantial and generally negative in content.

The European Institute for the Media monitoring mission reported that, out of 29 hours and 40 minutes of public affairs and election-related coverage on HTV, 42% were devoted to HDZ-affiliated officials and an

additional 18% to the HDZ itself. In contrast, the opposition coalition received coverage totaling 25% for all six parties combined.

According to weekly reports prepared by the U.S. Embassy, for the period of November 30 to December 6, the amount of negative air time for the opposition equaled the total of the previous two months combined. In addition to negative opposition party coverage, the HTV also broadcast a series of reports portraying the international community as working against Croatian interests. For instance, HTV discussed a *Vjesnik* article, which suggested that the CIA was using NGOs, including IRI, to finance opposition parties and topple the ruling party. During this same time, the HTV coverage of the ruling party was largely dominated by members of the government participating in campaign-style events – the opening of a power plant, a new program for the disabled, the commemoration of a monument to war victors, and the presentation of gifts to children. While ostensibly 'news,' these broadcasts cast favorable light on the HDZ throughout the campaign season.

The opposition, meanwhile, was limited to allotted free time and a limited amount of paid advertising during the 'official' campaign period only – which itself was curtailed by a media blackout period for paid advertising and election coverage from December 24-26 and again from December 30-January 2. These combined constraints effectively left the opposition only 13 days for party advertising and election-related coverage.

The parties' allotted individual programs were grouped together in rapid succession and were scheduled following the "main" news at a time when few voters were expected to be watching. In the limited time allowed, parties had little opportunity to distinguish themselves from their opponents, and the discussion format in most cases offered little opportunity for any substantive discussion of the issues.

In Rijeka (Unit 8), for example, IRI observers were told that the HDZ-run HTV set the schedule and order of appearance for the 23 parties in the region, and that the parties were given 5 minutes to present themselves as well as answer two questions that were prepared, allegedly, by HDZ:

1. "What will your party do concerning employment if they come to power?"
2. "What position would you take with The Hague court?"

Though not inherently prejudicial, these sorts of broad questions offer little opportunity for real discussion or debate. Taken in the context of a 23-party succession of five-minute presentations, likely overwhelming to the voters if of any interest at all, the parties, as well as their intended audience, were clearly able to derive little real benefit from their allotted media time.

Opposition parties also expressed concerns about the impact that media coverage of President Tudjman's death might have on the outcome of the vote. Immediately after the president's death (and just a day before the official campaign period), the public was subjected to non-stop coverage of Tudjman's (i.e. HDZ's) achievements as well as programs of a clearly nationalistic nature, which discussed the war with Serbia and Croatia's fight for independence. The state funeral, however, and the media's coverage of it, was relatively brief, and IRI observers did not generally feel that the state media attempted to exploit Tudjman's death to HDZ's benefit to the extent the opposition feared it might.

Voter Registration Lists

Current voter registration lists were not available to the parties, a point of considerable frustration for opposition leaders as they were thus prevented from checking the accuracy of the lists with respect to their party members. They were also deprived of a key resource for targeted mailings and door-to-door campaigns. The governing HDZ, on the other hand, apparently did have access to the lists. This was evidenced by the fact that a bar-coded HDZ letter asking voters to support the party on election day was received by households across Croatia just days before the election.

Election Timing

Opposition party leaders and party activists were virtually unanimous in their criticism of the government for the way in which it handled the timing of the election. First, they cited the fact that the election was called in extremely short notice which, combined with the fact that the campaign and election were scheduled around the Christmas and New Year's holidays, resulted in a substantially truncated campaign. Taking President Tudjman's state funeral into account as well, the official campaign period consisted of barely 15 days. The opposition's complaints in this regard were well-founded.

Opposition spokesmen also claimed that the timing of the election was deliberately intended to reduce voter turnout, as many vacationing Croatians may might not have returned home from Christmas and New Year's holidays by election day. Though the concern was valid, it wasn't realized. Voter turnout was in fact higher than expected, with an average of 75.3% turnout in the 10 in-country constituencies.

Party representatives also told IRI that the government's choice of the election date created a risk that election commissioners and administrators might not have had sufficient time to prepare for the election. Again, while the concern and criticism are valid, their fears were not realized, as evidenced by the confidence that most expressed in the readiness of the commissions and the actual performance of the commissions on election day.

B. Election Administration

Though generally minor irregularities in administrative procedure were noted by many of IRI's observers, their overall impression on election day was very positive. Individual polling stations across the country were generally well organized. Polling station committees were adequately trained and performed their duties seriously and competently. The balloting process itself took place in a generally well-organized manner and in an environment free of intimidation. There were few reported problems with registration lists, or evidence that any significant number of voters were denied the opportunity to cast ballots. Although the ballot tabulation and reporting processes proceeded less smoothly – owing mainly to the multiplicity of protocols that polling station committees were required to complete and file – IRI observers saw no reason to believe that votes were incorrectly tabulated or reported. IRI's team was particularly impressed with the State Election Commission's rapid presentation of election results to the public on election night so that the results of the election were quickly known and accepted by all parties.

Opening Polling Stations

Teams were present at the opening of polling stations at 7:00 a.m. on election day. In general, polling sites appeared to have received adequate materials and to have been properly organized. Rules for insuring the safeguarding of the polling sites, and the balloting materials, also appear to have been adequately applied.

Rules prohibiting the placement of political campaign materials in, or in the vicinity of, voting stations were generally respected. Pictures of the recently-deceased President Tudjman were on display in some voting stations that were in public buildings. This was not a widespread problem and it appeared in almost all cases that the portraits had long been in place.

Delegates noted that voter registration lists, including lists for ethnic minorities, appeared to be in order, and all commission members were present as required by the law. In some rural areas, observers noted that stations opened late due to the late arrival of commissioners or the fact that the polling station preparations were not completed on time. In one instance, delegates noted that a polling site opened after 7:00 a.m. because the chairman of the election board was briefing a new election commissioner on his duties. This did not appear to be a widespread problem, or one that had an impact on the balloting process.

Delegates did note in some cases, such as several polling stations in Electoral Unit 6, that proper sealing materials were not received (wax and twine) and that, as a result, ballot boxes could not be sealed at both the top and bottom. In some Unit 6 stations, polling commissioners indicated they had not received instructions on how to seal the bottom of the ballot box, so it had not been sealed at all. During the course of the voting day, observers did not, however, report problems with ballot box security.

Delegates also found that in some cases early in the day the number of ballots received by the polling commission were reported to be identical to the number of voters on their voter registration lists. Later in the day, observers found that polling station commissions generally reported a number of ballots between 5% and 10% greater than the number of voters on the registration list. This led to them to conclude that in many polling stations the ballots may not have been counted until after the polling stations opened.

Balloting Process

In general, voting proceeded without incident at the polling sites visited by IRI delegates. Voters appeared to be knowledgeable about the polling process and the proper identification required. Voting station commissioners, for their part, appeared to be adequately trained and conducted themselves professionally with very rare exceptions. They were helpful to voters that required information and provided open access to domestic and international observers. With one exception (see below), there were no signs of unusual crowding. Balloting proceeded in an organized fashion throughout the day. There were no reported problems with security around voting stations, nor did observers report the presence of police or military in polling stations.

Accessibility of Polls

Most polling sites were readily accessible to voters. Many of the polling sites were located in schools, for example, which provided an excellent setting for voting to occur. Some challenges to voter access were noted, however. In Unit 8 (the Rijeka region), for example, delegates noted several sites without signs identifying the location as a polling site. One polling station in Unit 8 was located in a bar. Many polling sites were located on the second floors of buildings, which made it difficult for elderly voters to access.

A common observation from delegates was that the polling site locations were too small, creating potential for overcrowding. In one case delegates reported that one polling site was so small as to accommodate only one voter in addition to the commission and observers.

In some sites, delegates noted that too many people were assigned to one polling site, many of which had to travel significant distances to reach the site. The Dvor site on the Bosnian border (Unit 6) had 2,696 voters on their registration lists, with the vast majority (1,906) on the Serb minority list. Delegates arrived at the site at noon to find long lines of people waiting.

Voter Privacy

While no malicious intent was likely, delegates noted that the great majority of polling sites did not contain adequate provisions for private voting. Delegates from Unit 4 (the Osijek region), for example, noted that in most sites, small cardboard tri-folds were set on tables, but that in no instance was anything resembling a voting booth observed. Despite the lack of real privacy in many voting stations, observers did not report instances in which voters appeared to be interfered with, or in other ways intimidated or influenced, in filling out their ballots.

Instances of family voting, typically husband and wife, were also noted. Delegates in Unit 3 (Varazdin) commented on instances of more than one person in a voting booth at a time, and one case of proxy voting, in Stefanec. Isolated instances of family voting were also reported in Unit 8 and Unit 7. IRI observers did not feel there to be any intent of fraud or intimidation in these cases, nor were there sufficient instances to in any way influence the outcome of the elections.

Voter Lists / Verification of Identification

Delegates also reported few significant problems involving either the regular or the ethnic voter lists. With the exception of Electoral Unit 5 (see below) there were very few instances reported where polling station workers had to refuse a voter the right to cast a ballot because his or her name did not appear on the registration list. Observers did note, however, that there appeared to be a different standard used at many polling places for verifying the identification of voters. In some places, commissioners asked for and kept the voter notifications that voters had received in the mail. In others, commissioners asked simply for photo identification cards.

Delegates also noted instances in which the election commission decided to permit voters – usually the elderly – to vote without showing proper identification. Observers in Units 7 and 8 noted instances where no identification was requested at all. These were in smaller rural communities where it seemed clear that everyone on the voting station commission knew one another and the voter.

Delegates in Unit 5 noted complaints expressed by ethnic Serb voters that they were being turned away because they did not have the proper identification. According to Serbian Democratic Party (SDSS) representatives whom the IRI delegates met with, many of these voters showed up without a proper certificate, which would have enabled them to vote. Claiming they had been told that they could use other forms of identification to vote, they were surprised to learn that such a certificate was required. Many Serbs, having travelled long distances to polling sites, simply chose to go home once they were turned away, according to the SDSS representatives in Vukovar. IRI observers could not independently confirm these incidents.

Minority Lists

The issue of minority lists raised certain questions with IRI delegates. Serb voters could vote either on the designated 'minority' list – to which they were automatically assigned – or the regular, 'constituency' list. Voters on the minority list received a ballot with the names of candidates running for the five seats set aside for ethnic minorities. A voter assigned to the minority list could request to be placed instead on the regular list, which entitled them to receive a regular ballot and thus cast their vote for candidates running for the fourteen seats from the electoral unit. An unexpectedly large proportion of ethnic voters in fact chose to have their names transferred from the ethnic lists to the regular voter lists. This caused a certain degree of confusion, as well as some significant delays. In the village of Kistanje, for instance (Unit 9), those voters who asked to vote on the general list were required to wait in a separate voting line to register on the list. Members of the polling commission and voters were particularly upset with this procedure but failed to convince the chairman to amend his procedure. He claimed that it was done for reasons of efficiency.

More generally, there was a sense that the minority list system, while intended to be a positive means of addressing the interests of minority voters, may in fact have stigmatized minority voters and drawn undue attention to the ethnic status of the voter. A voter in Unit 10, in fact, complained to IRI delegates that he felt discriminated against, for this very reason.

Campaign Materials

As required by the election law, delegates noted that the majority of polling sites had posted the ballot listing the candidates/parties. Delegates did not report any significant evidence of campaign materials in or around voting stations. A notable exception is that portraits of President Tudjman – a leader strongly identified with the HDZ – were seen in several polling stations.

Mobile Ballot Box

Procedures for handling the "mobile ballot box" – a provision to allow ill or infirm voters to cast their ballots – appeared to differ among polling stations visited by IRI delegates. Delegates in Unit 8 reported, for example, that in some instances, the ballots were kept in their blue envelopes and then placed into the box at the polling station; in other instances, the envelopes were opened and the ballots were placed inside. Further, delegates had anticipated that the mobile box would actually travel to the home of the ill voter, and were thus surprised to see that they were only provided with a ballot, and therefore, no assurance that their vote would actually be placed in the box.

Access for Election Observers

Representatives from the domestic monitoring organization, GONG, were present in the many of the polling sites that IRI delegates visited. It appears that their coverage, however, was more limited in rural areas. In general, IRI delegates noted that GONG observers were courteous and well trained. Commissioners also appeared to respect their presence. With one notable exception - a polling station near the Bosnian border in Electoral Unit 10 - IRI delegates did not encounter any polling sites where they were refused entry or treated inappropriately.

IRI delegates did encounter serious problems at a polling station adjacent to the Bosnian border in electoral unit 10. In this instance, IRI observers approached a polling station and upon getting out of their vehicle were surrounded by a group of locals loitering outside the station. The locals, whom the IRI observers suspected had been drinking, demanded to know who the observers were and, upon learning they were IRI election

observers, became agitated and hostile, accusing the observers of being 'foreign agents' and 'CIA.' The locals followed the observers into the polling station and conferred with the station commissioner, who demanded to see the observers' credentials. Examining the credentials, the commissioner declared them to be invalid due to the lack of an official signature and ordered the observers to leave the polling station. At this point, one of the locals became physically aggressive, and the IRI observers chose to depart the polling station.

This was an isolated and extreme instance, and in fact neither the Unit 10 team nor any other observer team reported any similar instances of physical or verbal harassment.

Polling Station Closings and Vote Counting

In all cases IRI observers reported that polling stations closed without incident at 7:00 p.m. Voters present at the polling station, or on line waiting to get in at 7:00 p.m. were permitted to vote. Voting station commissioners and polling station workers were professional and conscientious in conducting the ballot count and in recording and reporting the results.

The procedures of counting ballots and completing the numerous required protocols proceeded slowly, however because of the need for duplication and because of the number of different types of ballots issued. Nonetheless, observers reported that in most polling stations the counting and reporting proceeded without incident. In others, ballots had to be recounted, or protocols retabulated, because of counting or other mathematical errors. In all observed instances, polling station teams proceeded patiently and conscientiously in identifying and correcting mistakes.

For instance, IRI observers in Unit 3 noted that the movement of the ballots to the next election commission level was delayed severely because of the need to fill out protocols for the minority ballots, despite the fact no votes were cast for these lists. Most all units reported that the counting process was significantly slowed due to the arduous process of counting minority ballots and in many cases due to confusion as to the proper protocol regarding minority ballots.

Ballot Security

Delegates noted occasional irregularities with regard to ballot security before and during the counting process. Some polling stations had not properly sealed their ballot boxes (see above) and as previously noted some observers had reason to conclude that polling station teams had not counted their ballots prior to the opening of the voting stations. Delegates also noted in several instances that ballots were not stored in a secure or orderly manner after being turned in by polling station chairmen at city or municipal commission sites. This could have caused problems and delays if it had been necessary to retrieve and recount ballots at a later time.

V. Findings and Recommendations

Finding 1: The official campaign period was excessively short, denying parties and candidates for office the opportunity to conduct broad-based campaigns and also unnecessarily challenging the capacity of election administrators to put the needed infrastructure in place and train the many thousands of polling station workers. This was clearly an intended consequence of the government's decision-making process. The problem resulted from three related factors: the decision to call the election within the legal minimum of 30 days notice; the death of President Tudjman shortly after the election date was announced – an event that could not be predicted but most definitely should have been anticipated, and; the intervening Christmas and New Year holidays.

Recommendation 1: The new Parliament should amend Croatia's election law to avoid the possibility of similarly and intentionally-truncated political campaigns in the future. Parliament should consider amending the election law to increase the minimum election notification period from 30 to 45 days. Alternatively, parliament might consider amending the law to guarantee that parties will have no less than 25 days for campaigning and advertising between the date an election is officially announced and election day.

Finding 2: In 1995, Croatia was divided into 29 electoral units, most of which largely corresponded to the county lines. However, in late October, the Sabor approved a new election law, which provided for the division of Croatia into ten electoral units, with eleventh and twelfth units being reserved for the diaspora and ethnic minorities respectively. The electoral unit lines were drawn without regard to county demarcations. In the case of Zagreb, the city was divided into four electoral units, which stretched as far west as Rijeka and as far east as the Hungarian border. This gerrymandering on the part of the ruling party was clearly an attempt to manipulate the final outcome of the vote and dilute the opposition's support in key urban areas. It was also a cause for confusion among voters, many of whom found out about the changes shortly before election day and were required to vote in electoral districts different than those of their neighbors residing in the same county or municipality.

Recommendation 2: Parliament should amend the election law to standardize the election unit framework. An electoral unit framework should be established that respects the natural administrative borders of the country - either by county demarcations or some other standard.

Finding 3: Regarding the financing of campaigns, the Croatian election law states that "every political party that has submitted lists for the election of representatives to the Sabor is bound, by the beginning of the (official) campaigning period, to publish outline data about the amount and origin of its own funds that it intends to spend on electoral campaigning." In practice, however, this provision is not applied. Parties do not report their sources of finances. Moreover, the law does not require that they report in-kind contributions such as goods and services, nor are they required to file any financial closure reports after the election.

Recommendation 3: Parliament should expand campaign finance reporting requirements and strengthen enforcement procedures. In order to monitor campaign spending and prevent, in particular, the abuse of state resources by parties in power, financial disclosure requirements should be broadened. Croatia's election law should be amended to require all parties in parliament, as well as non-parliamentary parties participating in national elections, to fully disclose and make public the sources of private contributions to the parties budget, the source and value of in-kind contributions, and their actual campaign expenditures. Amendments to the

election law should also strengthen financial oversight and enforcement mechanisms, and provide for appropriate penalties in cases of non-compliance.

Finding 4: Media coverage of the 2000 Croatian parliamentary elections was badly skewed in favor of the ruling HDZ. This reflected the editorial bias of Croatian state television (HTV), as well as the fact that there are no nationally available alternatives to HTV at the present time.

Recommendation 4a: Parliament must act expeditiously to enhance the editorial independence of Croatia's main state owned television and radio stations. In particular, parliament must act to enhance the independence and professionalism of the HRT Council, which supervises the operations, and oversees editorial content, of Croatia's state owned television and radio. Toward this end, parliament should consider alternatives to the current method of choosing and appointing members of the Council, provide the council with authority to select its own chairman, and prohibit the Council Chairman from being an individual with political party affiliation.

Recommendation 4b: Independent and financially stable electronic media capable of providing objective yet critical sources of information are vital to the development and maintenance of free and democratic societies. Croatia's new government should create an environment that is hospitable to the emergence and development of national, privately-owned alternatives to the nation's major state-owned television and radio outlets.

Finding 5: While media guidelines developed in compliance the new election law did provide all political parties with free (publicly-funded) access to national television, free media access was structured and limited in ways that prevented it from contributing in a significant way to the quality of political debate or to public education.

Recommendation 5: Parliament should amend the election law to establish new guidelines for insuring adequate and effective publicly-financed access to media by all parties competing in national elections. In particular, parties should be given maximum freedom to decide how they wish to package the free air time allocated to them (many short appearances versus fewer but longer appearances, for example), when they want their ads to appear, and what issues they want to address.

Finding 6: Despite repeated efforts, political parties failed to get access to voter registration lists prior to the election. Political parties doubted the accuracy of the lists, but were prohibited from obtaining copies of the lists from the State Administration. While in the end, there did not seem to be significant problems with inaccuracies in the voter lists, failure to provide more equitable access to political and civic groups diminished confidence in the electoral process and offered the ruling HDZ, with access to the lists, an advantage in their direct mail efforts.

Recommendation 6: Voters, political parties, and electoral commissions should have adequate time and access to review registration lists in advance of the elections. Provided the proper measures are taken to protect voter privacy, providing political parties with access to these lists would increase transparency, enhancing confidence in the election process. In addition, access to the lists for all parties would eliminate any advantage (such as the opportunity to send targeted direct mail) previously afforded by the ruling party's

sole access to the lists. A nominal fee could be charged for the administrative costs associated with these lists.

Finding 7: The election law reduced the number of seats reserved in the Sabor for ethnic Serbs from three to one, despite the fact that ethnic Serbs constitute approximately 6% of the population. (One seat was also reserved for each of four other officially recognized, but much smaller, ethnic minority groups.) This created an obvious disincentive for ethnic Serbs, in particular, to cast a minority ballot. To do so would have vastly diluted their vote. Substantial numbers, as a consequence, opted to have their names transferred from minority voter registration lists to the regular lists at their voting stations on election day, and cast regular ballots. The process was administratively burdensome and, arguably, intimidating and prejudicial to the voters in question.

Recommendation 7: Parliament should review the policy of maintaining separate voter registration lists for ethnic minorities and consider ways to incorporate the names of ethnic minority voters, so designated if necessary, in the regular registration list. This would relieve minority voters, and polling station workers, of the need to engage in the conspicuous and potentially disruptive "re-registration" process during the course of the voting day. It would also make it possible to reduce the number of protocols that polling station workers are required to tally at the conclusion of the voting. Moreover, parliament should consider amendments to the election law that eliminate the need for ethnic voters to cast a separate ballot. Parliament should consider the possibility of including the minorities' candidate list on the regular ballot.

Finding 8: While civic organizations, particularly Glas 99, should be commended for the role they played in educating the public about the date of elections, candidates and their platforms and voting rights, the responsibility for voter education should not rest solely with these organizations. The Croatian Government, unfortunately, failed badly in terms of voter education efforts. More disturbing was its attempt to condemn the efforts of organizations like Glas 99 as partisan and foreign-funded.

Recommendation 8: Parliament should amend the election law to include provisions mandating state owned media – radio and TV – to set aside time for voter education broadcasts throughout the official campaign period.

Finding 9: The new election law provided for the establishment of Election Ethics Commission, which was chaired by the President of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences. Prior to the election, the Commission published an Ethics Code intended to establish guidelines for the campaign and enhance the overall quality and integrity of the election process. Though the Commission held only seven meetings and issued four warnings during the abbreviated campaign, the group took its work seriously and conducted itself professionally. Unfortunately, the public appears to have had little knowledge of the Commission's existence, nor did its statements and warning have detectable impact on the parties to which they were directed.

Recommendation 9: Parliament should preserve and strengthen the Ethics Commission in future amendments to the election law. Specifically, the election law should be amended to give the commission authority to fine parties for breaches of the ethics code. Fines might include whole or partial forfeiture of access to publicly financed media and/or publicly financed reimbursements for campaign expenditures. Parliament should also consider giving the Commission a visible role in the voter education process prior to the next national or local elections.

Finding 10: In a compromise worked out with the opposition, the ruling party agreed to a new formula for allocating diaspora seats in the elections. Explained earlier in this report, the compromise reduced the diaspora's disproportionately large representation in the parliament. This was a very positive step. Unfortunately, the law did not adequately address the potential for duplicate voting by diaspora voters in Bosnia and in Croatia, a problem that was reported upon in prior elections. By allowing voting to take place over two days in foreign representative offices and consulates, the law in fact increased the possibility for duplicate voting. Moreover, procedures called for in the law to reduce the risk were not consistently followed. Although ultraviolet ink was to be placed on the hands of voters in polling places in Bosnia, reports received by IRI suggested that this was not being done consistently. Further, the ultraviolet lights designed to detect the ink, which were to be placed at polling sites across the Bosnian border in Croatia, were not present.

Recommendation 10: At a minimum, Parliament should amend the election law to allow only a single day of balloting in representative offices and consulates outside of Croatia proper, and take steps to insure that procedures to guarantee against multiple voting are followed in future elections. Parliament should also give serious consideration to going much further, however, and review the policy of offering citizenship and voting rights to Croats born and residing abroad. There are numerous strong arguments for ending this policy and practice.

Finding 11: Although multi-party commissions in polling stations across the country were a major improvement to the election law, this provision did not apply to prison voting and voting at military installations. As a result, the validity and transparency of the vote was not assured with the same level of confidence as at other polling stations.

Recommendation 11: In order to ensure that voting is transparently conducted at all polling locations in Croatia, the provision ensuring multi-party electoral commissions must be extended to polling locations in military installations and prisons.

Finding 12: Thousands of refugees with Croatia citizenship were effectively denied the right to vote in the parliamentary elections due to the failure of the government of the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) to establish territorial voting places until late December. The SEC accepted this late agreement. Although three voting places were approved for these citizens within FRY territory, little to no public notice was given and thus voters were not informed adequately of their rights. In addition, many of these citizens lacked the proper documentation to prove citizenship. In total, just 1,534 voters cast ballots in the FRY out of a total estimated 8,015 registered refugee voters (a figure given to the OSCE by the Zagreb Municipal Authority, responsible for refugee voter registration, but that the OSCE speculated to be significantly lower than the actual number of eligible refugee voters).

Recommendation 12: Greater efforts must be made in upcoming elections to ensure that Croatia citizens living in FRY not only have the proper citizenship documentation, but are also informed of their voting rights in a timely manner.

Appendix I

POLITICAL PARTY PROFILES
As of December 10, 1999

Croatian Democratic Union / Hrvatska Demokratske Zajednice (HDZ)

Address:	Trg Hrvatski Velikana, Zagreb
Phone:	4553-000
Fax:	4552-852
website:	www.hdz.hr
President:	Franjo Tudjman (Croatian President)
Vice Presidents:	Ivica Pašali (Domestic Policy)
	Mate Grani (Foreign Minister)
	Ljerka Mintas Hodak (Eur. Integration)
	Jure Radi (Development / Reconstruction)
	Vladimir Šeks (Deputy Speaker of Sabor)
	Vlatko Pavleti (interim President)
	Zlatko Mateša (Prime Minister)
General Secretary:	Drago Krpina
Spokesperson:	Ivica Ropuš
Campaign Manager:	Vesna Skare Ozbolt
Date party founded:	June 17, 1989

Party Overview
Croatia held its first multi-party elections in 1990. Dr. Franjo Tudjman, a former high-ranking communist party member and author of historical books who was imprisoned from 1972 to 1981, had earlier formed the HDZ. In 1990, Tudjman won a decisive victory, campaigning on the themes of an independent Croatia and tapping into citizen discontent with Serb domination in economic and social life in Yugoslavia. Tudjman was named president on May 30, 1990 and the new government began dismantling the Yugoslav federal structures. Later that year, the name of the country was officially changed to the Republic of Croatia and the proposal to restructure Yugoslavia into a confederation of sovereign states was put forth. In December of 1990, the Croatian parliament enacted a new constitution which declared Croatia's sovereignty.

Elections for the legislative and executive branches were held in August 1992, at which time Tudjman was again reelected to a five-year term with 56 percent of the vote. The HDZ also secured victory, winning 85 of the 135 seats in the House of Representatives (Sabor). In 1995, after the successful military offenses in the Republic of Serbian Krajina, the parliament was dissolved and new elections were called for October 29, 1995. The HDZ captured just under 66 percent of the parliamentary seats.

The HDZ again flexed its political muscle in the April 1997 local and House of Counties elections. The HDZ won 42 of the 63 seats. The opposition, however, won in several key cities, including Osijek and Rijeka.

Tudjman's last go-round as a presidential candidate occurred in June 1997, when he ran against Vlado Gotovac, then a member of the HSLS and Zdravko Tomac of the SDP. Tudjman won with 53% percent of the vote to Gotovac's 18% and Tomac's 23%. Throughout the campaign, the ruling party enjoyed a huge advantage over its opponents in television coverage from the state-controlled media. *Dnevnik*, by far the most prominent source of news for the country's population, particularly in non-urban settlements, was devoted almost exclusively to Tudjman and the HDZ accomplishments. For instance, on Tudjman's 75th birthday, HRT provided live coverage of the celebration at the National Theater, including a three-hour play casting Tudjman as the culmination of a millennium of Croatian historical achievements!

Tudjman continued to be Croatia's most controversial political figure. Ever popular with the countries nationalistic-oriented population, he also laid claim to a significant "unfavorability" rating. His authoritarian governing style and failure to abide fully with the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords were viewed as impediments to improved U.S.-Croatia relations. On November 1, 1999 after concluding ceremonies for All Saints' Day, Tudjman collapsed and was hospitalized in a Zagreb clinic for complications related to his alleged stomach cancer. Although he had previously sought medical attention in the United States and France, his team of physicians had never acknowledged to the Croatian public that he was suffering from cancer. He was rumoured to be on life support and his team of medical experts only issued terse statements to the media in the month since he was first hospitalized.

After weeks of debate, the Parliament deemed the president "temporarily incapacitated," a provision which was not in the constitution. Sabor Speaker Vlatko Pavleti was sworn in as the interim President on November 26th and subsequently called the elections for January 3, 2000. International organization questioned the government's decision to hold the elections on this date, which shortened the campaign period and served as a deterrent to international observers.

The HDZ was adrift without Tudjman at the helm. The hard-line faction, led by presidential advisor Pašali , and the moderate faction were at odds over who will succeed Tudjman both within the party and as President. Many pundits anticipated the party's disintegration into 2 political parties after Tudjman's death. In addition, the party's support had been in decline for over a year. An indication of the President's affect on the outcome of the elections, however, was the increase in the HDZ's electoral support in IRI's November poll, which was conducted at the beginning of the President's hospitalization. The poll showed the HDZ with 24% support, up from 18% in July. At the time, it was unclear to what extent this rise in support was a one-time phenomenon or a trend that could have positively affected the HDZ's vote support in the actual elections.

Campaign Overview

Tudjman's hard-core nationalist rhetoric appeared to have lost much of its appeal. However, this did not deter him from attacking all foreign NGOs as harboring spies and sounding other nationalist themes. The state-controlled media stepped up its campaign against international NGOs, including IRI and NDI, accusing these organizations of being fronts for the CIA.

While the public blamed the HDZ for squandering state assets and political "tycoonism" which had ruined the once vibrant Croatian economy, this did not deter the party from trying to appeal to voters on economic issues. After enacting one of the highest Value Added Taxes (PDV) in Europe of 22%, the HDZ proposed a zeroing out of the tax on food and medicine, which went into affect last fall.

Rather than focus on its own failures, the HDZ predictably labelled the opposition as incompetent and unable to unify and govern. It issued warnings that they would return Croatia to the Balkans, a theme that Tudjman also used vis-à-vis the international community. Finally, its attacks on the SDP's "communist" roots were featured on several *Dnevnik* shows.

Croatian People's Party / Hrvatska Narodna Stranka (HNS)

Address:	Ilica 61,10000 Zagreb
Phone:	48 46 106/107
Fax:	48 46 109
website:	www.rijeka.com/hns/hns.htm
President:	Radimir a i (member of Sabor)
Honorary President:	Savka Dabevi -Ku ar
Vice Presidents:	Martin Špegelj
	Igor Dekani
	Miljenko Dori
	Dragutin Lesar
	Miroslav Grani
	Ante Lovri
President/Coordinator of Academy and Campaign Manager:	Vesna Pusi
Organization Secretary:	Ivo Lepoglavec
Office manager:	Branimir Znika
Date party Founded:	October 13, 1990

Party Overview

A small, Zagreb-based party, the Croatian People's Party (HNS) did not get past the five-percent threshold in the October 1998 Dubrovnik county elections. From an outsider's perspective, the HNS was suffering from an "identity crisis" common to smaller parties. President Radimir a i was a young businessman who some political observers in Croatia felt was more interested in sitting in parliament for his personal benefit than for building the party. Party activist Vesna Pusi took on a more prominent role in the party and most observers expected her to become the party president after the January elections. Some pundits even anticipated that she could run for President, given her popularity with the electorate. Ms. Pusi was already an internationally- respected voice on democracy and Professor of Sociology at the University of Zagreb. Her western-oriented thinking and understanding of the political process provided a much needed boost to the HNS. She was serving as campaign manager and was largely responsible for the aggressive campaign that the party had unveiled over the summer announcing their plan to create 200,000 new jobs.

The party boasted a number of distinguished members, including the Honorary President for Life, Mrs. Dabevi -Ku ar. Mrs. Ku ar, now in her 70's, was a popular member of the youth wing of the Croatian Communists who later became head of the Communist Party in Croatia. With a small number of moderates, she sought to bring about reforms in the party in the late 60's and early 70's, a period commonly referred to as the Croatian Spring. Unlike many of her Croatian political contemporaries, including Liberal Party President Gotovac, she avoided imprisonment for her activities. However, she became a political *persona non grata* after Tito's crackdown on those responsible for the perceived threat on the Yugoslav state.

Another high profile member, Mr. Stipe Mesi , was the last Croatian representative to the rotating Yugoslav Presidency in the months leading up to the outbreak of war. Mesi had served as the last President of the Presidency of the former Yugoslavia. Later he served as a party vice-president and was once a member of the Croatian Democratic Movement (HDZ) as well as a close advisor to President Tudjman.

The party saw itself as strongest in the northwestern area of the country and along the Dalmatian coast, but readily acknowledged its weakness in Dubrovnik prior to the October county elections. A party brochure written in English described its typical member as "male, middle-aged, mostly private entrepreneur, living in his own house or apartment, predominantly in a city of more than 10,000 inhabitants."

In 1995, the party ran in a coalition with the Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS), the Croatian Peasant's Party (HSS), the Christian Democrats (HKDU), and the Slavonia/Baranja Party of Croatia (S-BHS), which garnered approximately 18 percent of the vote. In the months prior to the opposition's decision to run as two electoral blocs, the HNS sought to enter into a large Group of Six coalition, perhaps in recognition of its modest strength.

Campaign Overview

The HNS campaign theme focused on the creation of 200,000 jobs as well as "A New Generation of Croatian Politics." In an indication of the control of the HRT by the ruling party, attempts to air their television commercial in early December were denied. The ads feature Mesi , Pusi and a i . Unlike the other members of the Group of Four, the HNS waged a summer campaign in which billboards and newspaper inserts unveiled its economic program.

a i served as the bearer of the list in electoral unit #7. As an individual party, the HNS was frozen at 2% support since IRI's October 1998 poll.

Istrian Democratic Assembly / Istarski Demokratski Sabor (IDS)

Address:	52 100 Pula, Splitska 3
Phone/fax:	062-23 316/213 702
in Zagreb:	45 69 498
website:	www.ids-ddi.com
President:	Ivan Jakov i (member of Sabor)
Vice President:	Damir Kajin (member of Sabor)
General Secretary:	Emil Soldati (member of House of Counties)

IDS Secretary /
Campaign manager: Nenad Klapi

Date party Founded: February 14, 1990

Party Overview
Istria – a northern region of Croatia bordering Italy – is a scenic, multi-cultural area of the country. Today, the region is attempting to establish its reputation as the "Tuscany of Croatia" by promoting its wines, agro-tourism industry and flavorful regional cuisine.

The Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS) was a strong, well-organized regional party that described itself as "elevating regional issues to the national level" and decentralizing decision-making power. The party often referred to the models of Austria and Switzerland where power derives from the regions.

The IDS regularly received over 60 percent of the vote in the Istrian region, but its level of support dropped dramatically in other regions. While small in number, the IDS nonetheless played an important role on the national scene where it was a vocal advocate for decentralization, minority rights, the use of the Italian language, and a more democratic electoral law.

In the 1995 parliamentary elections, the IDS ran as part of the five-party Sabor '95 coalition, which garnered approximately 18 percent of the vote. In the 1997 presidential elections, the IDS supported the candidacy of Vlado Gotovac, running as the presidential candidate of the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS).

IDS President Ivan Jakov i was seeking closer ties with other regions in Europe and played an active role in the European Union's Council of Regions. However, the HDZ often characterized "regionalism" as an attack on the Croatian state. The most recent flare-up over minority rights occurred in the fall of 1998 when the IDS sought changes in the law governing the use of minority languages. The HDZ used this issue to drive a wedge between the opposition by publicly exposing their disputes. The IDS subsequently backed down on the issue, but nonetheless remained committed to minority issues and resolving the foreign language question.

Some of the other five opposition party leaders regarded the IDS and Jakov i with skepticism. In December 1998, shortly after Jakov i was due to take over as spokesperson for the Group-of- Six opposition parties for a one-month period, the group announced that it would no longer have a rotating spokesperson chosen from each party respectively. Although denying Jakov i his "turn at bat" was not the sole reason for the Group announcing this change, it was seen as a move by some to minimize Jakov i 's public profile. Jakov i did, in fact, have a low favorability rating with the public.

Campaign Overview
A well-organized party, the IDS was running this campaign largely in the same manner that previous local elections were run. The IDS name would appear on the ballot with the Group of Four only in the 8th electoral unit (Istria and Rijeka).

After weeks of political maneuvering, the party secured the top three names on the Group of Four electoral list in the 8th unit – a blow to many members of the coalition who felt that their own electoral strength was overshadowed by the IDS. IDS President Jakov i would also be the bearer of the list in this unit.

Croatian Social Liberal Party / Hrvatska Sociajalno Liberalna Stranka (HSLS)

Address:	Trg Nikole Šubi a Zrinskog 17, Zagreb
Phone:	48 10 401
Fax:	48 10 404
website:	www.hsls.hr
President:	Dra en Budiša (member of Sabor)
Vice Presidents:	Ivo Škrabalo
	Zrinjka Glovacki-Bernardi
	Vesna Cvetkovi Kurelec
General Secretary:	Jozo Radoš (member of Sabor)
Parliamentary Caucus Leader:	Đur a Adleši (member of Sabor)
Campaign Manager:	Jozo Radoš
Spokesperson:	Đur a Adleši
Date party Founded:	May 5,1989

Party Overview

The Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) is a centrist political party that advocates a mix of social and liberal policies regarding the economy, individual rights, and the role of the state. From 1990-1995, the HSLS was the first opposition party and was the strongest opposition party in Croatia. However, its vote support was in decline the last few years.

Two factions were formed in the party in the late 90's around former party president Vlado Gotovac (now the head of the Liberal Party) and former party president Dra en Budiša – largely over cooperation with the ruling HDZ. As a result, the party split in 1997 and in January 1998, Vlado Gotovac formed the Liberal Party. The electorate remained unable to differentiate between the two parties.

President Dra en Budiša, a rather charismatic figure, once served as the leader of the Croatian League of Students, the first independent student organization in then-Yugoslavia. In 1972, he was arrested and subsequently imprisoned for promoting Croatian nationalism. Under the HSLS banner, Gotovac ran for president against Tudjman in the 1997 elections and garnered 17 percent of the vote.

In IRI's November 1999 poll, the party garnered eleven percent of the vote on the ballot test. Although support for the HSLS was lower than the SDP's, Budiša was still a popular figure who received a consistent

65-70% approval rating in IRI's surveys. The party itself maintained a 65 percent approval rating, second only to the Croatian Peasant's Party (HSS).

Budiša declined the invitation from U.S. Ambassador William Montgomery to travel to Washington, D.C. in July of 1998 with the other opposition party leaders. Although his rationale was not exactly clear, it seemed that he did not want to appear manipulated by "certain foreign circles" as the state-controlled news media and President Tudjman continued to label opposition party contact with Americans and other foreigners.

Campaign Overview

The HSLS was a well organized party with active local branches, particularly in Split, Bjelovar, and Dubrovnik. The party's decision to join forces with the SDP took some by surprise since the party's centrist tradition did not appear to mesh well with the "reformed communists." Budiša and Ra an, to their credit, were able to put aside personal and political differences for the sake of their combined vote support. They appeared together throughout the campaign. The coalition chose "Honest and Successful Leadership" as their campaign theme/slogan.

After negotiations with the SDP, the party secured 56 of the 140 slots on the electoral lists. Almost simultaneously, party president Budiša announced that he would be a candidate for President in the anticipated 2000 presidential election, though he had not yet secured the support of the other party presidents, which threatened to pose a huge stumbling bloc to the opposition's chances of victory in the presidential election.

Social Democratic Party / Social Demokratska Partija Hrvatske (SDP)

Address:	Iblerov Trg 9, Zagreb
Phone:	4552-658/659
Fax:	4552-842
website:	www.tel.hr/sdp/
President:	Ivica Ra an (member of Sabor)
Vice Presidents:	Zdravko Tomac (member of Sabor)
	Mato Arlovi (member of Sabor)
	Snje ana Biga-Friganovi (member of Sabor)
	Mirjana Feri -Vac
	Šime Lu in
	Davorko Vidovi
Secretary and Campaign Manager:	Gordana Sobol
Spokesperson:	Tihomir Ladiši
International Secretary:	Tonino Picula

Date party Founded: November 3, 1990/1993*
* adopted SDP title in April 1993

Party Overview
The SDP, Croatia's strongest opposition party, garnered 20-23% in IRI's polls. The party emerged as the party of the reformed Communists, following the breakup of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and competed as an opposition party in Croatia's first multi-party elections in 1990. Its formal name as the SDP was adopted in April 1993. Since that time, it continued to gain electoral support. Later, it fashioned itself to be modeled on a modern social democratic party trying to gain admittance into the Socialist International.

In IRI's four national polls, the SDP consistently tied or outdistanced the HDZ, with the exception of the November 1999 poll, in which the party garnered 20% to the HDZ's 24%. Due to these results and other similar public opinion polls, which also showed it as the strongest opposition party, as well as the party's electoral success in the Dubrovnik county elections, the party suffered from an overinflated sense of its electoral potential. No doubt, its confidence was also boosted by its European neighbors, where there was a series of social democratic victories (e.g. Great Britain and Germany).

After the opposition leaders' trip to Washington in the summer of 1998, Ra an and HSLS President Dra en Budiša agreed to enter into a very loose electoral agreement of sorts, a precursor to the Group of Six formation which occurred in early fall. This loose two-party agreement was heralded as a real breakthrough, given that many viewed the respective opposition presidents as having a rather strained relationship. On July 2, 1998, the parties formally announced their coalition at a press conference in Split.

Of the six main opposition parties, the SDP waged the best effort to attract young people and women to the party. In the 1997 presidential elections Zdravko Tomac, one of the party's vice-presidents, finished second when he garnered 23 percent of the vote.

Campaign Overview
The SDP had an approach of "less is more" during the campaign. While the party had well-organized local branches which held open meetings and organized other local events, its national strategy appeared to be to take as few of positions as possible throughout the campaign. Together with the HSLS, the campaign themes were "Honest and Successful Leadership."

The party fielded 84 candidates to the HSLS's 56 on the electoral lists, with SDP candidates heading the list in seven electoral units. Of the 84 SDP candidates, 26 were women.

Liberal Party / Liberalna Stranka (LS)

Address:	Ilica 16 Zagreb
Phone:	434 300/425 105
fax:	433 400
website:	www.liberali.hr
President:	Vlado Gotovac (member of Sabor)
Vice Presidents:	
	Tereza Ganza-Aras (House of Counties)
	Zlatko Kramari (Mayor of Osijek and member of Sabor)
	Stanka Mau i -Ma ek (House of Counties)
Organizing Secretary and Campaign Manager:	Karl Gorinšek
Spokesperson:	Bo o Kova evi
International Secretary:	Haris Boko
Date party Founded:	January 24, 1998

Party Overview

The Liberal Party (LS) was founded in 1998 after a split within the HSLS. Party President Vlado Gotovac was a colorful figure – a poet, philosopher, and journalist who seemed less adept at political compromise. He was a founder of the HSLS and was elected LS party president at the party's first convention. Gotovac was imprisoned for his political beliefs from 1972 to 1976 and again in the 1980's for talking to foreign journalists.

After founding the HSLS together with Dra en Budiša, Gotovac and his faction could not accept the HSLS cooperation with the HDZ in local government. He was elected LS president at the party's first convention. Before the elections, the Party was still in its developmental stages, suffering from lack of financial means and well-rooted local organizational structures. While it succeeded in "converting" parliamentary members from the HSLS, the party remained hampered by the fact that the ruling HDZ blocked it from receiving governmental funding normally due to parliamentary parties.

In 1997, Gotovac served as the HSLS presidential party candidate, placing third with 18 percent of the vote. During the pre-election period, Gotovac was seriously injured when he was attacked by a military officer while speaking at a campaign rally in Pula. Appeals from him and other opposition parties to suspend the elections in order for him to recover were ignored and he was largely unable to campaign during the crucial final days of the campaign.

In IRI's polls, the party remained largely frozen with 2-3% of vote when respondents were asked which party they would vote for "if the election for parliament were held today." This seemed to come as a surprise to

some members of the LS who had not yet fully grasped their standing on Croatia's electoral scene. Nevertheless, Gotovac remained a political favorite of many.

The party faced a great deal of internal and external political dissension in the fall over the naming of eight new members to the Constitutional Court, whose term expired on December 8th. Among the eight was LS member Jasna Omejec, a professor of law at the Law Faculty and key proponent of electoral law reform. Protesting the "politicization" of the naming of all of the members of the court, a member of the HSLS led a protest walkout on the vote – and the other opposition parties followed. Only the HDZ majority in the Sabor confirmed the new members. The HSLS and HSS subsequently sued the Court to have her membership blocked. This incident further led to bad relations among Gotovac and his fellow members of the Group of Four and further poisoned the already acrimonious relationship between Gotovac and Budiša.

Campaign Overview
Hampered by lack of funds and poorly-organized local branches, the LS seemed very poorly positioned going into the elections. Even in Osijek where the LS was perceived to be strong, it was uncertain whether LS member Mayor Kramari could garner the same level of support for the party as when he was a member of the HSLS. Despite the best efforts of its economic team, the party failed to articulate its economic message. The party did have an active youth wing – although their influence was minimal on the party leadership. Many members also left the party over the Constitutional Court flap with party member Jasna Omejec or became disillusioned over the party's lackadaisical approach to campaigning.

Croatian Peasant's Party / Hrvatska Seljacka Stranka (HSS)

Address:	Zvonimirova 17, Zagreb
Phone:	4553 627/4553 624
Fax:	4553 631
website:	www.hss.hr
President:	Zlatko Tom i (member of Sabor)
Vice Presidents:	Stjepan Radi (member of Sabor)
	Petar Juruši
	Ljubica Lali
	Petar Nova ki (House of Counties)
	Bo idar Pankreti (House of Counties)
	eljko Pecek (House of Counties)
	Znovimir Sabati (member of Sabor)
	Ante Simoni
	Ivan Sta ner (House of Counties)
	Josip Torbar
	Luka Trconi (member of Sabor)
General Secretary:	Stanko Gr i
Spokesperson:	Ivo Lon ar
Organizing Secretary:	Darko Till

Date party Founded: December 22, 1904/reestablished in 1990

Party Overview

The oldest and most conservative party in Croatia, the Croatian Peasant's Party (HSS) grew out of the country's strong rural tradition. Still, it remained one of Croatia's strongest opposition parties given the country's deeply-rooted traditional sentiments and the view of the party as an anti-Communist stalwart. There were some members who believed that the party should modernize and transform itself from simply a "workers and peasants party" into a more up-to-date 21st-century party. However, the party had the most demographic overlap with the typical HDZ voter - older, rural, undereducated. As a result, the HSS was able to garner vote support in many areas of the country where its fellow opposition partners were unable to, namely eastern Slavonia and northern Croatia.

Party President Zlatko Tomi was challenged by Dubrovnik Mayor Vido Bogdanovi at the party's December 1998 convention. Bogdanovi was a popular mayor who was elected President of the Dubrovnik County Assembly after the HSS's strong showing in the October 1998 county elections. Despite this challenge, Tomi was reelected and the party seemed to have avoided an internal bloodletting, which could have hampered their electoral preparations. Tomi was an able politician who ran his party with an iron fist and deftly maneuvered the Group of Four coalition negotiations, giving the party the most leverage over its partners. He was the only party president who did not speak fluent English.

The HSS was viewed by its fellow opposition parties as a solid coalition partner given its popularity and strong base of support. However, the HSS struggled with the problem of joining the SDP in a coalition because many of its members strongly opposed any semblance of cooperation with communists, even those "reformed" communists who now comprise the SDP leadership. As a result, the party chose to run together with the members of the former Porec Group.

In IRI's October 1998 poll, the party had the highest favorability rating, with a solid 67 percent of the electorate expressing a favorable impression of the party. However, the party did not effectively translate that favorability rating into parliamentary ballot support, which remained around 9% in IRI's polls. The party felt that IRI's polls underestimate its true strength among the electorate, given that their voters resided in small, rural villages which were normally undersampled.

Campaign Overview

Unlike the other opposition parties, the HSS had the ability to attract rural voters. It focused some of its time and energies traveling to local markets where short campaign speeches were given. The party also tried to attract the support of certain celebrities in Croatia to endorse its campaign. Newsletters, door-to-door, and candidate appearances on local TV were also employed. For the first time in the history of the party, the HSS also developed a website, which it attempted to use to attract younger voters.

Despite the party's reputation as a rural, older party, quite a few young people were involved in the campaign. The party ran on a theme of "Croatia Must Do Better."

Other Opposition Parties

Primorske Goranska Savez (PGS)

Address:	Ciottina 19/II, Rijeka
Phone:	051/335-359
Fax:	051/213-867
President:	Luciano Sušanj
General Secretary:	Zoran Dragi evi
Date founded:	March 3, 1990

The PGS, a small regional party with its headquarters in Rijeka, was a coalition partner with the SDP-HSLS in Electoral Unit #8 which was comprised of Istria and Rijeka.

Serbian Democratic Independent Party / Srpska Demokratska Samostalna Stranka (SDSS)

Address:	Radni ki Dom, 3rd floor, Vukovar
Phone:	032-665 116
Fax:	032-665 116
President:	Dr. Vojislav Stanimirovi
Secretary:	Ivana Peje
Date Founded:	October 1995

Founded only in October 1995, this party represented the country's Serb community. The pre-war Serb population was estimated at 12%. Before the elections that figure was closer to 4%, primarily in eastern Slavonia, where return and resettle continued to plague the ruling party given its lack of efforts to return non-Croats to the region. It is important to point out, however, than many Serbs have been supporting non-ethnic parties, including the SDP and HSLS.

Croatian Party of Pensioners / Hrvatska Stranka Umirovljenika (HSU)

Address:	Ul. Republike Austrije 11/II
Phone:	3705-002
Fax:	4677-030
President:	Rudolf Mauran
Date Founded:	1996

Founded in 1996, the party was headed by the former General Consulate to the United Sates, Rudolf Mauran. The party claimed to have 40,000 members, although it was unclear where the lines were drawn between political membership and the desire for economic redress. In 1998, the Constitutional Court ruled that back pensions were due amounting to 30 billion. The HSU actively sought the signatures of tens of thousands of

pensioners on petitions to the Court. However, no action was taken to redress their concerns. The party participated in local elections in several cities.

Social Democratic Action of Croatia / Akcija Socijaldemokrate Hrvatske (ASH)

Address:	Gunduli eva 21a/III
Phone:	48 54 261/48 54 262
Fax:	48 54 258
President:	Silvije Degen
General Secretary:	Zlatko Klari
Date founded:	October 22, 1994

ASH, a left-leaning social democratic party, failed to garner more than 1-2% in IRI's opinion polls. The party desperately sought to go into a coalition with the Group of Four, but their name would only appear with the coalition in the first electoral unit (Zagreb).

Croatian Party of Rights / Hrvatska Stranka Prava (HSP)

Address:	Primorska 5, 2nd floor
Phone:	3778-016
Fax:	3778-736
website:	www.hsp.hr
President:	Ante Đap i
General Secretary:	Vlado Juki

The extreme right portion of the political spectrum was occupied by the HSP, which had been on the political scene since 1990, and the HKDU. The HSP derived its name from a party founded in 1861 from which the Ustashe organization, which ruled the Croatian fascist state during World War II, emanated. The party was decidedly anti-Serb and an advocate of a "Greater Croatia."

The HSP, together with the HKDU, garnered approximately 6% of the vote in each of IRI's national surveys. The two parties would likely have formed a coalition government with the HDZ if they had won.

Croatian Christian Democrats / Hrvatska Kršanska Demokratska Unija (HKDU)

Address	Tkali eva 4, 1st floor
Phone:	4816 282
Fax:	421 969
President:	Marko Veselica
Secretary	Tatjana Kado i
Date founded:	December 12, 1992

Appendix II

Delegate Biographies
IRI Election Observation Mission
Croatian Parliamentary Elections, January 2000

Dorothy Anderson – is Director of Constituent Services for Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE). Prior to joining Senator Hagel's staff in 1997, she spent 11 years working in the Lincoln, Nebraska, office of Congressman Doug Bereuter. She also has served as Chief Deputy Election Commissioner for Lincoln County. Ms. Anderson is a graduate of the University of Nebraska at Lincoln.

John Anelli – is IRI's Regional Director for Central and East European Programs. He served previously as IRI's Deputy Regional Director for Programs in the Commonwealth of Independent States, and before that spent two years as IRI's Resident Program Officer in Bucharest, Romania. Before joining IRI, Mr. Anelli worked for six years in the U.S. Congress and for two years in the office of the Secretary of Labor in the Administration of President George Bush. He holds a BA from the University of Texas/Austin and an MA in International Affairs from Columbia University. He has monitored eight elections for IRI in East Europe and Russia.

Scott Carpenter – is the co-director of IRI's Regional Office for Central and Eastern Europe, headquartered in Bratislava, Slovakia. He has served as the Resident Program Officer for IRI in Bulgaria, Poland and Turkey, and is now co-manager of IRI's regional Program Office in Bratislava, Slovakia. Carpenter has observed elections in numerous central and eastern European countries on behalf of IRI.

Francis Chiappardi – is Assistant Tally Clerk in the U.S. House of Representatives, where she assists all aspects of voting in the House and the compilation of all publications of the Tally Clerk. From 1992-1998, Ms. Chiappardi held several positions with the International Republican Institute (IRI), including Deputy Director for Program Assessment and Director of Women's Programs at IRI's Moscow office. In addition, she served as an international observer for Russia's 1993 and 1995 parliamentary elections and its 1996 presidential elections. She also has worked as Chief of Staff for the convention manager at the 1992 Republican National Convention, and served as a political appointee during the Reagan and Bush Administrations.

Mary Crawford – currently serves as the state agricultural director for Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE), specializing in constituent services and legislation dealing with farm policy, the agencies of USDA, conservation programs, livestock and range management, and natural resource issues. Prior to joining Senator Hagel's office in 1997, she spent 13 years working as a reporter, photographer, farm writer, field editor, and associate magazine editor for several Nebraska publications. In 1993, the Nebraska Press Women named her Communicator of the Year. Ms. Crawford is a 1980 graduate of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln with majors in Animal Science and Communications.

Chris Holzen – is currently a program officer in IRI's Asia Division, primarily responsible for programming in Mongolia. Previously, he served for three years as IRI's Resident Program officer in Kiev, Ukraine, undertaking extensive political party training and development programs.

Alex Jarvis – currently serves as Legislative Director for Congressman Lindsey Graham (R- SC). Prior to joining Congressman Graham's office in 1995, he held positions in the offices of Congressman Charles Taylor and Senator Connie Mack. Mr. Jarvis is a native of Lewinsville, North Carolina, and received a BA in Political Science from the University of North Carolina.

Eric Jowett – was previously a program officer with IRI's Central and Eastern Europe division, where his duties included Croatia program coordination from Washington, DC.

Marek Kotlarski– is the Director of the Foreign Office of Poland's AWS parliamentary caucus. Since 1994, Mr. Kotlarski has been the Secretary General of the Conservative Coalition. From 1993-1997, he was the Chairman of the Forum of Young Conservatives.

Lindsay Lloyd – is currently the co-director of IRI's Regional Office for Central and Eastern Europe, headquartered in Bratislava, Slovakia. Previously, he served as the Resident Program Officer in Slovakia. Lloyd holds a master's degree from Georgetown University. He has observed numerous elections in central and eastern Europe.

Bill McBride – has served as Chief of Staff for Congressmen Vern Ehlers (R-MI) since 1995. He previously served as Deputy Chief of Staff to Michigan Governor John Engler and Chief of Staff to Congressman Carl Pursell (R-MI). Mr. McBride received his BA from Michigan State University and an MA from George Mason University.

Kristen McSwain – is currently a program officer in IRI's Central and Eastern Europe Division, coordinating the division's programs in Turkey and Macedonia. She has held various legislative positions on Capitol Hill, including legislative assistant to Congressman Jon Fox (R-PA).

Norris Nordvold – is the Intergovernmental Programs Coordinator for the City of Phoenix. He's responsible for facilitating interaction between Phoenix officials and their counterparts across the region. Before joining the city government in 1997, he worked in Africa for seven years and in the Arizona state senate for 10 years. Mr. Nordvold has an MA from Arizona State University.

Leslie Padilla – is currently the Director of Research for the Legislative Council Service of the New Mexico State Legislature. She previously served for eight years in the U.S. Department of State, holding positions at U.S. missions in Macedonia and Guatemala as well as in Washington, DC. Ms. Padilla received a BA from the University of New Mexico and an MA in International Communication from American University in Washington, DC.

Marek Revilak – is the General Secretary of the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), the largest partner in Slovakia's new governing coalition.

Mary Schwarz – is currently IRI's Resident Program Officer in Jakarta, Indonesia, overseeing IRI's post-governance and political training assistance programs. She previously served as a program officer in Moscow, Russia, working extensively on women's political development programs.

Ron St. John – is currently serving as IRI's Resident Program Officer in Bucharest, Romania. Previously, he worked in state government in Arizona.

Brad Smith – has served as Chief of Staff for Congressman David Dreier (R-CA) since 1980. When Mr. Smith first came to Capitol Hill in 1975, he was a press assistant to Congressman Barry Goldwater, Jr. (R-CA) and later served in a similar capacity for Congressman Sam Hall. He has a degree in International Relations and Government from American University and, in addition to his work on Capitol Hill, has been involved with a variety of congressional and presidential campaigns.

Robert Thomas – currently serves as coordinator of the West Balkan Initiative, which is run by the Conservative Party and the European Democratic Union, and seeks to provide a structured program of assistance and training to political parties in the Balkans. Mr. Thomas has extensive experience in political development and election-monitoring programs in Eastern Europe, including his membership on an IRI-Conservative Party team that observed an election 'primary' conducted by Bulgaria's United Opposition in June 1996. In 1998, he received his PhD from the University of London's School of Slavonic and East European Studies. In April 1999, Columbia University Press published his book titled *The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s.*

Deborah White – is currently a program officer in IRI's Africa division, primarily responsible for programming in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria. White previously worked in the Public Law and Policy division of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer, & Feld; and prior to that was a legislative assistant in the Texas State Senate.

Alvin Williams – currently serves as the Executive Director for Black America's Political Action Committee (BAMPAC), a non-partisan federal PAC founded in 1993. In the 1998 elections, BAMPAC supported 88 candidates seeking office at the local, state, and federal levels. BAMPAC is ranked as the 18th largest political action committee out of approximately 4,000 registered PACs. Mr. Williams first entered politics by joining the Bush campaign in 1987. He subsequently served on the President's transition team, with Lee Atwater at the Republican National Committee (RNC), and on the 1992 and 1996 campaigns of Ambassador Alan Keyes for the U.S. Senate and the presidency, respectively. Mr. Williams is a 1987 graduate of South Carolina State University and received a graduate degree Magna Cum Laude from George Washington University's School for Political Management.

Ellen Yount – is currently the Resident Program Officer of IRI's Zagreb, Croatia program. Previously, she served as the Program Officer in IRI's Belgrade, Serbia office. Prior to joining IRI, Yount was the Director of Communications for Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge. She graduated Phi Beta Kappa in International Relations from Allegheny College in 1987. Yount has observed elections in 6 countries – Nigeria, Macedonia, Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia and Ukraine.

Eugene Zelenko – is currently a program assistant in IRI's Kiev, Ukraine office.

Appendix III

International Republican Institute
Croatia Parliamentary Election Observation Mission
Preliminary Statement
January 4, 2000

SUMMARY

The International Republican Institute (IRI) sponsored the participation of 25 delegates to the Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Office for Democracy Initiatives and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) election observation mission for the January 3, 2000 parliamentary or Sabor elections.

The IRI-sponsored delegates observed the balloting and ballot-tabulation processes in ten election units in Croatia. Prior to election day, the IRI-sponsored delegates participated in briefing sessions in Zagreb and in their respective regions with election administrators, civic organizers, representatives of national and local media, and representatives of almost all of the major political parties and coalitions taking part in the election.

IRI-sponsored observers conclude unanimously that the election process was basically sound. They found no evidence of either widespread or systematic irregularity in the balloting process, although ballot tabulation and reporting is still not complete. It appears that the results of the balloting are a credible and generally accurate reflection of the will of the citizens of Croatia. By their extraordinary participation in the balloting process – nearly 75 percent of eligible voters went to the poll – citizens have expressed their faith in the democratic process and their desire for political change.

PRE-ELECTION ENVIRONMENT

IRI-sponsored observers evaluated the election process in terms of the pre-election environment and the actual balloting and counting process. It is important to stress that the comments that follow are preliminary and represent only a summary of the IRI-sponsored delegates' findings, and is subject to change. A more complete and detailed presentation of IRI's findings will be contained in an observation report that will be released within the next several weeks.

With respect to the pre-election environment, it appears that all political parties were able to campaign freely and without significant interference. However, IRI's observers concluded that late passage of the new election law under which the election was held, and subsequent decisions regarding the actual date upon which the election was held, restricted the capacity of political parties to organize and carry out their campaigns. An additional significant factor was President Franjo Tudjman's death on December 10, which further delayed and shortened the campaign period. Given that the election date came so close to the Christmas and New Year's holidays, national parties' efforts to campaign, and the public's access to political debate, were significantly curtailed.

IRI-sponsored observers also found much evidence suggesting political bias in the national media. The coverage of political events by national television, HTV, during the pre-election period, and during the brief period of the official campaign, continued to favor the ruling party. This was particularly evident with

respect to the evening news broadcast, *Dnevnik*, which devoted significant positive airtime to the activities of government officials.

Moreover, while media guidelines developed in compliance with the new election law did provide all political parties with access to national television, the structure of that access prevented it from contributing in a significant way to the quality of political debate or to public education regarding the election and the major political and economic issues surrounding it. For example, candidate forums which involved representatives of over 50 political parties seemed to confuse rather than educate voters as to the party programs.

On a more positive note, HTV should be commended for its decision to provide free airtime to GONG, the domestic election-monitoring group. This significantly enhanced GONG's capacity to recruit election monitors and also served the secondary purpose of informing citizens of the upcoming election.

IRI observers also note the positive efforts of Glas 99, the Get-Out-the-Vote campaign, to inform and educate voters about the upcoming elections. Their efforts contributed to unprecedented voter turnout.

PRE-ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

Croatia's new election law contains several positive improvements over the law, which applied to the 1995 elections, primary among them the establishment of multi-party election commissions and the provision for the participation of domestic election monitors. These measures clearly contributed to greater transparency and increased voter confidence.

Provisions of the new election law permitting GONG to monitor the balloting and tabulation processes contributed in a significant way to the overall quality and integrity of the election. These efforts should be commended. GONG's volunteers were well prepared, professional, and their coverage was widespread. The State Election Commission also took a positive step forward by ruling that GONG monitors would receive copies of polling station protocols at the polling station level. This is a strong step toward further transparency in the voting process.

IRI observers also commend the adoption of the non-fixed quota system for Croatia's "Diaspora." This addressed the issue of disproportionate representation that was afforded to non-resident citizens under the 1995 law.

The creation of a State Ethics Commission to issue rulings or warnings related to the pre-election environment was also an improvement over the 1995 law. While IRI observers commend the State Ethics Commission for taking their job seriously, unfortunately, its impact was limited due to lack of enforcement powers.

Voter registration lists, as in previous elections, continued to be a source of concern. In particular, the IRI delegates would cite what appeared to be the unequal treatment of political parties with respect to access to the voter lists prior to the election observers noted the suspicion expressed by many political parties that the HDZ might have used this list to send letters soliciting support to every household in Croatia.

ELECTION DAY – BALLOTING, COUNTING AND ADMINISTRATION

In general, IRI observers were strongly impressed by the professionalism and enthusiasm of election administrators at all levels. The balloting and County processes proceeded in a generally smooth and uninterrupted manner throughout the country on election day. Election commissioners, despite some instances of lack of training or last minute training, were knowledgeable regarding the election law, diligent, and polite. IRI would also note that with few exceptions, observers received a welcome reception by representatives of local polling stations as well as at city/municipal election commissions. They were accorded all of their rights under the law.

IRI observers generally found the addition of opposition political party representatives to the polling station commissions was administered without incident or conflict. However, despite the improvement in the law allowing for opposition parties to be represented on election commissions, this provision was not uniformly applied to military installations, prisons, ships, or to overseas embassies and consulates. It was difficult if not impossible for political parties to participate in the execution of voting at these sites. However, it is positive that domestic and international observers were allowed access to these sites.

Voters were able to cast their ballots in an atmosphere free of intimidation and only in a few very limited instances did voters appear confused by the balloting process. The irregularities and inconsistencies that IRI observers noted did not appear to be relevant to the final outcome of the voting process. However, it appears that certain obstacles to voting by displaced Serbs in eastern Slavonia may have existed. This is a problem, which deserves follow-up and investigation by election authorities.

Appendix IV

RESULTS OF 2000 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

POLITICAL PARTY / COALITION	% WON	# SEATS
Social Democratic Party / Croatian Social Liberal Party (SDP-HSLS) + 2 regional parties (SBHS & PGS)	39.25	71
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) – includes 6 diaspora	28.63	46
Croatian Peasants' Party / Liberal Party / Croatian People's Party / Istrian Democratic Assembly (HSS-LS-HNS-IDS)	13.33	24
Croatian Party of Right / Croatian Christian Democratic Union (HSP-HKDU)	5.27	5
Minorities	13.52	5
TOTAL	100	151

SEATING IN PARLIAMENT BY INDIVIDUAL PARTY:

Party affiliation	Seats
SDP	45
HDZ	46
HSLS	23
HSS	16
IDS	4
HSP	4
LS	2
HNS	2
PGS	2
SBHS	1
HKDU	1

RESULTS OF 1995 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

POLITICAL PARTY / COALITION	% WON	# SEATS
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)	59.05	75
United List (HSS, HNS, IDS, HKDU, SBHS)	12.60	17
Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS)	8.66	11
Social Democratic Party (SDP)	7.09	9
Croatian Party of Right (HSP)	3.15	4
Candidates with Multiple Party Support	3.15	4
Independent candidates	3.15	4
Serbian People's Party (SNS)	1.57	2
Social Democratic Action of Croatia (ASH)	0.79	1
TOTAL	100.00	127

***Liberal Party was formed in 1997 by splitting off from the Croatian Social Liberal Party taking with it 4 seats in the parliament.**

Appendix V

Members Elected and Seated in the Croatian Parliament as a Result of January 2000 Elections

UNIT	MP NAME	ADDRESS	PARTY
1	**Dr. Mate Grani**	Zagreb; Kameniti stol 36	HDZ
1	**Zlatko Canjuga**	Zagreb; V.Poljanice 8	HDZ
1[1]	**Marina Matulovi - Dropuli**	Zagreb; Ksaver 74	HDZ
1	**Vlado Gotovac, prof.**	Zagreb; Kneza Mislava 4	HSS, LS, HNS, ASH
1	**Dr. Josip Torbar**	Zagreb; Baruna Trenka 7/II	HSS, LS, HNS, ASH
1[2]	**Ivica Ra an**	Zagreb; B adali eva 26c	SDP, HSLS
1	**Milan Bandi**	Zagreb; Bu anova 41	SDP, HSLS
1[3]	**Dr.sc. Goran Grani**	Zagreb; Kninski trg 8	SDP, HSLS
1	**Mirjana Feri -Vac**	Zagreb; Kumi i eva 4	SDP, HSLS
1[4]	**Goranko Fi uli**	Zagreb; Jurjevska 54a	SDP, HSLS
1	**Mirjana Didovi**	Zagreb; Primorska 3	SDP, HSLS
1	**Nenad Stazi**	Zagreb; Travanjska 1	SDP, HSLS
1[5]	**Dr.sc. Hrvoje Kraljevi**	Zagreb; Medveš ak 102	SDP, HSLS
1	**Akademik Ivo Šlaus**	Zagreb; Breš enskoga 11	SDP, HSLS
2	**Dr. Ljerka M intas-Hodak**	Zagreb; P.Hatza 2	HDZ
2	**Dr. Ivi Pašali**	Zagreb; Zagreba ka 138	HDZ
2	**Dr. uro Njavro**	Zagreb; Podgaj 57	HDZ
2	**Dr. Ka rmela Capa rin**	Bjelovar; A.Mihanovi a 8a	HDZ
2	**Zlatko Tom i , dipl.ing.**	Zagreb; Maksimirska 67	HSS, LS, HNS
2	**eljko L edinski, dipl.ing.**	Bjelovar; J.J.Strossmayera 4	HSS, LS, HNS
2	**Ivan Kolar**	Molve; Virovska 7	HSS, LS, HNS
2	**Dra en Budiša**	Zagreb; Matije Divkovi a 11	HSLS, SDP
2	**ur a Adleši**	Bjelovar; Mirka Bogovi a 3	HSLS, SDP
2	**Gordana Sobol**	Zagreb; Poljani ka 6	HSLS, SDP
2	**Franjo Ku ar**	azma; Palan ani 14	HSLS, SDP
2	**Stjepan Henezi**	Koprivnica; Ludbreški odvojak 9	HSLS, SDP
2	**Ivo ovi**	Zagreb; Nova cesta 128	HSLS, SDP
2	**Mladen Godek**	Koprivnica; Trg k. Tomislava 3	HSLS, SDP

UNIT	MP NAME	ADDRESS	PARTY
3	**Ivan Jarnjak**	Sv.Nedjelja,Bestovje; Zlatarska 5	HDZ
3	**Hrvoje Vojvoda**	Vara din; Bra e Radi a 16	HDZ
3	**Velimir Pleša**	akovec; A.Augustin i a 6	HDZ
3	**Krunoslav Gašpari**	Zagreb; Bolni ka 94	HDZ
3	**Luka Trconi , dr.iur.**	Bjelovar; Istarska 6	HSS, LS, HNS
3	**Dr. Zvonimir Sabati**	Donji Kneginec, Tur in; Ku anska 31	HSS, LS, HNS
3	**Dr.sc. Zdravko Tomac**	Zagreb; Pantov ak 60a	SDP, HSLS
3	**Baltazar Jalšovec**	Selnica; Štrukovec 135	SDP, HSLS
3	**Dragica Zgrebec**	akovec; Zrinsko-Frankopanska 8	SDP, HSLS
3	**Miroslav Korenika**	Vara din; Zagreba ka 71	SDP, HSLS
3	**Dr.sc. Ivan ehok**	Vara din; Bo e Te aka 17	SDP, HSLS
3	**Sonja Borov ak**	Zabok; Naselje Borov aki 18	SDP, HSLS
3	**Mr.sc. Zorko Vidi ek**	Donja Stubica; upana Vratislava 6	SDP, HSLS
3	**eljko Pavlic**	Sveta Marija; Trg bana Jela i a 4	SDP, HSLS
4	**Vladimir Šeks**	Zagreb; F.Petri a 7	HDZ
4[6]	**Branimir Glavaš**	Osijek; Šetalište P.Preradovi a 7	HDZ
4	**uro De ak**	Virovitica; Zrinski vrt 19	HDZ
4	**Berislav Šmit**	Osijek; Bjelolasi ka 1	HDZ
4	**Dr.sc. Zlatko Kramari**	Osijek; Gunduli eva 28	HSS, LS, HNS
4[7]	**eljko Pecek, dipl.oec.**	Pitoma a; J.J.Strossmayera 2	HSS, LS, HNS
4	**Dr.sc. Vilim Herman**	Osijek; Nikola Šubi Zrinskog 33	HSLS, SDP, SBHS
4[8]	**Dr.sc. Antun Vuji**	Zagreb; Kumi i eva 1	HSLS, SDP, SBHS
4	**eljko Malevi**	akovo; Stjepana Dr islava 15	HSLS, SDP, SBHS
4	**Damir Juri**	Osijek; Vijenac Ivana Meštrovi a 62	HSLS, SDP, SBHS
4	**Viktor Bro**	Virovitica; 30. svibnja 144	HSLS, SDP, SBHS
4	**Sanja Kapetanovi**	Osijek; Dragutina Neumana 6a	HSLS, SDP, SBHS

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4	**Dragutin Vukuši**	Virovitica; Grofa Peja evi a 3	HSLS, SDP, SBHS
4	**Anto api**	10000 Zagreb; Nehajska 18	HSP, HKDU
5	**Vesna Škare-O bolt**	Zagreb; Branimirova 39	HDZ
5	**Jadranka Kosor**	Zagreb; Šeferova 4	HDZ
5	**Josip Sesar**	Vrpolje; S. Radi a 1	HDZ
5	**Dr. Juraj Njavro**	Vukovar; M. Oreškovi a 41	HDZ
5	**Marija Bajt**	Po ega; S. S. Kranj evi a 3	HDZ
5	**Ivo Lon ar, dipl.ing.**	Zagreb; Sokolgradska 67A	HSS, LS, HNS
5	**Ljubica Lali , dr.iur.**	Slavonski Kobaš; Nikole Zrinskog 14	HSS, LS, HNS
5	**Marijan Marši**	Posavski Podgajci; M. Gupca 194	HSS, LS, HNS
5	**Anto Kova evi**	10000 Zagreb; Rašljice 1	HSP, HKDU
5	**Mr.sc. Mato Arlovi**	Zagreb; Ilica 81	SDP, HSLS
5	**elimir Janji**	upanja; Petra Hektorovi a 2	SDP, HSLS
5	**Branislav Tušek**	upanja; Aleja Matice hrvatske 33	SDP, HSLS
5	**Dubravka Horvat**	Slavonski Brod; Petra Krešimira IV 41	SDP, HSLS
5	**Marko Bari evi**	Pleternica; Kralja Tomislava 6	SDP, HSLS
6	**Dr. Ivica Kostovi**	Zagreb; Pantov ak 162	HDZ
6[9]	**uro Brodarac**	Sisak; S.A. Radi a 12/3	HDZ
6	**Ivan Milas**	Zagreb; Novakova 12	HDZ
6	**Ivan Šuker**	Velika Gorica; Lj.Posavskog 7	HDZ
6	**Stjepan Radi , Prof.**	Zagreb; Hercegova ka 131	HSS, LS, HNS
6	**Zdenko Haramija, dr.iur.**	Velika Gorica; Zagreba ka 144	HSS, LS, HNS
6	**Vlado Juki**	31000 Osijek; Belomanastirska 26	HSP, HKDU
6[10]	**Davorko Vidovi**	Sisak; D.Radovi a 32	SDP, HSLS
6[11]	**Jozo Radoš**	Zagreb,Sesvete; Zumbula 25	SDP, HSLS
6	**Snje ana Biga Friganovi**	Zagreb; Ilica 81	SDP, HSLS
6[12]	**Tonino Picula**	V.Gorica; M.Magdaleni a 1/VII	SDP, HSLS

UNIT	MP NAME	ADDRESS	PARTY
6	**Dorica Nikoli**	Zagreb; Sinkovi eva 8	SDP, HSLS
6	**Slavko Koji**	Zagreb; 2. Maksimirsko naselje 11	SDP, HSLS
6	**Katica Sedmak**	Zagreb; alskoga 80	SDP, HSLS
7	**Akademik Vlatko Pavleti**	Zagreb; Rubeti eva 7	HDZ
7	**Pavao Miljavac**	Duga Resa; Maleti i 38	HDZ
7	**Ivan Peni**	Jastrebarsko; Zdihova ka 39	HDZ
7	**Dario Vuki**	Rijeka; F.Paravi a 13	HDZ
7[13]	**Radimir a i , dipl.ing.**	Vara din; Cankareva 5	HSS, LS, HNS, IDS
7[14]	**Mr. Bo idar Pankreti**	Vrbovec; Zleninska 12a	HSS, LS, HNS, IDS
7	**Ton i Tadi**	10040 Zagreb; Viganjska 8	HSP, HKDU
7[15]	**eljka Antunovi**	Zagreb; Vlaška 103	SDP, HSLS
7	**Mr.sc. Ivo Škrabalo**	Zagreb; Vini ka 10	SDP, HSLS
7[16]	**Dr.sc. Mato Crkvenac**	Zagreb; Radi evo šetalište 22	SDP, HSLS
7	**Milanka Opa i**	Zagreb; Donje Svetice 47	SDP, HSLS
7	**Dr.sc. Zrinjka Glovacki - Bernardi**	Zagreb; Kneza Ljudevita Posavskog 4	SDP, HSLS
7	**Dr.sc. Zdenko Frani**	Zagreb; Nova cesta 1	SDP, HSLS
7	**Mr.sc. Ivan Štajduhar**	Karlovac; Smi iklasova 21a	SDP, HSLS
8	**Mr. Zlatko Mateša**	Zagreb; Zelenjak 66	HDZ
8	**Mr. Nevio Šeti**	Pula; Borik 6	HDZ
8[17]	**Ivan Jakov i**	Pore ; Pionirska 3	IDS, HSS, LS, HNS, ASH
8	**Damir Kajin**	Buzet; Ivana Sancina 4	IDS, HSS, LS, HNS, ASH
8	**Valter Drandi**	Pula; Maruli eva 9	IDS, HSS, LS, HNS, ASH
8	**Dr. Ante Simoni**	Rijeka; Trg B. Ma urani a 8	IDS, HSS, LS, HNS, ASH
8	**Dr. Petar Tur inovi**	Kastav; Štivar 11	IDS, HSS, LS, HNS, ASH
8[18]	**Slavko Lini**	Rijeka; Joakima Rakovca 21	SDP, HSLS, PGS
8	**Mr.sc. Nikola Ivaniš**	Rijeka; V.i M.Lenca 48	SDP, HSLS, PGS

UNIT	MP NAME	ADDRESS	PARTY
8	**Mr.sc. eljko Glavan**	Rijeka; Brajšina 21	SDP, HSLS, PGS
8	**Mr.sc. Drago Kraljevi**	Buje; Klesovska 36	SDP, HSLS, PGS
8	**Jadranka Katarin i -Škrlj**	Buzet; Frane i i 40	SDP, HSLS, PGS
8	**Vladimir Šep i**	Rijeka; Save Jugo Bujkove 8	SDP, HSLS, PGS
8	**Luciano Sušanj**	Rijeka; M.Špilera 5	SDP, HSLS, PGS
9	**Nikica Valenti**	Zagreb; Jordanovac 71	HDZ
9	**Drago Krpina**	Biograd na moru; R. Boškovi a bb	HDZ
9	**Ivo Baica**	Šibenik; Dobri 6	HDZ
9	**Anton Kova ev**	Kaštel Lukši ; Obala K. Tomislava 41	HDZ
9	**Bo idar Kalmeta**	Zadar; J.K. Skenderbega 61	HDZ
9	**Ante Markov, dipl.oec.**	Murter; Šibenska 30	HSS, LS, HNS, ASH
9	**Prof.dr. Vesna Pusi**	Zagreb; Ra koga 12	HSS, LS, HNS, ASH
9	**Boris Kandare**	51523 Baška; Primorska 12	HSP, HKDU
9[19]	**Šime Lu in**	Trogir; Kneza Domagoja 40	SDP, HSLS
9	**Joško Konti**	Sinj; Tripalov vo njak 0	SDP, HSLS
9	**Ingrid Anti evi - Marinovi**	Zadar; Fra Gjergja F ishte 2a	SDP, HSLS
9	**Ivan Nini**	Šibenik-Brodarica; Krapanjskih spu vara 73	SDP, HSLS
9	**Mario Kova**	Šibenik; Kralja Zvonimira 32	SDP, HSLS
9	**Romano Meštrovi**	Zadar; Jakše edomila- uke 8	SDP, HSLS
10	**Dr. Jure Radi**	Zagreb; Kozjak 50	HDZ
10	**Dr. Ivo Sanader**	Split; Rije ka 5	HDZ
10	**Luka Bebi**	Zagreb; Petrinjska 31	HDZ
10	**Dubravka Šuica**	Dubrovnik; A.Topi a Mimare 6	HDZ
10	**Ivica Tafra**	Dugi Rat; Hrvatske mornarice 21	HDZ
10	**Luka Roi , dipl.oec.**	Split; Vukovarska 40	HSS, LS, HNS, ASH
10	**Ivan Škari**	Split; Katalini ev prilaz 7	HSLS, SDP
10	**Mr.sc. Marin Jurjevi**	Split; Gotov eva 1	HSLS, SDP
10	**Vedran Lendi**	Vrgorac; A.G. osina 8	HSLS, SDP

UNIT	MP NAME	ADDRESS	PARTY
10	**Mr.sc. Andro Vlahuši**	Dubrovnik; Janjevska 1	HSLS, SDP
10	**Ton i uvela**	Kor ula; Ulica 60 5	HSLS, SDP
10	**Branka Baleti**	Makarska; T.Andrijaševi a S-3/3	HSLS, SDP
10	**Ante Grabovac**	Prolo ac;	HSLS, SDP
10	**Vesna Podlipec**	Split; Ivana Rendi a 37	HSLS, SDP
11	**Milan Kova**	Zagreb; P. Heruca 12	HDZ
11	**Zdenka Babi - Petri evi**	Zagreb; P almoti eva	HDZ
11	**Ljubo esi -Rojs**	Zagreb; Nova ka 62C	HDZ
11	**Mr. Zdravka Buši**	Zagreb; Divka Budaka 1D	HDZ
11	**Ante Beljo**	Zagreb; Nova ka 62B	HDZ
11	**Krunoslav Kordi**	Zagreb; Travanjska 14	HDZ
		NATIONAL MINORITIES	
12	**dr. Tibor Santo**	31000 Osijek; Gornjodravska obala 81	Hungarian
12	**Milan uki**	Zagreb; Ksaver 192	Serbian
12	**Dr. Furio Radin**	Pula; Osije ka 1	Italian
12	**Mr.sc. Zdenka uhnil**	Daruvar; A.G.Matoša 6	Czechs and Slovaks
12	**Borislav Graljuk**	10000 Zagreb; Izidora Poljaka 60	Austrian, German, Ruthenian, Ukrainian, Jewish

[1.] Relinquished her seat because she is Mayor of Zagreb
[2.] Relinquished his seat to take position as a Prime Minister. He was replaced with **Pavle Kalinic (SDP)**.
[3.] Relinquished his seat to take position as a Deputy Prime Minister. He was replaced with **Jadranko Mijalic (HSLS)**.
[4.] Relinquished his seat to take position in Government. He was replaced with **Darinka Orel (HSLS)**.
[5.] Relinquished his seat to take position in Government.
[6.] Relinquish his seat because he is Prefect of Slavonsko Baranjska County
[7.] Relinquished his seat to take position in Government. He was replaced with **Stjepan Zivkovic (HSS)**.
[8.] Relinquished his seat to take position in Government. He was replaced with **Jadranka Reihl-Kir (SDP)**.
[9.] Relinquished his seat because he is Prefect of Sisacko Moslavacka County
[10.] Relinquished his seat to take position in Government. He was replaced with **Kreso Kovacicek (SDP)**.
[11.] Relinquished his seat to take position in Government. He was replaced with **Hrvoje Zoric (HSLS)**.
[12.] Relinquished his seat to take position in Government. He was replaced with **Josip Leko (SDP)**.
[13.] Relinquished his seat to take position in Government. He was replaced with **Darko Santic (HNS)**.
[14.] Relinquished his seat to take position in Government. He was replaced with **Miroslav Furdek (HSS)**.
[15.] Relinquished her seat to take position in Government. She was replaced with **Dragutin Vrus (SDP)**.
[16.] Relinquished his seat to take position in Government. He was replaced with **Zlatko Seselj (SDP)**.
[17.] Relinquished his seat to take position in Government. He was replaced with **Dino Debeljuh (IDS)**.
[18.] Relinquished his seat to take position in Government. He was replaced with **Dijana Cizmadija (SDP)**.
[19.] Relinquished his seat to take position in Government. He was replaced with **Ivo Fabijanic (SDP)**.