2013
Jordan Parliamentary Elections
36
POST-ELECTION DAY AND FINAL RESULTS
IRI polling shows that 55 percent of respondents believe the IEC was able to ensure free and fair
elections. This number may well have been higher had it not been for mistakes in the immediate
post-election period that seriously damaged the IEC’s reputation. The audit of results in the post-
election period was compromised by administrative mistakes and poor communication, raising
doubts about the IEC’s impartiality. Specifically, the miscalculation of national lists results caused
confusion and was not handled in a transparent manner. These shortcomings show there is
considerable work to be done by the IEC to improve its work in the results and auditing process.
The IEC initially did a good job of handling a contestation from the National Committee on Human
Rights concerning vote totals from Balqa’s first district. In the presence of citizen and international
observers, on January 26 the IEC conducted a recount of both ballot boxes from polling station
137. The recount, which was conducted by polling station members themselves, uncovered
inaccuracies in the recording of results, but the discrepancies were not enough to change the
preliminary result that had been announced.
A complaint brought forward to the IEC regarding discrepancies in the national list results served as
the catalyst for the main post-election controversy. During a partial audit of national list results on
January 26, 2013, which was only done for two contested lists, a seat which was originally given to
the Citizenship list was awarded to the Democratic Promotion list. The IEC explained to
international observers, including IRI, that the reason for the switch was that IEC staffers
inadvertently entered results incorrectly during data entry at the IEC level following the closing of
polling stations on Election Day. The next day, January 27, 2013, however, the IEC conducted a
full audit of the national list district-level results in order to identify additional discrepancies between
written protocols and electronic results. For this count the IEC invited international and citizen
observers but failed to invite all party agents. After the full district-level audit of all 61 lists, results
were adjusted again because of discrepancies at a number of polling stations. This resulted in
another change that awarded the seat back to the Citizenship list, and which contradicted the
decision made the day before. As a result of this confusion, some citizen observation groups asked
the IEC to conduct a recount of the national list ballots, but these requests were ignored. The case
was ultimately referred to the courts, where a final decision by the Amman Court of Appeals based
on recounts of 19 national list ballot boxes awarded the seat to Citizenship list.
Thus, with the media covering and both citizen and international groups observing, the last national
seat to be awarded changed hands several times, with each successive change shining a spotlight on
inefficiencies in the IEC’s vote auditing procedures. If administering future elections, the IEC
should conduct a thorough audit of data entry before announcing final election results.
While audits were taking place on January 26-27 at the IEC, candidates and their representatives
were trying to file complaints with the commission after being unable to access DEC officials, where
complaints were to be filed. The IEC was not prepared to accept these complaints, but said it
would review each one on a case-by-case basis and make sure to forward those they thought were
credible to the proper authorities. Candidates expressed doubt, however, that the overtaxed and
understaffed IEC would be able to fairly address their concerns. During this critical period, IRI
observers also experienced difficulty contacting DEC officials after Election Day to do exit
interviews, even though the officials were to be available until January 31, 2013. Indeed, in IRI post-
