2013
Jordan Parliamentary Elections
14
former lawmaker who served in both houses of parliament, was the fifth prime minister to serve
since the onset of the Arab Spring in early 2011.
Overall, the opposition did not buy into the government’s approach to reform. Instead they
criticized the NDC, the new election law and what they deemed as the government’s rush to
elections as insincere efforts built more for posturing than real reform. The
Herak
’s concerns were
initially expressed through economic demands, but price hikes in November 2012, dissatisfaction
with the election law, and reports of government corruption led to calls from some members for the
end of the current monarchy. A number of political parties, including the IAF, who had boycotted
the elections in 2010 subsequently announced their intentions to boycott the January elections in
protest against what they believed was the government’s failure to deliver meaningful reform to the
election law and the political process more broadly. The IAF, parts of the
Herak
and other
opposition movements organized joint protests in the lead up to elections.
Though the recommendations of the NDC were largely neglected, government representatives and
supporters of the King maintain that progress was made by adopting the new election law and
through constitutional changes. Supporters of the King’s reform agenda emphasize that these
efforts are part of an incremental approach that is more in line with public demands and with
maintaining stability and security in a volatile region. During a speech in October 2012, the King
himself said the next parliament would be a “gate to comprehensive reform,” stating further that
parliament would be “the institution constitutionally mandated to continue achieving true change
and overcoming national challenges.” As such, the King and his government saw changes to the
election and political party laws as steps forward in the country’s democratic transition.
Government representatives and supporters of the Palace disagreed with calls for constitutional
changes that would curtail the King’s power so early in the reform process. While they acknowledge
there are obstacles slowing reform, they point the finger at the circle of entrenched elite around the
King rather than at the King himself. This political elite, which has been identified by the King
himself, is bolstered by ties to the Royal Court and security services and is influential in business
circles, stands to lose the most from political reform and has resisted calls for change
Resistance
was evident during the process of reforming the election law in the summer of 2012 under the
premiership of Awn Khasawneh, when a more reformist version of the election law was reportedly
shelved after interference from governmental entities that felt threatened by the NDC
recommendations.
Chief among the “threatening” reforms were more equitable representation between districts and
introducing more than one vote at the district level, innovations that likely would have benefited the
IAF.
3
Goldberg, Jeffrey. “The Modern King in the Arab Spring.”
The Atlantic
, 18 March 2013.
>.
4
In two separate stakeholder interviews, one with a former Prime Minister and another with a prominent Palestinian
Jordanian candidate thought to have close relations with the IAF, IRI long-term observers were informed that
substantive changes to the law did not occur because of government fear of the IAF. Specifically, they both alleged that
in negotiations held over the law, the IAF failed to give guarantees to the government that if they were able to gain a
sizeable chunk of representation in parliament that they would not pursue constitutional changes to articles 34, 35 and
36, which reference the King’s powers with respect to holding elections, appointing and dismissing the prime minister,
and appointing the senate.
