wh y w e l o s t
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impact on its ratings or reputation. This was not the case with VMRO, which, though
privatizing much less under its rule, was quickly stigmatized as running the most corrupt
Macedonian government ever. It seems the old saying holds true that if two people do the
same thing, it is not in fact always the same.
V. Defeat and Fragmentation
Parliamentary elections were held in autumn 2002. For the first time, the election system
worked according to the proportional model, under which the country was divided into
six electoral districts. According to domestic and international observers, the elections
were fair and democratic and mostly in line with international standards. In the larg-
est election observation mission ever to be employed in Europe, the polls were observed
by 3,799 local monitors and by 1,015 international monitors. A total of 3,500 specially
trained policemen were on hand to provide a secure post-election atmosphere. SDSM
won 59 of the 120 seats in the new parliament, VMRO-DPMNE and the Liberal Party (LP)
together only won 34 seats. PDSH won 7 seats, and the Democratic Union for Integration
(BDI), a new Albanian party led by former insurgent leader Ali Ahmeti, gained 16 seats
in the new parliament.
VMRO’s main slogan was “Heads Up,” in reference to the post 2001 situation as an at-
tempt to regain the lost dignity of Macedonians after the conflict. Georgievski believed he
would win the election, since he did not trust the polls of foreign or domestic institutions
in Macedonia.
These elections were the most orderly ever conducted in Macedonia. International pres-
sure on the government to stage peaceful, fair elections was successful, but was seen by
many at VMRO as favoring SDSM. According to this argument, domestic and foreign
NGOs, which had demonstrated an intense dislike for the standing government, implied
that some kind of dictatorship had been formed in Macedonia. VMRO, it was argued, did
not have any network in its favor that would explain to the public the positive achieve-
ments of the government or highlight its political program.
As a governing coalition was concluded among SDSM, LDP and BDI, an anti-corruption
campaign against VMRO-DPMNE officials was started, bringing charges against many
former officials and close associates of Prime Minister Georgievski. The collapse of party
unity and the lack of positive media coverage or NGO support left the party alone un-
der the attack of the pro-SDSM media and the prosecutor’s office. VMRO officials noted
that many of those accused were held in custody for almost a year, but no institution or
foreign human rights organization reacted to allegation of the abuse of their civil rights.
This bad situation in the party and weak prospects for winning the next elections forced
Georgievski to resign from his position as party leader. At the party congress in May 2003
a new leader was elected, supported by ex-leader Georgievski. This was the former suc-
cessful minister of finance in his government, Nikola Gruevski.
Nobody could have guessed what would happen within VMRO after the resignation of the
party icon Georgievski. The general party opinion was that whoever might become head
of VMRO, he or she would find it hard to break with Georgievski’s policies and distance
the party from its legacy of corruption.
