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Wh y We Lo s t – Th e M a c e don i a n C a s e
The NLA issued several “communication notices” that proclaimed their actions as a “fight
for the liberation of Albanian territories.” They later changed their argument and pro-
claimed they were fighting for better rights of the Albanians in Macedonia. This was a
turning point when the Macedonian government lost the support of the international
community. The unsuccessful siege of the Lipkovo region and the failure of the Arachi-
novo action only increased the pressure from abroad for developing a dialog with insur-
gents. On 13 May 2001, SDSM and its coalition partners entered the all-national coalition
government. This was supposed to unite all the parties in Macedonia in order to end
the crisis and was done under strong international pressure that led to the signing of the
Ohrid Framework Agreement on 13 August 2001. It was negotiated among the main party
leaders in Macedonia and President Trajkovski.
Meanwhile, as the coalition proved unable to stop what many called the ethnic cleans-
ing of Macedonians in the Tetovo region, another mistake was made by Georgi Efremov,
chairman of the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Macedonia, who suggested that the
best way of ending hostilities between the Macedonian and Albanian communities was to
divide the country into two parts. According this plan, Albanians would settle in the west-
ern regions of Gostivar, Tetovo and Debar, which would then join Albania. In exchange,
Albania would hand over to Macedonia the town of Pogradec and the surrounding area
near Prespa Lake, where a small Macedonian minority lives. The proposal enraged large
sections of the political spectrum. There was a danger that the EU might decide to review
the validity of the Stabilization and Association Agreement that Macedonia signed in Lux-
embourg on 9 April 2001. This proposal could also have undermined all the support that
Macedonia had received so far and endanger Macedonian Euroatlantic integration.
Whether it was a test of public opinion, an outright provocation or a serious project, this
plan certainly shifted attention away from the fighting in the north. Prime Minister Geor-
gievski did not refuse the plan, indirectly showing support for this unrealistic idea.
In the Tetovo region, the Albanian insurgents undertook what many called the ethnic
cleansing of Macedonians, trying to merge a territory from Skopje into Tetovo along the
border with Kosovo. Regular troops were unable to defend the population, and many
people fled to Skopje and other cities. Interior Minister Boskovski, by the order of the
prime minister, formed and trained a unit called “Lions,” composed mostly of unem-
ployed young men and women, as well as other people with a criminal background. The
name of this unit was badly chosen, reminding the people of the symbol of the lion on the
VMRO-DPMNE party flag. The media harshly criticized the activities of the unit, and the
international community labeled them paramilitary troops. Yet, the “Lions” generally did
not take part in the biggest actions in the crisis, because they were formed too late. The
unnecessary publicity, parades and shows of strength created a bad picture and negative
publicity. The highlight of this was the action in village of Trebosh, long after the signing
of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, when they were sent with cameras from state TV
directly into an ambush, where three policemen from the unit were killed.
During the last months of the conflict, Prime Minister Georgievski and Interior Minister
Boskovski openly lobbied for proclaiming martial law on the whole territory of Mace-
donia and constantly argued with international mediators on this point. The two most
influential men on the political stage in Macedonia gave many statements accusing NATO
