

Russia
Election Observation Report
December 12, 1993

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The International Republican Institute (IRI) sponsored a 24 member delegation to observe the parliamentary elections and constitutional referendum in Russia on December 12, 1993. Under the leadership of IRI Chairman, U.S. Senator John McCain, the delegates evaluated the electoral process, identified the strengths and weaknesses of the system, and made recommendations for future elections. As a matter of policy, IRI does not make simple findings as to whether an election can be categorized as free and fair.

IRI's observation mission to Russia's April 1993 referendum led to a report detailing weaknesses in technical aspects of the voting process. That observer team's recommendations were published in *Izvestiya* and later introduced on the floor of the parliament by its pro-democratic members.¹ A number of improvements suggested by IRI monitors following the April referendum mission had been adopted by December, including clearer guidelines on validation of ballots and procedures for replacing spoiled ballots by local election officials; increased security for mobile ballot boxes; revisions in the absentee voting system; and provisions for an orderly process of accrediting domestic and international observers. These changes demonstrated a willingness to reexamine the process and make modifications where weaknesses were found.

The 25 recommendations contained in this report will be forwarded to the appropriate Russian and American officials in a constructive effort to help Russia improve the process in anticipation of the next step, local elections tentatively scheduled for March 1994. There are many traditions in the current system that, although their origins lie in the old Soviet-style elections, have positive benefits when reapplied to democratic elections; for example, the invitation to vote, universal registration, and the efficiency and dedication of polling station personnel. IRI observers, however, found other components of the electoral process that hold the potential for abuse, such as the portable ballot box, an under-appreciation of the secret ballot, and ill-defined elements of the election law. In addition to specific recommendations for improving the electoral process, this report also contains suggestions for the institutional development of political parties, a free and independent media, and a legislative branch that can serve as a genuine partner in governance. The long-term development of civil and political institutions that support and sustain a democracy will be critical to Russia's transition.

II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The IRI delegation found the December 12 elections to be a significant, positive step forward in Russia's democratic transition that affirmed a commitment to the democratic process. The competitive nature of the campaigns waged by the parties, the interest displayed by Russian voters in the election process, the media access afforded differing points of view, the efforts of election administrators to add uniformity to the process, and the creation of a new constitutional order -- all signaled a momentous departure from past Soviet practices and habits.

The IRI observers applauded the Russian people for their peaceful and serious conduct in a potentially volatile campaign period. The Russian people also deserve recognition for their endorsement of a post-communist constitutional order providing a clear division of power and establishing institutional relationships. In the face of the hardship and pain found in any economic transition, the Russian people chose a democratic framework to move them beyond the paralyzing effects of the recent power struggle.

IRI observers found the campaign environment to be diverse and dynamic. The IRI delegation commended Russia's 13 political parties for their success, given a brief campaign period, in obtaining the required signatures to compete in the elections, and in recruiting and fielding candidates. The short campaign period, however, led to the issuance of an incomplete election law, the hurried appointment of a Central Election Commission (CEC), and a rush to create new political parties. Additional steps must be taken in the two-year transitional period ahead to secure the positive benefits of the election, minimize the negative consequences, and build durable democratic institutions.

Election Law

Issue: Russia's new parliamentarians revising the election law or writing new laws ought to bear in mind that their counterparts in other countries, with the benefit of deeper democratic traditions and the accumulated experience of competitive elections, still seek and find ways to refine the process. Whether by applying innovative technologies, meeting new procedural challenges, or relearning old lessons, the development of electoral systems is a never-ending process.

Although the current election law contains serious shortcomings, it is nevertheless a significant step forward in encouraging the development of democratic institutions. The short period of preparation for the December 12 elections led to a hastily assembled and inadequate set of election regulations. Many directives from the CEC were, in effect, new laws rather than interpretations of existing law. While this timetable obviously was dictated by the unique set of circumstances surrounding the dissolution of the Supreme

Soviet, future elections will provide the opportunity for greater advanced planning.

Furthermore, the CEC's maneuvering on the issue of turnout had little effect in the final analysis except to erode its own credibility. It was reminiscent of past practices in which authorities manipulated the rules to achieve a pre-determined outcome. If Russians are to have faith in their new political institutions, the process must be fully defined and respected by those institutions.

- Recommendation 1:** All aspects of the electoral process should be clearly defined by law in advance of the campaign period, rather than on an ad hoc basis throughout the process. The new parliament should revise and consolidate the current election law to provide a more consistent framework for future elections. The process of reexamination and amendment should be continued with successive elections.
- Recommendation 2:** Results of individual polling stations should be published locally, or otherwise made available for public consumption and dissemination, by the constituency election commissions.
- Recommendation 3:** Sample ballots posted at polling stations for the purposes of voter education should be unmarked. There also should be a greater uniformity of civic education materials at polling stations.
- Recommendation 4:** There should be a uniform method of marking ballots to minimize voter confusion and make a clear distinction between old and new methods.
- Recommendation 5:** A well-defined process of appeal should be developed and clearly defined so that aggrieved parties may readily have a method of recourse.
- Recommendation 6:** Procedures should be put in place to ensure the sanctity of the secret ballot for voters utilizing the portable ballot box.

Election Administration

Issue: IRI observers saw a genuine effort made by national, regional, and local election officials to guarantee a fair process. Particularly impressive was their detailed knowledge of the election procedures. IRI observers found that the majority of election officials at the regional and local level had worked in previous elections.

Recommendation 7: Effort should be made to recruit new people into the process of election administration. Better training programs are needed for new poll workers who lack experience and to educate experienced workers on departures from past practices.

Issue: The accreditation of pollwatchers was limited to representatives of political parties, thereby excluding a large pool of prospective pollwatchers from civic organizations.

Recommendation 8: Civic organizations should be allowed to sponsor domestic pollwatchers.

Issue: Civic education was compromised because of the shortness of the campaign period. In addition, the CEC and constituency commissions should not be the only institutions that play a role in civic education.

Recommendation 9: Other civil institutions such as unions, newspapers, political parties, universities and schools also have an interest in providing civic education and should be encouraged to do so.

Issue: The partial and incomplete release of results by the CEC implied an orchestrated and selective release of results, thereby fueling suspicion of vote tampering. Such suspicions were not immediately disproved because many of the activities of the CEC were not open to the public, the press, or observers.

Recommendation 10: The CEC should establish a well-defined and well-publicized process for reporting results based upon a

realistic timetable given the level of technology. The CEC also should provide access to domestic and international observers in the aggregation of results as they are reported from the constituencies.

Recommendation 11: The CEC should become a permanent and fully accountable body, with pre-defined terms and conditions of office. Every effort should be taken to ensure that the CEC is independent and free from political influence.

Issue: Eligible voters were counted at the end of the process. When the CEC released the number of eligible voters after the December elections, the figure was approximately one million less than the eligible voters in the April 1993 referendum, further fueling speculation about vote tampering.

Recommendation 12: Local governments are responsible for updating the voter registries before the election. Those numbers should be forwarded to the CEC before the election, not after, to provide a nationwide total of eligible voters upon which to base voter turnout before voting begins.

Issue: IRI observers were troubled by the potential influence of military officers in military voting. IRI observers also concluded that many members of the military were disenfranchised from elections in their place of official residence because there was no method of absentee balloting.

Recommendation 13: Members of the military should vote at civilian polling stations whenever possible. The system of military voting when no civilian stations are available must be reevaluated and a new system devised, whether at civilian administered stations on military installations, absentee voting, or early voting. Military officers should be removed from civic education and all other aspects of the voting process to avoid concerns regarding influence, and political parties and candidates should be provided greater access to military personnel.

Recommendation 14: Russian election authorities should continue to explore and develop other methods of absentee voting to allow persons in the military, students, or other individuals away from their district of official residence for a prolonged period an opportunity to vote on regional and local ballots.

Political Party System

Issue: The presence of plurality on Russia's political landscape is no longer questionable. What remains questionable is the degree to which democratic institutions capable of adjudicating societal interests can consolidate and overcome the legacy of past practices. Democratic institutions cannot be created simply by legislation, presidential decree, or a single election. Democratic institutions gain strength as they organize over time, broaden their public acceptance, learn from practical experience, and adapt to changing circumstances. Russia's transition, therefore, is tied not only to democratic elections, but also to the long-term development and strengthening of institutions necessary to support and sustain a democracy. The continued and active role of political parties in governance and in future elections will be critical components of that process. While the elections were a vital catalyst for party development, many of those gains can be squandered in the post-election period if parties fail to make the organizational transition to governance. Given the level of voter turnout in December, it will be particularly important that members of various parties in the new Duma demonstrate they are capable of working together to solve Russia's problems.

Recommendation 15: Parties should form institutional structures in the Duma, hold regular meetings, form leadership offices, recruit staff with technical expertise, establish caucuses, and coordinate with extra-parliamentary party structures.

Issue: Russian democracy is coming to life in the age of television. Methods of mass communication allow candidates to appeal directly to the voter, and thereby bypass much of the need for party structures. Party institutions, however, have many important functions in Russian society at this stage of political development.

Recommendation 16: Parties must focus on building structures at the regional and local levels to help develop party platforms, recruit candidates, and mobilize popular support.

Issue: Parties devoted most of their effort to candidate registration and the campaign period that followed, neglecting the fact that political parties have an important role to play on election day. While effective legal mechanisms guaranteeing an equitable political process may be provided by an election law, it is the competitive nature of a multi-party system that brings those mechanisms to life. Abuses go unchallenged when one party begins to dominate political life.

Recommendation 17: Political parties should recruit and train domestic pollwatchers to monitor the process, provide a disincentive for abuse, and conduct a parallel vote count to provide an external basis for judging the validity of the official count.

Issue: Many political parties found it difficult to generate interest and recruit members without clearly defined election dates. Parties lacked an organizational impetus when elections seemed a distant and uncertain event. With the scheduling of elections for December 12, parties were faced with the opposite extreme: approximately 30 days to register their candidates and 30 days to campaign.

Recommendation 18: Provide an adequate campaign period with sufficient advanced notice to allow parties an opportunity to make organizational preparations before the start of the campaign period.

Issue: IRI observers found the emergence of a multi-party system within two years of the collapse of the Communist's single-party monopoly to be a truly remarkable development. Particularly notable was the identification of many voters with a specific party and the striking diversity of the parties. The provision for a proportional ballot was an important measure in encouraging the development of a multi-party system. The minimum requirement of two candidates on the single mandate ballot and three candidates on the double mandate ballot similarly were important provisions that ensured competition on the ballot. These benefits, however, were mitigated by the absence of party identification on the single and double mandate ballots. Voters unfamiliar with the candidates but wanting to support a specific party were unable to do so. In addition, deputies not elected under a party label may feel less compulsion to maintain party loyalty after the election, making it more difficult for parties to provide discipline and play an effective role in governance.

Recommendation 19: The party affiliation of all candidates should be indicated on all ballots. If a candidate has no official party affiliation, his or her status as an independent should be noted.

Issue: The funding of parties became an issue in the campaign period and thereby detracted from the debate of larger issues because there was no mechanism to evaluate accusations of illegal financing.

Recommendation 20: A campaign financial disclosure law that reveals amounts, sources, and recipients of campaign funds should be passed by the new legislature, with periodic reporting deadlines during the campaign period and stiff sanctions for non-compliance.

Issue: IRI observers were struck by the noticeable absence of young voters. Political parties have a vital interest in recruiting and developing the next generation of leaders that will help their organizations become durable institutions over the long term. Young people usually are the members of society most open to new ideas, and often the most enthusiastic participants of political life, because they have more at stake in the future.

Recommendation 21: Political parties should make a concerted effort to recruit young people to provide them an avenue to shape their own future while developing the next generation of political leaders. Parties, for example, should include a youth program in their platforms, develop organizational components specifically for young people, and include young people among their candidates.

Print and Broadcast Media

Issue: IRI observers noted the broad spectrum of political interests participating in the vigorous campaign debate. Observers believed that political parties enjoyed equal access to unpaid television and radio, adequate access to paid advertising, and that media restrictions or cases of censorship ultimately had little impact on the public's access to information. IRI observers noted, however, that several news outlets representing views opposed to the

government were closed during the initial stage of the campaign, and temporarily operated under government-imposed editorial restrictions regarding the proposed constitution.

Recommendation 22: The creation of independent and financially stable print and broadcast news organizations that provide an objective yet critical source of information are vital institutions in the development of a free society. National and local government authorities, therefore, should resist the temptation to assert media control and, whenever possible, play a positive role in moving media institutions toward greater freedom and independence. As a first step, the new Parliament should redefine the relationship between the government and the media in a manner that allows freedom of the press.

Government Role

Issue: Boris Yeltsin embarked upon a campaign to consolidate his power with the issuance of Presidential Decree no. 1400 on September 23, 1993, which disbanded the parliament. Although some of Yeltsin's actions in September and October could be considered undemocratic, the end result of those actions was to break his monopoly on power and create a legislative body with a new degree of democratic legitimacy.

Under the new constitution, Ministers must resign from their positions upon election to the State Duma. A two-year exception to this rule is provided for Ministers in the new constitution's transitional section. This provision, however, still allows for potential conflict of interest regarding the conduct of ministers in the campaign period. IRI observers heard widespread criticism regarding the unfair advantage many ministers enjoyed by virtue of their office, especially as it pertained to access to television.

Recommendation 23: The new Russian constitution prohibits a minister from serving in the State Duma. IRI observers believe consideration should be given to extending that prohibition to the campaign period. Ministers running as candidates to the State Duma should consider taking a leave of absence, or resigning from their post, upon registration as a candidate to avoid the potential for conflict of interest or the misuse of state resources.

Issue: In addition, conflict of interest issues are likely to arise in future elections regarding officials who misuse the advantages and privileges of incumbency to win re-election, unless there is a legally proscribed process for regulating their activity.

Recommendation 24: The new parliament should pass a law specifying the allowable activities of elected and appointed officials seeking elected office. In addition, the range of allowable political activities for government officials who support specific candidates or parties should be defined by law.

Issue: Many parties identified the "Mafia" as a source of campaign influence for their opponents. It was often unclear whether those identified as such were true organized crime figures or simply new capitalists who had made a lot of money. In a society where the ownership of private property was prohibited for over 70 years, the latter is perhaps understandable, but Russia now needs to define what it truly means by the "Mafia" - those genuinely involved in organized crime.

Recommendation 25: A law akin to the *Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization* act (RICO) in the United States, coupled with a high-level investigative and prosecutive office within the Russian government to concentrate on organized crime, could aid a great deal in bringing the true "Mafia" to justice. In addition, a politically insulated criminal justice system, improved compensation for law enforcement officials, and a strengthened legal framework, providing prosecutors with the necessary tools, would aid Russia's fight against crime and encourage popular faith in the system.

III. ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK

When Russian voters entered the voting booth on December 12, 1993, they cast votes on four separate ballots (see Appendix IV for sample ballots). On the first ballot, voters selected two regional representatives to the 176-member Federation Council, the upper house of the new Federal Assembly. These double mandate constituencies were based upon the extant administrative boundaries of Russia's 88 regions and territories. The second and third ballots were for the 450-member State Duma, the lower house. On ballot number two, half of the State Duma was elected from national party lists based on a proportional system. The first three candidates of each party's list were presented on the ballot below each party name. The first three names from a party's regional list of candidates also could be included on the ballot (a complex system meant to capitalize on the name recognition of local political figures and weight the party list to those regions in which the party has above average strength). The remaining half of the State Duma was selected on ballot number three from 225 newly created single-mandate constituencies. Party affiliation was not provided for candidates on either the single mandate (no. 3) or double mandate (no. 1) ballots. On all three ballots, voters indicated their choice by placing an "X" or any other mark in a box located to the right of the candidate's name or party. Voters also had the option of registering a vote against all candidates.

The fourth ballot asked voters to endorse or oppose the new constitution published on November 10, 1993. Beneath the question "Do you approve the constitution of the Russian Federation?" were printed the words yes and no, and voters were instructed to cross out that which they did not want. The law stated the draft constitution required the approval of more than 50% of the voters participating in the election, and that a minimum of 50% of all eligible voters were required to participate to make the referendum valid.

The participation of at least 25% of eligible voters was required to make the single and double-mandate elections valid. If 25% was not attained, elections would be held again in 12 weeks. If fewer than three candidates registered for any Federation Council race, or two candidates for any State Duma contest, those elections also would be postponed for 12 weeks. The candidate receiving the largest plurality of votes on the single-mandate ballot won, while the first- and second-place finishers on the double-mandate ballot were elected. In addition, the election law established a threshold for the national party lists. Any party receiving less than 5% of the vote on ballot no. 2 was excluded from the tabulation process.

While districts for the Federation Council were based upon extant administrative boundaries, the 225 constituencies for the State Duma were new districts drawn by the Central Election Commission (CEC). The number of voters within a single-mandate constituency ranged from a high of 670,000 in the Amur Oblast on the Chinese border to a low of 13,000 in Siberia's remote Evenkia tribal zone, with an average number of 508,000 voters per constituency.

The December 12 elections were administered by three administrative layers. At the national level, a newly formed CEC was established by presidential decree on September 29, 1993. Over 400 applications were received for membership on the 21-member commission. The commission members ultimately were appointed by President Yeltsin, with Nicholay Ryabov serving as Chairman and Alexander Ivanchenko as Vice Chairman. The remaining members were assigned to one of seven committees that dealt with specific areas: Interaction with Constituency Commissions; Interaction with Associations of Voters that have their Candidates Running for Office; Financing; Logistics; Mass Media; Preparation of Instructions; and Interaction with Federal Power, Ministries, Departments, and Representative and Executive Powers of Federation Subjects.

In addition to the national CEC, 225 constituency election commissions were created to administer the elections at the regional level. The CEC designated 88 of the 225 constituency commissions as super commissions, vested with the responsibility for administering the Federation Council elections within the entire region. Balloting on election day was administered by the third layer, 95,000 polling station commissions, with each polling site having approximately 100 to 3,000 voters.

Voters had two alternate methods to casting ballots at polling stations on election day. The first method was early voting. Voters expecting to be away from their district of official residence on election day could cast their ballot beginning 15 days in advance at their constituency bureau and three days in advance at their polling station. In addition, voters unable to travel to polling stations due to illness or other reasons could request that a portable ballot box be brought to their residence on election day. There was also a provision for a special voter registry list. Voters inadvertently left off the list or voting outside their district could vote for the constitutional referendum and party last ballot to the State Duma.

Mission Framework

IRI observation teams were deployed to four cities in which IRI observers monitored the April 1993 referendum: Archangelsk, Voronezh, Chelyabinsk, and Khabarovsk. By returning to these and other cities in December, observers used the findings of IRI's referendum mission as a benchmark in determining whether the administration of the electoral process in each region had improved, worsened, or remained relatively static. In addition, IRI observers traveled to the following six cities not included in the referendum monitoring mission: Vladimir, Novgorod, Kazan, Rostov-na-Donu, Kemerovo, and Irkutsk. The eleventh team remained in Moscow to provide a national perspective and to monitor the administration of the election in the capital city and its environs. With the exception of Kazan, all of these cities have been the site of IRI training seminars on the fundamentals of party organization, campaign management, and pollwatching techniques.

The 11 deployment cities were selected to expose IRI's election observers to disparate geographic regions of the Russian Federation at various stages of political liberalization. The proposed deployment cities were chosen according to whether the city was a major population center; added geographic diversity to the observation mission; was located in a region that is a stronghold for former communists with incumbents from local or regional soviets maintaining conservative or nationalist party affiliations; had experienced conflict between local executive and legislative bodies that led to a paralysis in government similar to the national power struggle; had been asserting its autonomy with central authorities in Moscow; or indicated support for Yeltsin weaker than the national average in the April 25 referendum.

Prior to election day, IRI observers held meetings in Moscow with national authorities concerned with election administration, including members of the Central Election Commission (CEC); political party leaders of all persuasions; and newspaper, radio, and television journalists. After traveling to their respective deployment cities, the observers held a second round of similar meetings at the regional and local levels. The purpose of these meetings was to help observers gain an understanding of the political context of elections, receive first-hand information regarding the conduct of the campaign period, and pose questions to the responsible authorities regarding election administration.

On election day, IRI observers visited polling stations throughout the day starting with the opening of polling stations early in the morning and ending with the counting of ballots that often lasted until the early hours of the next morning. Observers sought to cover a diverse geographic cross-section, traveling to both rural and urban areas of their respective regions.

Members of the delegation identified both strengths and weaknesses of the system under two broad categories: electoral environment and election administration. The electoral environment refers to the specific conditions of the campaign period which may affect voting on election day. Elements of the electoral environment can include the functions performed by political parties and other civic organizations; the extent of government control; the role of a free and independent media; and the major issues motivating the public debate.

The outcome of an election can also be affected by the political "playing field" on which competing parties attempt to deliver a message to voters. Uninhibited access to scarce campaign resources, equitable media exposure, and equal protection under the law are all factors affecting a party's true competitiveness. This is a special concern in electoral environments such as Russia's, in which economic structures have yet to complete the shift from a command to a market-based system. In such circumstances, local officials often retain control of major sectors of economic life. For example, factory directors, farm collective managers, and former party apparatchiks, whose livelihood is tied to preserving the status quo rather than embracing change, may control many resources essential to conducting an effective campaign. The continued state ownership of newspapers, printing houses, and radio and television stations is another area of

concern. Observers also sought to ascertain the level of voter understanding of ballot procedures and the voters' familiarity with parties, candidates, and their policy positions. Democratic elections are undermined when voter ignorance, misunderstanding, or fear can be manipulated to generate support for a particular candidate or party.

Finally, the larger historical and political context in which elections take place was considered. The particular stage of a country's democratic evolution, combined with the milieu of traditions and beliefs that come together in a political culture, must be appraised and applied to specific observations.

The equitable and consistent administration of the voting process is also necessary to ensure a legitimate outcome. Observers evaluated vital elements of election administration such as: the recruitment and training of polling station workers, the production and distribution of ballots, the legibility of ballot papers, the availability of voting booths and ballot boxes, the tabulation of ballots, and the reporting of results. This evaluation extended to an examination of the election law itself to determine whether it contained clear guidelines and procedures or if vague and ambiguous language allowed for wide administrative discretion and, consequently, an inconsistent application of the law.

Observers also examined the process with a critical eye towards opportunity and motive to commit ballot fraud and abuse, performing random checks against fraudulent voting practices. Observers paid close attention to any evidence indicating the willful tampering or destruction of ballots, the manipulation of voting results, or the use of ineligible or multiple voters. In addition, observers looked for evidence of coercion, intimidation, or bribery.

IV. DELEGATE OBSERVATIONS

Candidate Registration

Of the 91 parties and organizations determined eligible by the CEC to submit lists for the December elections, 21 submitted petitions with the required 100,000 signatures by the November 6 deadline. The CEC declared on November 10 that it had registered 13 of the 21 parties to take part in the elections. On checking the petitions, the CEC found that eight parties had violated the rules for collecting signatures and therefore were excluded. The most common violation had been exceeding the 15% limit for signatures collected from any one region. The eight excluded parties were: the Association of Independent Professionals, the Russian All-People's Union, the National Republican Party, the Constitutional Democratic Party, the Consolidation Party, "New Russia," the Russian Christian Democratic Party, and the Transformation Party.

On October 4, 1993, President Yeltsin issued a decree banning 10 extreme nationalist and communist parties.² Following the end of the "state of emergency" in Moscow, the ban was lifted on the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CP-RF) and the People's Party of Free Russia (PPFR). The CP-RF then submitted and registered a party list with the CEC while the PPFR ran its candidates on the Civic Union's national list. The remaining eight parties were allowed to resume activities but were still prohibited from taking part in the elections.

Approximately 1,700 candidates were distributed among the 13 parties running on party lists for the 225 proportional seats in the State Duma. Another 1,500 candidates were nominated for the single mandate seats in the State Duma, and 490 candidates were nominated to compete for 176 seats in the Federation Council. Parties that failed to attain the required 100,000 signatures to register a party list often fielded candidates in the single-mandate Duma and Federation Council elections.

Elections for the Federation Council were not held in Tatarstan, Chelyabinsk, and Chechnya because less than three candidates were registered. Nineteen other regions had the minimum three candidates running for the Federation Council. In Chelyabinsk, IRI observers met potential candidates who chose not to run because they would have to quit their jobs and move to Moscow. In Kemerovo, IRI observers saw a similar reluctance to run from the head of city administration (mayor) who believed that he could be of more benefit to people by keeping his current office rather than running for federal office. In Khabarovsk, the democratic parties failed to put forward a single candidate for the Federation Council because they lacked the organizational strength necessary to solicit the required number of signatures in such a short period of time. Local democratic activists complained to IRI observers that all five of the region's candidates for the Federation Council were government officials, and that they had used

their offices to unfair advantage in the signature campaign.

In Kazan, IRI observers found that the failure to hold the Federation Council race in Tatarstan was not the product of the election boycott. There actually were five willing candidates, but two candidates failed to obtain the necessary number of signatures, one failed to establish legal residency in time for the election, and one had already registered as a candidate for the State Duma.³

Political Parties

IRI observers met in Moscow with representatives of the following parties: Russia's Choice, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, the Women of Russia Party, the Movement for Dignity and Charity, and the Civic Union. All party leaders and candidates universally decried the brevity of the campaign period, a large portion of which was consumed on signature drives for candidate registration. The 13 political parties represented the full diversity of Russia's political spectrum. Of the 13 parties, only one supported the government's policy of economic reforms; while the rest embraced various reform and anti-reform positions (see Table I).

Russia's Choice was most closely identified with Yeltsin and his pro-reform agenda, although Yeltsin himself continued to shun direct party membership. Three other parties could be identified as the "liberal opposition," a group supporting continued economic and political reform, but opposing the "shock therapy" of the Yeltsin government in support of a more moderate program. These parties included the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform, and the Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc (Yabloko).

Two centrist parties could be described as statist: the Democratic Party of Russia and the Civic Union for Stabilization, Justice, and Progress; accepting market reform as an inevitability that must be managed in favor of the status quo. Three parties were anti-reform: the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and its rural counterpart, the Agrarian Party. In addition, there were four parties that could be categorized as either pro-reform or centrist, but focused on either a specific issue or the interests of a specific segment of society. These parties included the Women's Party of Russia, the Constructive Ecological Movement, the Dignity and Charity bloc, and the New Names/Future of Russia bloc.

Yeltsin's banning of certain political parties, most of which were fringe organizations with small memberships, did not substantially limit the range of choice on the ballot. Ironically, the effect of the ban was to reduce the threat of a divided vote for the anti-reform parties, which were concentrated in three main blocs. Furthermore, the failure of Sergei Baburin's nationalist

organization, the Russian National Union, to collect enough signatures to register a national party list also diminished the competition among anti-reform parties.⁴

Table I. Political Party Spectrum

Party or Bloc	Agenda	Party Leader
Russia's Choice bloc	Radical Reform	Yegor Gaidar
Party of Russian Unity and Accord	Moderate Reform	Sergei Shakhrai
Russian Movement for Democratic Reform	Moderate Reform	Gavril Popov
Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc	Moderate Reform	Grigory Yavlinsky
The Constructive Ecological Movement	Moderate Reform (Environmentalist)	Anatoly Panfilov
Civic Union for Peace Justice and Progress	Centrist	Arkady Volsky
Democratic Party of Russia	Centrist	Nikolai Travkin
Future of Russia/New Names	Centrist (Youth)	Vyacheslav Lachevsky
Women of Russia	Centrist (Women)	Alvetina Fedulova
Dignity and Charity Bloc	Centrist (Veterans, Disabled, and Elderly)	Vyacheslav Grishin
Communist Party of the Russian Federation	Anti-Reform	Gennady Zyuganov
The Agrarian Party	Anti-Reform	Mikhail Lapshin
The Liberal Democratic Party	Anti-Reform	Vladimir Zhirinovskiy

The decision of three pro-reform parties to run their own candidates rather than support Russia's Choice or form a coalition ultimately split the reform vote. Many reformers believed providing voters with a range of moderates and radicals would expand their support rather than make the election a simple yes or no vote on reform. The failure to work together also reflected the fact that reformist parties often were built around individual party leaders driven by personal political aspirations rather than common programmatic goals. In addition, many of the parties actually were coalitions themselves, with unstable and inconsistent memberships. Coalition-building between parties was made more difficult by a lack of internal party cohesion.

The national leadership of Russia's Choice spent considerable effort fighting its regional leaders, often members of the Democratic Russia Movement. The Democratic Russia Movement was formed in 1990. When Democratic Russia joined the Russia's Choice bloc at its founding congress in June 1993, it brought with it a relatively sophisticated grassroots network. But the conflict between national and regional leaders of Russia's Choice was a problem since its founding.

In the candidate registration process, the national leadership of Russia's Choice was able to dictate candidates to regional branches because of a provision in the election law. If a party had been certified to be placed on the proportional ballot, it could unilaterally nominate candidates for the single-mandate ballot without satisfying the separate requirement of signatures from 1% of the population within the district. This top-down option of candidate selection - fostered the growing dissatisfaction of regional branches with the Moscow headquarters of the Russia's Choice bloc.

For example, IRI observers in Chelyabinsk found that national leaders of Russia's Choice in Moscow had picked candidates for the State Duma over those favored by the local Russia's Choice activists. The national leadership of Russia's Choice had actively sought candidates with technical expertise and experience in government, often leading them to former members of the Communist Party apparatus. Local democratic activists who had been working towards elections for the past few years felt disenfranchised when Moscow nominated former apparatchiks. Consequently, many local Russia's Choice activists supported candidates from the Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc rather than from Russia's Choice. In Khabarovsk, the democratic movement also was demoralized by factionalism. IRI observers were told that one faction of Russia's Choice sent a list of "bureaucrats" to Moscow while another faction sent a list of "true reformers" to be State Duma candidates. The list of "bureaucrats" was approved. Local resistance to having candidates determined by party leaders in Moscow ultimately led to Democratic Russia candidates running against Russia's Choice candidates in 20 regions.

There were some instances, however, in which pro-reform parties overcame infighting to pool their efforts. IRI observers in Voronezh found that the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) candidate, Nikolai Alyokhin, decided to resign his candidacy because he would have pulled support away from the Russia's Choice favorite, the local presidential representative, Viktor Davydkin. Although the national leadership of the DPR left the Democratic Russia Movement in the summer of 1992 to pursue a more centrist agenda, the Voronezh branch of the DPR remained in the Democratic Russia coalition.

In addition to candidate selection, the pro-reform parties pursued a Moscow-based campaign strategy that dictated policies to regions rather than listening to the concerns of local party leaders to build support for a popular program. This top-down approach was designed to reinforce the position of party leaders, but in the end, the Moscow "crowd" itself became a

campaign issue as they were depicted as "out of touch" with the challenges of everyday life faced by most Russians.

The Voronezh branch of Russia's Choice, however, did not rely upon direction and support from Moscow. It developed a diverse and well-organized campaign strategy, implemented by over 200 volunteers, that included telephone banks, door-to-door campaigning, the distribution of flyers, and a coordinated television, radio, and newspaper advertising campaign. The local Communist Party representative, however, still claimed a grassroots organization ten times as large as the pro-reform parties.

IRI observers found that many reform candidates generally were poor campaigners. Few bothered to present clear and concise arguments to the voters for their program or offer any hope for the future beyond several more years of economic hardship. Their public speeches often sounded like lectures on economics more suited to a university audience. Overconfidence was partially responsible for the reformers' failure to deliver a clear message. Anatoly Chubais, Deputy Prime Minister for Privatization, said "We thought our work would speak for itself."⁵

IRI observers in Moscow met with Father Gleb Yakunin and Lev Ponamarev, co-chairmen of the Democratic Russia Movement, who were critical of the campaigns run by supporters of reform, including President Yeltsin and his unwillingness to campaign vigorously. For example, they said 60 million copies of the constitution were printed but kept locked up until the last minute of the campaign. IRI observers also saw stacks of posters at the Russia's Choice headquarters in Moscow that had not been distributed.

Material Resources

The election law placed limits on individual and corporate donations to candidates and parties. The election law allowed the use of private funds by campaigns and candidates, setting relatively high caps on donations. Individuals could donate up to 600,000 rubles (\$500) to candidates and 900,000 rubles (\$750) to parties, while corporations could give up to six million rubles (\$5,000) to candidates and 600 million rubles (\$500,000) to individual parties. Limits were not placed on the amount that parties could transfer to individual candidates. Donations from foreign states, organizations, or individuals were prohibited.

The CEC allocated 50 million rubles to each of the 13 parties. In addition, the electoral regulations provided for compensation of certain types of expenses. These included candidate travel expenses, the use of public facilities for campaign events, and one hour of free broadcast time. (Parties could use their own funds to purchase additional broadcasting time or advertising space.) Many candidates, however, complained that the sluggish transfer of funds from the CEC in Moscow meant that they often received their allotment late in the campaign. Observers found

this was often attributable to the inherent slowness of Russian bank transactions and, occasionally, unsympathetic local officials.

Employers were required to grant unpaid leave to candidates from the date of registration until the publication of election results. The candidates were to be compensated for wages lost during the campaign period by the election commission that certified the nomination. A candidate running in a single-mandate constituency could register up to 10 "authorized representatives" or campaign staff. In addition, parties running national lists could register up to 500 authorized representatives. Although employers also were required to grant such representatives unpaid leave, no provision was made for compensation of their lost wages.

IRI observers found that each party had its own theory regarding the funding sources of its opponents. For example, the Civic Union thought Russia's Choice was funded by the United States, while Russia's Choice thought the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was funded by the KGB. The LDP's treasurer said the one billion rubles the party spent on the election came entirely from individual contributions of 2,000 to 3,000 rubles, but there was no way to verify this claim. Other accusations went unanswered because the only financial disclosure requirements were how money was spent, not its source. Article 33 of the election law states that "no later than 60 days after the results in a given constituency are known, the election association shall submit [to the appropriate election commission] a statement of all election campaign receipts (including their sources) and expenses."

IRI observers found that many parties identified the so-called "Mafia" as a source of campaign influence for their opponents. It is unclear whether those identified as such were true organized crime figures or simply new capitalists who had made a lot of money in a brief period of time. Public corruption, however, was not a political issue on the same scale as in the April 1993 referendum. The absence of Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, who had emerged in April as the leader of the anti-Yeltsin bloc and had accused top Yeltsin advisers of diverting funds into foreign bank accounts, perhaps accounted for the lower profile of this issue. IRI's exit poll did identify "stopping corruption" in government as the second most important issue facing the new parliament, after economic reform.

Media Issues

IRI observers met in Moscow with representatives of the following Russian media organizations: *Izvestiya*, *Nezavissamaya Gazeta*, *Moscovski Komsomolets*, and Ostankino Television. In addition, IRI observers were briefed by representatives of the Russian-American Press Center and the European Institute for Media.

President Yeltsin suspended the publication of 15 newspapers in his "state of emergency" decree on October 4. Most of these newspapers were published in Moscow and were either extremely nationalist or communist. Two of these newspapers, *Den* (Day) and the anti-semitic *Puls Tushina* (Pulse of Tushina), in fact had encouraged inter-ethnic strife and called for the overthrow of the government. The Ministry of Information allowed the two main pro-Communist newspapers, *Pravda* and *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, to resume publication only if they re-registered under new names and found new editors. *Pravda* was back on the newsstand in early November, still printed under the "*Pravda*" banner but with a new editor, Viktor Linnik, who announced that *Pravda* would adopt a more civilized tone in its criticism of Yeltsin. The staff of *Sovetskaya Rossiya* appealed to Russia's new procurator general, Aleksei Kazannik, asking him to override the Ministry's order. A Moscow district court ruled on November 23 that the government acted illegally in suspending the paper's operations and that the newspaper could resume publication, but the paper did not return to the newsstand until after the election, on December 14.

President Yeltsin signed a decree on October 29 *On Informational Guarantees for Participants of the Election Campaign of 1993*. The decree was meant to ensure equal access to the media, in particular to state-owned radio and television, for all candidates and political parties in the December elections. The decree established a special Arbitration Court, appointed by Yeltsin, to investigate complaints against the media. The decree also urged the broadcast media to report all news on the elections in the beginning of newscasts and asked that newscasters refrain from commenting on any such news. Yeltsin also ordered all Russian radio and television companies to publicize the prices for the air time they sell to candidates and parties.

The Arbitration Court issued a statement on December 17 enumerating violations of campaign regulations committed by the media and individual candidates. The statement singled out for criticism an Ostankino TV documentary meant to depict Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party, in a negative light on the eve of the elections. The Chairman of Ostankino Television, Vyacheslav Bragin, defended the program in an interview with a Moscow paper, saying it was shown to "sober up" people who might be tempted to vote for Zhirinovskiy, but Bragin's critics say the tactic backfired, and instead broadened Zhirinovskiy's media exposure.⁶

The Russian-American Press and Information Center released a report on its findings from monitoring the role of the media during the election campaign. The Center found heavy media bias in favor of pro-reform blocs, in particular Russia's Choice. Many candidates complained to IRI observers that Russia's Choice, and other parties with government ministers on their party list, enjoyed an unfair advantage regarding access to television, which served as the main source of information for 85% of all Russians.

The Center also found that Russia's Choice main reformist opponent, the bloc led by economist Grigory Yavlinsky, suffered the most. The report notes that Ostankino TV gave 24 minutes of coverage to Russia's Choice leader Yegor Gaidar, compared with six minutes given to Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov and 10 seconds to Yavlinsky. Yavlinsky, however, did not attempt to compensate for the lack of news coverage and decided to forego any paid advertising on television. Yavlinsky stated that victory would be achieved "not on [the basis of] television agitation, but on an electorate informed about their platforms." ⁷

The Center also concluded that when paid media was added to the earned media coverage and the allotted free time slots, Zhirinovskiy received more exposure on television than any other single candidate during the five-week campaign period.

IRI observers found that arbitrary assertions by candidates often went unchallenged by the media, but concluded it was partly attributable to government efforts to minimize editorializing and partly attributable to indigenous traditions of Russian journalism. Some journalists were unabashed supporters of Yeltsin and reform. Observers noted that a large number of ad-hoc publications appeared and disappeared with regularity. While many of these publications made no pretense of objectivity, IRI observers concluded that most points of view were represented in the aggregate.

IRI observers in Vladimir noted a problem with newspapers that published morning editions as it related to the 24-hour "cooling-off" period. For example, if a campaign event on Friday, December 10, the last day of legal campaign activity, is reported in a newspaper's Saturday edition, does this constitute a violation of the "cooling off period?" In one instance, observers noted that a last-minute political attack by one candidate published in a newspaper on the day before the election left the opponent with no time to respond.

Four days after the December 12 elections, President Yeltsin dismissed Vyacheslav Bragin, the Chairman of Ostankino Television, presumably because he and many Russian reformers held television responsible for their relatively poor performance. Aleksandr Yakovlev, a former Gorbachev associate, was named to replace Bragin. Yeltsin issued a decree on December 22 turning the ITAR-TASS news agency back into a government entity, even though the news agency often endorsed the government's line in its reporting. A second news agency, RIA-Novosti, was brought back under government control on December 26 and ordered to reorganize. New government regulations revaluing newspaper assets were issued, ostensibly to prevent the privatization of state property at rock-bottom prices. The new regulations, however, caused sharp rises in property taxes and sent newspaper production costs soaring. In response, Yeltsin formed a new committee for the press, chaired by a Yeltsin protege, Boris Mironov, to assist in the financing of newspapers.

Observers saw the local media play an active role in voter education. The *Pacific Ocean Star* in Khabarovsk provided a full page to each candidate. In Kemerovo, "Our Newspaper," a pro-labor publication with the largest circulation in the region (500,000), published sample ballots the day before the election. The sample ballot for the Federation Council clearly showed a vote in support of the newspaper's owner. In Novgorod, observers met with Lidia Vinogradova, the city attorney who also served as head of the constituency election commission. Ms. Vinogradova published a series of columns on voter education, including a column on December 8 informing voters that they now had the right to receive a fresh ballot to replace their first ballot if they marked it incorrectly.

IRI observers in Voronezh commented that Communist Party candidates had much better access to the press in rural areas, while Russia's Choice candidates appeared to have considerably more money to purchase paid media advertising.

IRI observers in Rostov met a Russia's Choice candidate, Alla Amelina, who was a local television reporter and former member of the regional soviet. Observers thought Ms. Amelina saw a clear division between her role as a candidate and as a TV reporter and, consequently, were not concerned about a conflict of interest.

Civic Education

Officials at all levels of election administration believed they did not have sufficient time to conduct civic education programs, which often competed for their attention with the logistical demands of the election. In a meeting with IRI observers, Valeri Korobenikov, head of the CEC's Department of Information and Analysis, referred to civic education "as our headache." Mr. Korobenikov added that civic education efforts were too abstract and complicated and a "real system of voter education" needed to be developed.

CEC Chairman Ryabov did produce several voter education video clips that were broadcast on national television. In addition, the CEC designed, printed, and distributed copies of a CEC poster that IRI observers across the country found nearly ubiquitous. The CEC's efforts were supplemented by constituency and polling station commissions. For example, the Constituency Commission in Kemerovo produced a voter education flyer that was mailed along with "invitations to vote." IRI observers in Vladimir found urban polling stations particularly well equipped with voter education materials, including outlines of party platforms, but noted that rural polling stations were almost devoid of such materials. Some IRI observers saw polling stations create their own voter education materials, such as an explanation of the new Federal Assembly's structure or sample ballots. At one polling station, a separate "question table" was provided. Observers in Novgorod and Kazan saw sample ballots posted with specific parties and candidates checked off. Observers could not, however, conclusively state whether this was

meant to demonstrate how to correctly mark a ballot or to send a subliminal message on which candidate to support.

Government Activities

President Yeltsin removed himself from participation in the campaign period with two notable exceptions. The first came when Yeltsin threatened that parties opposing the constitution could be banned from the elections. The second exception came on December 8, when Yeltsin asked all Russians to endorse the constitution in a nationally televised address, but did not endorse any specific parties or candidates. In fact, when Russia's Choice began distributing a poster with a picture of Yeltsin and Gaidar with the caption "Yeltsin is Russia's Choice," the president's press spokesman vigorously denied that this was an official endorsement by Yeltsin.

While IRI observers went unhindered in most cities, some did encounter local government interference. For example, in Archangelsk, the regional administration required an observation permit in addition to the credentials issued by the Foreign Ministry. Observers in Voronezh also were provided with a police escort despite their best efforts to refuse it. In Novgorod, the constituency commission presented observers with a list of eight polling stations they could visit, out of 84 total polling stations in the constituency district. The observers in Novgorod made their own selection of polling stations to visit.

A total of 11 ministers ran as candidates on three different party lists.⁸ There were concerns about abuse of their powers of incumbency.⁹ Mikhail Poltoranin, who enjoyed ministerial status as Chairman of the Federal Information Center (FIC), ran on the Russia's Choice party list for the State Duma. Although the new constitution does not allow ministers to hold parliamentary posts, the transitional section of the constitution dropped this restriction for the next two years. Although Poltoranin decided to resign his post at the FIC and concentrate on his duties as a new member of parliament, he did not resign until after he was elected.

IRI observers did not see or hear any reports of politically motivated harassment or acts of violence, either during the campaign period or on election day. The mayor of Chelyabinsk did inform IRI observers that he had arranged an agreement between all political parties to refrain from organizing any political rallies in the city to avoid the threat of riots.

Observers did, however, express concern about a more subtle and less detectable form of coercion. Specifically, IRI observers were troubled by the role of traditional authority figures in the campaign environment and on election day. Factory directors, collective farm managers, or military officers were often present in polling stations, either in an official capacity as chairman of the election commission, or unofficially overseeing the process. Concern regarding

undue influence also extended to the period of candidate registration. IRI observers heard reports in Novgorod and Chelyabinsk of factory directors circulating registration lists at the workplace with the names and addresses of employees pre-printed.

Election Law

The hurried manner in which the law was written resulted in a stream of directives and supplemental explanations from the CEC that in effect were additional statutes rather than interpretations of existing law. In addition, there was constant tinkering with the law that was often confusing and contradictory.

Many sections of the election law allowed for wide interpretation and ultimately were defined by polling station commissioners. For example, the provision for the portable ballot box said the box may be utilized by a voter unable to come to a polling station "due to bad health or for any other valid reason" (Article 36, Section 9). The definition of what constituted a valid reason was left to the polling station commissioner. In addition, many of the potential violations of the election law were ill-defined, there was no cumulative body of common law that defined irregularities, and possible sanctions to be imposed for violations of the law were lacking. For example, what is the standard for "campaigning" as applied to the 24-hour ban or cooling off period? The election law simply states the campaign period will end one day prior to the election (Article 30, Section 1). IRI observers in Voronezh found that reform party activists interpreted the ban on campaign to apply only to the constitutional referendum, not individual candidates and parties. In other areas, the ban was interpreted to apply to all activities conducted by parties and candidates, but not the media.

CEC Activities

The CEC's primary responsibility was tabulating results in the federal constituency (the Duma's proportional ballot). The constituency commissions were required to forward protocol sheets to the CEC, which would then aggregate the ballots, exclude parties not attaining the threshold, derive an electoral coefficient, and allocate seats on a proportional basis. The CEC was dependent upon the 225 constituency commissions for tabulating results for the other three ballots, which could be subsequently checked by the CEC.

IRI observers found uncertainty among polling station commissions as to what constituted turnout, with a wide range of interpretations: some thought it was based upon the number of voters signing in or the number who received ballots, while others said it was ballots in the box, and still others believed it was valid ballots counted in the box. Although there was disagreement over method, all polling station chairmen questioned on this issue believed it would

ultimately be resolved by the CEC because all figures would be reported. The confusion over what constituted the basis for turnout was caused by contradictory directives from the CEC. In the CEC's Explanation #24 of the application of the election law, Section 2 of Article 37 (Counting Votes in the Voting District) states that, "The number of citizens who have taken part in the voting should be determined according to the number of ballots extracted from stationary and portable ballot boxes." When IRI observers met in Moscow with Valeri Korobenikov, head of the CEC's Department of Information and Analysis, he stated "The moment of voting is fixed by signature on the voter registry.... if you sign for the ballot, it means you're a voter." In a meeting with IRI observers on December 11, however, CEC Chairman Ryabov explained ballots in the box as the basis for turnout.

The CEC's confusion on this issue could be attributed to mounting government concerns in the final weeks before the election that turnout would be insufficient to validate the constitution. Polling information that predicted low voter interest, combined with one of the coldest winters in recent years, was expected to affect turnout. In addition, many parties advocated voting against the constitution, pocketing the constitutional ballot while voting the other three, or not voting at all. The voiding of the constitutional draft, however, would not have prevented the legislature from taking office and potentially writing its own constitutional document likely to be far less favorable to the executive. When all votes were counted, turnout was sufficient to make the referendum valid whether it was based upon the total number of ballots received by voters or the total number of ballots cast by voters.

Ostankino Television began broadcast of a show entitled "The New Political Year," from the Kremlin which began at 11:00 pm on December 12 and was scheduled to conclude at 6:00 am the following morning. All political parties and candidates were invited to attend the event organized by the independent Neva television company, which featured Russian celebrities and entertainers interspersed with periodic election returns. Popularly known as the "Kremlin Party," the program was meant to be a Russia's Choice victory celebration, with the seating plan placing Russia's Choice at the most central table, squarely facing the stage and in view of television cameras. The program, however, went off the air by 3:30 am with the official explanation that the computer had been infected with a virus and was unable to supply the results. Some IRI observers, however, felt that, dismayed by gains registered by Zhirinovskiy's party, the program presenters in effect "pulled the plug."

The release of partial results during the Kremlin Party created the suspicion that the CEC might be withholding information. CEC Chairman Ryabov hastily called a press conference on Monday in an effort to ease those suspicions as well satisfy the desire for immediate results by western media accustomed to covering elections with a more sophisticated tabulation process. Ryabov later stated that, "The press and other people are pushing us to go faster... but we are striving for trust rather than speed."¹⁰ The system of tabulating four paper ballots at 95,000 different polling stations throughout Russia was a labor-intensive process. The CEC had not

developed a plan for releasing results and continued to release partial results.

Public suspicion of vote tampering continued to build when initial results of the national party list showing Zhirinovsky's unexpected lead were tempered by later results from the single-mandate side of the State Duma ballot that showed reformers pulling ahead. A discrepancy in the total number of eligible voters also caused rumors of vote tampering. In the April 1993 referendum there were 107.6 million eligible voters; but the number of eligible voters in the December elections had declined to 106.2 million. The initial suspicion was that CEC had lowered the total number of voters to clear the turnout hurdle for the constitutional referendum; but even with the higher number of voters used in April, turnout would have been sufficient for the referendum to be valid. Ryabov attributed the difference to corrections in voter registries, voters that had died since April, and different methods for Russians voting abroad.

Most IRI observers saw the most basic level of a pyramid process of tabulation; that is, they observed the voting process at the polling station level. IRI observers were confident that the national results reflected their observations at the local level. The suspicions surrounding the "Kremlin Party," the partial release of results, and the discrepancy in turnout between the December elections and the April referendum were created because the CEC had focused on the process that would occur on election day, not what would follow. It was the CEC's failure to think through a process of reporting results that would have been transparent and predictable that led to suspicions of ballot tampering, but IRI observers saw no reason to conclude that these suspicions were valid.

Constituency Commissions

The CEC provided funding for the 225 constituency commissions. Some constituency commissions complained of a delay in the transfer of funds from Moscow to the regions, as did many parties and candidates. In Khabarovsk, the Deputy Head of Regional Administration, Irena Strelkova, told IRI observers that the regional administration was funding 75% of the cost of the elections, until Moscow could reimburse them. The presence of polling stations in remote regions of Khabarovsk *Krai* (territory) required the constituency commission to incur additional transportation costs. IRI observers were concerned that the financial burden of elections on already overburdened local governments would create opposition to future elections.

Polling Stations

IRI observers found that individual polling stations operated efficiently and polling station workers demonstrated an impressive knowledge of the election law. It was not uncommon for observers to see a polling station chairman read aloud from a book of regulations to resolve a

procedural issue. An IRI observer deployed to Rostov commented that most people on the commissions were women, while commission chairmen were most often men, and that it was women who did the work and made the process function.

With a legal maximum of 3,000 voters per polling station, some more densely populated neighborhoods combined two polling stations at a single site, providing observers with an opportunity to simultaneously observe two polling stations tabulate results. In Kemerovo, for example, IRI observers watched two side-by-side polling stations use fundamentally different methods of tabulation, demonstrating the discretionary power of the chairman of each station.

Military Polling Stations

IRI observers were denied access to polling stations located on military installations in Voronezh, Rostov, and Novgorod. Observers in Khabarovsk, which serves as headquarters for the Russian Pacific Command, saw mostly 18 to 20-year-old military conscripts who were first-time voters and therefore confused with the process. The soldiers were more likely to ask their commanding officer questions regarding ballot procedure than civilian members of the polling station commission.

IRI observers in Vladimir watched a group of young soldiers from a tank division stand at attention in freezing temperatures outside a grammar school that served as a civilian polling station. Groups of soldiers were called in to vote as voting booths became available. In Archangelsk, IRI observers similarly watched a group of servicemen march to the polling station. IRI observers learned that once a week for the month before the election, special political instructors gave servicemen three hours of lectures on voting procedures, the constitution, and the various political parties.

Ballot Security

In an effort to enhance ballot security, a directive was issued in the April 1993 referendum that required the signatures of at least two polling site commissioners on the back of each ballot to validate the ballot. Confusion over whether a stamp or two signatures was the correct method of validation led the CEC to state belatedly that either form was acceptable.

This dual method of validation was again utilized in the December elections. IRI observers found that most ballots were stamped on the back. The problem was that, since ballots, by law, arrived at least three days prior to actual voting, many commissioners started to stamp ballots before the day of the election, leaving a large quantity of uncast, validated ballots. Ballot security was the responsibility of the polling station chairmen, who lacked

consistent methods of providing adequate safeguards.

The CEC did issue provisions on procedures for handling a spoiled ballot, a significant improvement over the April referendum when the issue was unaddressed. IRI observers found that most polling stations were aware of the new procedure, with one exception in Voronezh. IRI observers noted that ballot box seals, especially in rural areas, were inconsistent and often of poor quality.

Voting Procedures

The old way of voting against a candidate was to cross out the name of the only candidate listed on the ballot. The voter was presented with a ballot that listed the name of only one candidate, and simply dropped the ballot into the box. Curtained voting booths were provided but their use was suspect. The voter was thought to have crossed the name out, the only way of registering a vote against a single candidate, if the booth was properly utilized. The practice of crossing out a candidate, therefore, was seldom employed in a decisive way. In the local USSR elections in 1980, only 77 out of 2 million candidates failed to get elected because the number of scratched ballots exceeded the number of "yes" votes. This traditional method of voting continued as Russia's elections gradually became more competitive. In elections for the Soviet and Russian Congress of People's Deputies, in 1989 and 1990 respectively, voters crossed out all undesired names. In the April 1993 referendum, voters were presented with four questions and crossed out *da* to vote *nyet* and vice versa.

For the December 12 elections, there was a different method of marking each of the four ballots. On the two State Duma ballots, voters were required to indicate their choice with a single "X" - but voted for a single candidate on one ballot and a single party on the other. On the Federation Council ballot, voters indicated two choices, each with a single mark. Finally, the old method of placing an "X" through that which they did not want was employed on the constitutional ballot. IRI observers found that confusion over procedures for marking ballots was common among older voters more accustomed to the Soviet-era single-candidate ballots. In Khabarovsk, an older woman marked her ballot in full view of IRI observers, clearly voting against the constitution, and then proceeded to tell IRI observers she supported the constitution. IRI observers found that questions from voters were not limited to procedural issues, they also asked for party affiliation of certain candidates.

IRI observers saw a great deal of open voting. This was attributed, in part, to voters who did not want to wait until one of the few voting booths became available and simply marked their ballot in the open. Voters also voted in the open to consult one another on candidate preferences or to ask procedural questions. Many polling stations actually facilitated this practice by setting-up tables for voters. In Rostov, observers saw voters taking their ballots

outdoors to mark them because the polling stations were so crowded. IRI observers felt the open voting demonstrated a weak appreciation of the importance of a secret ballot and a lack of comfort with the voting booth.

Open voting should be distinguished from the "family voting" more common in the Soviet-style elections, in which a father would arrive at a polling station, receive several ballots, and cast them on behalf of his entire family. This practice was allowed and encouraged in the past, essentially as another mechanism to increase turnout figures. IRI observers to the December 1993 elections did not see any evidence of the head of a household casting votes on behalf of absent family members (one IRI observer saw a voter's request to vote for their family denied). Observers, however, did witness instances when husband, wife, and other family members would crowd into a single voting booth or around tables or window sills to mark their ballots together.

Portable ballot boxes were not overused and averaged between one and two dozen requests per polling station. Twenty people at a hospital in Vladimir were turned down because they did not have passports. Observers in Vladimir also accompanied the ballot box to the home of several elderly people, and had serious concerns regarding the ability to provide the opportunity for a secret ballot under such circumstances.

More stringent requirements on controlling the portable ballot box were implemented since the April referendum. Polling stations must have a signed request from the voter, and if the number of ballots in the portable box didn't correspond to the number of requests, all ballots in the portable box would be invalidated. Special lists used for voters not on the permanent registry similarly did not seem overutilized.

IRI observers in Archangelsk saw a problem with the system of early voting. The election law included a new provision that allowed voters to cast their ballots in advance if they expected to be away from their district of residence on election day. Early ballots were placed in a sealed envelope and signed by the voter. Observers saw instances when ballots were removed from the envelope and placed in the ballot box. On other occasions, ballots were placed directly in the box still in the signed envelope, potentially compromising the ballot secrecy.

Domestic Observers

Nearly all domestic pollwatchers encountered by IRI observers were either Communist or Agrarian Party members, revealing that significant remnants of the grassroots network developed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, although greatly diminished, nevertheless remained in operation. In Moscow, a stronghold of democratic parties, Russia's

Choice did have a significant network of domestic pollwatchers, but the Communist Party pollwatchers were still widespread. Although pro-reform activists in Voronezh had recruited 200 volunteers for the campaign period, IRI observers were surprised to discover that no pollwatching activities were organized for these volunteers on election day.

Members of many civic organizations became domestic pollwatchers for political parties because the CEC excluded such organizations from pollwatching. While most observers identified themselves as affiliated with a particular party, some observers identified their affiliation with individual candidates or as independent observers - one pollwatcher in Novgorod said he was a "pollwatcher of the people," an interesting comment since the election law allowed only party observers.

V. ELECTION RESULTS

On December 20, 1993, the CEC reported final figures on the vote on the proposed new Russian constitution: 54.8% of Russia's 106,170,335 eligible voters took part in the referendum, and 58.4% of those voting supported the draft. The 54.8% turnout continued the recent trend of declining participation in Russian elections. Turnout for the June 1991 presidential election was 74.4% of eligible voters, but fell to 65% in the April 1993 referendum. When compared with turnout figures for more established democracies, the participation rate is comparable to turnout in the United States, but somewhat lower than other developed democracies. In the United States, 55.2% of the voting age population voted in the 1992 presidential election.¹¹ The recent elections in Japan had a turnout of 67% of eligible voters, 68% of eligible French voters participated in their elections in March 1993, the April 1992 elections in Great Britain had a turnout of 77% of eligible voters, and Canada has averaged a 75% participation rate for eligible voters in its elections since World War II.

IRI observers offered a number of possible reasons for low turnout. Having gone to the polls six times since 1989, some Russian voters are beginning to question whether voting makes a difference in their everyday lives. In addition, the initial impression of other voters with democracy has been limited to a rise in prices and a fall in living standards. An elderly man in Kazan with rows of medals pinned to his chest told an IRI observer that "under communism, my overcoat cost me 109 rubles. Now that communism is gone... this coat cost me 30,000 rubles. Why is this good for me and good for the country?" Furthermore, the cold weather and short daylight hours of December simply discouraged some people from leaving their homes to vote. IRI observers also noted that an individual's right to not vote was an essential component of democracy.

While the Liberal Democratic Party finished first on the proportional ballot for the State Duma with 24% of the vote, the Russia's Choice bloc fared better on the single-mandate side of the ballot, giving it 66 seats, the largest number of seats won by any single party. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy came second with 64 seats. The main anti-reform blocs (the LDP, the CP-RF and the Agrarian Party) won 145 seats altogether; whereas the four pro-reform blocs (Russia's Choice, the Party of Unity and Accord, the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform, and Yabloko) received 116 seats (see Table II).

Eight of the 13 parties running candidates on the party list won seats in the Duma. Sixteen additional parties won seats in the State Duma on the single-mandate ballot. Approximately 7% of the ballots cast for the State Duma were invalid and about 4% were cast against all parties. Six constituencies failed to meet the required the 25% minimum turnout and, consequently, the final membership of the State Duma totaled 444 instead of 450.

Table II: State Duma Results

Party	Proportional Vote	Party List Seats	Single-Seat Ballot	Total Seats
Russia's Choice	15.38%	40	26	66
Liberal Democratic Party	22.79%	59	5	64
Communist Party of the Russian Federation	12.35%	32	16	48
The Agrarian Party of Russia	7.9%	21	12	33
Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc	7.83%	20	7	27
Women of Russia Party	8.10%	21	2	23
Party of Russian Unity and Accord	6.76%	18	1	19
Democratic Party of Russia	5.50%	14	1	15
Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms	4.06%	0	4	4
Civic Union for Stability, Justice, and Progress	1.92%	0	3	3
New Names/Future of Russia Bloc	1.25%	0	0	0
The Constructive Ecological Movement	0.75%	0	0	0
Dignity and Charity Bloc	0.70%	0	2	2
Other Parties	NA	0	13	13
Independents	NA	0	127	127
Total ¹²		225	219	444

The absence of party identification on the single-mandate ballot has made it difficult to conclusively determine the number of seats controlled by each party. Different reports published after the election listed the number of seats controlled by independents between 30 and 127. The absence of party identification on the Federation Council ballot again made it difficult to analyze the results, but a closer look at the names of the new deputies shows it to be overwhelmingly representative of the old regional nomenklatura. These were candidates who benefitted from their local name recognition. In Kemerovo, the former chairman of the regional soviet, Aman Tuleev, won 80% of the vote. IRI observers in Kemerovo saw many Federation Council ballots in which Tuleev was the only name marked.

Table III. Federation Council Results

Party	Seats
Communist Party of the Russian Federation	12
Russia's Choice	7
Constitutional Democrats	1
Socialist Workers' Party	1
Farmers' Party of Russia	1
Russian Movement for Democratic Reform	1
Agrarian Party	1
Russian Party of Unity and Accord	1
Labor Party	1
All-Russia Union Obnovlenie	1
Senezsky Forum	1
Independents	142
Total ¹³	170

Support for the constitution and pro-reform parties was concentrated in the area above the 55th parallel, including the cities of St. Petersburg and Moscow. The combined vote for anti-reform parties was greatest in the geographic area below the 55th parallel. This geographic

distribution mirrored voting patterns that emerged in the June 1991 presidential elections and the April 1993 referendum, in which the anti-Yeltsin vote was concentrated in the agricultural and industrial areas to the south of the 55th parallel.

According to the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion, Zhirinovskiy's supporters were mostly young males between the ages of 25 and 40, and older, less educated men. Despite the difference in their ages, the groups share several characteristics. Most were workers in state-owned industrial enterprises, earning average or higher-than-average wages. What distinguished them from other members of the Russian population was their concern about the breakdown of law and order in Russia. While those who voted for the Communist Party were likely to complain about declining living standards in their own towns, Zhirinovskiy's supporters complained more about the "anarchy" and "weak government" threatening Russia as a whole.¹⁴

IRI observers thought that the unexpectedly strong showing of Zhirinovskiy's party on the proportional ballot was attributable to a variety of factors. Zhirinovskiy did have a core group of supporters who believed in the content of his message. Other voters began to support Zhirinovskiy in the closing weeks of the campaign because of his ability to speak to voters in a manner that demonstrated his empathy with the average Russian and connected with their dissatisfaction over the declining economy. Some observers thought the Zhirinovskiy vote was essentially a protest vote, something they found difficult to reconcile with the success of the constitution, which was viewed as a referendum on Yeltsin. About 80% of the respondents to IRI's exit poll said they were dissatisfied with the current state of affairs in Russia, and 60% said their lives had gotten worse since the break-up of the Soviet Union.

While some Western reporters have asserted that Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) found widespread support among the Russian military, the initial data is inconclusive. Western news agencies reported that the Taman Guards division stationed near Moscow voted heavily for the LDP, as did the Pacific Fleet and Russian troops in Tajikistan. On December 15, however, *Moskovski Komsomolets* reported that the Taman division's troops had voted in six separate areas, making a complete tally impossible. Furthermore, it noted that in other areas for which data has been released, notably the Tver and Vladimir military hospitals, the Liberal Democrats received between 8% and 15% of the vote. In the Black Sea Fleet, where some 12,000 Russian servicemen voted, the LDP received only 19% of the vote.¹⁵

Defense Minister Grachev, at a press conference in late December, criticized those touting figures on how the military voted in the December elections, noting that the CEC had not released any figures on military voting, and reiterating that most military personnel often voted together with civilians, even in voting stations located in military bases in former Soviet republics outside Russia.

Over 160 candidates ran for the 35 seats on the Moscow City Duma, including 31 former deputies of the former Moscow City Soviet. Russia's Choice candidates won 19 of the 35 seats, 10 seats went to the centrist blocs Civic Union and a local organization called Citizens for People's Power, four seats were won by other reformist candidates, and the remaining seats went to independents. About 15 of the new deputies were former members of the Moscow City Soviet.

In 15 of Russia's 21 republics, voter turnout was over 50%. In Komi, Khakassia, Udmurtia, and Ingushetia, and Bashkortostan turnout ranged from 42% to 46%. In Chechnya the elections were not held at all. IRI observers in Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, saw how voter turnout in the republics often was connected to rising regional challenges to Moscow's authority. Only 13.8% of the electorate turned out to vote in Tatarstan, where nationalist parties had called for a boycott and President Mintimer Shaimiev had spoken strongly against the draft constitution. A similar boycott campaign in the April referendum kept turnout to 22.6%. Although there was no election for the Federation Council, at least two candidates ran for the State Duma in four of the republic's constituency districts, but none of these races were valid because turnout was below 25%.

IRI observers found the motivation for the boycott in Tatarstan was a desire for greater economic autonomy rather than regional identity. They believed the tax rate combined with continued central control of such major industries as oil production stifled entrepreneurial activity and forced people to operate on the black market. The political leadership of Tatarstan has not sought outright secession, merely greater autonomy. Momentum for decentralization began before the dissolution of the USSR when, in August 1990, the government of Tatarstan sent a declaration of sovereignty to Gorbachev. Since 1991, Tatarstan has refrained from outright secession, but has withheld taxes from Moscow, issued its own privatization vouchers, and adopted its own constitution. Furthermore, the Tatar government does plan to fully endorse participation in its own local elections this Spring to replace the old system of soviets with new representative bodies.

When IRI observers visited the Tatar village of Shali on election day, they found that not a single voter had cast a ballot by 3:00 p.m., including members of the polling station commission. The polling station was superbly organized, with sample ballots posted on the wall, ballot boxes properly sealed, and voting booths set up. IRI observers met a man in the polling station who was the chairman of the local agricultural union. Shali's livelihood is largely dependent on a local collective farm that produces meat and dairy products, and about 1,200 union members were registered at this polling station. Although the union boss would not admit to any methods of voter suppression, he would have been a critical figure in such an effort.

Observers in Novgorod found that candidates for the State Duma also were concerned about local control versus central authority in Moscow. Oleg Ochin, a Federal Assembly

candidate running in Novgorod said that "voters were tired of sending their taxes to Moscow and getting nothing in return."

APPENDIX I: IRI Exit Poll Results

The questions contained in this poll were prepared for IRI observers to the December 12 elections in Russia with the generous assistance of Linda DiVall of American Viewpoint, Inc. The pool of respondents was 167.

1. Generally speaking, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with how things are today in Russia?

17.6%	Satisfied
80.6%	Dissatisfied

2. Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the policies of the government since 1992?

27.8%	Satisfied
70.9%	Dissatisfied

3. Was your vote for Parliament:

19.4%	A vote to support Yeltsin in his policies
12.1%	A vote to oppose Yeltsin in his policies
27.9%	A vote for major changes in the country with policies agreed to by both Yeltsin and Parliament
28.5%	A vote for the policies advocated by the candidate's political party

4. What qualities were most important in the candidate you voted for?

10.9%	Time for a change
13.9%	Honesty
14.6%	Someone I trust
33.9%	One who will work hard to make life better for people

5. **Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, would you say that your life has:**

18.8%	Gotten better
18.8%	Stayed about the same
60.6%	Gotten worse

6. **Do you think the new Constitution weakens regional authority in order to strengthen federal authority?**

33.9%	Yes, agree
55.2%	No, disagree

7. **With the election of a new Parliament, do you expect that the quality of your life in the next year will:**

56.4%	Get better
29.1%	Stay the same
6.7%	Get worse

8. **In your opinion, is the speed of reform occurring too quickly, at about the right speed, or not fast enough?**

25.5%	Too quickly
10.9%	At about the right speed
53.3%	Not fast enough

9. **Please assess the progress of economic reforms in Russia.**

36.4%	Reforms are producing positive results
30.9%	Reforms have not produced anything
26.1%	Reforms are producing negative results

10. **How optimistic are you about the Parliament and Yeltsin working together?**

38.2%	Optimistic
6.6%	Very optimistic
35.2%	Pessimistic
17.0%	Very pessimistic

11. **What do you think the top priority of the new Parliament ought to be?**

7.3%	Political stability
18.8%	Economic reform
10.3%	Stopping corruption in government
9.1%	Reducing crime in cities and on the streets
7.3%	Redefining the relationship between Russia and the former Soviet republics

12. **What did you think of Yeltsin's decision to dissolve the Parliament?**

50.9%	Approved
31.5%	Disapproved

13. **Now thinking again about the elections, do you think these elections were:**

49.7%	Held at the right time
23.0%	Held too soon

14. **Should early presidential elections be held also or should Yeltsin be given time to implement his programs?**

30.9%	Early elections should be held
50.3%	Yeltsin should be given time

15. Thinking about all the pre-election information you had, did you find that you:

- | | |
|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 10.3% | Had more than enough information to make an informed decision |
| 30.9% | Had about the right amount of information to make an informed decision |
| 40.6% | Had not enough information to make an informed decision |

16. The ballot instructions were:

- | | |
|-------|-----------------------------------------------|
| 58.2% | Easy to understand and not at all complicated |
| 19.4% | Somewhat complicated |
| 7.3% | Very complicated and difficult to understand |

17. What one source did you rely upon most for news and information in making your decision to vote?

- | | |
|-------|-----------------------------------|
| 34.5% | Television |
| 6.6% | Newspaper |
| 0.0% | Posters |
| 6.6% | Meeting the candidates personally |
| 1.8% | Party/movement label |
| 3.3% | Friend/relative or spouse |

18. Whom do you blame most for Russia's problems today?

- | | |
|-------|-----------------------------------|
| 8.5% | Yeltsin |
| 24.2% | Gorbachev |
| 4.9% | Brezhnev |
| 9.7% | Earlier Soviet leaders |
| 18.2% | The Congress of People's Deputies |
| 3.0% | Alexander Rutskoi |

19. What is your age?

18.8%	18-30
36.7%	31-45
21.2%	45-60
7.9%	60+

20. What is your gender?

42.4%	Male
43.6%	Female

21. Are you a member of a political party?

9.7%	Yes
74.6%	No

APPENDIX II: Political Party Survey

"Russia's Choice" bloc (reformist):

Formed under the leadership of former Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar in June 1993, Russia's Choice stood for the adoption of a democratic constitution and its implementation on the basis of parliamentary elections. Members of the bloc included the Democratic Russia Movement, the Association of Private Enterprises and Entrepreneurs, New Democracy (a faction of the Russian Christian-Democratic Union), the Peasant Party of Russia, and the Party of Democratic Initiative.

Russia's Choice ran as the party of radical economic reform in the December 1993 elections and, with 212 candidates on the proportional side of the State Duma ballot, had the largest list of any party or bloc. In addition to Gaidar, the list included Andrei Kozyrev, the Foreign Minister; Boris Fedorov, the Finance Minister; Valdimir Shumeiko, the Press and Information Minister; Anatoly Chubais, the Privatization Minister; Gennady Burbulis, a longtime Yeltsin adviser; Mikhail Poltoranin, Chief of the Central Information Committee; and Sergei Filatov, Yeltsin's Chief of Staff.

Russia's Choice held its nominating convention in mid-October under the banner "Freedom, Property, and Legality". The Russia's Choice campaign platform called for a continuation of the economic reforms that Yegor Gaidar initiated in 1992, first as deputy prime minister for economic policy and later as prime minister. This program of economic "shock therapy" is a continuation of the liberalization program started in January 1992 with the lifting of price controls, followed by the privatization of state businesses through a voucher program that began in the Fall of 1992. Gaidar's economic program was aimed at financial stabilization and rapid institutional change -- that is, dismantling the old system and unleashing entrepreneurial spirit in the economy. There was, however, a much sharper fall in production and consumption than Gaidar had originally anticipated, eventually leading centrists and hardliners in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) to pressure Yeltsin into removing Gaidar from the prime minister post and replace him with Viktor Chernomyrdin, a former USSR oil and gas minister.

Gaidar and his supporters believed that in a slower economic transition, bureaucratic incompetence and inflationary subsidies to state industry would leave Russia powerless to produce competitive products. They also believed that drawn-out reforms also would allow former party elites and bureaucrats to manipulate the system to become the first to benefit from the sale of state property.

The Russia's Choice electoral platform supported the privatization of farmland and the freeing of prices on the remaining goods and services still set by the government (e.g., bread, apartments, gasoline, and vodka). In addition, Russia's Choice wanted to reduce the deficit by

cutting massive state subsidies to industry and agriculture. Other reform measures supported by the Russia's Choice bloc included: laws on foreign investment guaranteeing property rights and the ability to remit profit; a new phase of privatization starting in July 1994 covering sectors such as energy and transport; and strict performance and profit targets set by the government for companies that remain state-owned. Gaidar also stated that the focus of privatization would be shifted from the distribution of state property through the voucher system to programs targeted at specific industries and companies.

Russia's Choice saw its electoral base as the 40% of Russian citizens who worked full or part-time in the growing private sector. The inclusion of the Democratic Russia Movement in the Russia's Choice bloc added grassroots strength to the bloc that was seen as critical to mobilizing voters. The Democratic Russia Movement emerged in 1990 from a coalition of nascent parties; voter clubs in Moscow and St. Petersburg; other informal organizations, such as groups dedicated to advancing environmental causes or preserving the memory of victims of Stalin; and the pro-reform Inter-Regional Deputies Group of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies (CPD). These groups organized informally to support pro-reform candidates to the March 1990 elections to the Russian CPD. The Movement held its founding Congress in October 1990 after democratic leaders realized they needed a more formal organization to break the political monopoly of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Democratic Russia's function was to serve as an umbrella organization for a broad range of pro-democratic groups rather than as a unified party. An ideologically vague platform and a common antipathy toward the communist establishment allowed the disparate members to maintain the coalition's unity.

Democratic Russia deputies were instrumental in electing Yeltsin Chairman of the Russian CPD in April 1990, and they campaigned heavily on his behalf in the June 1991 presidential elections. Yeltsin, however, shunned membership in Democratic Russia, preferring to cultivate a presidential image above party politics. Democratic Russia's role since 1991 has been confined mostly to mobilizing support for Yeltsin in moments of crisis.

Party of Russian Unity and Accord (reformist):

The Party of Russian Unity and Accord was led by Serge Shakhrai and Alexander Shokin, both deputy prime ministers. The party ran 193 candidates on its federal list for the proportional side of the State Duma. Also included on their list was Sergei Stankevich, a presidential adviser and an original leader of the democratic movement who grew increasingly nationalistic in the months leading up to the election; Oleg Soskovets, Minister of Industry; and Yuri Kalmykov, the Minister of Justice.

The Party of Russian Unity and Accord rejected Gaidar's "shock therapy" in favor of slower economic reforms with a stronger role for the government. At a press conference on

October 27, Shakhrai said his party stood for conservative values such as family, property, labor, and the fatherland. He went on to describe his understanding of conservatism as the preservation of the Russian state and the rebirth of Russian traditions, and stressed the need to preserve and strengthen a united, multinational, and federal Russian state. Shokin added that, if elected, his party would continue the present reform course, but more regional aid and social welfare would be redirected to the poor segments of the population.

Shakhrai, who was born in the Crimea and served as deputy prime minister in charge of nationalities policy, has maintained his provincial roots. He stated that he wanted to form his party on the basis of regional politics with a "minimum of participation of Moscow politicians." Shakhrai also stated that his party would support Viktor Chernomyrdin for prime minister before it would support Gaidar.

Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms (reformist):

An all-Union movement called the Movement for Democratic Reforms (MDR) was formed in July 1991 by prominent reformers to counter the hard-line nature of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The MDR supported all Gorbachev policies and the passage of the Union Treaty. At the time of its founding, three MDR leaders were simultaneously members of the Democratic Russia Movement's Coordinating Council.

In February 1992, the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms (RMDR) held its founding congress and elected former Moscow Mayor Gavril Popov as its chairman. The RMDR attempted to unite democrats with former communists who favored reform. Radical democrats, such as those associated with Democratic Russia, felt the RMDR would be overrun by former communist elites trying to preserve their stature in a post-communist society and therefore avoided any formal links. The relative inability of the RMDR to take off as a major player in Russian politics stems from the fact that it is largely a top-heavy organization in which party leaders seem to outnumber rank and file members.

Since its inception, the RMDR fought for the adoption of a new constitution, a Constituent Assembly, and correcting the economic reforms carried out by the Gaidar government. The RMDR's December election platform called for socially responsible economic reforms, a presidential system with autonomous federated components; a parliament limited strictly to lawmaking functions; a review of industrial and taxation policy; a reduction in the amount of tax payable by commodity producers; land reform through the issuance of vouchers; and the establishment of a united European Russian state within the CIS framework. This mixture of economic and tax reforms, and social policies made the RMDR nearly identical to other pro-reform parties. What differentiated the RMDR from other reform parties was a plan to halve the government expenditures by reducing the state's bloated bureaucracy.

At the top of the RMDR's party list was Anatoly Sobchak, the mayor of St. Petersburg who, from his high-profile role as an early reformer, enjoyed positive name recognition throughout Russia. The RMDR party list had 152 additional candidates, including Alexander Yakovlev, who was once a Gorbachev advisor. Gavril Popov, Chairman of the RMDR, who resigned as Mayor of Moscow in June 1992 to devote his full effort to running the party, did not run for the Federal Assembly. The RMDR party list included no government ministers, and Gavril Popov accused ministers who were standing for election of doing so only to receive parliamentary immunity under the new constitution (see Article 98).

The RMDR was affiliated with the centrist Civic Union and Democratic Choice blocs, and was searching this past summer for another coalition partner. Sobchak criticized Sergei Shakhrai and Grigori Yavlinsky for forming separate blocs rather than joining a larger coalition of moderate reformers. Popov stated that the RMDR would cooperate with all pro-democratic parties in the December elections, but not with Arkady Volsky's Civic Union.

Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc (reformist):

The Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc was named after its main leaders: Grigory Yavlinsky, Yuri Boldyrev, and Vladimir Lukin, although Yavlinsky appeared to be the troika's leading figure. Yavlinsky, an economist who devised the aggressive 500 day plan of economic reform for Gorbachev that Gorbachev later refused to embrace, helped devise a program of rapid privatization for Nizhny Novgorod that made the city a model of economic reform in Russia. Yuri Boldyrev, a former scientist who served as state-inspector, Russia's top corruption investigator, and Vladimir Lukin, Russia's Ambassador to the United States and former chairman of the Parliament's foreign affairs committee, completed the bloc. The bloc operated under the slogan "Democracy, Freedom, and Market Economy" and came to be known by the acronym Yabloko, which means "apple" in Russian. It was created from the factions of the Russian Christian Democratic Union: the Social Democratic Party, New Democracy, and the Republican Party of Russia.

The bloc's party list for the State Duma had 172 candidates, including the co-chairmen of the Republican Party, Vyacheslav Shotakovsky and Igor Yakovenko, who departed from the Russia's Choice bloc despite Gaidar's best efforts to retain them. Also included on the bloc's list were Viktor Sheinis, a former parliamentarian; Evgenii Ambartsumov, who also was a former chairman of the foreign affairs committee; and First Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin. Many of the bloc's candidates tended to come from the intelligentsia rather than from political organizations.

Yavlinsky adopted a program in the December election campaign that enabled him to be highly critical of both Yeltsin and the dissolved parliament. Like many other Russian politicians, he called for Gaidar's economic therapy without the shock. His program focused

on the protection of private ownership and stabilization of the national currency in a decentralized federal republic. He consistently supported the sale of state property, rather than redistribution, which he believed only produced a new form of collectivization. Yavlinsky believed it was "useless to try for tight money policies while property is not widely dispersed and the economy is dominated by monopolies." He also favored a unified CIS program of economic reform rather than a exclusively Russian one.

Yavlinsky publicly stated his intention to be a candidate if and when presidential elections are scheduled. Yavlinsky suffered a major defeat when Konstantin Zatulin, the head of a powerful association called Entrepreneurs for New Russia, departed from the bloc to join Sergei Shakhrai's Party of Russian Unity and Accord, claiming Yavlinsky was simply a "populist."

Democratic Party of Russia (centrist):

The founding congress of the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) was held in May 1990, under the leadership of Nikolai Travkin, a former engineer from Moscow's largest construction trust. While Travkin felt the democratic movement needed a hierarchical, well-disciplined party structure, other pro-democratic reformers believed Travkin was using the DPR as a vehicle for personal ambition. Disagreement over organizational structure caused Travkin and DPR supporters to walk out of Democratic Russia's founding congress in October 1990. Bowing to strong pressure from many provincial branches, however, Travkin rejoined the movement and became a member of its coordinating council in January 1991.

Travkin's organization departed Democratic Russia for the second time in November 1991, in protest of the movement's apparent acquiescence to the dissolution of the USSR. Many regional branches of the DPR, however, remained with the Democratic Russia Movement after Travkin's departure and eventually supported the Russia's Choice bloc in the December elections. In the summer of 1992, the DPR was a founding member of Civic Union, the ascendant centrist coalition. Travkin had left the Civic Union by August 1993 over disagreements with Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, who emerged as the Civic Union's leading spokesman and Yeltsin's chief opponent in the April referendum.

Although Travkin was opposed to much of the reformist agenda, he did not desire the return of the communists. The broad aims of the DPR's electoral program were the enhancement of Russia's sovereignty, the development of market forces, freeing the means of production from state-controlled monopolies, and an improved standard of living. The group supported the development of market conditions through privatization of the means of production and protections for property rights. The party supported Yeltsin's dissolution of the CPD, even though it acknowledged the decree was unconstitutional.

The DPR had one of the best-organized grassroots networks among Russia's parties. In many ways, the mimicked the organizational devices of the CPSU. For example, the DPR had branches in nearly all 88 regions of Russia; and had factory committees, youth groups, and a party school. The Party also had one to two billion rubles in its campaign fund and operated its own newspaper.

The DPR had 167 candidates on its proportional list with Nikolai Travkin at the top. Other top candidates included prominent director Stanislav Govorukhin, a strong Yeltsin critic whose latest film, *The Russia We Have Lost*, blamed Lenin for the country's woes. Other candidates included economist Oleg Bogomolov, a former economic consultant to ex-parliamentary speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov; and former Justice Minister Nikolai Fedorov.

Civic Union for Stability, Justice, and Progress bloc (centrist):

The Civic Union was formed in June 1992 by three main groups: Travkin's Democratic Party of Russia, having departed from Democratic Russia; Alexander Rutskoi's People's Party of Free Russia, a group of reform communists that emerged from the pre-coup Communists for Democracy party; and Arkady Volsky's All Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, representing the industrial lobby. The bloc's platform favored the reintroduction of many elements of the Soviet-style command economy: massive state subsidies to industry, price controls, government management of the energy sector, and fixing the ruble administratively rather than through the open market. The Civic Union deplored the breakup of the USSR, advocated close integration of the CIS states on an economic and political rather than a military basis, and sought a foreign policy less oriented to the West.

Travkin left the Civic Union in August 1993, followed by Volsky in September, because Rutskoi was moving closer to the ideologically extreme positions of the National Salvation Front. After Rutskoi's arrest, the bloc renamed itself the Civic Union for Stability, Justice and Progress under the leadership of Volsky and Vasily Lipitsky, the Chairman of the People's Party of Free Russia who had openly denounced Rutskoi. Among the top figures on the Civic Union's list of 184 candidates were Oleg Rumyantsev, the former Chairman of the parliamentary Constitutional Commission; Vladimir Ispravnikov, former deputy parliamentary speaker; cosmonaut Svetlana Savitskaya; singer Iosif Kobzon; and a number of well-known Moscow and regional state enterprise directors. Volsky had unsuccessfully sought to ally the bloc with the parties and blocs that shared similar views -- including Shakhrai's party, the Agrarians, and the Consolidation Party.

Women of Russia bloc (centrist):

The Women of Russia bloc was founded by three women's associations: the Association of Women Entrepreneurs; the Union of Navy Women; and the Union of Russia's Women, the former Soviet Women's Committee. Olevtina Fedulova, leader of the Union of Russia's Women, said the bloc was formed because women have no other opportunity to enter state structures. Although women make up 53% of Russia's population, they have been increasingly excluded from politics. Only 15.5% of the deputies elected in 1989 to the Soviet CPD and 5.5% of the deputies elected in 1990 to the Russian Congress were women. Furthermore, Fedulova claimed that women candidates for the December elections were usually placed at the bottom of party lists. She denied, however, that the sole goal of her bloc was to solve women's issues, stating their aims to include a softer approach to market reforms and more social benefits for the poorer elements of society. The bloc nominated 36 candidates for its party list.

Communist Party of the Russian Federation (conservative):

Russia's Constitutional Court ruled in late 1992 that Yeltsin had acted unconstitutionally when he banned the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) after the August 1991 coup attempt. The court's decision, however, did not lead to a widespread revival of the CPSU. Any reform elements that had not already left the Party were driven out by the August 1991 coup attempt. The CPSU's total absence of credibility with the Russian people was the key motivation for many former communists to find homes in new political organizations such as Civic Union or the Movement for Democratic Reforms.

The revived Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CP-RF) held a founding congress outside Moscow in February 1993 attended by approximately 650 delegates. The congress attracted mostly strident members of the former CPSU who had yet to find alternate political homes. The delegates elected Gennady Zyuganov chairman of the party's Central Executive Committee. Zyuganov was formerly the ideology chief of the Russian Communist Party. He served simultaneously as chairman of the CP-RF and as co-chairman of the National Salvation Front, the nationalist-communist bloc that was initially banned by Yeltsin October 1992 and later prevented from participating in the December elections. The CP-RF was also associated with the hard-line bloc in the former parliament called Russian Unity.

The party's official platform sought to strengthen the transport, defense, science, sectors of the economy while developing better social protection plans and reversing deregulation of state property. Zyuganov urged Russians to vote no on question four, saying the draft was a "Bonapartist constitution" that gave sweeping rights to the president. The CP-RF took the view that the president should be elected to the State Duma and be subordinate to that body.

The Communists ran 151 candidates on the proportional side of the State Duma ballot. In addition to Zyuganov, other CP-RF candidates included Valentin Chikin, editor of *Sovetskaya Rossiya*; Gennady Seleznev, former *Pravda* editor; and Anatoly Lukyanov, the former chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet who was standing trial for his role in the August 1991 coup. The party claimed to have 600,000 registered members, which would have made it the largest political organization in Russia.

Agrarian Bloc (conservative):

This bloc operated under the slogan "Legality, Justice, Prosperity." It was led by Alexander Zaveryukha, Deputy Prime Minister for Agriculture; Mikhail Lapshin, who led the intransigent Agrarian Union faction in the former Russian CPD; and Alexander Davidov. The bloc essentially consolidated the Agrarian Party of Russia and the Agrarian Union of Russia under a single banner.

From the introduction of collectivization in 1929 to the banning of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1991, farm managers ruled the Soviet countryside in an uneasy alliance between local agricultural and party officials. They used the vast investments that poured into the countryside during Brezhnev's years to strengthen their own position. Although this money did not result in significantly improved output, it did bring power to those who controlled it. Since emerging from the shadow of party guidance in 1989, the farm managers have been able to enrich themselves at the expense of their employees. While the Civic Union and the Agrarian Union agree on many issues, they disagree over the issue of privatization. The industrial managers do not oppose privatization because they stand to benefit by becoming the legal owners of plants they have historically controlled. The farm managers, however, expect to lose their jobs, power, and free access to agricultural resources if the collectives are broken into smaller family operations and cooperatives.

The Russian CPD adopted a law in December 1990 that allowed farmers to leave collectives with a share of land and equipment, but individuals often did not receive enough quality land to run a viable farm. A provision providing a ten year waiting period before the new owner could sell the land further slowed the process. A 1992 presidential decree released all state farms from central control, forcing them to find their own markets and handle their own accounting. Most farms, however, remained collectives, controlling 92% of agricultural land and housing 30 million people. On October 27, 1993, President Yeltsin signed a decree *On the Regulation of Land and the Development of Agrarian Reform* that allowed all land-owners, corporate or individual, to dispose of their land at their own discretion.

The Agrarian Union demanded that the government restore central control over agriculture, increase financial subsidies, end land reform, and allow collective and state farms to produce food unhindered by market competition and bank loan obligations. While these

demands were largely motivated by the vested interests of farm managers in preserving state-sponsored large-scale farming, they reflected genuine popular concern about the state of Russian agriculture.

Mikhail Lapshin, the leader of the Agrarian Party, stated during the campaign period that "there are 40 million people in the villages and they are all ours." The Agrarians real base were the collective farm bosses who still ruled farms as personal fiefdoms and probably told their workers whom to support. The Agrarian Bloc ran 145 candidates on its party list for the proportional side of the State Duma.

Liberal Democratic Party (nationalist):

Often characterized as neither liberal nor democratic, the LDP was founded in 1989 by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Extremely nationalist in orientation, the party called repeatedly for the introduction of a state of emergency in Russia and the dissolution of all political parties. Zhirinovskiy emphasized the economy over political reforms, appealing to those who have suffered under marketization and members of the business community who favor stability over democracy.

In the June 1991 presidential elections, Zhirinovskiy's program was simple: cut the price of vodka, restore Russia's greatness by changing the name "USSR" to "Russia," and keep Russian troops in Eastern Europe until Russia was ready for their return. Despite his extremism, Zhirinovskiy received 7.8% of the votes (over six million) in the presidential election, placing third behind Boris Yeltsin and former Soviet premier Ryzhkov.

The party's program in the December 1993 elections specifically called for stopping defense industry conversion, reintroducing state orders, and restoring inter-enterprise links. Zhirinovskiy also proposed a ban on refugees entering Russia, a ban on non-Russian citizens trading in Russian cities, and a new federal structure that dissolved Russia's 21 ethnically-based republics. Zhirinovskiy headed the Liberal Democratic Party's list of 156 candidates, which was the first party list presented for certification.

In addition to the ten parties and blocs discussed above, three little-known blocs also successfully registered national party lists for the December 12 elections. These include the Constructive Ecological Movement (44 candidates), the Dignity and Charity bloc (58 candidates), and the Russia's Future/New Names bloc (95 candidates).

The Russia's Future/New Names bloc was a youth party headed by Vyacheslav Lachevskiy, former leader of the Komsomol, the Communist Party youth organization. Many of the candidates and supporters of this bloc emerged from the Komsomol network. Several other leaders had been associated with Rutskoi's People Party of Free Russia. The Dignity and

Charity bloc was a conglomeration of the organizations such as veterans of the Afghan War, pensioners, and the disabled. Its sole purpose was to fight for continued social protection of the least advantaged segments of society. The Constructive Ecologic Movement, known by the Russian acronym "Cedar," sided with the reformers because they believed environmental damage would be addressed only under a free market system.

APPENDIX III: Deployment Cities

Moscow:

Moscow is the sixth largest city in the world, and with seven million eligible voters, constitutes the single largest district in the new Russian parliament's upper house, the Federation Council. In the new lower house, the State Duma, Moscow has 35 single-seat mandates. Moscow, along with St. Petersburg, was an early stronghold for the reform movement. In the 1990 elections, for example, democrats won 57 out of Moscow's 64 seats in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) and 280 of the 500 seats on the Moscow city soviet. Over three million Muscovites (74% of those voting) supported Yeltsin in the April referendum. Although a democratic bulwark, nearly all Russian parties find substantial support in Moscow and its environs.

The Moscow city council, which supported the national parliament, was dissolved along with the city's district councils on October 5th. Elections to the new Moscow City Duma were held on December 12 in conjunction with the national ballot. IRI observers in Moscow paid particular attention to the role played by domestic observers and whether vague election laws and inadequate guidance from central authorities lead to wide administrative discretion at polling stations.

Vladimir (Central Region):

Vladimir is one of several cities that comprise the Golden Ring, a series of outposts of Kievan Rus that pre-dated medieval Muscovy. Modern Vladimir, a city of 350,000 located approximately 120 miles northeast of Moscow, produces textiles, machines, and chemicals, and closely resembles many other medium-sized Russian industrial cities. The Vladimir Oblast mixes urban industrial areas with rural agricultural areas.

Vladimir's citizens were generally pro-Yeltsin and more than 60% supported Yeltsin in the referendum. The presidium (executive committee) of the Vladimir regional legislature, however, was dominated by hardliners who denounced Yeltsin's decree dissolving parliament hours after it was published in Moscow. A week later, the hardliners were forced to resign under pressure from Yeltsin's local governor and pro-democracy protests organized in the city-center. Vladimir was one of several pro-reform cities (Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, and Yekaterinburg were among the others) that had been punished in the central government's 1993 draft budget, when they were allowed to retain far less tax revenue than the more sluggish regions.

IRI observers in Vladimir compared public attitudes about the continuation of economic reform, administration of polling stations, and popular support for various candidates and parties in urban and rural areas. Observers found urban areas to be largely pro-reform while the

Agrarian and Communist parties dominated the countryside. In addition, IRI observers found inconsistencies between rural and urban polling stations, especially with regard to voter education materials.

Novgorod (Northwest Russia):

Novgorod is located approximately 300 miles north of Moscow and 100 miles South of St. Petersburg. It was first settled in the 9th century, by the Varangian Norsemen who established the embryonic Russian state, and became one of Russia's most advanced cultural and political centers for the next 600 years. Contemporary Novgorod is seen as the source of Russian history, and consequently, the regional soviet has diverted municipal funds into restoration of Orthodox churches and other historic landmarks, such as the city's kremlin, to increase tourist revenue, rather than pay for local services and improvements. The local mafia is active and growing because of the unusually large amount of hard currency injected into the local economy by tourism. Outside of Novgorod's historic core lies an industrial zone and the flat, open plains of the Northwest.

Novgorod is often described as the cradle of Russian democracy because of its medieval *veche*, an assembly of farmers and merchants who voted on local issues. Novgorod is now home to a variety of local party organizations representing the diversity of the Russian political spectrum. A poll conducted by a local radio station indicated that 62% of Novgorod's citizens supported Yeltsin's action against the CPD. Novgorod was also the site of an IRI women's conference held in June 1993. The conference brought women activists from across Russia and Central Asia to attend workshops on practical skills that could be applied to business and community endeavors as well as political party activism.

IRI observers paid particular attention to how political parties functioned. Specifically, IRI monitors observed the ability of political organizations to mobilize grassroots support, communicate a coherent message, and field domestic observers or members of local electoral commissions.

Archangelsk (Arctic North):

Archangelsk is a port city of 395,000 situated on the White Sea, about 650 miles from Moscow and 150 miles below the Arctic Circle. A major timber conduit, Archangelsk and its harbors are ice-bound for a significant portion of the year. As in many other regions, challenges to Moscow's authority are common in Archangelsk. A proposal to elevate the administrative status of Archangelsk to autonomous region had been discussed informally by the local soviet in hopes of boosting their status under a new constitution. In addition to regional demands for greater autonomy, ethnic issues also are prominent; in particular, the Pomyrs (inhabitants of the

region who, according to legend, came from Denmark and mixed with native Eskimo tribes) are calling for greater rights and freedoms from central authorities.

Unlike the situation in Moscow and a vast majority of the regions, the various branches of Archangelsk's government had a cooperative and productive working relationship. The mayor, Yeltsin's presidential representative, and the chairman of the regional legislature maintained open and regular communication. Their flexibility and commitment to problem-solving were rare among Russia's current leaders. As for political organization, what pro-democracy activists may have lacked in financial and material resources, they made up for in access to elected officials and an open mass media. The Social-Democrats, Democratic Party of Russia, and Democratic Russia Movement were among the most organized political groups in the region. IRI has sent several political party training missions to Archangelsk to work with these groups on basic party organization and management.

IRI observers in Archangelsk paid particular attention to whether administrative weaknesses identified by the IRI team observing last April's referendum have been addressed. These included: 1) the arbitrary process of granting absentee certificates, allowing voters to cast ballots in districts in which they did not reside, 2) absentee voters who were simply added to the list of eligible voters in a precinct, reducing opportunities to cross-check absentee voter lists, and 3) polling sites that continued to stamp the back of ballots rather than employ the proscribed procedure of signatures from two polling station commissioners.

Kazan (Tatarstan):

Kazan is a city with slightly over one million people located on the eastern bank of the upper Volga River, approximately 450 miles east of Moscow. Kazan is the capital of the autonomous republic of Tatarstan and serves as a major road and rail junction for East-West traffic between Moscow and the Ural Mountains. Named after the muslim Tatars, one of Russia's largest ethnic minorities, Tatarstan has refrained from making an official proclamation of independence. It did, however, move toward greater autonomy in March 1992 by holding a popular referendum on sovereignty, withholding federal tax revenues, and issuing its own vouchers to privatize state property.

The IRI team deployed in Kazan, in meetings before election day, sought to determine the role that identification with the Tatar ethnic group played in influencing voter behavior. Observers concluded that the organized boycott of the December elections was based on a desire for greater economic autonomy rather than ethnic nationalism. IRI observers also sought, with little success, to uncover techniques of voter suppression. In Soviet-era elections, voter participation was manipulated to produce turnout in the 90%-95% range. The 13% turnout in the December elections demonstrated how the ruling elite had retained their ability to control

voter participation.

Voronezh (Black Earth Region):

Voronezh is a city of nearly one million inhabitants surrounded by a rich agricultural region of another 1.5 million people. Located approximately 300 miles south of Moscow, Voronezh is part of the fertile Black Earth region situated along the Don River basin. The city of Voronezh itself was once a high-technology center for the military-industrial complex, which provided nearly 40% of the region's jobs in its heyday. Although now suffering from the sharp decline in defense orders, Voronezh has great economic potential because of its scientific facilities and well-educated workforce.

In addition to its economic potential, the city of Voronezh is relatively advanced in its political development. A corps of highly motivated and organized political activists in Voronezh formed a local coalition to support President Yeltsin and continued reform in the April referendum. This local coalition overcame divisions among their counterparts at the national level, pooled resources, and targeted voting constituencies to get out the vote. IRI has sent two political party training missions to Voronezh, and has used Voronezh political activists as trainers on missions to other regions of Russia.

In the April referendum vote, however, less than 50% of the oblast's population voted for Yeltsin and his economic policies (slightly more than 50% had supported Yeltsin in the June 1991 presidential elections). This was attributable to the predominantly anti-Yeltsin vote in the countryside, where most farmers still work on collectives. The Voronezh regional soviet was one of several local legislatures that condemned Yeltsin's September 21 decree dissolving the Parliament, and along with the soviet in Novosibirsk, offered Rutskoi their city as a capital for the rump government headed by Rutskoi.

The IRI team deployed to Voronezh attempted to determine how issues of economic stability and a desire for reform affected the campaign process. IRI exit poll results for Voronezh showed that 56.5% of the respondents believed the speed of reform had been too quick, compared to 25.5% nationally.

Rostov-na-Donu (Volga-Don Region):

Rostov-na-Donu (Rostov on the Don) is the hub of the Russian South. Located approximately 600 miles south of Moscow, where the Don River flows to the Sea of Azov and then into the Black Sea, this port city of approximately one million inhabitants is the industrial center for a large farming region, and also serves as the gateway to the Trans-Caucasus Region

immediately to the South.

One of the largest oblasts in Russia, Rostov is also home to a large Don Cossack community, with the city of Novocherkassk serving as the unofficial Cossack capital. Traditionally, Cossacks were a warrior caste of staunch Russian nationalists, firm believers of the Orthodox faith, and the benefactors of a special status accorded by the tsars. Because of their strong sense of cultural identity, the Cossacks were a special target of the Bolsheviks' campaign to eliminate political opposition, losing, by some estimates, a third of their population of 4.5 million during Stalin's purges. The Cossacks' hatred for the Communists led them to support Yeltsin in his struggle against the Russian Congress of People's Deputies (CPD). IRI observers found that, after the CPD was disbanded, Cossack support for Yeltsin and his allies became weakened by the weight of Yeltsin's unfulfilled promises. Most Cossacks, however, seemed prepared to support reform in the December elections.

Chelyabinsk (Uralian Region):

Chelyabinsk is a city of one million located in the Ural mountains, over 900 miles east of Moscow and less than one hundred miles from Russia's southern border with Kazakhstan. Once a "closed" city due to its nuclear weapon production facilities and testing sites, Chelyabinsk is now a dinosaur of Russia's vast military-industrial complex. During the Soviet-era, 90% of the region's industrial output fulfilled military orders, but today only 10% of production is necessary to satisfy the requests of a shrinking military.

A small but active corps of political activists in Chelyabinsk agitated for democratic reforms and the observance of universal human rights throughout the 80's and 90's. Mass deportations funneled through Chelyabinsk to Siberia and Kazakhstan during the Stalin period as well as serious long-standing environmental problems served as a rallying point for political dissidents and their supporters. Democratic Russia, among the strongest and most popular political groups in Chelyabinsk, raised \$35,000 for an advertising blitz at the end of the December election campaign.

Chelyabinsk is a textbook example of chaos in government and politics at the regional level. Following the lead of the CPD in Moscow, the communist-dominated regional legislature in Chelyabinsk began in 1992 to restrict political openness and limit grass-roots activism. In early 1993, the Chelyabinsk legislature announced it would not be bound by presidential decrees emanating from Moscow. The legislature then took measures to suspend the public sale of shares of state-owned enterprises under Yeltsin's privatization plan. In the April referendum, the legislature added a fifth question to the ballot in a successful effort to elect a regional governor to replace Vadim Solovyov, the former mayor of Chelyabinsk and Yeltsin's regional representative. Peter Sumin, the pro-communist candidate defeated Solovyov, creating a

confusing dual power situation that remained unresolved for several months. The victory of the local anti-Yeltsin candidate was especially surprising because 70% of the voters expressed confidence in the policies of Yeltsin, and 65% approved his painful economic policies (roughly 10% higher than the national average).

While the 1991 coup appeared to fail in Moscow, the battle lines shifted to many regions where remnants of the communist *nomenklatura* waged a stubborn fight against the new government. The IRI team in Chelyabinsk therefore paid particular attention to issues of local governance, and particularly, how former elites may have attempted to preserve or reassert their control by manipulating the campaign period or subverting the voting process. Yeltsin's September decree disbanding parliament was supported by Solovyov, but his opponent, Peter Sumin, denounced it as unconstitutional with the support of the regional legislature. Sumin's supporters then mounted a failed attempt to storm the local television station on October 4. When Yeltsin had successfully removed all remaining deputies from the White House in Moscow, the Chelyabinsk soviet acceded to new elections, but refused to disband itself. IRI observers found that the soviet was not in session, but that deputies continued to work in their offices.

Kemerovo (Western Siberia):

Located nearly 2,000 miles from Moscow, Kemerovo is situated in the Kuzbass coal-mining region. Kemerovo was first developed in the late nineteenth century to feed the coal needs of the expanding Trans-Siberian Railroad. With the introduction of the Communist's first five year plan, the region underwent rapid industrial development to feed the USSR's coal and steel needs. The Kemerovo Oblast was created from the Tomsk Oblast in the 1940's when industrial plants and factory workers were moved eastward to evade the advancing Nazi army.

Kemerovo now has a steel and heavy machine-building industry in addition to coal mines. The city of Kemerovo has a population of 500,000; 2.5 million reside in the oblast. A wave of mass strikes by miners in the Kuzbass region in 1989 and 1990, the first in the heart of the Soviet "rustbelt" since the 1920's, sent shock waves through the Communist Party. The Kuzbass coal miners went on strike again in 1991 to support Yeltsin in his power struggle against Gorbachev, but the miners' loyalty has waned as pro-market reforms have cut living standards. Yeltsin visited the region in his April referendum campaign and promised to cut taxes on coal exports and grant mining operations greater freedom to dispose of their assets. Gaidar visited Novokuznetsk, located in the southern portion of the oblast, in early December 1993 to buttress support for Yeltsin and avert a possible strike. Although he claimed to be on official business as Deputy Prime Minister, Gaidar's trip to Kemerovo had many trappings of a political campaign.

While public opinion in Kemerovo was about equally divided between communists and reformers, the rising threat that communists would revert to familiar habits of coercion, power and privilege created a potentially volatile situation. IRI observers in Kemerovo, therefore, paid particular attention to the role that local communist elites played in administering the electoral process. Observers found that Aman Tuleev, the former chairman of the regional soviet, remained one of the region's most popular political figures. Tuleev had been a vociferous opponent of Yeltsin since the 1991 presidential elections, in which Tuleev was one of six candidates. When Yeltsin issued his decree disbanding the Russian parliament, Tuleev called upon the Siberian Accord economic group to unite in a Urals Republic to oppose Yeltsin. Tuleev then flew to Moscow where he joined other anti-reform deputies in the White House.

Irkutsk (Eastern Siberia):

Irkutsk is located on the southern tip of the 400 mile-long Lake Baikal, the world's deepest fresh-water body. Located 2,800 miles east of Moscow, Irkutsk was founded in the seventeenth century as a Cossack garrison and later became the administrative center of Eastern Siberia. With a population of just over half a million, the city of Irkutsk is the capital of a region of over two million inhabitants employed by large timber and mining sectors. Irkutsk's economy also hosts a growing tourist industry based on its well preserved historical city-center and nearby lake.

The University of Irkutsk, established in 1918, was the first Russian institution of higher learning established west of the Urals. In addition to being a university town, Irkutsk was home to the exiled Decembrists and other dissidents of the nineteenth century. While the people of Irkutsk tend to have a higher level of political and cultural sophistication compared to neighboring cities in the region, they remain politically conservative (58% supported Yeltsin in the referendum). Although most political parties in the region remain committed to reform, the lack of organization has resulted in little popular participation. Furthermore, there is little communication and cooperation between pro-democratic parties.

Many current political activists emerged from environmental movements formed during Gorbachev's period of *glasnost* and *perestroika*. The Baikalsk paper mill, built on the lake's southern shore by the Soviet military in 1960 produces paper of a high enough quality that 25% of output is exported. The mill's 4,500 employees, however, often find themselves at odds with local environmentalists who believe the mill seriously pollutes the lake's once pristine waters. The IRI team, in their pre-election meetings paid particular attention to whether local issues, such as environmental concerns, would override national issues in the minds of voters. The observers found that environmental concerns had faded considerably in light of more pressing economic issues.

Khabarovsk (Far East Region):

Lying on the banks of the Amur River, Khabarovsk is located over 3,800 miles from Moscow and under 50 miles from the Chinese border. With 630,000 inhabitants, Khabarovsk is the capital of a krai (territory) with few other population centers that stretches for over 2,000 kilometers along the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk. An industrial hub with access to abundant natural resources and warm water ports, Khabarovsk is a city in which politics, business, and a strong mafia overlap, in many ways preserving the spirit of a frontier town.

Khabarovsk demonstrated how the devolution of power from Moscow did not always lead to better local government. The collapse of the old party system meant that Moscow found it increasingly difficult to exercise control over the regions. The local ruling elite, who remained in power after the August 1991 coup-attempt, were freed from Moscow's interference. They took advantage of the confusion to grab the spoils as state structures were dismantled. For example, almost no new public housing has been built in Khabarovsk, yet local officials squandered millions of rubles on palatial residences for themselves. IRI observers attributed the low voter turnout to the elections being concerned with the choice of representatives to a national body in Moscow whose new functions were not well-understood. The elections, therefore, were viewed by citizens as having little impact on the more critical issues of local government.

Among the most visible pro-democratic groups are the Democratic and Republican parties and the Democratic Russia Movement. Most pro-reform candidates and parties believed that the Communists and other anti-reform groups had an unfair advantage because of their links to the local government bureaucracy.

IRI monitors in Khabarovsk for the April referendum found the populace was well-informed about the four questions on the ballot due to the efforts of the regional electoral commission. IRI monitors in Khabarovsk for the December elections found election organizers confronted by the main problems they faced in the April referendum: a lack of time and money.

APPENDIX IV: Sample Ballots

Federation Council Ballot

1

ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ БЮЛЛЕТЕНЬ

ПО ВЫБОРАМ ДЕПУТАТОВ СОВЕТА ФЕДЕРАЦИИ
ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОГО СОВРАНИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ
ПО ДВУХМАНДАТНОМУ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНОМУ ОКРУГУ

12 декабря 1993 г.

РОСТОВСКИЙ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ ОКРУГ N 01
РОСТОВСКОЙ ОБЛАСТИ

Поставьте крест либо любой иной знак в пустом квадрате напротив фамилий тех кандидатов, за которых Вы голосуете, либо в квадрате, расположенном напротив строки "Против всех кандидатов".

Вы можете проголосовать не более чем за двух кандидатов, указанных в бюллетене.

ЗУБКОВ Владимир Николаевич, 1945 года рождения, работник аппарата органа исполнительной власти, представитель Президента РФ в Ростовской области, проживает в г.Ростове-на-Дону.

ИВАНЧЕНКО Леонид Андреевич, 1942 года рождения, предприниматель, генеральный директор акционерного общества "Светлана", проживает в г.Ростове-на-Дону.

ПОПОВ Александр Васильевич, 1947 года рождения, работник аппарата органа представительной власти, председатель областного Совета народных депутатов, проживает в г.Ростове-на-Дону.

ЧУБ Владимир Федорович, 1948 года рождения, работник аппарата органа исполнительной власти, глава администрации области, проживает в г.Ростове-на-Дону.

ПРОТИВ ВСЕХ КАНДИДАТОВ

Избирательный бюллетень, изготовленный неофициально, без печати окружной или участковой избирательной комиссии либо подписей двух членов участковой избирательной комиссии, а также такой, из которого нельзя установить волеизъявление избирателя, в частности, такой, в котором крест либо иной знак (знаки) проставлен более чем в двух квадратах, или проставлен одновременно против фамилии одного из кандидатов и в строке "Против всех кандидатов", или не проставлен ни в одном из них, считается недействительным.

State Duma – Party List Ballot



12 ДЕКАБРЯ 1993 ГОДА



ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ БЮЛЛЕТЕНЬ

ПО ВЫБОРАМ ДЕПУТАТОВ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ДУМЫ
ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОГО СОБРАНИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

ОБЩЕФЕДЕРАЛЬНЫЙ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ ОКРУГ

РОСТОВСКАЯ ОБЛАСТЬ

ПОСТАВЬТЕ КРЕСТ ЛИБО ЛЮБОЙ ИНОЙ ЗНАК В ПУСТОМ КВАДРАТЕ
напротив названия того избирательного объединения, за общенедеральный
список кандидатов которого Вы голосуете, либо в квадрате, расположенном
напротив строки "Против всех списков".

Вы можете проголосовать ТОЛЬКО ЗА ОДНО избирательное объединение из
указанных в бюллетене.

Избирательный бюллетень, изготовленный неофициально, без печати окружной
или участковой избирательной комиссии либо подписей двух членов участковой
избирательной комиссии, а также такой, из которого нельзя установить
возлеизъявление избирателя, в частности: такой, в котором крест или любой другой
знак (знаки) проставлен более чем в одном квадрате или не проставлен ни в
одном из них, считается недействительным.

Аграрная партия России		<input type="checkbox"/>
<small>Региональная группа</small>		
Лапшин Михаил Иванович	Животов Алексей Александрович	
Давылов Александр Семенович	Моркозской Николай Анатольевич	
Заверюха Александр Харламович		
Блок: Явлинский-Болдырев-Лукин		<input type="checkbox"/>
<small>(Российский христианско-демократический союз-Новая демократия, Республиканская партия Российской Федерации, Социал-демократическая партия Российской Федерации)</small>		
<small>Региональная группа</small>		
Явлинский Григорий Алексеевич	Лютов Игорь Эдуардович	
Лукин Владимир Петрович	Майборода Александр Олегович	
Михайлов Алексей Юрьевич	Байбуртян Владимир Артемович	
Будущее России - Новые Имена		<input type="checkbox"/>
<small>(Молодежное движение в поддержку Народной партии Свободная Россия, Политико-экономическая ассоциация "Гражданский Союз")</small>		
<small>Региональная группа</small>		
Лашевский Вячеслав Викторович	Сердюкова Наталья Валентиновна	
Соколов Олег Владимирович		
Миронов Владимир Николаевич		
Выбор России		<input type="checkbox"/>
<small>(Политическое движение "Выбор России", Движение "Демократическая Россия", Партия "Демократическая инициатива", Крестьянская партия России)</small>		
<small>Региональная группа</small>		
Гайдар Егор Тимурович	Титенко Борис Михайлович	
Ковалева Сергей Александрович	Емельянов Михаил Васильевич	
Памфилова Элла Александровна	Змеев Виктор Борисович	
Гражданский союз во имя стабильности, справедливости и прогресса		<input type="checkbox"/>
<small>(Российский союз промышленников и предпринимателей, Всероссийский союз "Обновление", Российский социал-демократический центр, Ассоциация промышленников и предпринимателей России, Профсоюз работников лесных отраслей Российской Федерации, Профсоюз работников строительства и промышленности строительных материалов Российской Федерации, Движение "Ветераны войны - за мир")</small>		
<small>Региональная группа</small>		
Вольский Аркадий Иванович	Гаташов Василий Васильевич	
Бех Николай Иванович		
Владиславен Александр Панлович		
Демократическая партия России		<input type="checkbox"/>
<small>Региональная группа</small>		
Травкин Николай Ильич		
Говорухин Станислав Сергеевич		
Богомолов Олег Тимофеевич		
Достоинство и милосердие		<input type="checkbox"/>
<small>Региональная группа</small>		
Фролов Константин Васильевич		
Губенко Николай Николаевич		
Гришин Вячеслав Леонидович		
Стр. 2, РОСТОВСКАЯ ОБЛАСТЬ		

Коммунистическая партия Российской Федерации Зюганов Геннадий Андреевич Севастьянов Виталий Иванович Илюхин Виктор Иванович	<input type="checkbox"/>
Конструктивно-экологическое движение России "Кедр" Лымарь Любовь Михайловна Чибураев Владимир Иванович Баранов Станислав Михайлович	<input type="checkbox"/>
Либерально-демократическая партия России Жириновский Владимир Вольфович Кобелев Виктор Васильевич Марычев Вячеслав Антонович	<input type="checkbox"/>
Партия Российского Единства и Согласия Шахрай Сергей Михайлович Шохин Александр Николаевич Затулин Константин Федорович	<input type="checkbox"/>
Региональная группа Шоповалов Сергей Александрович Хоперская Лариса Львовна Мирошниченко Иван Константинович	<input type="checkbox"/>
Политическое движение "Женщины России" Федулова Алеитина Васильевна Лахова Екатерина Филипповна Гундарева Наталья Георгиевна	<input type="checkbox"/>
Российское Движение Демократических реформ Собчак Анатолий Александрович Федоров Святослав Николаевич Басилашвили Олег Валериевич	<input type="checkbox"/>
ПРОТИВ ВСЕХ СПИСКОВ	<input type="checkbox"/>

Стр. 3. РОСТОВСКАЯ ОБЛАСТЬ

State Duma – Single Mandate Ballot

3

ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ БЮЛЛЕТЕНЬ

ПО ВЫБОРАМ ДЕПУТАТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ДУМЫ
ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОГО СОБРАНИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ
ПО ОДНОМАНДАТНОМУ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНОМУ ОКРУГУ

12 декабря 1993 г.

**РОСТОВСКИЙ ПЕРВОМАЯСКИЙ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНЫЙ ОКРУГ № 144
РОСТОВСКОЙ ОБЛАСТИ**

Поставьте крест либо любой иной знак в пустом квадрате напротив фамилии того кандидата, за которого Вы голосуете, либо в квадрате, расположенном напротив строки «Против всех кандидатов».

АМЕЛИНА Алла Леонидовна, 1952 года рождения, журналист, проживает в г. Ростове-на-Дону.

ВУКОЛОВ Владимир Константинович, 1937 года рождения, адвокат, проживает в г. Ростове-на-Дону.

ЗБРАНЛОВ Сергей Александрович, 1966 года рождения, глава коммерческой фирмы, проживает в г. Ростове-на-Дону.

ЛИННИК Виталий Викторович, 1949 года рождения, работник аппарата главы исполнительной власти Ростовской области, проживает в г. Ростове-на-Дону.

МАЙБОРОДА Александр Олегович, 1957 года рождения, руководитель научно-технического центра, проживает в г. Ростове-на-Дону.

ПОВОЛЯЕВ Виктор Васильевич, 1945 года рождения, глава коммерческой фирмы, проживает в г. Ростове-на-Дону.

РОЖКОВ Игорь Анатольевич, 1956 года рождения, глава коммерческой фирмы, проживает в г. Ростове-на-Дону.

СЕРДЮКОВА Наталья Валентиновна, 1962 года рождения, руководитель ассоциации, проживает в г. Ростове-на-Дону.

СТУРОВ Борис Николаевич, 1952 года рождения, глава коммерческой фирмы, проживает в г. Ростове-на-Дону.

ЧЕРНЕНКО Александр Леонидович, 1949 года рождения, руководитель высшего учебного заведения, проживает в г. Ростове-на-Дону.

ПРОТИВ ВСЕХ КАНДИДАТОВ

Избирательный бюллетень, не изготовленный официально, не снабженный печатью окружной или участковой избирательной комиссии либо подписями двух членов участковой избирательной комиссии, а также такой, из которого нельзя установить волеизъявление избирателя, в частности, такой, в котором крест или любой иной знак (знаки) проставлен более чем в одном квадрате, либо не проставлен ни в одном из них, считается недействительным.

Тел. АРО. Заг. № 734-550000. 22.11.93

Constitutional Referendum Ballot

**ВСЕНАРОДНОЕ ГОЛОСОВАНИЕ
ПО ПРОЕКТУ КОНСТИТУЦИИ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

12 декабря 1993 года

**БЮЛЛЕТЕНЬ ДЛЯ ГОЛОСОВАНИЯ
Принимаете ли Вы Конституцию Российской Федерации?**

Да

Нет

Если Вы голосуете **за** принятие Конституции Российской Федерации, зачеркните слово «**НЕТ**».

Если Вы голосуете **против** принятия Конституции Российской Федерации, зачеркните слово «**ДА**».

Бюллетень, изготовленный неофициально, без печати участковой избирательной комиссии либо подписей двух ее членов, а также бюллетень, в котором оставлены или вычеркнуты оба слова «**ДА**» и «**НЕТ**», считается недействительным.

APPENDIX V: Deputies of the Federation Council

Name	DOB	Nationality	Educ	Party	Occupation	Residency	Constituency
Romanov Peter Vasilyevich	1943	R	H	N	General Director of the Krasnoyarsky Production Association	Krasnoyarsk	Krasnoyarsk Krai
Gayer Evdokiya Alexandrovna	1934	Narxian	H	RC	Deputy Chairwoman of Russia's State Committee on Social and Economic Development of the North	Moscow	Primorski Krai
Nazdratenko Evgeny Ivanovich	1949	R	H	N	Head of the Krai Administration	Vladivostok	Primorski Krai
Kuznetsov Evgeny Semenovich	1938	R	H	RC	Head of the Krai Administration	Stavropol	Stavropol'ski Krai
Kulakovskiy Aleksey Viktorovich	1954	R	H	N	Presidential Representative in Stavropol Krai	Stavropol	Stavropol'ski Krai
Bulgakov Viktor Kirillovich	1949	R	H	N	Head of Khabarovsk Technical University	Khabarovsk	Khabarovsk Krai
Ibaev Viktor Ivanovich	1948	R	H	N	Head of Krai Administration	Khabarovsk	Khabarovsk Krai
Korotkov Leonid Viktorovich	1965	R	H	CP	Section Manager on the Amurskaya Pravda Editorial Staff	Blagoveshchensk	Amurskaya Oblast
Strelin Pavel Semenovich	1951	R	H	CP	Unemployed		Amurskaya Oblast
Balakhin Pavel Nikolayevich	1936	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Archangel	Archangel Oblast
Yeroshin Yevgeny Fedorovich	1950	R	H	N	Chairman of Kotlasny Line and Sand Brick Factory Limited Partnership	Kotlas	Archangel Oblast
Zvolinsky Vyacheslav Petrovich	1947	R	H	N	General Director of the Lower Volga Scientific and Production Association	Astrakhan	Astrakhan Oblast
Adrov Valery Mikhailovich	1937	R	H	N	Presidential Representative in Astrakhan Oblast	Astrakhan	Astrakhan Oblast
Bestimelnitsyn Mikhail Ivanovich	1956	R	H	N	Chairman of the Oblast Council of People's Deputies	Belgorod	Belgorod Oblast
Ponomarev Aleksey Filippovich	1930	R	H	N	Deputy Head of the Belgorod Agricultural Institute	Belgorod	Belgorod Oblast
Lodkin Yury Yevgenievich	1938	R	H	CP	Unemployed		Bryansk Oblast
Shirshov Peter Petrovich	1945	R	H	N	Armed Forces	Bryansk	Bryansk Oblast
Yegorov Nikolai Sergeyevich	1941	R	H	N	Presidential Representative in Vladimirska Oblast	Vladimir	Vladimirska Oblast
Vlasov Yury Vasilyevich	1961	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Vladimir	Vladimirska Oblast
Chakhov Yury Viktorovich	1947	R	H	N	Head of Volgograd City Administration	Volgograd	Volgogradskaya Oblast
Shabanov Ivan Petrovich	1935	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Volgograd	Volgogradskaya Oblast
Podgornov Nikolai Mikhailovich	1949	R	UG	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Vologda	Vologodskaya Oblast
Pozgalev Vyacheslav Evgenievich	1946	R	H	RC	Cherepovets City Mayor	Cherepovets	Vologodskaya Oblast

Deputies to the Federation Council

Name	DOB	Nationality	Educn	Party	Occupation	Residency	Constituency
Dzharimov Aslan Aleevich	1939	Adygei	H	N	President, Prime Minister of the Republic	Maikop	Adygei Republic
Chernichenko Mikhail Nikolayevich	1944	R	H	N	Maikop Administration Head	Maikop	Adygei Republic
Kopsov Anatoly Yakovlevich	1942	R	H	N	Prime Minister of the Republic	Ufa	Bashkortostan Republic
Rakhimov Muratza Gubasbullovich	1934	Bashkir	H	N	Chairman of the Republic Supreme Soviet	Ufa	Bashkortostan Republic
Nimayeva Lidiya Chumilovna	1948	Buryat	H	CP	Acting Chairwoman of the Science and Education Committee of the Republic Supreme Soviet	Ulan-Ude	Buryatia Republic
Posupov Leonid Vasilyevich	1935	R	H	N	Chairman of the Republic Supreme Soviet	Ulan-Ude	Buryatia Republic
Chapaynov Valery Ivanovich	1945	Altai	H	N	Chairman of the Republic Supreme Soviet	Gorno-Altaiisk	Altai Republic
Petrov Vladimir Ivanovich	1942	R	H	N	Prime Minister of the Republic	Gorno-Altaiisk	Altai Republic
Abdullatipov Ramazan Gadzhilmarudovich	1946	Avar	H	Serezhsky Forum	First Deputy Chairman of Russia's State Committee on Federation and Nationalities Matters	Moscow	Dagestan Republic
Magomedov Magomedali Magomedovich	1930	Dargin	H	N	Chairman of the Republic Supreme Soviet	Mathachbala	Dagestan Republic
Auahev Rustan Sultanovich	1954	Inghush	H	N	President of the Republic	Nazran	Inghush Republic
Kostov Iser Magomedovich	1942	Inghush	H	N	Department Manager of Russia's General Prosecutor's Office	Moscow	Inghush Republic
Kokov Valery Mubamsedovich	1941	Kabardin	H	N	President of the Republic	Nalchik	Kabardino-Balkarian Republic
Cherketov Georgy Mubatshevich	1938	Beitar	H	N	Prime Minister of the Republic	Nalchik	Kabardino-Balkarian Republic
Golovarov Alexander Vasilyevich	1952	R	H	N	Republic's State Property Management Committee Chairman	Elitsa	Kalmyk Republic
Ilyumzhinov Kirsan Nikolayevich	1962	Kalmyk	H	N	President of the Republic	Elitsa	Kalmyk Republic
Strigin Vladimir Pavlovich	1955	R	H	N	District Court Chairman	Zelenchukskaya Village	Karachayvo-Cherkess Republic
Khabiev Vladimir Islamovich	1932	Karachi	H	N	Prime Minister of the Republic	Cherkessk	Karachayvo-Cherkess Republic
Stepanov Viktor Nikolayevich	1947	Karelian	H	CP of Karelia	Chairman of the Republic Supreme Soviet	Petrozavodsk	Karelia Republic
Blumikov Sergei Nikolayevich	1945	R	H	N	Prime Minister of the Republic	Petrozavodsk	Karelia Republic
Spiridonov Yury Aleksseyevich	1938	R	H	N	Chairman of the Republic Supreme Soviet	Sykt'yvkar	Komi Republic
Khadayev Vyacheslav Ivanovich	1946	Komi	H	N	Prime Minister of the Republic	Sykt'yvkar	Komi Republic
Zenkina Anatoly Alexandrovich	1939	Mari	H	N	First Deputy Chairman of the Republic Supreme Soviet	Yoshkar-ola	Mari El Republic

Nationality:

- B Belorussian
- R Russian
- U Ukrainian

Education:

- H Higher Education (university)
- HS High School
- TS Technical School
- UG Undergraduate (partial university education)

Party:

- AP Agrarian Party
- CP Communist Party
- CU Civic Union
- DC Dignity and Charity
- DPR Democratic Party of Russia
- DR Democratic Russia
- FDP Free Democratic Party of Russia
- LDP Liberal Party
- N Non-Partisan
- PEF Party of Economic Freedom
- PRES Russian Party of Unity and Accord
- RC Russia's Choice
- RCDU Russian Christian Democratic Union

- RMDR Russian Movement for Democratic Reform
- RP Republican Party
- SDP Social Democratic Party
- WR Women of Russia
- Yabloko Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc

Name	DOB	Nationality	Edctn	Party	Occupation	Residency	Constituency
Khalilain Vyacheslav Alexandrovich	1948	R	H	N	Medvedevsky Raion Administration Head		Maril El Republic
Shevtsov Valery Nikolayevich	1939	Moldovan	H	N	Prime Minister of the Republic	Saratk	Moldovan Republic
Ivanova Lyudmila Alexandrovna	1953	R	H	CP	Chief Expert at the Republic's Labor and Employment Ministry	Saratk	Moldovan Republic
Nikolayev Mikhail Yefimovich	1937	Yakut	H	N	President of the Republic	Yakutsk	Sakha (Yakutia) Republic
Baterlein Eduard Yakovlevich	1935	German	H	N	Neryungy City Administration Head	Neryungy	Sakha (Yakutia) Republic
Khetagurov Sergei Valentinovich	1942	Osetian	H	N	Prime Minister of the Republic	Vladikavkaz	North Ossetia Republic
Galgrov Alkharbek Khodzhiyevich	1929	Osetian	H	N	Chairman of the Republic Supreme Soviet	Vladikavkaz	North Ossetia Republic
Elections to be Held on March 13, 1994							Tatarstan Republic
Elections to be Held on March 13, 1994							Tatarstan Republic
Kara-Sai Vladimir Borisovich	1938	Tuvimian	H	N	Interior Minister of the Republic	Kyzyl	Tuva Republic
Oorzhak Sherig-ol Dirizhikovich	1942	Tuvimian	H	N	President of the Republic	Kyzyl	Tuva Republic
Podorigora Vladimir Nikolayevich	1954	R	H	N	Chief of Staff of the Federation Council	Mozhga	Udmurt Republic
Volkov Alexander Alexandrovich	1951	R	H	N	Prime-minister of the Republic	Izhevsk	Udmurt Republic
Asochakov Andrei Serafimovich	1955	Khasasian	H	N	Republic's Ennisary to Russian President	Moscow	Khasas Republic
Shekapov Yuri Stepanovich	1935	R	H	N	General Director of Khakassagol Jz. Company	Abakan	Khakass Republic
Elections not Held							Chechen Republic
Elections not Held							Chechen Republic
Viktorov Valerian Nikolayevich	1951	Chuvash	H	N	Prime Minister of the Republic	Cheboksary	Chuvash Republic
Kurakov Lev Panteleimonovich	1943	Chuvash	H	N	Head of the Republic University	Cheboksary	Chuvash Republic
Surikov Alexander Alexandrovich	1940	R	H	N	Chairman of the Krai Council of People's Deputies	Barnaul	Altai Krai
Shekhet Yakov Naikhanovich	1940	Jewish	H	N	Deputy Chairman of Krai Committee on Effects of Nuclear Testing, Surgeon at the Krai Medical Institute	Barnaul	Altai Krai
Yegorov Nikolai Dmitriyevich	1951	R	H	N	Head of the Krai Administration	Krasnodar	Krasnodarski Krai
Kondratenko Nikolai Ignatovich	1940	R	H	N	Deputy General Director of the Rezerv-akab Company	Krasnodar	Krasnodarski Krai
Zubov Valery Mikhailovich	1953	R	H	N	Head of the Krai Administration	Krasnoyarsk	Krasnoyarski Krai

Name	DOB	Nationality	Edctn	Party	Occupation	Residency	Constituency
Kovalev Alexander Yakovlevich	1942	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Voronezh	Voronezhskaya Oblast
Vorobyev Alexander Vasilyevich	1942	R	H	N	Head of the Investigation Department of the Oblast Administration	Voronezh	Voronezhskaya Oblast
Tikhonin Vladimir Nikolayevich	1939	R	H	N	Chairman of the Oblast Council of People's Deputies	Ivanovo	Ivanovskaya Oblast
Gladkov Igor Yevgenievich	1954	R	H	N	Deputy General Director of the Ivanovskozh Is Company	Ivanovo	Ivanovskaya Oblast
Nozhikov Yuri Abramovich	1934	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Irkutsk	Irkutskaya Oblast
Golyshev Pavel Alexandrovich	1952	R	H	N	President of the Agrolorpeustroi Construction Company	Irkutsk	Irkutskaya Oblast
Mitochkin Yuri Semenovich	1931	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Kaliningrad	Kaliningradskaya Oblast
Stamysko Vladimir Filipovich	1945	R	H	N	First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia	Moscow	Kaliningradskaya Oblast
Demichev Aleksey Petrovich	1943	R	H	N	General Director of Erdnevenskoye Is Company		Kaliningradskaya Oblast
Sudarenkov Valery Vasilyevich	1940	R	H	N	Chairman of the Oblast Council of People's Deputies	Kaluga	Kaluzhskaya Oblast
Premyak Peter Grigoryevich	1945	R	H	N	Chairman of the Oblast Council of People's Deputies	Petrovavlovsk-Kamchatsky	Kamchatskaya Oblast
Grigoryeva Lyudmila Aleksевна	1940	R	H	N	Deputy Manager of Russia's Central Bank Department for Kamchatskaya Oblast	Petrovavlovsk-Kamchatsky	Kamchatskaya Oblast
Tuleev Amanzheby Molsagazyevich	1944	Kazakh	H	N	Unemployed (Former Chairman of the Oblast Council of People's Deputies)	Kemerovo	Kemerovskaya Oblast
Atlanski Alexander Valentinovich	1947	R	H	N	Executive Director of Naasha Gazeta Limited Partnership, Deputy Editor	Osinsky	Kemerovskaya Oblast
Sengonenkov Vladimir Nikolayevich	1938	R	H	N	Head of the Institute of Social and Economic Problems	Kirov	Kirovskaya Oblast
Desyatnikov Vasily Aleksievich	1942	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Kirov	Kirovskaya Oblast
Arbuzov Valery Petrovich	1939	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Kostroma	Kostromskaya Oblast
Kozobov Boris Konstantinovich	1946	R	H	N	Head of Kostroma City Administration	Kostroma	Kostromskaya Oblast
Ovayarnikov Valery Ivanovich	1938	R	H	N	Director of Batuniskoye Experimental Production Enterprise		Kurganskaya Oblast
Bogomolov Oleg Aleksievich	1950	R	H	N	Chairman of the Oblast Council of People's Deputies	Kurgan	Kurganskaya Oblast
Likhachev Vladimir Nikolayevich	1946	R	H	N	Chairman of the Oblast Council of People's Deputies	Kursk	Kurskaya Oblast
Shileev Vasily Ivanovich	1942	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Kursk	Kurskaya Oblast
Belyakov Alexander Semenovich	1945	Kerelian	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	St. Petersburg	Leningradskaya Oblast

Name	DOB	Nationality	Educn	Party	Occupation	Residency	Constituency
Gusov Vadim Anatolievich	1948	R	H	N	Chairman of the Oblast Council of People's Deputies	St Petersburg	Leningradskaya Oblast
Narolin Mikhail Tikhonovich	1933	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Lipetsk	Lipetskaya Oblast
Korolev Oleg Petrovich	1952	R	H	N	Chairman of the Oblast Council of People's Deputies	Lipetsk	Lipetskaya Oblast
Shlyapin Mikhail Alexandrovich	1944	R	UG	N	Head of Magadanregionstroim Construction Company	Magadan	Magadan'skaya Oblast
Tsvetkov Valentin Ivanovich	1948	R	H	N	General Director of Magadanmors Is Company	Magadan	Magadan'skaya Oblast
Tyazhlov Anatoly Stepanovich	1942	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Moscow	Moscow'skaya Oblast
Dolgopletov Anatoly Vasilyevich	1949	R	H	All-Russia Union Obnovlenie	First Deputy of the Head of the Oblast Administration, Co-chairman of the All-Russia Union Obnovlenie	Moscow	Moscow'skaya Oblast
Pobedinskaya Lyudmila Vasilyevna	1949	R	H	N	Staff Manager of the Oblast Administration	Kola	Murmanskaya Oblast
Ievlev Sergei Viktorovich	1965	R	H	N	President of Arkhiveservice Company	Murmansk	Murmanskaya Oblast
Krestyaninov Yevgeny Vladimirovich	1948	R	H	N	Chairman of the Oblast Council of People's Deputies	Nizhny Novgorod	Nizhnegorodskaya Oblast
Nemtsov Boris Yefimovich	1959	R	H	N	Governor of the Oblast	Nizhny Novgorod	Nizhnegorodskaya Oblast
Prusak Mikhail Mikhailovich	1960	U	H	PRES	Head of the Oblast Administration	Novgorod	Novgorod'skaya Oblast
Tsvetkov Alexander Sergeevich	1938	R	H	N	General Director of Kvant Production Association	Novgorod	Novgorod'skaya Oblast
Manamitkov Aleksey Petrovich	1956	R	H	RC (DR)	Unemployed	Novgorod	Novgorod'skaya Oblast
Isidinek Ivan Ivanovich	1938	R	H	N	Acting Head of the Oblast Administration	Novosibirsk	Novosibirskaya Oblast
Polezhaev Leonid Konstantinovich	1940	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Novosibirsk	Novosibirskaya Oblast
Smolin Oleg Nikolayevich	1952	R	H	Labor Party	Senior Lecturer at Omsk Teachers' Training Institute, Chairman of the Labor Party Council	Omsk	Omskaya Oblast
Yelagin Vladimir Vasilyevich	1955	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Omsk	Omskaya Oblast
Gurkhalov Pavel Ivanovich	1939	R	H	N	General Director of Nostra Is Company	Orenburg	Orenburgskaya Oblast
Yepimakhov Alexander Leonidovich	1961	R	H	CP	Teacher at the Mtsensk Metallurgy Technical School	Novotroitsk	Orenburgskaya Oblast
Siroev Yegor Semenovich	1937	R	II	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Mtsensk	Oriovskaya Oblast
Kalaabnikov Alexander Serafimovich	1949	R	H	N	Head of Penza City Administration	Orel	Oriovskaya Oblast
Kovlyagin Anatoly Fedorovich	1938	R	II	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Penza	Penza'skaya Oblast
						Penza	Penza'skaya Oblast

Name	DOB	Nationality	Educn	Party	Occupation	Residency	Constituency
Kovlygin Anatoly Fedorovich	1938	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Penza	Permskaya Oblast
Levitan Sergei Vladimirovich	1963	U	H	N	President of Neotromo Concern	Perm	Permskaya Oblast
Zelenikh Vitaliy Afanasyevich	1944	R	H	N	Director of the Regional Branch of the International Fund of Assistance to Privatization and Foreign Investment	Perm	Permskaya Oblast
Skorenko Vladimir Romanovich	1948	U	H	AP	President of Cherkasskaya Agricultural Company	Pankinsky Raion	Pskovskaya Oblast
Tumanov Vladislav Nikolayevich	1958	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Pskov	Pskovskaya Oblast
Ivanchenko Leonid Andreyevich	1942	R	H	CP	General Director of Svetlana JS Company	Rostov-na-Donu	Rostovskaya Oblast
Chab Vladimir Fedorovich	1948	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Rostov-na-Donu	Rostovskaya Oblast
Lyubimov Vyacheslav Nikolayevich	1947	R	H	CP	Unemployed		Ryazanskaya Oblast
Stroev Yevgeny Alekseyevich	1942	R	H	N	Head of the Ryazan Medical Institute	Ryazan	Ryazanskaya Oblast
Tarasenko Vasily Georgievich	1950	R	H	N	Manager of a Law Firm	Samara	Samarskaya Oblast
Tilov Konstantin Alekseyevich	1944	R	H	RDDR	Head of the Oblast Administration	Samara	Samarskaya Oblast
Ayatkov Dmitry Fedorovich	1950	R	H	N	First Deputy Head of Saratov City Administration	Saratov	Saratovskaya Oblast
Belykh Yuri Vasilyevich	1941	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Saratov	Saratovskaya Oblast
Romanovsky Mikhail Alexandrovich	1947	R	H	N	General Director of Sakhalin JS Shipping Company	Kholmsk	Sakhalinskaya Oblast
Krasovoyarov Yevgeny Alekseyevich	1939	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Yuzhno-sakhalinsk	Sakhalinskaya Oblast
Karelova Galina Nikolayevna	1950	R	H	N	Deputy Chairwoman of the Oblast Council of People's Deputies	Ekerenbourg	Sverdlovskaya Oblast
Rorsel Eduard Ergantovich	1937	German	H	N	President of the Urals Regions and Republics' Association of Economic Cooperation	Ekerenbourg	Sverdlovskaya Oblast
Ghahenkov Anatoly Yegorovich	1942	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Smolensk	Smolenskaya Oblast
Fateev Valery Petrovich	1946	R	H	RC	Deputy Economics Minister of Russia	Moscow	Smolenskaya Oblast
Ryabov Alexander Ivanovich	1936	R	H	N	Chairman of the Oblast Council of People's Deputies	Tambov	Tambovskaya Oblast
Gorbunov Pavel Ivanovich	1946	R	H	CP	General Director of Housing Initiative Company Tambov	Tambov	Tambovskaya Oblast
Rastorguev Valery Nikolayevich	1949	R	H	N	Head of Philosophy Department of Tver University	Tver	Tverskaya Oblast
Suslov Vladimir Antonovich	1939	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Tver	Tverskaya Oblast
Kress Viktor Melkhorovich	1948	German	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Tomsk	Tomskaya Oblast

Name	DOB	Nationality	Ethnic	Party	Occupation	Residency	Constituency
Siarobastser Vasily Alexandrovich	1931	R	H	N	Chairman of the Lenin Cattle Breeding Kolhoz		Tulskaya Oblast
Tikhin Alexander Alekseevich	1948	R	H	N	President of a Financial and Investing Company	Moscow	Tulskaya Oblast
Roketaki Leonid Yulianovich	1942	U	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Tyumen	Tyumen'skaya Oblast
Pavlov Yevgeny Alexandrovich	1947	R	H	N	Former Manager of the Oblast Council of People's Deputies Press Center	Tyumen	Tyumen'skaya Oblast
Yermakov Sergei Nikolayevich	1937	R	H	N	Ulianovsk City Mayor	Ulianovsk	Ulianovskaya Oblast
Gonyachev Yuri Evrolovich	1938	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Ulianovsk	Ulianovskaya Oblast
Elections to be Held on March 26, 1994							Cheliabinskaya Oblast
Elections to be Held on March 26, 1994							Cheliabinskaya Oblast
Dongyallo Alexander Ivanovich	1938	B	H	N	Manager of Zabaikalskaya Railroad	Chita	Chitinskaya Oblast
Kurochkin Viktor Vasilyevich	1954	R	H	DR	Narodnaya Gazeta Editor	Chita	Chitinskaya Oblast
Litvinin Anatoly Ivanovich	1947	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Yaroslavl	Yaroslavl'skaya Oblast
Mizulina Yelena Borisovna	1954	R	H	N	Professor of Criminal Law and Legal Proceedings Department of Yaroslavl University	Yaroslavl	Yaroslavl'skaya Oblast
Chernishenko Yuri Dmitrievich	1929	R	H	Farmers' Party of Russia	Farmers' Party of Russia Chairman, Writer	Moscow	Moscow
Gonechar Nikolai Nikolayevich	1946	R	H	N	Unemployed (Former Chairman of Moscow's Council of People's Deputies)	Moscow	Moscow
Boklyrev Yuri Yurievich	1960	R	H	N	Leading Fellow at the Center of Economic and Political Studies (Epitsenter)	Moscow	St. Petersburg
Belyayev Alexander Nikolayevich	1953	R	H	N	Chairman of St. Petersburg Council of People's Deputies	St. Petersburg	St. Petersburg
Antonov Gennady Alekseevich	1949	R	H	Socialist Workers' Party	Deputy Chairman of the Oblast Council of People's Deputies	Birobidzhan	Yevrey'skaya Avtonomnaya Oblast
Volkov Nikolai Mikhailovich	1951	R	H	N	Head of the Oblast Administration	Birobidzhan	Yevrey'skaya Avtonomnaya Oblast
Ayushiev Boris Vardanovich	1949	Buryat	H	N	Unemployed		Aginsky Buryatsky Autonomous Okrug
Zhambolov Nardak	1950	Buryat	H	N	Chief Physician of a Territorial Medical Association	Mogou Village	Aginsky Buryatsky Autonomous Okrug

Name	DOB	Nationality	Educ	Party	Occupation	Residency	Constituency
Fedorov Anatoly Mikhailovich	1947	R	H	Constitutional Democratic Party (People's Freedom Party)	Member of the Oblast Bar, Lawyer of Kudymkar City Law Consultancy	Kudymkar	Komi-Permyatsky Autonomous Okrug
Vodyanov Mikhail Yuryevich	1957	R	H	N	Physician at a Substance Abuse Clinic	Kudymkar	Komi-Permyatsky Autonomous Okrug
Lezakhin Sergei Gennadyevich	1950	R	H	N	Head of the Okrug Administration	Palana Village	Koryatsky Autonomous Okrug
Olmov Grigory Mikhailovich	1960	Koryak	H	N	Presidential Representative in the Okrug	Palana Village	Koryatsky Autonomous Okrug
Komarov Yury Vladimirovich	1952	R	H	N	Head of the Okrug Administration	Naryan-Mar	Nenetsky Autonomous Okrug
Sablin Leonid Ivanovich	1949	R	H	CP	Manager of the Nenetsky Regional Department of Russia's State Committee for Social and Economic Development of the North	Naryan-Mar	Nenetsky Autonomous Okrug
Filatov Anatoly Vasilyevich	1935	R	H	N	Director of Norilsk Integrated Iron and Steel Works	Norilsk	Taymyrsky Autonomous Okrug
Nedelin Gennady Pavlovich	1938	R	H	N	Head of the Okrug Administration	Dudinka	Taymyrsky Autonomous Okrug
Bugayev Aleksey Nikolayevich	1950	Buryat	H	N	Head of the Okrug Administration	Ust-Ordynsky Village	Ust-Ordinsky Buryatsky Autonomous Okrug
Khalyatun Viktor Nikolaevich	1946	R	H	N	Russia's Minister of Agriculture	Moscow	Ust-Ordinsky Buryatsky Autonomous Okrug
Filipenko Alexander Vasilyevich	1950	R	H	N	Head of the Okrug Administration	Khanti-Mansiisk	Khanti-Mansiysky Autonomous Okrug
Shafrank Yury Konstantinovich	1952	R	H	N	Russia's Minister of Fuel and Power Engineering	Moscow	Khanti-Mansiysky Autonomous Okrug
Elyoniyeva Maya Ivanovna	1940	Chukcha	H	N	Unemployed		Chukotsky Autonomous Okrug
Kotesova Lyudmila Stepanovna	1947	R	H	RC	Justice Department Manager of the Okrug Administration	Anadyr	Chukotsky Autonomous Okrug
Shurov Vladimir Konstantinovich	1948	R	H	N	Head of Baikitsky Raion Administration	Balich Village	Evenkiysky Autonomous Okrug
Uss Alexander Viktorovich	1954	R	H	N	Head of Legal Department of Krasnoyarsky Krai Administration	Krasnoyarsk	Evenkiysky Autonomous Okrug
Korepanov Sergei Evgenyevich	1948	R	H	CP	Office Manager of Gazprom JS Company	Salskhard	Yamalo-Nenetsky Autonomous Okrug
Elections to be held on March 6, 1994							

APPENDIX VI: Deputies of the State Duma (Single Mandate Ballot)

Deputies to the State Duma Elected in Single Seat Constituencies

Name	DOB	Nationality	Edctn	Party	Occupation	Residency	Consty	Territory
Lodnev Valentin Petrovich	1941	R	H	N	Deputy Prime Minister, Social Security Minister of Adygei Republic	Maikop	#1	Adygei republic
Galiev Akhmetgali Mubapagalievich	1950	Bashkir	H	N	Sovkhoz Director	Ufimsky Vil.	#2	Bashkortostan Republic
Mirzaev Ramil Nurpovich	1950	Bashkir	H	N	Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Food in the Republic	Ufa	#3	Bashkortostan
Adzhin Alexander Nikolaevich	1955	R	H	PRES	Head of the Motherland's History and Culture Department of the Ufa Branch of the Consumer Services Academy	Ufa	#4	Bashkortostan
Asaev Rais Bekisigitdinovich	1931	Tatar	H	AP	Kolchoz Chairman	Chishmy	#5	Bashkortostan
Ullin Yuri Vasilyevich	1939	R	H	N	Head of City Administration	Ishumbai	#6	Bashkortostan
Saegaliev Zifkat Islamovich	1947	Bashkir	H	N	Director of Cattle Breeding Research Institute		#7	Bashkortostan
Kondakov Nikolai Yakovlevich	1949	R	H	Social Justice Association	General Director of "Buryatvodmelioratsiya" Engineering, Construction and Operating Association	Ulan-ude	#8	Buryatia Republic
Gvozditov Mikhail Zakharovich	1946	R	H	N	1st Deputy Prime Minister of Altai Republic	Gorno-Altinsk	#9	Altai Republic
Gumblov Gurnid Murafovich	1954	Dargin	H	N	Chairman of Dagestan Saving Bank	Makhachkala	#10	Dagestan Republic
Tolboev Magomed Omarovich	1951	Avar	H	N	Test Pilot at the Aeronautics Research Institute	Zhukovskiy, Moscow Oblast	#11	Dagestan
Montzhan Alexandra Vasilyevna	1949	R	H	N	Vice President of Arts Academy, President of the International Women's Center	Moscow	#12	Inghush Republic
Karmakov Khachim Mukhamedovich	1941	Kabardinian	H	N	Chairman of the Republic's Supreme Soviet	Nalchik	#13	Kabardino-balkarian Republic
Khalitchev Bembya Viktorovich	1957	Kalmyk	H	N	Chairman of the City People's Court	Elista	#14	Kalmyk Republic
Albayev Azret Aliyevich	1939	Karachai	H	N	Chairman of the Republican Culture Fund	Cherkesk	#15	Karachayev-cherkess Republic
Chukhin Ivan Ivanovich	1948	R	H	DR	Police Officer, Lieutenant Colonel, Correspondent of the "Shehit 1 March" Newspaper of the Ministry of Interior	Petrozavodsk	#16	Karelia Republic
Maximov Valery Nikolaevich	1947	R	HS	N	Assistant Director of the Severmaya Mine	Vorkuta	#17	Komi Republic
Gen Nikolai Leonidovich	1958	Komi	H	N	Senior Assistant to the Republic Prosecutor for Special Assignments	Syktuykar	#18	Komi Republic
Popov Anatoly Gennadiyevich	1948	Mari	H	Mari Ushem Democratic Movement, Board Member	Director of a Shoe Factory	Yoshkar-Ola	#19	Mari El Republic
Kartashov Vladimir Petrovich	1941	R	TS	CP	Equipment Adjuster at the "Lisina" Electric Lamp Factory	Saransk	#20	Mordovian Republic

Nationality:
 B Belorussian
 R Russian
 U Ukrainian

Education:
 H Higher Education
 HS High School
 TS Technical School
 UG Undergraduate (partial university education)

Party:
 AP Agrarian Party
 CP Communist Party
 CU Civic Union
 DC Dignity and Charity
 DPR Democratic Party of Russia
 DR Democratic Russia
 FDP Free Democratic Party of Russia

Party:
 LDP Liberal Party
 N Non-Partisan Party
 PEF Party of Economic Freedom
 PRES Russian Party of Unity and Accord
 RC Russia's Choice
 RCDU Russian Christian Democratic Union

Party:
 RMDR Russian Movement for Democratic Reform
 RP Republican Party
 SDP Social Democratic Party
 WR Women of Russia
 Yabloko Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc

Name	DOB	Nationality	Edejn	Party	Occupation	Residency	City	Territory
Zhirkov Yegor Petrovich	1954	Yakut	H	N	Minister of Education of Sakha Republic	YAKUTSK	#21	Sakha (Yakutia) Republic
Dzatsokhov Alexander Sergeevich	1934	Osssetian	H	N	Co-chairman of the International Association for Dialog and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region	Moscow	#22	North Ossetia Republic
Arakchaa Kara-kys Dongakovna	1950	Tuvimian	H	N	Laboratory Manager of the Tuva Section of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences	Kizil	#28	Tuva Republic
Krasnykh Aleksei Ivanovich	1943	R	H	N	Senior Designer of ACS at the Izhevsk Radio Factory	Izhevsk	#29	Udmurt Republic
Vasilyev Mikhail Arkadyevich	1950	Udmurt	H	N	Chairman of the Raion Council	Starikan Village	#30	Udmurt Republic
Mityukov Mikhail Aleksevich	1942	R	H	RC	Chairman of the Presidential Law Drafting Commission, 1st Deputy Minister of Justice of Russia	Abakan	#31	Khakass Republic
Agafonov Valentin Aleksevich	1935	R	H	N	Unemployed	Kanash	#33	Chuvash Republic
Bikalova Nadzheida Alexandrovna	1960	R	H	N	Head of State Property Sales Department of Chuvash Republic	Cheboksary	#34	Chuvash Republic
Sarychev Aleksei Nikolaevich	1956	R	H	RDDR	Assistant Head of Altai Krai Justice Department	Barnaul	#35	Altai Krai
Eftremov Pavel Vasilyevich	1947	R	H	N	Head of Agricultural Department of the Krai Administration - Deputy Head of Krai Administration	Barnaul	#36	Altai Krai
Bessanabov Vladimir Grigoryevich	1954	R	H	N	Head of the Civic Law Enforcement Supervision Section of Altai Krai Prosecutor's Office	Barnaul	#37	Altai Krai
Opentsherev Sergei Pavlovich	1949	R	H	AP	Chairman of the Raion Council	Rodino Village	#38	Altai Krai
Dolgopolev Anatoiy Alexandrovich	1952	R	H	N	Pensioner of the Armed Forces (retired military)	Labinak Town	#39	Krasnodarski Krai
Kochegura Anatoiy Timofeevich	1941	R	H	N	Chairman of the "Privolnoye" JS Company	Privolnoye Village	#40	Krasnodarski Krai
Glotov Sergei Alexandrovich	1959	R	H	N	Senior Instructor at Krasnodar Rocket Artillery Engineering College	Krasnodar	#41	Krasnodarski Krai
Zatsupina Nina Andreivna	1948	R	H	N	Director of Anapa Training Center for Trade Unions' Health Restor Personnel	Anapa	#42	Krasnodarski Krai
Kirili Peter Yakovlevich	1940	R	H	AP	Chairman of an Agricultural Enterprise	Chebargol Village	#43	Krasnodarski Krai
Vervetko Nadzheida Aleksevna	1953	R	H	N	Raion Law Consultancy Manager	Novopokrovskaya Village	#44	Krasnodarski Krai
Boiko Vladimir Anatolevich	1965	R	H	N	Journalist at "Sochi" Newspaper, Director of Information and Advertising Agency "V.Boiko Yug-Infom"	Sochi	#45	Krasnodarski Krai
Zhurko Vasily Vasilyevich	1963	R	HS	LDP	Bus Driver	Achinsk	#46	Krasnoyarski Krai
Kolinakov Valery Agafonovich	1946	R	H	N	Head of City Police Department	Norilsk	#47	Krasnoyarski Krai

Name	DOB	Nationality	Edcm	Party	Occupation	Residency	Crsty	Territory
Yaroshenko Anatoly Ivanovich	1937	U	H	AP	Director of a JS Company	Bolshaya Urza Village	#48	Krasnoyarski Krai
Tikhonov Vladimir Ageyevich	1938	R	H	N	Unemployed		#49	Krasnoyarski Krai
Nesterenko Valery Ivanovich	1945	U	H	DPR	Director of a National Park	Spassk-dalny	#50	Primorski Krai
Ghubokovsky Mikhail Konstantinovich	1948	R	H	YABLOKO	Laboratory Manager of the Sea Biology Institute of the Far East Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences	Vladivostok	#51	Primorski Krai
Ustinov Igor Gvenilovich	1935	R	H	N	Chairman of the Free Economic Zone Administrative Committee	Nakhodka	#52	Primorski Krai
Borodin Viktor Ivanovich	1950	R	H	N	Head of City and Raion Administration	Georgievsk	#53	Stavropol'ski Krai
Katrenko Vladimir Semenovich	1956	R	H	N	General Director of "Sovtrazsveto" JS Company	Mintzhalny Vody	#54	Stavropol'ski Krai
Moroz Vasily Andreyevich	1937	R	H	AP	Director of All Russia Sheep and Goat-breeding Research Institute	Stavropol	#55	Stavropol'ski Krai
Trasov Alexander Mikhailovich	1956	R	H	N	Lawyer of the Inter-republican Bar, Lawyer at a Local Law Firm	Stavropol	#56	Stavropol'ski Krai
Brylshev Vladimir Ivanovich	1959	R	H	RC	Private Detective	Komomol'sk-na-aznare	#57	Khabarovski Krai
Podmaako Valery Borisovich	1958	R	H	N	Deputy Chairman of the Krai State Property Fund	Khabarovsk	#58	Khabarovski Krai
Zakharov Andrei Alexandrovich	1961	R	H	N	Teacher at a Polytechnic Institute	Blagoveshchensk	#59	Amurskaya Oblast
Shalgin Sergei Nikolaevich	1956	R	H	N	President of the "Gardvibank" Economic Development Bank	Arhangel	#60	Arhangel Oblast
Plakunov Alexander Alexandrovich	1951	R	H	N	Armed Forces, Councillor to the First Deputy Minister of Defence	Mirny	#61	Arhangel Oblast
Vinogradov Vladimir Vladimirovich	1961	R	H	N	Acting Assistant Professor of History and Political Department of Astrakhan Teachers' Training Institute	Astrakhan	#62	Astrakhan Oblast
Berestovoi Viktor Ivanovich	1948	R	H	N	Unemployed	Belgorod	#63	Belgorod Oblast
Zanai Boris Ivanovich	1959	R	H	N	Judge at Belgorod Oblast Court	Belgorod	#64	Belgorod Oblast
Voronov Anatoly Evgenievich	1933	R	H	AP	Kolhoz Chairman	Gkinshchevo Village	#65	Bryansk Oblast
Shenkarov Oleg Alexandrovich	1947	R	H	CP	Senior Instructor at Bryansk Transport Machine Building Institute	Bryansk	#66	Bryansk Oblast
Churkin Gennady Ivanovich	1937	R	H	AP	Director of a JS Company	Vladimir	#67	Vladimirskaya Oblast
Buchenkov Evgeny Viktorovich	1938	R	H	CP	Director of a Pedigree Stock Breeding Company	Mezhsichy Village	#68	Vladimirskaya Oblast
Nikitin Valery Alexandrovich	1944	R	H	N	Head of City's Education Department	Boitzy City	#69	Volgogradskaya Oblast
Kosikh Vladimir Ivanovich	1950	R	H	N	Head of Criminal Police Service of the City Police Department	Volgograd	#70	Volgogradskaya Oblast
Plotnikov Vladimir Nikolaevich	1961	R	H	N	Chief Agriculturist at a Collective Farm	Gusevka	#71	Volgogradskaya Oblast

Name	DOB	Nationality	Educn	Party	Occupation	Residency	Conty	Territory
Lukashov Igor Lvovich	1955	R	H	SDP	Deputy of the Smaller Regional Council of People's Deputies	Vologda	#72	Vologodskaya Oblast
Leis Tamara Il'inichna	1939	U	H	N	Assistant Chief Physician at Vologda Regional Hospital	Vologda	#73	Vologodskaya Oblast
Kovalev Vadly Nikolaevich	1960	R	H	N	First Deputy Head of the Oblast Administration	Chepovels	#74	Vologodskaya Oblast
Parinov Nikolai Vasilievich	1947	R	H	N	General Director of "Sad" Agricultural Firm	Novozhebninskiy Village	#75	Voronezhskaya Oblast
Davydov Viktor Aleksievich	1945	R	H	RC	Presidential Representative in Voronezhskaya Oblast	Voronezh	#76	Voronezhskaya Oblast
Matyasov Peter Ivanovich	1942	R	H	N	First Deputy Head of Raion Administration, Head of the Raion Agricultural Department	Pavlovsk	#77	Voronezhskaya Oblast
Muravyev Igor Vladislavovich	1960	R	H	All-Russia Union Obzovleniye	Political Counsellor to the "All-Russia Pure Stimul" Civic Organization	Voronezh	#78	Voronezhskaya Oblast
Zelenkin Viktor Vasilievich	1947	R	H	RC	Chairman of the City Council of People's Deputies	Ivanovo	#79	Ivanovskaya Oblast
Zenkun Sergei Antonievich	1960	R	H	N	Teacher at Ivanovo University	Ivanovo	#80	Ivanovskaya Oblast
Mishinsky Viktor Leonidovich	1949	R	H	N	General Director of "Byskalt" JS Company	Angarsk	#81	Irkutskaya Oblast
Shiba Vitaliy Borisovich	1951	R	H	N	Chairman of the City Council of People's Deputies	Bratsk	#82	Irkutskaya Oblast
Tem Yury Mikhailovich	1951	Korean	H	CU	President of "Trud" JS Company	Irkutsk	#83	Irkutskaya Oblast
Tunusin Anatoly Afanasievich	1934	R	H	N	Head of Raion Administration	Nizhnedinsk	#84	Irkutskaya Oblast
Voevoda Yury Evgenievich	1951	R	H	RDDR	Senior Assistant Procurator of the Baltic Fleet, Head of General Oversight Department	Kaliningrad	#85	Kaliningradskaya Oblast
Burakov Pavel Imofievich	1947	R	H	N	Sovkhoz Director	Kulibsherskiy Raion	#86	Khabarovskaya Oblast
Pamfilova Ella Alexandrovna	1953	R	H	RC (N)	Social Security Minister of Russia	Moscow	#87	Khabarovskaya Oblast
Lezdinsh Ayvurs Yanovich	1952	Latvian	H	N	Director of a Small Enterprise	Petrozavlovsk-Kamchatski	#88	Kamchatkaya Oblast
Parshenatova Galina Vasil'yevna	1951	R	H	N	Assistant Head of Social Security Department of the Oblast Administration	Kemerovo	#89	Kemerovskaya Oblast
Burkov Sergei Vasilievich	1956	R	H	N	Counsellor on Economics to the Oblast Council of People's Deputies	Kemerovo	#90	Kemerovskaya Oblast
Meditov Viktor Yakovlevich	1950	R	H	N	Professor at the Economics and Organization of Metallurgy Production Department of the Siberian Metallurgy Institute	Novouzenskiy	#91	Kemerovskaya Oblast
Volkova Nina Veniaminovna	1941	R	H	N	Director of a JS Company	Prokopiysk	#92	Kemerovskaya Oblast
Vakulenko Mikhail Yuryevich	1964	R	H	LDP	High School Teacher	Kirov	#93	Kirovskaya Oblast

Name	DOB	Nationality	Educn	Party	Occupation	Residency	County	Territory
Agstonov Yegor Andreyevich	1941	R	H	N	Head of the Agricultural Department of the Oblast Administration	Kliov	#94	Kliovskaya Oblast
Puzanovsky Adriaan Georgievich	1942	R	H	N	Head of the Management, Marketing and Law Department of the Kostroma Agricultural Institute	Kostroma	#95	Kostromskaya Oblast
Bezborodov Nikolai Maksimovich	1944	R	H	N	Air Force	Kurgan	#96	Kurganskaya Oblast
Kaizistratov Gennady Stepanovich	1940	R	H	N	Assistant Department Manager at "Energeticheskiye Sety Rossi" JS Company	Moscow	#97	Kurganskaya Oblast
Mikhailov Alexander Nikolayevich	1951	R	H	CP	Unemployed	Korsik	#98	Kurskaya Oblast
Pozdnenko Alexander Fedorovich	1958	B	H	CP	Manager of a Railway Car Shop	Lgov	#99	Kurskaya Oblast
Sokolov Yuri Vasilyevich	1938	R	H	N	Chairman of the City Council of People's Deputies	Toono	#100	Leningradskaya Oblast
Fedorov Evgeny Aleksievich	1963	R	H	RDDR	Armed Forces	Vyborgsky District	#101	Leningradskaya Oblast
Repkin Viktor Pavlovich	1938	R	H	N	Head of the Agricultural Department of the Oblast Administration	Lipetsk	#102	Lipetskaya Oblast
Chepasova Tamara Eduardovna	1950	R	H	N	Head of the Lipetsk Territorial Department of the State Anti-monopoly Committee	Lipetsk	#103	Lipetskaya Oblast
Kokorev Evgeny Mikhailovich	1940	R	H	N	President of the International Pedagogical Institute	Magadan	#104	Magadan'skaya Oblast
Muraviev Amir Aleksevich	1965	R	H	N	Lawyer at Klin City Law Consultancy	Klin	#105	Moscow'skaya Oblast
Gaboyev Vladimir Nikolayevich	1943	Osetian	H	DR	Psychiatrist at Krasnogorsk Reion Hospital	Krasnogorsk	#106	Moscow'skaya Oblast
Skorobkin Sergei Grigorievich	1961	R	HS	N	General Director of a Limited Partnership	Zarysk	#107	Moscow'skaya Oblast
Guskov Anatoly Vladimirovich	1948	R	UG	Russia's Party of Free Labor	President of "Ramen'skoye" Maintenance and Construction Association	Ramen'skoye	#108	Moscow'skaya Oblast
Ayzdentzis Andrei Daynisovich	1958	R	TS	N	Chairman of the Board of "MDK Bank", Chairman of the Board of Directors of the International Business Corporation	Khimki	#109	Moscow'skaya Oblast
Solyayev Nikolai Sergeievich	1947	B	H	N	Chairman of "Soglasiey (Agreement)" Public Council of Economic and Moral Support of Servicemen, Dean of Higher School at the International University	Moscow	#110	Moscow'skaya Oblast
Lukin Vladimir Petrovich	1937	R	H	YABLOKO (N)	Former Russian Ambassador to the United States		#111	Moscow'skaya Oblast
Kvarov Vladimir Petrovich	1936	R	H	N	Chief of Staff of Russia's Government	Moscow	#112	Moscow'skaya Oblast
Bondarev Grigory Semenovich	1946	R	H	YABLOKO	Secretary of the Presidential Law Drafting Commission	Podolsk	#113	Moscow'skaya Oblast

Name	DOB	Nationality	Educ	Party	Occupation	Residency	Conty	Territory
Zhirinovskiy Vladimir Volkovich	1946	R	H	LDP	LDP/PR Chairman	Moscow	#114	Moscowskaya Oblast (Sverdlovskiy Raion)
Manamnikov Vladimir Nikolayevich	1947	R	H	RC	Member of the Presidential Law Drafting Commission	Moscow	#115	Murmanskaya Oblast
Kozyrev Andrei Vladimirovich	1951	R	H	RC	Foreign Minister	Moscow	#116	Murmanskaya Oblast
Tsypin Alexander Ivanovich	1943	R	H	N	Deputy General Director for Personnel of Gaz JS Company	Nizhni Novgorod	#117	Nizhnegorodskaya Oblast
Voronov Sergei Vasilyevich	1967	R	H	N	Emisary of Nizhnegorodskaya Oblast to Russia's Government	Nizhni Novgorod	#118	Nizhnegorodskaya Oblast
Sealavinsky Mikhail Vladimovich	1964	R	H	N	Chairman of Russia's Union of Culture Workers	Dzerzhinsk	#119	Nizhnegorodskaya Oblast
Bulavov Vadim Evgenyevich	1963	R	H	N	Lawyer at the Oblast Bar	Nizhni Novgorod	#120	Nizhnegorodskaya Oblast
Chertovitskaya Tatiana Vladimirovna	1948	R	H	N	Director of Russian Povolzhye Institute of Manuscripts and Old Books	Nizhni Novgorod	#121	Nizhnegorodskaya Oblast
Bushimov Evgeny Viktorovich	1938	R	H	N	Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the "Nizhnegorodskaya Yarmarka" Voucher Investment Fund	Nizhni Novgorod	#122	Nizhnegorodskaya Oblast
Ochlin Oleg Fedorovich	1950	R	H	N	General Director of the "Internervice" Program Management Center	Novgorod	#123	Novgorodskaya Oblast
Kharitonov Nikolai Mikhailovich	1948	R	H	AP	Director of a JS Company	Moskovskiy Raion	#124	Novosibirskaya Oblast
Anishkin Ivan Stepanovich	1938	U	H	DC	General Director of the "Oksid" Production Association	Novosibirsk	#125	Novosibirskaya Oblast
Lipitskiy Vasily Semenovich	1947	R	H	People's Party of Free Russia	Deputy Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Social and Political Studies	Moscow	#126	Novosibirskaya Oblast
Starikov Ivan Valentinovich	1960	R	H	N	Director of Agricultural JS Company		#127	Novosibirskaya Oblast
Zharov Oleg Yuryevich	1954	R	H	N	Director of a JS Company	Omsk	#128	Omnskaya Oblast
Lodkov Viktor Nikolayevich	1946	R	H	N	Chief of the Oblast Police Force	Omsk	#129	Omnskaya Oblast
Baburin Sergei Nikolayevich	1959	R	H	Russia's People Union	Dean of the Law School at Omak University	Omak	#130	Omnskaya Oblast
Chernyshev Aleksei Andreyevich	1939	R	H	N	Deputy Agriculture Minister of Russia	Moscow	#131	Orenburgskaya Oblast
Zlotnikova Tamara Vladimirovna	1951	R	H	Russia's Ecological Union	Chairwoman of the Standing Commission of the Oblast Council of People's Deputies on Ecology and Natural Resources	Orenburg	#132	Orenburgskaya Oblast
Volkov Vladimir Nikolayevich	1948	R	H	CP	Secondary School History Teacher	Orsk	#133	Orenburgskaya Oblast
Voropyshev Alexander Ivanovich	1949	R	H	N	General Director of APK Production and Commerce Center in Orlovskaya Oblast	Orsk	#134	Orlovskaya Oblast

Name	DOB	Nationality	Educn	Party	Occupation	Residency	Consty	Territory
Goryshev Valery Sergeevich	1952	R	H	RP	Lawyer at the Oblast Bar	Penza	#135	Permskaya Oblast
Iyukhin Viktor Ivanovich	1949	R	H	CP	Political Correspondent for the Newspaper Pravda	Moscow	#136	Permskaya Oblast
Kravtsov Vladimir Ivanovich	1948	U	H	N	Director of Iron Ore Department of the "Uralskiy" JS Company	Berezniki	#137	Permskaya Oblast
Pavlov Mikhail Alekseevich	1935	R	H	N	Kolhoz Chairman		#138	Permskaya Oblast
Zelenin Vladimir Mikhailovich	1936	R	H	CP	Department Head at the Perm Agricultural Institute	Perm	#139	Permskaya Oblast
Pokornelkin Viktor Valerievich	1960	R	H	RC	Sciences Manager of a Private Research Institute of Law Politics	Perm	#140	Permskaya Oblast
Mikhailov Evgeny Eduardovich	1963	R	H	LDP	Deputy Chief Editor of the Newspaper Pravda Zhirinovskogo	Moscow	#141	Pykovskaya Oblast
Ponomarev Sergei Alexandrovich	1956	R	H	Socialist Worker's Party	Chairman of a Collective Farm Board		#142	Rostovskaya Oblast
Danchenko Boris Ivanovich	1947	R	H	N	Head of Agricultural Department of the Raion Administration	Kashirsky Raion	#143	Rostovskaya Oblast
Amelina Alia Leonidovna	1952	R	H	N	Deputy Chief Editor of the Vecherny Rostov Newspaper	Rostov-na-Donu	#144	Rostovskaya Oblast
Bratishev Igor Mikhailovich	1938	R	H	CP	Head of a Department at Rostov Railroad University	Rostov-na-Donu	#145	Rostovskaya Oblast
Rodionov Yury Nikolayevich	1938	R	H	N	Deputy Chief Military Inspector of Russia, Three Star General	Moscow	#146	Tugulurug, Rostovskaya Oblast
Bergelov Ivan Mikhailovich	1938	R	H	CP	Mine Administration Official	Shakhty	#147	Rostovskaya Oblast
Laykum Konstantin Emilyevich	1957	R	H	N	Director of a Limited Partnership	Ryazan	#148	Ryazanskaya Oblast
Yentov Sergei Alekseevich	1949	R	H	AP	Deputy Chairman of the Oblast Committee of the APK (Agricultural and Industrial Complex) Workers' Union	Ryazan	#149	Ryazanskaya Oblast
Gusarova Galina Ivanovna	1947	R	H	WR	Chairwoman of the Family, Maternity and Childhood Committee of the Oblast Administration	Samara	#150	Samarskaya Oblast
Chaikanov Nikolai Alexandrovich	1940	R	H	N	Head of the Samara New Economic Studies Fund	Samara	#151	Samarskaya Oblast
Rozhkova Lyubov Petrovna	1947	R	H	N	Department Head at Samara University	Samara	#152	Samarskaya Oblast
Gusarov Evgeny Alexandrovich	1951	R	H	N	President of JS Company	Syzran	#153	Samarskaya Oblast
Smirnov Vyacheslav Mikhailovich	1953	R	H	N	Chairman of the "Lada Bank" JS Commercial Bank of Social Development	Togliati	#154	Samarskaya Oblast
Sergeenkov Alexander Nikolayevich	1955	R	H	DR	Deputy Chairman of the City Administration Temporary Committee on the Reform of Local Representative and Executive Bodies	Balakhovo	#155	Saratovskaya Oblast
Dorovikhin Andrei Mikhailovich	1965	R	H	LDP	Director of the "Decision" Law Enterprise	Balakhovo	#156	Saratovskaya Oblast

Name	DOB	Nationality	Educn	Party	Occupation	Residency	Chsky	Territory
Gonteyev Anatoly Nikolayevich	1954	R	H	CP	1st Vice-president, Executive Director of the "Germes" Saratov Regional Trading and Production Association	Saratov	#157	Saratovskaya Oblast
Lysemko Nikolai Nikolayevich	1961	R	H	National Republican Party of Russia	National Republican Party Chairman	St. Petersburg	#158	Saratovskaya Oblast
Treyak Boris Nikolovich	1938	U	H	N	"Sakhalincoifrazrazvedka" Trust Manager	Ocha	#159	Sakhalinskaya Oblast
Tokareva Tamara Petrovna	1940	R	H	Peasants' Party of Russia	Chairwoman of the Land Commission of the Oblast Council of People's Deputies	Ekaterinburg	#160	Sverdlovskaya Oblast
Mikhailina Larisa Pavlovna	1949	R	H	RC	Chairwoman of the Glasnost Commission of the Oblast Council of People's Deputies	Ekaterinburg	#161	Sverdlovskaya Oblast
Milchev Sergei Vladimirovich	1955	R	H	N	Secondary School Director	Sukhoy Log	#162	Sverdlovskaya Oblast
Veyer Amur Pavlovich	1947	German	H	N	Deputy Head of the City Administration	Nizhni Tagil	#163	Sverdlovskaya Oblast
Brunastin Yuri Alexandrovich	1946	R	H	N	Head of the Kirovsky Raion Administration	Ekaterinburg	#164	Sverdlovskaya Oblast
Nekrasov Leonid Vasilyevich	1958	R	H	Party of Economic Freedom	Manager of the "Ester Bank"	Ekaterinburg	#165	Sverdlovskaya Oblast
Selivanov Andrei Vladimirovich	1967	R	UG	N	Chairman of the Youth Committee of the City Administration	Krasnoturinsk	#166	Sverdlovskaya Oblast
Balshayev Vyacheslav Efimovich	1950	R	H	AP	General Director of a JS Company	Safonovo	#167	Smolenskaya Oblast
Lukyanov Anatoly Ivanovich	1930	R	H	CP	Pensioner	Moscow	#168	Smolenskaya Oblast
Ponomarev Aleksei Alekseevich	1942	R	H	CP	Unemployed	Mikhailinsk	#169	Tambovskaya Oblast
Pletneva Tamara Vasilyevna	1947	German	H	CP	Director of a Boarding School	Inzhavino Village	#170	Tambovskaya Oblast
Bayunov Vladimir Alexandrovich	1952	R	H	CP	Director of Farmers' Association	Bezhesk	#171	Tverskaya Oblast
Astrakhanina Tatiana Alexandrovna	1960	R	H	CP	Journalist for the Newspaper Rzhnevskaya Pravda	Rzhev	#172	Tverskaya Oblast
Bauer Vladimir Anatolyevich	1946	German	H	RC	Deputy Head of the Oblast Administration	Tonsk	#173	Tomskaya Oblast
Sulatskhir Stepan Stepanovich	1954	R	H	RP (DR)	Presidential Representative in the Oblast	Tomsk	#174	Tomskaya Oblast
Vasilyev Vladimir Alexandrovich	1936	R	H	N	Director of the Novomoskovsk Branch of Russia's Chemical Engineering Institute	Novomoskovsk	#175	Tul'skaya Oblast
Pastukhenco Eduard Alexandrovich	1939	R	H	N	Manager of Tula Universal Regional Exchange, Consultant to the Head of Oblast Administration	Tula	#176	Tul'skaya Oblast

Name	DOB	Nationality	Educn	Party	Occupation	Residency	Casty	Territory
Bogdanova Elena Mikhailovna	1955	R	H	AP	Chief Forest Warden of Tula Experimental Forest	Tula	#177	Tulskaya Oblast
Shkuro Stanislav Ivanovich	1948	U	H	N	Director of a State Experimental Enterprise	Zavodoukovsk	#178	Tyumenetskaya Oblast
Trushnikov Alexander Khristoforovich	1948	R	H	N	Journalist for Regional TV Company	Tyumen	#179	Tyumenetskaya Oblast
Sychev Valery Alexandrovich	1960	R	H	N	Deputy Head of the Oblast Administration, Chairman of Public-state Youth Committee	Ulianovsk	#180	Ulianovskaya Oblast
Zhadanova Lyudmila Alexandrovna	1950	R	H	N	Chief Pediatrician at the City Children's Hospital	Ulianovsk	#181	Ulianovskaya Oblast
Grigoriyev Vladimir Stilianovich	1949	R	H	N	Unemployed	Zlatoust	#182	Cheljabinskaya Oblast
Golovlev Vladimir Ivanovich	1957	R	H	RC	Chairman of the Oblast State Property Management Committee	Chelyabinsk	#183	Cheljabinskaya Oblast
Kushnir Alexander Leonidovich	1954	U	H	RC	President of the Union of Leaseholders and Entrepreneurs of the Urals	Chelyabinsk	#184	Cheljabinskaya Oblast
Pochinok Alexander Petrovich	1958	R	H	RC	Deputy Finance Minister of Russia	Moscow	#185	Cheljabinskaya Oblast
Utkin Vladimir Petrovich	1950	R	H	N	Unemployed		#186	Cheljabinskaya Oblast
Surenkov Vladimir Sidorovich	1948	R	H	N	Executive Director of "Zabaykalskoye" Association	Chita	#187	Chitinskaya Oblast
Martidonov Sergei Alexandrovich	1961	R	H	N	Chairman of the Oblast Property Fund	Chita	#188	Chitinskaya Oblast
Tubkovskaya Evgenia Leonidovna	1948	R	H	N	Designer-engineer of "Yaroslavlnefteorgsintez" JS Company	Yaroslavl	#189	Yaroslavl'skaya Oblast
Greshnevnikov Anatoly Nikolayevich	1956	R	H	Russia's Union of Culture Workers	Writer	Borisoglebsky Village	#190	Yaroslavl'skaya Oblast
Nlancevich Yuly Anatolyevich	1951	Jewish	H	DR	Deputy General Director of a JV Company	Moscow	#191	Moscow
Kovalev Sergei Adamovich	1930	R	H	RC	Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Human Rights	Moscow	#192	Moscow
Zhdanovskiy Georgiy Ivanovich	1940	R	H	DR	Department Manager at the Ministry of Labor	Moscow	#193	Moscow
Khakumada Irina Muzumovna	1955	R	H	Party of Economic Freedom	Expert at Russia's Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange	Moscow	#194	Moscow
Mironov Viktor Fimionovich	1948	R	H	N	Head of the Chief Oversight Department of the Mayor's Office	Moscow	#195	Moscow
Volkov Andrei Romanovich	1961	R	H	N	Consultant to "Servolvest" Company	Moscow	#196	Moscow
Onorov Alexander Avramovich	1957	R	H	RC (DR)	College Dean, Professor at the International University	Moscow	#197	Moscow
Zaitkov Alexander Dmitrievich	1956	R	H	DC	Vice-president of the Avtostratoexport Foreign Trade Company	Moscow	#198	Moscow

Name	DOB	Nationality	Ethnic	Party	Occupation	Residency	Chady	Territory
Gerber Alla Efreimovna	1932	Jewish	H	RC	Writer, Journalist	Moscow	#199	Moscow
Vlasov Yuri Petrovich	1935	R	H	N	President of the Pushkin Academy	Moscow	#200	Moscow
Braginskiy Alexander Pavlovich	1948	R	H	RDDR	Deputy Premier of Moscow's Government	Moscow	#201	Moscow
Tarsov Artem Mikhailovich	1950	R	H	N	Employee of Kemore Service Ltd	Moscow	#202	Moscow
Makarov Andrei Mikhailovich	1954	R	H	RC	Russia's Choice Executive Committee Member	Moscow	#203	Moscow
Medvedev Pavel Aleksievich	1940	R	H	N	Expert in the Presidential Expert Group	Moscow	#204	Moscow
Fedorov Boris Grigorievich	1958	R	H	RC (N)	Finance Minister of Russia	Moscow	#205	Moscow
Savitskiy Vitaliy Viktorovich	1955	R	H	RCDU	Fellow at St Petersburg University	St Petersburg	#206	St Petersburg
Kiselev Mikhail Mikhailovich	1964	R	UG	N	Fellow at the Institute of National Economic Model	St Petersburg	#207	St Petersburg
Rysakov Yuly Andreevich	1946	R	HS	FDP	Deputy of the City's Council of People's Deputies, Human Rights Commission Chairman	St Petersburg	#208	St Petersburg
Alexandrov Alekssei Ivanovich	1952	R	H	RC	Lawyer on the City Bar	St Petersburg	#209	St Petersburg
Nezvorov Alexander Glebovich	1958	R	TS	Russian National Sobor	TV Journalist, Chief Editor of the NTK-600 Program	St Petersburg	#210	St Petersburg
Yegorov Alexander Kiryanovich	1954	R	H	N	Chairman of the Standing Planning and Budget Commission of the City's Council of People's Deputies	St Petersburg	#211	St Petersburg
Popov Sergei Anatolyevich	1960	R	H	N	President of the Commercial Bank Association	St Petersburg	#212	St Petersburg
Goryachev Mark Leonidovich	1954	R	TS	N	President of "Goryachev" Concern	St Petersburg	#213	St Petersburg
Biryukov Anatoly Mikhailovich	1947	R	H	AP	Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the APK Trade Union	Moscow	#214	Yevreykaya Avtonomnaya Oblast
Zhamsuev Baii Bayasthalanovich	1959	Buryat	H	N	Emissary of the Aginsky Buryatsky Autonomous Okrug to the President of Russia	Moscow	#215	Aginsky Buryatsky Autonomous Okrug
Vlasova Anna Petrovna	1941	Komi-penmyak	H	WR	Chairwoman of the Committee of Economy of the Okrug Administration	Kudymkar	#216	Komi-Penmyatsky Autonomous Okrug
Popov Mikhail Ivanovich	1942	Koryak	H	N	Koryak Laboratory Manager of the Institute of Ethnic Education Problems of the Ministry of Education of Russia	Pulana Village	#217	Koryatsky Autonomous Okrug
Chaligatov Arun Nikolayevich	1939	Armenian	H	All-Russian Union Obshchestvo	President of Polar Explorer Association	Moscow	#218	Nenetsky Autonomous Okrug
Vasilev Alexander Gerasimovich	1948	R	H	N	First Deputy Head of the City Administration	Dudinka	#219	Taymyrsky Autonomous Okrug

Name	DOB	Nationality	Edeth	Party	Occupation	Residency	Chsty	Territory
Bokholov Sergei Semenovich	1950	Buryat	H	N	Chief Consultant and Counsellor to the Constitutional Court of Russia	Moscow	#220	Ust-Ordinsky Buryatsky Autonomous Okrug
Medvedev Vladimir Sergeievich	1943	R	H	N	President of the Oil Industry Entrepreneurs Union	Tyumen	#221	Khanti-Mansiysky Autonomous Okrug
Ajpin Erenpey Danilovich	1948	Khanti	H	RC	Presidential Representative in Khanti-mansiysky Autonomous Okrug	Khanti-Mansiisk	#222	Khanti-Mansiysky Autonomous Okrug
Nestzerenko Tatiana Gerasimovna	1959	R	H	N	Deputy Head of the Okrug Administration, Financial Department Manager	Asasir	#223	Chukotsky Autonomous Okrug
Gayvalsky Viktor Ivanovich	1937	Evenk	H	N	Director of Reindeer Breeding Collective Farm		#224	Evenkiysky Autonomous Okrug
Goman Vladimir Vladimirovich	1932	U	H	N	Mayor of Nadim City and Nadim Raion	Nadim	#225	Yamal-Nenetsky Autonomous Okrug

APPENDIX VII: Deputies of the State Duma (Party List Ballot)

Deputies to the State Duma Elected on the Communist Party List

Name	DOB	Nationality	Education	Party	Occupation	Residency
Zyuganov Gennady Andreyevich	1944	R	H	CP	Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party	Moscow
Sevast'yanov Vitaly Ivanovich	1935	R	H	CP	Astronaut, Deputy Department Manager of the NPO Energiya	Moscow
Chikin Valentin Vasilyevich	1932	R	H	CP	Chief Editor of Sovetskaya Rossiya Newspaper	Moscow
Martemyanov Valentin Semenovich	1932	R	H	CP	Department Head at the Moscow Law Academy	Moscow
Ionov Anatoly Vasilyevich	1946	R	HS	CP	Worker at Ryazan Instrument Building Plant	Ryazan
Seleznev Gennady Nikolayevich	1947	R	H	CP	Vice President of Pravda International JS Company, Member of the Editorial Board of Pravda	Moscow
Samogo Vladimir Vladimirovich	1947	R	H	CP	General Director of a Joint Venture	Moscow
Taiko Kazbek Aslanbechevich	1935	Adygei	H	CP	Economics Department Head at Adygei State University	Maykop
Severina Yury Konstantinovich	1935	R	H	CP	General Director of Leningradobrestroy Construction and Assembling Association	St Petersburg
Zorkaitsev Victor Ilyich	1936	R	H	CP	Unemployed	
Kovalev Valentin Alekseyevich	1944	R	H	N (CP list)	Professor at Law Institute of the Ministry of Interior	Moscow
Mironov Oleg Orestovich	1939	R	H	CP	Professor of Constitutional Law Department at Saratov Law Institute	Saratov
Krasnitsky Evgeny Sergeyevich	1951	R	HS	CP	Secretary of Communications and Informatics Standing Commission of the City Council	St Petersburg
Zaytsev Alexander Nikolayevich	1953	R	H	N (CP list)	Armed Forces	Moscow
Ivanov Yury Pavlovich	1944	R	H	CP	Lawyer, Member of the Moscow Oblast Bar	Moscow
Costev Ruslan Georgievich	1945	R	H	CP	Professor at Voronezh Teacher's Training Institute	Voronezh
Bokov Vladimir Anatolevich	1927	R	H	CP	Unemployed	
Nikitin Valentin Ivanovich	1948	U	H	CP	Head of the State Inspectorate on the Quality of Consumer Servicing in Bashkortostan	Ufa
Korotkin Evgeny Alekseyevich	1949	R	H	CP	Sector Manager at the Mordovian Supreme Soviet	Saratov
Shevelukha Victor Stepanovich	1929	U	H	CP	Secretary Academician at the Department of Plant Growing and Selection at the Russian Academy of Agriculture	Moscow
Filimonov Vadim Doratovich	1931	R	H	CP	Head of the Criminal Law Department at Tomsk State University	Tomsk
Keshalsky Sergey Nikolayevich	1951	R	H	CP	Unemployed	

Deputies to the State Duma Elected on the Agrarian Party List

Name	DOB	Nationality	Education	Party	Occupation	Residency
Lapshin Mikhail Ivanovich	1934	R	H	AP	President of the Lemin's Prepeps JS Company, AP Chairman	Moscow Oblast Dubovo Village
Davydov Alexander Semenovich	1932	R	H	AP	Chairman of the Central Committees of the Agroproom Trade Union of Russia	Moscow
Zaverynkha Alexander Kharlampiyevich	1940	U	H	N (AP List)	Deputy Chairman of Russia's Cabinet	Moscow
Nazarbyuk Alexander Grigoryevich	1939	U	H	AP	Chairman of the Agroproom Union	Barnaul
Abdulbasitov Magomedtaghir Medzhidovich	1935	Avar	H	AP	Russia's Committee on Food and Food Processing Industry Chairman	Moscow
Klochikov Igor Yevgeniyevich	1939	R	H	N (AP List)	Chairman of the Board of Solidarnost Bank	Moscow
Rybkin Ivan Petrovich	1946	R	H	AP	Deputy Head of the Water Resources Department of the Agricultural Ministry	Moscow
Dyudiyayev Gennady Timofeyevich	1947	R	H	AP	Chairman of the Agrarian Union of Kemerovo Oblast	Kemerovo Oblast Leninsk-Kuznetskiy City
Bystrov Sergei Nikolayevich	1937	R	H	AP	Deputy of the Economics Department of the NPO Stavropolye	Stavropol'skiy Krai Sipakovskoye Village
Kotov Nikolai Saveliyevich	1936	R	H	AP	General Director of the Kuban JS Company	Krasnodarski Krai Bereznovskaya Village
Isakov Vladimir Borisovich	1950	R	H	N (AP List)	Professor at the Ural's State Academy of Law	Ekaterinburg
Medemsov Gennady Alexandrovich	1936	R	H	AP	Regional Committee Chairman of the Agroproom Trade Union	Volgograd
Mikhailov Alexander Dmitriyevich	1929	R	H	AP	Head of the Main Department of Kolchoz Affairs at the Agricultural Ministry, Deputy Chairman of the Agrarian Party	Moscow
Popov Andrei Petrovich	1963	R	H	N (AP List)	Engineer - Economist at the Compozit Small Enterprise	Volgograd
Kulick Gennady Vasilyevich	1935	R	H	AP	Consultant at the Inex-Interexport Company	Moscow
Ivanov Nikolai Vasilyevich	1952	R	H	AP	Head of the Raion Agricultural Department	Bryanskaya Oblast Dubrovka Village
Vershinin Vasily Fedorovich	1940	R	H	N (AP List)	Partner in Dico-3 Farming Company	Moscow
Naumov Vladimir Ivanovich	1929	R	II	AP	Head of the Main Territorial Department of the Agricultural Ministry	Moscow
Gaukov Vitali Vladimirovich	1948	R	H	AP	Chairman of Kursk Agroproom Union	Kursk
Sulboi Nikolai Avksentyevich	1941	R	H	AP	Vice-President of the Rosselkhozvodolot Corporation	Moscow
Ivanayev Peter Vasilyevich	1942	Chuvash	H	AP	Chairman of the Agroproom Trade Union of Chuvash Republic	Cheboksary

Nationality:

B Belorussian
R Russian
U Ukrainian

Education:

H Higher Education
HS High School
TS Technical School
UG Undergraduate (partial university education)

Party:

AP Agrarian Party
CP Communist Party
CU Civic Union
DC Dignity and Charity
DPR Democratic Party of Russia
DR Democratic Russia
FDP Free Democratic Party of Russia

LDP Liberal Party
N Non-Partisan Party
PEF Party of Economic Freedom
PRES Russian Party of Unity and Accord
RC Russia's Choice
RCDU Russian Christian

RMDR Russian Movement for Democratic Reform
RP Republican Party
SDP Social Democratic Party
WR Women of Russia
Yabloko Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc

Name	DOB	Nationality	Education	Party	Occupation	Residency
Birdyukov Nikolay Gavrilovich	1946	B	H	CP	Director of Pedagogical Institute at Novgorod State University	Novgorod
Leonov Yury Yuryevich	1963	R	H	CP	Chairman of the Executive Committee of Zashchita Trade-union Association	Moscow
Petrovsky Leonid Nikolayevich	1948	B	H	CP	Chairman of Gorky Collective Enterprise	Smolensk Oblast
Frenov Alexander Konstantinovich	1949	R	H	CP	Political Correspondent of Sovetskaya Rossiya Newspaper	Moscow
Pyatichis Nikolay Mitrofanovich	1947	R	HS	CP	Engine Tester at Zil JS Machine-building Association	Moscow
Oleynik Lyubov Vasilyevna	1949	U	H	CP	Unemployed	
Begov Omar Omarovich	1937	AVAZ	H	CP	General Director of Railroad Restaurant Association of Makhachkala Branch of the North Caucasus Railroad	Makhachkala
Kosenko Victor Grigoryevich	1945	R	H	CP	Chief Physician at Krasnodar Psychiatric Clinic	Krasnodar
Seletkova Tatyana Semenovna	1949	R	H	CP	Math Teacher at Secondary School	Perm Oblast, Bolshaya Sosnovka Village
Apatian Aleksei Viktorovna	1941	R	H	CP	1st Secretary of Volgograd Regional Communist Party Committee	Volgograd

Deputies to the State Duma Elected on the Democratic Party of Russia List

Name	DOB	Nationality	Education	Party	Occupation	Residency
Travkin Nikolai Ilyich	1946	R	H	DPR	Head of Administration in Shakhovskoy Ralon, Leader of the DPR	Moscow Oblast
Govornukhin Stanislav Sergeyevich	1936	R	H	N (DPR list)	Film Director	Moscow
Bogomolov Oleg Timofeyevich	1927	R	H	N (DPR list)	Director of the Institute of World Economics	Moscow
Fedorov Nikolai Vasilyevich	1938	R	H	N (DPR list)	Lawyer	Moscow
Gilzyev Sergei Yuryevich	1961	R	H	N (DPR list)	Laboratory Manager at the Economics and Mathematics Institute	Moscow
Zapolsky Sergei Vasilyevich	1947	R	H	N (DPR list)	Legal Consulting Firm Manager	Moscow
Kotlyar Valentin Alekseyevich	1951	R	H	DPR	Oblast Administration Deputy Head	Voronezh
Tropin Nikolai Maksimovich	1947	R	H	DPR	Unemployed	
Zubkevich Irina Borisovna	1944	R	H	DPR	Chairwoman of the Oblast Party Organization	Nizhny Novgorod
Talazov Viktor Lvovich	1951	R	H	DPR	Unemployed	
Lenushkin Aleksey Ivanovich	1967	R	H	DPR	Chairman of the Oblast Party Organization	Samara
Karelin German Yuryevich	1956	R	H	DPR	Chairman of the Oblast Party Organization	Ekaterinburg
Yakovlev Yury Nikolayevich	1950	R	H	DPR	Chairman of the Kraft Party Organization	Primorsky Krai
Pashenniy Feliks Semenovich	1952	R	H	DPR	Fund Manager of the Regional Party Organization	Krasnoyarsk

Deputies to the State Duma Elected on the Liberal Democratic Party List

Name	DOB	Nationality	Education	Party	Occupation	Residency
Kobelev Viktor Vasilyevich	1943	R	H	LDP	Chief of Staff of the Liberal Democratic Party Central Committee	Moscow
Maryobev Vyacheslav Antonovich	1939	R	H	LDP	Social Club Director at a Steel-Rolling Factory	St. Petersburg
Ivanov Vladimir Pavlovich	1946	R	H	LDP	Leader of Krasnoyarsk Regional Organization	Krasnoyarsk
Mitrofanov Aleksey Valentinovich	1962	R	H	LDP	Minister of Foreign Affairs in the LDP Shadow Cabinet	Moscow
Zhebrovich Stanislav Mikhailovich	1942	R	H	LDP	Deputy Chairman of the LDP	Moscow
Gvozdev Vladimir Zacharovich	1951	U	H	LDP	Deputy Chairman of the LDP	Moscow
Vergorovskiy Alexander Dmitriyevich	1953	R	H	LDP	Deputy Director of All-russia Interindustry Computer and Informatics Research Center	Moscow
Abelauv Sergei Nikolayevich	1961	R	H	LDP	Deputy Director of the Lenin Collective Farm	Moscow oblast
Kashpirovskiy Anatoly Mikhailovich	1939	R	H	N (LDP list)	President of the A.M. Kashpirovskiy Phenomenon Research Fund	Moscow
Gusev Vladimir Kuzmich	1932	R	H	N (LDP list)	Vice President of the "Promyshlennik" Scientific and Industrial Corporation	Moscow
Buzov Yury Yergenyevich	1955	R	H	LDP	Regional Director of the Nava-Chupe-Chupe JS Company	Moscow
Sidorov Anatoly Stepanovich	1933	R	H	N (LDP list)	General Director of the Economics and Entrepreneurship Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences	Moscow
Litichkin Vladimir Alekseyevich	1941	R	H	N (LDP list)	"Panunum" Concern President	Moscow
Lemashov Mikhail Yurkovlevich	1927	R	H	N (LDP list)	Consultant at the Russian Academy of Sciences	Moscow
Firinko Oleg Alexandrovich	1941	R	H	LDP	Chief Editor of Yuridicheskaya Gazeta Newspaper	Moscow
Kozyrev Alexander Ivanovich	1949	R	H	N (LDP list)	Senior Scientific Secretary of Russia's AENPD, Vice-President of the International Association of Economists-Historians	Moscow
Kuznetsov Yury Pavlovich	1947	R	H	LDP	Psychanalyst of the International Institute of Reserve Human Ability Studies	Moscow
Zhuraev Vityay Evgenyevich	1964	R	H	Social Justice party (LDP list)	Chairman of the Humanism and Democracy Fund	Moscow
Katashnikov Sergei Vyacheslavovich	1951	R	H	LDP	President of the "Neftehim" Trading House JS Company	Krasnoyarsk, Moscow oblast
Sidorov Mikhail Nikolayevich	1947	R	H	N (LDP list)	Vice Director for Research of the Economics Research Institute of the Economics Ministry of Russia	Moscow
Pechkin Vladimir Viktorovich	1967	R	TS	LDP	Head of the LDP Youth Sector	Moscow

Name	DOB	Nationality	Education	Party	Occupation	Residency
Boruk Vladimir Mikhailovich	1952	R	HS	LDP	Leader of the Orei Oblast LDP Organization	Orei
Korobov Sergei Alexandrovich	1958	R	H	LDP	Party Coordinator in Penza Oblast	Penza
Kornienko Viktor Ulyanovich	1937	R	H	LDP	Department Manager of the LDP	Moscow
Loginov Evgeny Yuryevich	1965	R	H	N (LDP list)	Serviceman, Student at the Armed Forces Humanitarian Academy	Moscow
Churkin Sergei Alexandrovich	1956	R	H	LDP	Party Coordinator in Vologda oblast	Vologda
Sychev Sergei Vladimirovich	1962	R	H	LDP	Student at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Moscow
Saizhkov Mikhail Nikolayevich	1945	R	H	LDP	Chairman of the "Collega" Student Scientific and Technical Cooperative	Moscow
Novikov Vladimir Ilyich	1960	R	H	N (LDP list)	Director of the Labor Limited Partnership	Glatov, Udmurtia republic
Bulgakova Tatyana Ivanovna	1945	R	TS	N (LDP list)	Director of the Metest Children and Youth Club	Moscow
Miroshnina Elena Valentinovna	1953	R	H	N (LDP list)	Head of the ECOLEX Law Firm	Moscow
Vishnyakov Viktor Grigoryevich	1931	R	H	LDP (CP)	Senior Fellow at the Institute of Law and Comparative Jurisprudence	Moscow
Asafiyev Nikolai Pavlovich	1940	R	H	N (LDP list)	Department Manager at the Moscow Oblast Office of Public Prosecutor	Lubertskiy town, Moscow oblast
Ishchenko Evgeny Petrovich	1938	R	H	N (LDP list)	Criminal Law Department Head at the Ural Law Academy	Ekaterinburg
Ivanov Viktor Petrovich	1938	R	H	N (LDP list)	Deputy Chief Editor of the Veroyatskiye Novosti Newspaper	Moscow
Tulinov Evgeny Vyacheslavovich	1954	R	H	N (LDP list)	Judicial Information Department Manager of the Juridicheskaya Gazeta Newspaper, Writer, Journalist	St. Petersburg
Molisev Boris Vasilyevich	1935	R	H	N (LDP list)	Deputy Chief Editor of the Yuniform Agency	Moscow
Kiselev Vyacheslav Viktorovich	1948	R	H	N (LDP list)	Manager of Shechelkovo Law Consultancy of the Moscow Oblast Lawyers' Bar	Shechelkovo, Moscow oblast
Boisbulakov Evgeny Alexandrovich	1949	R	H	LDP	General Director of the AB&AC JS Company	Vladivostok
Pronin Alexander Vladimirovich	1955	R	TS	LDP	Deputy Chief of Staff of the LDP	Moscow
Konutkin Vladimir Mikhailovich	1948	R	H	LDP	Assistant to the LDP Chairman	Moscow
Ruda Yuri Mikhailovich	1958	U	TS	LDP	Foreman at Kursk Oblast Public Utilities Department	Gorchebnoye village, Kursk ob
Lukava Georgy Grigoryevich	1925	Georgian	H	LDP	Department Head at the Moscow Technological University of Civil Aviation	Moscow
Usitsov Viktor Ivanovich	1937	R	H	LDP	Councillor to the LDP Chairman	Moscow
Panferov Konstantin Nikolayevich	1932	R	H	(LDP list)	Councillor to the LDP Chairman, Professor at the Moscow Technological University of Civil Aviation	Moscow

Name	DOB	Nationality	Education	Party	Occupation	Residency
Zarichansky Stanislav Konstantinovich	1962	U	H	LDP	LDP Central Committee's Organizational Department Official	Moscow
Filatov Alexander Valentinovich	1967	R	H	LDP	General Manager of the LDP Shadow Cabinet	Moscow
Maklakova Larisa Sergiyevna	1946	R	H	LDP	Assistant Party Coordinator in Moscow Region	Moscow
Gagut Larisa Dmitrievna	1949	Greek	H	LDP	Senior Fellow at the Institute of Ferrous Metallurgy Economics	Moscow
Zhuk Edward Georgievich	1960	B	H	N (LDP list)	Assistant Manager of the Alfa Bank	Moscow
Stun Dmitry Alexandrovich	1961	U	H	LDP	Deputy Assistant Chairman of the LDP	Moscow
Zyrgalin Aleksey Alekseyevich	1936	R	H	LDP	Professor at the Moscow Commerce University	Moscow
Zaev Aleksey Alekseyevich	1970	R	TS	N (LDP list)	Unemployed	Moscow
Bolshakov Vadim Ivanovich	1930	R	H	N (LDP list)	Consultant on the LDP Sociology Group	Moscow
Kriveiskaya Nina Viktorovna	1948	R	H	N (LDP list)	Senior Fellow at the Interior Ministry Scientific Complex on Psychology and Personnel	Moscow
Kapustin Anatoly Vladimirovich	1939	B	H	N (LDP list)	Chairman of the Board of the Unemployment Protection Fund	Moscow
Burilakov Mikhail Petrovich	1952	R	H	LDP	Department Head at Togliatti Branch of Samara Teachers Training Institute	Togliatti, Samara oblast
Moiseev Anatoly Semenovich	1947	R	TS	N (LDP list)	Manager of the Berezhka Vocal Instrumental Group	Zapovednoye village c. Kalining oblast
Vasilishin Aleksey Viktorovich	1945	R	H	N (LDP list)	Engine Operation Consultant to the Omega Company	Tobolsk

Deputies to the State Duma Elected on the PRES (Unity and Accord) Party List

Name	DOB	Nationality	Education	Party	Occupation	Residency
Stukhral Sergei Mikhailovich	1956	R	H	PRES, Leader	Deputy Prime Minister	Moscow
Shokhin Alexander Nikolayevich	1951	R	H	PRES	Deputy Prime Minister	Moscow
Zatulkin Konstantin Fedorovich	1958	R	H	N (PRES list)	Chairman of the Coordination Committee of the Entrepreneurs for New Russia Association	Moscow
Kalmykov Yuriy Khamzatovich	1934	Circassian	H	PRES	Minister of Justice	Moscow
Kirpichnikov Valery Alexandrovich	1946	R	H	PRES	President of the Union of Russian Cities	Sestroretsk Bor City, Leningrad C
Melikyan Gennady Georgiyevich	1947	Armenian	H	PRES	Minister of Labor	Moscow
Tumanov Vladimir Alexandrovich	1940	R	H	PRES	Professor at the State and Law Institute of the Russian Academy of Science	Moscow
Silva Anatoly Yakovlevich	1940	B	H	PRES	Deputy Manager of the State and Law Department of the President of Russia	Moscow
Nikonov Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich	1956	R	H	N (PRES list)	Councillor at the Reforms International Fund	Moscow
Kozhemyakin Vladimir Nikolayevich	1956	R	H	PRES	Deputy Chief of Staff of the Deputy Prime Minister	Moscow
Lepshin Vladimir Anatolyevich	1959	R	H	PRES Supporter	Teacher at Moscow State University	Moscow
Turbanov Alexander Vladimirovich	1950	R	H	PRES Supporter	Manager of the Law Department of Incombank	Moscow
Stuchanin Igor Alexandrovich	1955	R	H	PRES	Manager of the International Cooperation and C.I.S. Affairs Department of Russia's Government	Moscow
Zuev Konstantin Eduardovich	1961	R	H	PRES Supporter	Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Tekhnologiya JS Company	Moscow
Kazhaev Murad Magomedovich	1931	Lezgian	H	N (PRES list)	Chief Conductor of Ostankino Symphony Orchestra	Moscow
Slankovich Sergei Borisovich	1954	R	H	PRES	Unemployed (Former Presidential Adviser)	Moscow
Sharipov Sergei Alexandrovich	1951	R	H	PRES	Assistant Head of the Rostov Oblast Administration	Novocherkassk
Mukhinov Irek Sharipovich	1932	Bashkir	H	Senezh Forum Movement (PRES list)	Fellow at the State and Law Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences	Moscow

Deputies to the State Duma Elected on Russia's Choice List

Name	DOB	Nationality	Education	Party	Occupation	Residency
Gaidar Yegor Yurayevich	1956	R	H	RC	Former 1st Deputy Prime Minister	Moscow
Chubais Anatoly Borisovich	1955	R	H	RC	Deputy Prime Minister	Moscow
Voitkogenov Dmitry Anatolyevich	1928	R	H	RC	Councillor to the President in Defence and Security Matters	Moscow
Filatov Sergei Alexandrovich	1936	R	H	N (RC list)	President's Chief of Staff	Moscow
Yemelyanov Aleksey Mikhailovich	1935	R	H	RC	Head of the Agroecconomics Department at the Moscow Lomonosov University	Moscow
Poltorainin Mikhail Nikiiforovich	1939	R	H	RC	Head of the Federal Information Center of Russia	Moscow
Bunich Pavel Grigoryevich	1925	R	H	Democratic Initiative (RC list)	1st Vice-Chancellor of the National Economy Academy	Moscow
Burbulis Gennady Eduardovich	1945	R	H	RC	Chairman of the Strategy Center	Moscow
Zoloukhin Boris Andreevich	1930	R	H	RC	Deputy Chairman of the Presidential Law Drafting Commission	Moscow
Aven Peter Olegovich	1955	R	H	RC	General Director of the Fimp Company	Moscow
Golovkov Aleksey Leonardovich	1955	R	H	RC	Executive Director of the All-Russian Association of Privatized and Private Companies	Moscow
Guzman Yuly Solomonovich	1943	Jewish	H	RC	Director of the Central House of Cinematography	Moscow
Murashev Arkady Nikolayevich	1957	R	H	RC	Chairman of the Liberal - Conservative Politics Center	Moscow
Yushenkov Sergei Nikolayevich	1950	R	H	RC	1st Deputy Head of the Federal Information Center of Russia	Moscow
Yakovlin Gleb Pavlovich	1934	R	H	DR (RC list)	Member of the Presidential Law Drafting Commission	Moscow
Selyuun Vasily Ilarionovich	1927	R	H	DR (RC list)	Pensioner	
Voronsov Nikolai Nikolayevich	1934	R	H	DR (RC list)	Senior Fellow at the Koltsov Institute of Developmental Biology	Moscow
Nuytsh Andrei Alexandrovich	1931	R	H	RC	Deputy Director for Scientific Research at Cinematography Research Institute	Moscow
Molostov Mikhail Mikhailovich	1934	R	H	RC	Unemployed	
Aulov Alexander Petrovich	1952	R	H	RC	Laboratory Manager at the Ural Personnel Training Center	Ekaterinburg
Zaslavsky Iliya Iosifovich	1960	Jewish	H	DR (RC list)	Councillor to the Economics Minister of Russia	Moscow
Talarchuk Valentin Ivanovich	1937	Ukrainian	H	RC	Vice President of Lumber JS Company	Moscow
Gritsan Vladimir Vasilyevich	1937	R	H	RC	Manager of Judicial Center at the Accor Branch in Kuban	Krasnodar

Name	DOB	Nationality	Education	Party	Occupation	Residency
Starob Anatoly Efimovich	1939	Armenian	H	DR (RC list)	Senior Fellow at the Physics Institute of the R. Academy of Science	Moscow
Titenko Boris Mikhailovich	1954	Ukrainian	H	RP (RC list)	Chairman of Rostov Region Republican Party Organization	Rostov-na-donu
Ignatyev Kirill Borisovich	1966	R	H	N (RC list)	1st Deputy Chairman, CEO of the Ostankino TV and Radio Company	Moscow
Fedorov Anton Yuryevich	1961	R	UG	N (RC list)	Deputy Head of the Presidential Department	Moscow Oblast, Ussovo Village
Danilov-Danilyan Viktor Ivanovich	1938	R	H	RC	Minister of Environment and Natural Resources Protection of Russia	Moscow
Tonchlin Grigory Aleksyevich	1947	Jewish	H	DR (RC list)	Director of Privatization Department and Deputy Property Management Committee Chairman of St. Petersburg	St. Petersburg
Tetelin Vladimir Vladimirovich	1944	R	H	RP (RC list)	Professor at Krasnoyarsk Construction Engineering Institute	
Denisenko Bela Anatolyevna	1941	R	H	DR (RC list)	Laboratory Manager at the Institute of Transitional Period Economics	Moscow
Yuzhakov Vladimir Nikolayevich	1951	R	H	DR (RC list)	Chancellor of the Povolzhsky Personnel Training Center	Saratov
Aleksyev Gennady Aleksyevich	1945	R	TS	RC	Expert for the Presidential Administration	Irkutsk
Zastozhaya Olga Kirillovna	1944	R	H	RC	Deputy Chairwoman of Voronezh City Council	Voronezh
Generalov Andrei Ivanovich	1964	R	H	N (RC list)	President of Tuayev City Chamber of Commerce and Industry	Tuayev, Yaroslavl Region
Kuznetsov Evgeny Stepanovich	1944	R	H	N (RC list)	Presidential Representative in Volgograd Oblast	Volgograd
Sidorov Evgeny Yuryevich	1938	R	H	N (RC list)	Russia's Minister of Culture	Moscow
Danilov Mikhail Alexandrovich	1937	R	H	DR (RC list)	Chief Analyst for the Presidential Representative in Archangel	Archangel
Satykov Boris Georgiyevich	1940	R	H	RC	Russia's Minister of Science and Technological Policy	Moscow
Ryzhkov Vladimir Alexandrovich	1966	R	II	RC	Secretary to the Administration Head of Altai Krai	Barnaul

Deputies to the State Duma Elected on the Women of Russia List

Name	DOB	Nationality	Education	Party	Occupation	Residency
Foblova Alevina Vasilyevna	1940	R	H	WR	Chairwoman of the Women of Russia Union	Moscow
Lukhova Ekaterina Filipovna	1948	R	H	N (WR list)	Councillor to the President on Women's Affairs	Moscow
Guzdareva Natalya Georgievna	1948	R	H	N (WR list)	Actress at the Mayakovsky Theater	Moscow
Malakhukina Natalya Dmitrievna	1949	R	H	WR	Chairwoman of the D.O.M. (Childhood, Society, Charity) Center	Moscow
Zavadskaya Ludmila Nikolayevna	1949	R	H	WR	Acting Manager of Law and Sociology Sector at the State and Law Institute of the Russian Academy of Science	Moscow
Dobrovolskaya Marina Karamonova	1960	R	H	WR	Chairwoman of the Women of the Navy Union	Moscow
Klimantova Galina Ivanovna	1944	R	H	WR	Department Manager for Family Affairs at the Udmurtia Republic Government	Izhevsk
Arslanova Fariza Sharafievna	1951	Tatar	H	N (WR list)	Law Department Manager at the Urengoygazprom JS Company	Novy Urengoy, Yamalo-nenets Autonomous Okrug
Zhilina Antonina Alexandrovna	1949	R	H	N (WR list)	President of the Tsaritsin Dvor JS Trading and Production Company	Volgograd
Vybomova Irina Evgenievna	1951	R	H	N (WR list)	Vice President of the Free Economic Society of Russia	Kaliningrad, Moscow Oblast
Chepurnykh Elena Evgenievna	1955	R	H	N (WR list)	Chairwoman of the International Federation of Children's Organizations	Moscow
Skripitsina Raisa Ivanovna	1942	R	H	WR	Vice Mayor of Oymyak	Kaluzhskaya Oblast
Martynova Valentina Grigorievna	1942	R	H	N (WR list)	Assistant General Director of the Farmimpex, a State-Owned Company	Moscow
Popova Yekaterina Mikhailovna	1941	Komi	H	N (WR list)	Chief Physician at the Komi Republic Hospital	Sykt'yavik
Orlova Svetlana Yurievna	1954	R	H	WR	General Director of the Anna Women's Commercial Charity Organization	Vladivostok
Kozhakhova Valentina Vasilyevna	1930	R	H	WR	Chairwoman of the Board of Stavropol Krai Obligatory Medical Insurance Fund	Stavropol
Chubkova Galina Petrovna	1945	R	H	N (WR list)	Head of Sociology and Psychology Department of Astrakhan Technological Institute of the Fishing Industry	Astrakhan
Babakh Larisa Vladimirovna	1949	R	H	N (WR list)	General Director of the Larina Service JS Company	Moscow
Lozinskaya Zhanna Mikhailovna	1944	R	H	WR	Senior Fellow at Tula Technological University	Tula
Novitskaya Irina Efimovna	1951	R	H	WR	Department Manager of Children's City Emergency Hospital	Vladimir
Martina Ludmila Nikolayevna	1940	R	H	WR	Director of a Flour Milling Plant #3	Moscow

Deputies to the State Duma Elected on the YABLOKO list

Name	DOB	Nationality	Education	Party	Occupation	Residency
Yevlitsky Grigory Alekseyevich	1952	R	H	N (YABLOKO list)	Chairman of the Center of Economic and Political Studies (EPICENTER)	Moscow
Mikhailov Aleksey Yuryevich	1963	R	H	N (YABLOKO list)	Senior Fellow at EPICENTER	Moscow
Zadorov Mikhail Mikhailovich	1963	R	H	N (YABLOKO list)	Senior Fellow at EPICENTER	Moscow
Ivanenko Sergei Viktorovich	1939	R	H	N (YABLOKO list)	Senior Fellow at EPICENTER	Moscow
Melnikov Aleksey Yuryevich	1964	R	H	N (YABLOKO list)	Fellow at EPICENTER	Moscow
Yazygina Tatyana Vladimirovna	1953	R	H	N (YABLOKO list)	Senior Fellow at EPICENTER	Moscow
Sheina Viktor Leonidovich	1931	J	H	N (YABLOKO list)	Deputy Chairman of the Law Drafting Commission under the President	Moscow
Petrakov Nikolai Yakovlevich	1937	R	H	N (YABLOKO list)	Director of the Market Studies Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences	Moscow
Ignatov Vyacheslav Vladimirovich	1948	R	UG	N (YABLOKO list)	Director of the Institute of Humanities and Politics	Moscow
Adamtskiy Anatoly Leonidovich	1934	R	II	N (YABLOKO list)	1st Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs	Moscow
Yakovenko Igor Aleksandrovich	1951	R	II	Republican Party (YABLOKO list)	Director of the Monitoring Public Opinion Research Service	Moscow

Golov Anatoly Grigoryevich	1946	R	H	Social Democratic Party (YABLOKO list)	Social Democratic Party Chairman	St. Petersburg
Borshehev Valery Vasilyevich	1943	R	H	Christian Democratic Union - New Democracy (YABLOKO list)		Moscow
Shelishch Peter Borisovich	1945	Jewish	H	N (YABLOKO list)	Head of the Social Work Department at the North-west Personnel Training Center	St. Petersburg
Averchev Vladimir Petrovich	1946	R	H	N (YABLOKO list)	Councilor at the Russian Embassy in the United States	
Grachev Ivan Dmitriyevich	1952	R	H	N (YABLOKO list)	Department Head at the Kazan Technophotoproject Research Institute	Kazan
Dmitriyeva Oksana Gennrikhovna	1958	R	H	N (YABLOKO list)	Manager of the Regional Diagnostics Laboratory at St. Petersburg University of Economics and Finance	St. Petersburg
Shestakovskiy Vyacheslav Nikolayevich	1937	Ukrainian	H	Republican Party (YABLOKO list)	Chairman of the Republican Party Political Council, Director of the Social Science Center at the International Fund of Social, Economic and Political Studies	Moscow
Ambartsumov Evgeny Arshakovich	1929	Armenian	H	N (YABLOKO list)	Member of the Presidential Law Drafting Commission	Moscow
Lyenko Vladimir Nikolayevich	1956	R	H	Republican Party (YABLOKO list)	Member of the Presidential Law Drafting Commission	Moscow

Notes

1. IRI observers to the April 25 referendum in Russia found no evidence of systematic fraud or intimidation. The observers, however, did note that the production, distribution, and security of ballots was lax; and the various regions of Russia differed in their methods of tabulation. The IRI delegation further concluded that these weaknesses could be exploited easily when the stakes of elections were higher and if there were a greater incentive to cheat.
2. The banned parties included: the National Salvation Front, the Russian Communist Workers Party, the Social Club of the Officers Union, the United Front of Working People of Russia, the "Shchit" Union, the Russian Communist Youth League, "Working Russia," the Russian National Unity Party, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CP-RF), and the People's Party of Free Russia (PPFR).
3. Members of the Federation Council originally were to be appointed by the regions rather than elected. When elections were opened to the Federation Council, a new rule was issued stating that no one could simultaneously be a candidate to both bodies of the Federal Assembly.
4. Restrictions placed on political parties are not uncommon in other countries with similar histories of political extremism (such as Article 21 of the German constitution). The issue requires a careful balance when extremist forces that gain partial access to political power could, in the end, pose greater threat to multi-party democracy than the precedent established by their exclusion.
5. *The Financial Times*, December, 14, 1993
6. "The Arbitration Court on Campaign Issues," Vera Tolz, *RFE/RL Daily Report*, December 20, 1993
7. "Zhirinovskiy Received Most TV Exposure During Campaign," Study by the Russian-American Press and Information Center, December 15, 1993, p. 3.
8. Russia's Choice had six ministers on its party list (Gaidar, Kozyrev, Fedorov, Shumeiko, Chubais, and Poltoranin), the Party of Russian Unity and Accord had four (Shakhrai, Shokin, Soskovets, and Kalmykov), and the Agrarian party had one (Zaveryukha).
9. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin temporarily suspended the right of cabinet members to issue licenses for export quotas and government credits.
10. "Vote Counting Stirs Speculation," Anne Barnard, *The Moscow Times*, December 18, 1993

11. Richard Scammon and Alice McGillivray, *America Votes 20: Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics*, Congressional Quarterly, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 9.
12. The total does not add to 450 because six elections were voided in six constituencies because of either inadequate turnout or too few candidates.
13. The total does not add to 176 because Federation Council elections were not held in three regions because less than three candidates qualified.
14. "Who Voted for Zhirinovsky," Elizabeth Teague, *RFE/RL Daily Report*, January 3, 1994
15. "How Did the Military Vote," John Lepingwell, *RFE/RL Daily Report*, December 26, 1993

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