2011 Nigeria National Elections
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Post-Election Violence
Although the April 2011 elections showed vast improvements in preparation, administration and
transparency, the announcement of the presidential election results sparked the deadliest and most
damaging election related violence in the history of Nigeria's nascent democracy.
During the weekend of April 16–17, rumors and speculation reinforced a widely held belief that the
election between Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari would be very close, and possibly
even result in a run-off between the two.
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More specifically, one expectation regarding the electoral
outcome was that Jonathan would win all of the states in the south, and Buhari, all of the states in
the north, resulting in a close election that would ultimately be decided by each candidate's
respective margins in the areas that they won. On the day after the presidential election (Sunday,
April 17), results became available during the early evening hours via the resident electoral
commissioners of the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). These results—which
closely mirrored the final, official results announced later—showed Jonathan winning by a large
margin over Buhari. On Monday, April 18, at 8:32 p.m., INEC officially declared incumbent
Goodluck Jonathan the winner of the presidential election. In assessing how INEC handled the
adjudication of the election results, IRI did not find any aspect that was mishandled or that could
have avoided the post-election violence if handled differently. IRI views the violence as unrelated to
the assessment of INEC's performance, the validity of the election results and the average
perceptions held by Nigerians about the credibility of the electoral process—especially compared to
those of 2007.
IRI's short-term observers did not witness the violence first-hand. The media and second-hand
reports received by IRI indicate that northern Muslims expressed frustration with northern
politicians and with the continuation of a southern, Christian presidency. This frustration was
manifested by demonstrations in the streets to protest both the failure of northern politicians, as
well as the perceived electoral fraud they attributed to the Jonathan campaign, the PDP and INEC.
These initial protests degenerated into uncontrolled riots accompanied by cycles of sectarian and
retribution violence between Muslims and Christians. Stirred by the alleged electoral fraud and/or
motivated by revenge, rioters in the northern states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa,
Katsina, Kano, Kaduna, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara targeted religious communities,
politicians, government buildings and security forces. The violence left more than 800 people dead
and 65,000 people displaced. Rioters burned churches, homes and shops, and attacked police
stations, INEC offices, PDP offices, and universities. At one university in Zaria, four Christian
students and a Christian lecturer were cornered and hacked to death with machetes. In Kaduna
state, predominantly Christian mobs retaliated by attacking Muslims and burning down mosques and
Muslim-owned properties. Once reports of violence had been received, the army deployed
throughout the north to restore order, in preparation for the gubernatorial and state assembly
elections on April 26. Unfortunately, reports also surfaced citing instances of excessive use of force
and other abuses committed by military and/or security personnel while responding to the violent
protests.
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To win in the first round, Nigeria's constitution requires that a presidential candidate receive a simple majority of the
total national vote, and at least 25 percent of the vote in at least two-thirds (i.e., 24) of the states. Jonathan met both
conditions, thereby negating the need for a run-off election.
