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Wh y We Lo s t – Th e M a c e don i a n C a s e
allied with the SDSM, took 14 seats, compared to eleven seats for PDSH. Prime Minister
Georgievski said his government would continue to work toward membership in NATO
and the European Union and strive for better relations with neighboring Balkan countries.
He pledged to reform the economy by working to end corruption, reduce taxes, eliminate
regulations on investments and attract foreign investment.
PDSH’s participation in the coalition proved to be a wise step during the 1999 Kosovo
crisis. This was the first major challenge for the VMRO-led government, when more than
360,000 refugees fled to Macedonia. In spite of a weak economy, insufficient foreign assis-
tance and fears that the refugees would not return to Kosovo, the government successfully
managed the refugee crisis. This operation allowed NATO troops to cross Macedonian
territory and to build logistic facilities for their intervention in Kosovo. VMRO-DPMNE
thus was on the right track for building partnership with the Euroatlantic community,
always pushing to promote Macedonia’s Euroatlantic integration.
In addition to the relaxation of the inter-ethnic relationship, the mayors of Tetovo and
Gostivar, Alajdin Demiri and Rufi Osmani, were released from prison and their sentences
were revoked. On the third national TV and radio channel, a full day of programming
in Albanian and other minority languages was started for the first time. The rate of em-
ployment of Albanians in public administration rose, especially in the police and security
structures.
But the Kosovo crisis generally had a negative influence on the approval ratings of the gov-
ernment. The public thought that the government should not allow the Kosovo refugees
to enter the country, or that it should be more organized to prevent demographic change
in the Macedonian population. This was accompanied by the lowest ratings for NATO
and EU ever, as well as decrease in support for the country’s Euroatlantic integration. On
the other hand, many argued that the enormous number of foreign media covering the
Kosovo crisis and stationed in Macedonia misrepresented the efforts of the Macedonian
Government, taking every opportunity to blame it for mistreating the Kosovo refugees.
The VMRO government failed to win this media war or to use its humanitarian actions to
its benefit. It was unable to use this event to improve its image and stature in the interna-
tional community, even though it reacted in accordance with international humanitarian
standards.
The NATO campaign lasted for 72 days, and stabilizing the situation took several months,
with the Macedonian government arguing that it did not receive the financial help that
was promised by the international community. One VMRO official, future President of
the Republic of Macedonia Boris Trajkovski, made a name for himself during the Kosovo
crisis as a deputy minister of foreign affairs. He was in charge of coordinating the activi-
ties concerning refugees. His good international contacts and the famous statement that
he gave in a press conference addressing the international community demanding urgent
help for Macedonia made him popular and launched an excellent political career.
Later in the autumn of 1999, Trajkovski ran at the party convention and became the VMRO
candidate for president. He won the national race with 592,118 votes, defeating SDSM’s
Tito Petkovski. International observers said that although the elections were marred by
some faults in the western part of the country, they were generally fair. However, due to
allegations of fraud from SDSM, and a decision by the Supreme Court to repeat the vote
