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Th e F a i l u r e o f t h e Con s e r vat i v e P r o j e c t…
By then the Conservatives had little to offer in positive terms apart from economic liberal-
ism, and here they were outdone by the Liberals. The latter not only wielded much more
precise economic analysis, but also were able to drive home the positive aspect of their
proposed liberal reforms: wider rights for local communities at the municipal level, pro-
tection of small and medium businesses against foreign interests, etc. Moreover, the Liber-
als were able to develop solutions for concrete problems consistent with their underlying
belief in the free market and private initiative, while the Conservatives were still searching
for a consistent ideological rationale behind their political practice.
The ideological barrenness of the Conservative Party was one of the principal reasons why
its niche as the main party of the right was taken over by the Liberals during the 2000 elec-
tions. The immediate reaction to this development among the Conservatives was either to
adopt an ever more liberal economic stance (thus aiming to criticize the liberals from the
right), or to descend into pragmatic
realpolitik
.
It took the Conservative Party a few years to extricate itself from this ideological crisis.
With the appearance of
Dešinioji alternatyva
(The Right-Wing Alternative) in 2003, how-
ever, the Conservatives managed to reinvent themselves, once again finding an authentic
political voice and distinctive vision which have continued to dominate right-of-center
political discourse. The author of this surprising comeback, Kubilius, replaced Landsber-
gis as the paradigmatic politician of the new generation, whereas Landsbergis’ uncom-
promising global vision is now employed on the Conservative behalf at the European
Parliament.
The Policies of the Conservative Coalition Government
What was it about the Conservative coalition government’s policies that so crucially failed
to endear it to the electorate?
The program of Vagnorius’ government consisted of a series of ambitious undertakings
that could be broadly categorized as follows: thorough-going structural reforms in educa-
tion, health care, public administration and the economy; and privatization of large state
assets, such as Lithuanian Telecom or the Lithuanian fishing fleet, with a view toward
attracting foreign capital which then could be used to galvanize private initiative through
restitution of private property, primarily the devalued
ruble
deposits (in the year between
November 1998 when the payments started and November 1999 when they were stopped
almost 1.5 billion
litas
, or $3.75 million, were paid in compensation).
Large-scale and often painful structural reforms generated much resentment, especially
since the opposition was rather efficient in raising vocal protests. When it came to priva-
tization of state assets, the Conservatives fell afoul of a seeming inconsistency, insofar as
they had been protesting against the earlier (admittedly, very corrupt) privatization of
state assets by the ex-Communist LDDP, but then embarked on a round of privatizations
of their own. In the eyes of the public privatization became simply a “property grab” on
behalf of the Conservatives.
On the other hand, enjoying such overwhelming parliamentary majority (87 seats out of
a total 137), the Conservatives sometimes did not feel obliged to justify or explain their
policies, reforms and decisions to the public. With assiduous help from the opposition, the
