2013
Jordan Parliamentary Elections
12
P
OLITICAL CONTEXT
The Hashemite monarchy in Jordan is led by King Abdullah II, who is the head of state and the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The King, through a series of white papers and speeches
on the topic, announced his decision to carry out reform with the longer-term goal of transforming
Jordan into a constitutional monarchy. But a weak parliamentary mandate and an entrenched,
conservative political elite have both complicated and slowed the King’s reform agenda.
As a political class, East Bankers have disproportionately benefited from patronage networks created
by the existing order, which a democratic and merit-based system threaten to disrupt.
Such
positions of privilege have been sustained, in part, by laws that favor less populated, tribally-
dominated areas, and allow the King to appoint the upper house and have the final say in the
nomination, hiring and firing of the prime minister. The King is constitutionally permitted to veto
new legislative measures and dissolve the parliament if necessary. In theory, the veto authority is
limited by the bicameral parliament, comprising an appointed senate and an elected house of
deputies, where a two-thirds majority in both houses can override the King’s veto in legislative
matters. This situation, however, has never occurred, as both chambers of parliament have been
traditionally stacked with loyalists from large tribes that have usually served as the power base for
the King.
As a result of this framework, actual policy discussion in parliament has tended to be weak, and
issue-based alliances have rarely been formed. Rather, patronage and service delivery to their
respective constituencies (tribes, in most cases) have often been the main concerns for many
members of parliament. Administered by the Ministry of Interior, elections in 2007 and 2010
reinforced this status quo, as internal security services were seen to have played a significant role in
influencing election results.
The Arab Spring, however, catalyzed debate over the need for political change. The two main pillars
of the pre-election opposition were the
Herak
, the largely governorate-based popular movement that
arose in Jordan in response to the Arab Spring, and the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the largest and
most organized political party in Jordan.
Faced with the opposition’s demands, the Royal Court has repeatedly promised reforms. In 2011,
the King set up the NDC, which was tasked with drafting proposals for changes to two key
documents – the national election law and the political party law. In April 2011, the King formed
the Royal Commission on Constitutional Review to develop recommendations for constitutional
changes.
The 52-member NDC, chaired by Senate President Taher al-Masri, was established in May 2011 and
included ministers, pro-reform members of parliament, journalists, centrist political parties, religious
leaders and civil society representatives, although it included only four women. Despite its
prominence as the leading opposition party, the IAF chose not to participate because the committee
was not mandated to discuss constitutional changes to articles 34, 35 and 36, which reference the
1
Muasher, Marwan.
A Decade of Struggling Reform Efforts in Jordan: The Resilience of the Rentier System
. The Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, May 2011. p. 14.
>.
