I. Mission Overview

This preliminary statement is offered by the international election observation mission of the International Republican Institute (IRI) to Moldova’s September 28, 2025, parliamentary elections. At the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Moldova and the Central Election Commission (CEC), IRI deployed a 24-person international delegation representing nine countries to observe the electoral process. The mission was led by The Hon. Frank LaRose, Secretary of State of Ohio in collaboration with Mr. Scott Mastic, IRI Vice President of Programs, and Mr. Stephen Nix, IRI Senior Director of Europe and Eurasia.

IRI reaffirms the international community’s strong interest in and support for transparent and credible parliamentary elections in Moldova and its citizens’ aspirations for a free, prosperous, and European future. This statement offers an impartial and objective assessment of the electoral process, while providing recommendations to strengthen Moldova’s administrative, legal, and regulatory frameworks—and to bolster the resilience of its democratic institutions against malign foreign influence.

Methodology

The mission conducted its activities in accordance with the laws of Moldova and the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, and adhered to principles of non-interference. Thematic analysis of the pre-electoral environment began August 25 with the deployment of three long-term analysts. Analysis was augmented by 14 observers who arrived in Chisinau on September 14 and eight observers who observed the administration of polls for Moldovans living abroad. The mission deployed observer teams to 18 raions (districts), two municipalities (Chisinau and Balti), and the autonomous administrative unit of Gagauzia. Observers also witnessed opening, voting, and closing processes at polling stations dedicated for Moldovan voters who reside in Transnistria as well as voting at polling stations dedicated for Moldovan voters residing in Italy, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.

This preliminary statement includes the observations and analysis from the pre-election period of IRI’s long-term thematic analysts who focused on Moldova’s legal framework; the process of complaints and appeals; election administration; voter registration; election security; and the campaign environment including finance and foreign influence. This statement also offers election day observations of the voting, counting, and tabulation of preliminary results. The IRI mission met with representatives from government, civil society, political parties, media as well as other stakeholders. As the nation awaits the official results announcement of the parliamentary elections, IRI will continue to observe the electoral process including the adjudication of disputes. At the conclusion of the process, IRI will issue a comprehensive final report. The mission is made possible with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy and was conducted in partnership with the Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation.

II. Executive Summary

On September 28, 2025, Moldova held parliamentary elections to select its next legislature—the first parliamentary vote under Moldova’s recently reformed Electoral Code and the 12th legislative election to take place since independence. The vote takes place at a time when the citizens of Moldova believe the outcome may strongly influence whether Moldova continues its path toward the European Union or tilts back toward Kremlin’s orbit. President Maia Sandu, who is the founder of the incumbent Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) and who secured Moldova’s candidate status and opened negotiations for a path to EU accession has characterized the elections as “existential” for Moldova’s future.

Moldova has made impressive strides to align its legal frameworks to international conventions for democratic elections, to bolster political participation of minorities, and to proactively work toward more responsive and accountable governance. Moldova’s Central Election Commission has made great progress toward enacting meaningful reforms to advance electoral integrity in accordance with international standards and should be commended for their perseverance and professionalism under profound external threats, often delivering results under adverse conditions.

Moldova has also demonstrated remarkable progress through its vibrant civil society, robust citizen monitoring and oversight, a skilled and effective security sector and police force, political parties that have strengthened financial transparency and reporting, and a highly motivated electorate—including a committed diaspora—that turned out in large numbers on election day, embodying the nation’s enduring commitment to democratic ideals.   

Despite this progress, the country’s democratic gains continue to face challenges from forces determined to weaken its institutions and subvert the popular will—chief among them, malign foreign interference emanating from the Russian Federation. There were credible reports that Russia sought to employ tactics of coercion, intimidation, vote buying, and threats of political violence at an unprecedented scale.

In 2025, persistent threats to destabilize the country intensified with a surge of illegal funding. Interlinked with cryptocurrency. Financial flows via third parties were used to fund a range of illegal activities aimed at disruption and information manipulation, as well as the co-opting religious leaders to promote pro-Kremlin propaganda.

IRI unequivocally condemns Russia’s attempts to influence the outcome of Moldova’s election and state institutions. These acts represent not only an attack on the country’s sovereignty but constitutes a direct assault on the core values of democracy.

On election day, preliminary results show over 1.6 million voters turned out to vote—52 percent. Polls were professionally staffed and properly equipped, opening on time according to procedures. This was complemented by strong civic engagement, as both citizen and international observers were present at many polling stations, ensuring transparency and accountability despite concerns stemming from the last-minute disqualification of two parties. Observers did witness long lines and lack of availability of ballots at certain polling stations for Transnistrian voters. Overall, the voting environment was calm though there were multiple bomb threats in six cities abroad which caused temporary disruptions as well as similar scares in country. Closing procedures were similarly orderly with high presence of observers, reinforcing the integrity of the proceedings.

IRI continues to monitor the electoral process including the announcement of provisional and official results and the adjudication of disputes. At the conclusion of the process, IRI will issue a comprehensive final report.

III. Recommendations

To support Moldova’s democratic goals, the mission offers the following recommendations to improve transparent, credible, and inclusive elections and strengthen international cooperation.  While these six recommendations echo those made in previous years, they remain fully valid—and are even more critical to implement given the unprecedented threats Moldova now faces. The reform process is, by necessity, a continuous endeavor, requiring sustained commitment and vigilance to safeguard Moldova’s institutions.

1. Malign Foreign Interference. The great strides that Moldova has taken to adopt a unified government response to mitigate the multifaceted threats of foreign interference should be encouraged and may offer a model for other countries.
2. Illicit Finance. Oversight agencies should be empowered to further advance their capabilities to address illicit finance from malign external sources, including cryptocurrency, which was used in various illegal activities and presents potential national security concerns.
3. Judicial Enforcement. The Moldovan government should continue to take steps to ensure integrity at all levels of the judicial system to enforce laws and hold criminals accountable especially domestic and foreign provocateurs who act illegally to disrupt electoral processes.
4. Voter List. The Central Election Commission (CEC) in collaboration with the State Register of Population should continue to update and maintain the integrity of the State Registry of Voters (SRV) to resolve the complex issues of maintaining the voter list, especially concerning Moldovans in the diaspora.
5. Voter Participation. Parliament and the CEC should research and consider expanding postal voting to additional countries so Moldovans abroad can more actively participate in the electoral process.
6. Information Manipulation. Parliament should consider amending the law on the Audiovisual Council of Moldova to adopt precise definitions to remove ambiguities which would reduce the risk of inconsistent application or overly broad interpretation.

IV. Political Context  

Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections unfolded against a backdrop of profound polarization and geopolitical contestation. Voters face a consequential choice between deepening European integration and a potential reorientation toward Russia, with the future of Moldova’s democracy hanging in the balance. In this environment, entrenched geopolitical rivalry and relentless multi-faceted threats are as influential in determining the legitimacy and outcome of the vote as the administration of the polls.

Regionally, Moldova’s geographic proximity to conflict and historic ties to Russia heighten its vulnerability to external pressure. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the EU and Romania have provided significant economic, energy, and governance support, while the Kremlin has intensified hybrid tactics. The EU’s opening of accession negotiations and Romania’s deepened cooperation—including energy integration and joint counter-Kremlin initiatives—have reinforced Moldova’s Western trajectory. International partners frame the 2025 elections as a litmus test of Moldova’s democratic resilience and readiness for further European integration.

These elections follow several contentious but decisive cycles. In July 2021, the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), secured a parliamentary majority on a pro-European, anti-corruption platform. President Maia Sandu’s re-election in 2024, alongside a narrowly approved referendum enshrining Moldova’s EU accession aims in the constitution, underscored both robust support for European alignment and persistent divides between urban and rural voters, as well as between the pro-EU diaspora and domestic constituencies where pro-Russian actors retain influence.

Moldova’s democratic institutions face relentless, multi-dimensional threats from the Russian Federation. Hybrid interference—including covert financing of political parties and protests, sophisticated information operations, and leveraging separatist regions—has become a defining feature of the political landscape. Russian-backed actors continue to launch influence campaigns, including deepfakes, false narratives, voter bribery schemes, orchestrated street protests, and relentless manipulation of media—efforts that have attempted to undermine the integrity of the elections. Yet, remarkably, confidence in the CEC remains high, standing as a testament to the resilience of the country’s electoral institutions.

Despite legal reforms aimed at curbing illicit financing and strengthening transparency, actors linked to exiled oligarchs Ilan Șor and Vlad Plahotniuc continue to exploit vulnerabilities through illegal proxy parties and media networks. Heightened polarization and mistrust have led parties across the spectrum to increase rhetoric delegitimizing the CEC, raising concerns about acceptance of results and post-election stability.

The 2025 electoral field is largely defined by pro-European or pro-Russia orientations. PAS remains the dominant pro-European force, campaigning on stability, anti-corruption, and advancing EU negotiations, underscoring that a pro-European parliament is essential to pass legislative reforms aligned to accession by 2030. In opposition, pro-Russian parties reorganized after the banning of the Șor Party in 2023 under the electoral bloc of the Patriotic Electoral Bloc, led by Igor Dodon, which adopted a “sovereigntist” rhetoric to soften overtly pro-Kremlin messaging while still appealing to traditional bases.

New “centrist” blocs, including the Alternative Bloc led by former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo, position themselves as balanced between East and West. While professing support for EU integration, some of these formations are viewed with caution due to alleged ties to Russian influence networks. Local power brokers such as Chișinău Mayor Ion Ceban’s National Alternative Movement (MAN) play a key role. Once branded as pragmatic and pro-European, the perception of Ceban has shifted toward more a pro-Kremlin stance, raising concerns of Kremlin support. Political analysts suggest that Russia’s strategy is less about backing a single strong party and more about cultivating multiple actors to dilute PAS’s dominance and deny it a parliamentary majority thus increasing the risk of a fragmented and polarized parliament.

Ultimately, the implications of these elections extend beyond domestic governance. A renewed PAS majority will likely accelerate reforms needed for EU accession, while a fragmented or pro-Russian parliament could have stalled or reversed integration efforts, leaving Moldova exposed to further destabilization. The credibility of the process—its adherence to legal standards, fair competition, and transparent administration—will be decisive in determining whether the results are accepted both domestically and abroad, and whether Moldova’s democracy can withstand the existential threats it faces.

V. Key Findings

Pre-Election Period

Legal Framework

Moldova’s parliamentary elections are governed by a comprehensive legal framework, reflecting both domestic priorities and international principles. The 1994 Constitution, as amended, and the revised Electoral Code (2022) form the backbone of the system, complemented by the Law on Political Parties and regulations issued by the Central Election Commission (CEC). Moldova’s legal framework has been significantly updated to address emerging challenges, from vote-buying to foreign subversion, however, the timing and scope of changes so close to the election have raised concerns among stakeholders. On June 13 Moldova’s parliament adopted 13 amendments to 12 laws, to address previous challenges to election integrity and threats to the process. Positively, many reforms are aligned with recommendations from OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission.

These reforms have inter alia strengthened the powers of the Ministry of Justice, the courts, and the CEC to sanction or deregister parties involved in serious violations, including vote-buying and the use of foreign funds. While many changes align with OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission recommendations, the rapid pace—five major legislative packages in under three years—drew some criticism for violating the “one-year rule”, it does not contravene Moldova’s election code restrictions on last-minute changes within 12 months of a national election. 

Complaints and Appeals

Moldova’s legal institutions—from the CEC to the Supreme Court—are responsible for resolving electoral disputes neutrally and efficiently. The legal framework provides multiple avenues for complaints and appeals, with recent adjustments streamlining procedures. The CEC serves as the first instance for most election-related complaints during the campaign, while courts arbitrate appeals. Under the Electoral Code, contestants, domestic observers, and officials all have standing to file complaints.

The Constitutional Court (CC) confirms final election results and validates parliamentary mandates, adjudicating recounts and legal challenges. The CC has ten days from receiving official results to validate or void the election; invalidation is rare and did not occur in recent elections. Notably, in August 2025, five of six CC judges were reappointed to ensure continuity during the election period. Complaints mostly concerned candidate registration, campaign violations, and misuse of public resources. Most were rejected as ungrounded or forwarded to other bodies, such as the police.

Election Administration

The administration of elections is entrusted to the independent CEC, composed of nine commissioners appointed in 2021 for five-year terms. The CEC oversees 38 District Electoral Commissions (DECs)—35 permanent and three temporary, including one each for voting abroad, Transnistria, and the autonomous region of Gagauzia. DECs are responsible for staffing Precinct Electoral Bureaus (PEBs) with trained and certified staff. The CEC has generally earned a high degree of public confidence for professionalism and transparency, meeting legal deadlines and publishing decisions and agendas online. 

A key focus in 2025 has been adapting logistics for voters abroad and in sensitive regions. The CEC opened 1,961 polling stations in Moldova and 301 abroad—an increase of about 70 over 2024—including four special precincts for postal votes in 10 countries. The decision to allocate only two polling stations in Russia, down from 17 in 2019, was due to security concerns and the inability to ensure voter safety outside of consulates. For Transnistrian voters, 12 special polling stations on government-controlled territory accommodate them, though on September 25 the CEC adopted a decision to move four polling stations due to security concerns with monitored transportation routes to prevent organized busing of voters to polling stations. Legal amendments now explicitly outlaw organized busing of voters as a form of illegal influence.

Recruitment of precinct officials faced challenges, with some PEBs initially understaffed due to late or reluctant party nominations and ongoing investigations into past fraud. Election administration was conducted professionally and transparently, with pragmatic adjustments to ensure inclusivity and security. While some opposition actors remain wary of CEC decisions, there was broad agreement among stakeholders that the CEC and local electoral bodies were technically prepared to conduct a credible vote.

Voter Registration

Moldova maintains a passive voter registration system, drawing on the national population register. All citizens aged 18 or older on election day are eligible to vote, except those legally deprived of voting rights by a court. The centralized State Voter Register (SVR) is continuously updated by the CEC. As of September 1, the SVR listed 3,299,396 registrations, with 2,763,678 active voters domiciled in Moldova.

Voters from Transnistria and abroad are omitted from main precinct lists but can be added on election day via supplementary lists after electronic verification. There are an estimated 277,094 registered voters residing in Transnistria, alongside a large but indeterminate number of diaspora voters. The CEC offered online pre-registration for diaspora voters, with over 16,145 signaling intent to vote abroad and 2,606 opting for postal voting. Polling stations in-country are capped at 3,000 ballots, while those abroad have a 5,000-ballot limit. Voter rolls were posted for public scrutiny at most polling stations by September 8 and are searchable online, enabling voters to check entries and request corrections. Observers and party representatives had the right to inspect lists and flag irregularities. No significant incidents of dead or duplicate voters were reported.

Candidate Nomination

Moldova’s parliamentary electoral system operates on a closed-list proportional representation model to elect 101 members to the unicameral parliament. The system accommodates electoral blocs (comprising two or more parties), individual political parties, and independent candidates. To secure representation, blocs must surpass a seven percent threshold, parties, five percent, and independents two percent. By the August deadline, five electoral blocs, 23 parties, and 20 independents submitted candidacies. Following a thorough review of signatures and eligibility, the Central Election Commission (CEC) registered 15 parties, four electoral blocs, and four independent candidates, resulting in 23 contestant lists on the ballot.

Exercising its expanded powers, the CEC rejected the registration of the “Victory” electoral bloc in August 2025, citing its affiliation with Ilan Șor’s party, which had been dissolved in 2023. The candidate registration process was broadly inclusive, though not without incident. The CEC enforced new requirements for parties to submit up-to-date membership lists to the Public Services Agency (PSA), verifying compliance with the 4,000-member threshold and other obligations. The Modern Democratic Party was disqualified by the PSA for failing to meet these criteria, leading to its exclusion from the race. Independent candidates were required to collect 2,000–2,500 supporting signatures for men and 1,000–2,500 for women, reflecting affirmative action provisions. Of the 20 aspiring independents, only seven met the signature requirement, and ultimately four were certified.

According to the CEC, this election features one of the highest numbers of contenders in Moldova’s parliamentary history, underscoring the intense interest in this pivotal contest. However, on September 26, the CEC excluded the Heart of Moldova party—part of the Patriotic Electoral Bloc—following a court ruling on allegations of voter bribery, illegal financing, and money laundering. The political party Moldova Mare was also excluded due to allegations of illegal financing, undeclared foreign funds, and vote buying. These exclusions were based on court rulings. Meanwhile, the BUN party withdrew from the race and endorsed PAS on September 22.

Campaigning

The official campaign period ran from August 29 to midnight on September 26, followed by a 24-hour silence period before election day. Campaign activities were generally unhindered: parties held rallies, meetings, and were canvassed nationwide, with candidates able to travel and advertise freely. PAS, the Patriotic Bloc and Alternativa were the most active in physical campaigning, while smaller parties more actively leveraged the media environment. The campaign period allowed for vigorous competition. Opposition parties held large rallies, and PAS and the Patriotic Bloc each organized major gatherings in Chișinău, drawing thousands of supporters.

Campaign messaging focused on geopolitical orientation and socio-economic grievances. PAS highlighted anti-corruption reforms, economic stabilization, and the goal of EU membership, warning that a Russian-influenced government would jeopardize Moldova’s progress. Opposition parties, especially Dodon’s Patriotic Electoral Bloc, emphasized economic hardship and conservative values, blaming PAS for inflation and rising utility costs, and advocating for a neutral or Russia-friendly stance. The Alternative Bloc, led by Ion Ceban, positioned itself as pragmatic problem-solvers.

In the pre-election period, the diaspora vote was a divisive issue. Political parties which enjoy broad support carried out diaspora engagement campaigns. However, the opposition parties who enjoy less support called for preventing diaspora to engage in the electoral process, thus violating its constitutional right. This dispute fueled fake news, prompting authorities to actively debunk false narratives about diaspora voting.

Security concerns and anti-corruption crackdowns shaped the campaign environment. The campaign was adversarial and at times inflammatory. Monitoring groups observed at least 72 instances of inciteful propaganda in a two-week period, mostly targeting political opponents or vulnerable groups. Despite the Orthodox Church’s call for clergy to avoid politics, some priests were involved in campaigning, with investigative reports revealing Russian security services had recruited and trained using social media techniques dozens of Orthodox priests to advocate against the pro-Western government.

Campaign Finance

Illicit campaign finance was a central focus as authorities worked to investigate flows of illegal ‘dark money’ both in cash and complex cryptocurrency transactions involving third countries. Electoral contestants are required to open dedicated “Electoral Fund” bank accounts for campaign transactions. Throughout the campaign, parties submitted weekly finance reports to the CEC, detailing funds raised and spent, including online advertising expenditures—a new requirement reflecting the growing role of social media. The CEC published these reports within 24 hours, enabling media and observers to scrutinize them. Banks notified authorities of large transactions, and media companies reported weekly income from political ads. Compliance was high, with all major contestants filing reports on time and the CEC posting them promptly. However, Promo-LEX’s parallel civic monitoring estimated at least MDL 693,000 in spending not reflected in official reports, mainly for social media ads, transportation, travel abroad, and activist stipends.

In early September, law enforcement agencies conducted coordinated raids targeting an alleged vote-buying network linked to Ilan Șor. Between September 2 and September 8, police and prosecutors detained 21 individuals and seized cash, cryptocurrency cards, luxury vehicles, and payment ledgers. Authorities publicized these actions to signal zero tolerance for electoral corruption. On September 5, Prime Minister Dorin Recean announced the freezing of assets belonging to Irina Vlah, leader of the “Heart of Moldova” party during the investigation.

Combating illicit funding linked to foreign influence was a major theme. Leading up to the elections, authorities reported that billions of rubles were funneled by Russia into Moldova to corrupt the political process, including financing proxy parties, bribing voters, and disseminating propaganda. Enforcement agencies discovered suspected Russian-funded vote-buying operations and scrutinized complex and varied money laundering schemes leading abroad. The case of Evghenia (Yevgenia) Gutsul, governor of Gagauzia, exemplified this: in August 2025, she was convicted and jailed for funneling Russian money to the Șor Party to influence past elections. Between 2019 and 2022, she was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for illicit finance practices and laundering money to fund Șor’s political projects, including paying voters.

In the pre-election period, Promo-LEX documented 84 cases of misuse of administrative resources by officials, predominantly involving PAS incumbents. These included local mayors or ministers using official events to promote the ruling party, or public sector employees allegedly instructed to participate in campaign activities. While not on the scale of outright fraud, such misuse raises fairness concerns.

Media & Information Space

Moldova’s electoral information environment is polluted with false information and divisive propaganda orchestrated by the Russian Federation. Though the government has taken notable steps to shield its information environment from malign influence operations and inciteful speech by suspending known perpetrators and notifying global tech firms about false content mitigating this threat remains a daily challenge. Throughout the campaign, the government’s Strategic Communication and Countering Propaganda Center (StratCom) actively debunked false narratives and focused on public education. Common fake stories included claims of NATO troops massing in Moldova, doctored videos, and scare tactics about EU membership. Journalists, especially investigative reporters, faced harassment and intimidation, often through online smear campaigns. While legal protections exist, enforcement is inconsistent, and broad laws such as the Extremism Law can be used to shut down media without robust due process. Media NGOs called for clearer definitions and judicial oversight to ensure measures against propaganda do not stifle legitimate journalism or freedom of speech.

In August 2025, amendments to the Audiovisual Media Services Code increased civil society representation in the governing councils of the national public broadcaster (TRM) and the Audiovisual Council (AC), and reduced Parliament’s direct control over appointments. The AC was notably assertive in monitoring content, approving editorial plans for 22 TV channels and 12 radio stations, and scheduling electoral debates in compliance with regulations. Supported by NGOs like the Association of Independent Press (API), the AC monitored broadcasts and issued weekly reports on impartiality, applying sanctions for violations such as excessive favoritism in prime-time news.

Social media and messaging apps have become the primary arena for election information and propaganda, with over 80 percent of Moldovans using platforms like Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and Telegram. Regulation is complicated by the lack of direct jurisdiction. Notably, TikTok removed hundreds of inauthentic accounts operated from Russia, and police identified networks spreading false narratives to millions of followers. Parliament should take steps to review the scope of the AC’s mandate and adopt precise definitions of the laws while being careful to preserve free speech.  

Security Environment

The integrity and security of Moldova’s election process was paramount amid heightened threats of foreign interference. Authorities adopted a multifaceted approach, recognizing that challenges span physical security as well as cybersecurity. Russia’s overt and covert interference was described as unprecedented and remained a major concern. In the week before the vote, Moldovan police and SIS conducted 250 raids and detained dozens of suspects believed to be part of a Russia-backed scheme to incite mass riots on election day, potentially to create chaos or contest the results. These actions underscore the seriousness with which the government addressed warnings about destabilization.

Cybersecurity was a critical concern. After experiencing cyberattacks on state systems during previous elections, Moldova implemented comprehensive protective measures such as creating a Cybersecurity Agency and moving the SAISE system under STISC’s protection to ensure voting and tabulation went uninterrupted. No major cyberattacks were publicly reported during the campaign period suggesting that defenses supported by the EU and the U.S. were effective though risks aimed at disrupting the vote count or throttling CEC result websites remained high on election night. Physical security was reinforced, with over 6,000 police officers deployed on election day to guard polling stations and respond to incidents.

Election Day

Twelve teams observed 99 polling stations across Moldova and four teams observed 26 polling stations set up for diaspora voters in Italy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Polls opened on time and according to procedures. Based on our observations, most polling stations had adequate staff, although observers noted the absence of police officers in a few instances. All polling stations were well-prepared with the necessary voting materials, and the ballot boxes were locked, sealed, and visible.  Polling stations were generally calm with no crowding upon opening.

Voters had independent access to these stations. However, in 45 percent of polling locations, accessibility for voters with reduced mobility was insufficient. Citizen observers were actively present in 95 percent of polling stations, and international election observers were present in 18 percent, which signaled strong local and international engagement in the process. Political party representatives from parliamentary campaigns were present at nearly all polling stations visited by IRI observers, including PAS, Patriotic Bloc, Alternativa, and Our Party.

Voting processes were calm and well-administered. Proper procedures for voter identification were followed, and the layout of the polling stations effectively maintained the secrecy of the vote. Closing and counting processes were orderly and enabled a variety of stakeholders to observe and verify ballot tabulation, including citizen and international observers which helped to maintain oversight and reinforce the integrity of the proceedings.

Across the country, IRI observers noted no serious irregularities or critical incidents. In Copanca observers reported long lines and a shortage of ballots. IRI observers abroad reported that voting was conducted in a calm and orderly atmosphere, with procedures largely respected and election officials demonstrating professionalism. High turnout among the diaspora reflected strong civic engagement, though isolated issues were noted. Across all countries, transparency was broadly ensured, with party agents and local observers present, and vote counting was assessed as accurate and credible.

VI. Acknowledgements

IRI has actively worked in Moldova for more than 22 years, helping to strengthen democratic institutions and civil society. The mission is grateful to Ohio Secretary of State The Hon. Frank LaRose for leading the 24-person delegation, to Mr. Olin Wethington and Ms. Eva Gustavsson for their participation. IRI extends special thanks to the National Endowment for Democracy and the Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation, without whom this mission would not have been possible. Lastly, IRI is thankful for the cooperation it received from Moldovan citizens—both in-country and abroad—as well as from government officials, candidates, party members, civil society representatives, and journalists with whom it engaged.

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